Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

REASON. 401
which no good objection can be made, on the score either of
vagueness or of novelty. Nor has the etymoloyical %afnity between these two words, the slightest tendency to throw any
obscurity on the foregoing expression. On the contrary, this
affinity may be of use in some of our future arguments, by
philosophers, to the catholic principles of all philosophy. The prejudice
which, on this supposition, has sometimes been excited against the argunment, is groundless.
"Nor is it true, that the argument from common sense denies the decision
to the judgment of philosophers, and accords it to the verdict of the vulgar. Nothing can be more erroneous. We admit — nay, we maintain, as
I)'Alembert well expresses it, " that the truth in metaphysic, like the truth
in matters of taste, is a truth of which all minds have the germ within
themselves; to which, indeed, the greater number pay no attention, but
which they recognize the moment it is pointed out to them. But if, in this
sort, all are able to understand, all are not able to instruct. The merit of
conveying easily to others true and simple notions, is much greater tllan
is commonly supposed; for experience proves how rarely this is to be
met with. Sound metaphysical ideas are common truths which every one
apprehends, but which few have the talent to levelop. So dificult is
it, o.n any subject, to make our own what belongs to every one." Or, to
employ the words of the ingenious Lichtenberg- "PI'hilosophy, twist the
matter as we may, is always a sort of chemistry. The peasant eImploys
all the principles of abstract philosophy, only enveloped, latent, engaged, as
the men of physical science express it; the philosopher exhibits the pure
principle."
" The first problem of Philosophy - and it is one of no easy accomplishment- being thus to seek out, purify, and establish, by intellectual
analyrsis and criticism, the elementary feelings or belief, in which are
given the elementary truths of which all are in possession; and the argument fiom common sense being the allegation of these feelings or beliefs
as explicated and ascertained, in proof of the relative truths and their
necessary consequences;-this argument is manifestly dependent on
philosophy, as an art, as an acquired dexterity, and cannot, notwithstanding the errors which they have so frequently committed, be taken out of
the hands of the philosophers. Common Sense is like Common Law.
Each may be laid down as the general rule of decision; but in the one
case, it must be left to the jurist, in the other, to the philosopher, to
ascertain what are the contents of the rule; and though, in both instances,
the common man may be cited as a witness, for the custom or the fact,
in neither can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge."'Se.pplementary Dissertations to Reid, pp. 743, 744, 751, 752.1
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