Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

410 REASONING AND DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE.
In further confirmation of the same proposition, an appeal
might be made to the structure of syllogisms. Is it possible to
conceive an understanding so formed, as to-perceive the truth
of the major and of the minor propositions, and yet not to perceive the force of the conclusion? The contrary must appear
evident to every person who knows what a syllogism is; or,
rather, as in this mode of stating an argument, the mind is led
fiom universals to particulars, it must appear evident, that, in
the very statement of the major proposition, the truth of the
conclusion is presupposed; insomuch, that it was not without
good reason Dr. Campbell hazarded the epigrammatic, yet unanswerable remark, that " there is always some radical defect
in a syllogism, which is not chargeable with that species of
sophism, known among logicians by the name of petitio principii, or a begging of the question."
In what respect intuition differs from reasoning. - The idea
which is commonly annexed to intuition, as opposed to reason-,
ing, turns, I suspect, entirely on the circumstance of time. The
former, we conceive to be instantaneous; whereas the latter
necessarily involves the notion of succession, or of progress.
This distinction is sufficiently precise for the ordinary purpolses
of discourse; nay, it supplies us, on many occasions, with a
convenient phraseology; but in the theory of the mind, it has
led to some mistaken conclusions, on which I intend to offer a
few remarks in the second part of this section.
2. Conclusions obtained by a process of deduction often mistaken for intuitive judgments. — It has been frequently remarked, that the justest and most efficient understandings are
often possessed by men'who are incapable of stating to others,
or even to themselves, the grounds on which they proceed in
forming their decisions. In some instances, I have been disposed to ascribe this to the faults of early education; but in
other cases, I am persuaded that it was the effect of active and
imperious habits in quickening the evanescent processes of
thought, so as to render them untraceable by the memory; and
to give the appearance of intuition to wlat was, in fact, the result of a train of reasoning so rapid as tD escape notice. This