Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

RtEASONING AND DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 405
CHAPTER IXo
OF REASONING AND OF DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE.
I. Doubts withi respect to Locke's distinction between the powers
of intuition and reasoning. - Although, in treating of this
branch of the philosophy of the mind, I have followed the
example of preceding writers, so far as to speak of intuition
and reasoning as two different faculties of the understanding, I
am by no means satisfied that there exists between them that
radical distinction which is commonly apprehended. Dr. Beattie,
in his Essay on Truth, has attempted to show, that, how closely
soever they may in general be connected, yet that this connection is not necessary; insomuch that a being may be conceived
endued with the one, and at the same time destitute of the other.
Something of this kind, he remarks, takes place in dreams and
in madness; in both of which states of the system, the power
of reasoning appears occasionally to be retained in no inconsiderable degree, while the power of intuition is suspended or lost.*
But this doctrine is liable to obvious and to insurmountable objections; and has plainly taken its rise from the vagueness of
the phrase common sense, which the author employs, through the
whole of his argument, as synonymous with the power of intuition. Of the indissoluble connection between the last power
* [Locke very acutely observes, that the difference between an idiot and
a madman consists in this;- that a madman reasons correctly from wrong
premises, while an idiot does not reason at all. " Thus you shall find
a distracted man fancying himself a king, and, with a right inference,
requiring suitable attendance, respect, and obedience; others, who have
thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to
preserve such brittle bodies." Now the wrong premises that the madman
adopts are oftenfalse sensations, as the medical men call them; as when one