Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

REASON. 399
text for restricting, in the reader's mind, what is too general,
than for enlarging what use has accustomed us to interjlret in a
sense too nlarrow.'
[ In his " Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid," Mr. Stewart
remarks, "that the question about the propriety of the phrase common
sense Inust be decided by an appeal to general practice; for, although it be
allowable, and even necessary, for a philosopher to limit the acceptation of
vwords which are employed vaguely in common discourse, it is always
dangerous to give to a word a scientific meaning essentially distinct from
thlat in which it is usually understood. It has, at least, the effect of mlisleading those who do not enter deeply into the subject; and of giving a paradoxical appearance to doctrines, which, if expressed in more unexceptionable terms, would be readily admitted.
" It appears to me, that this has actually happened in the present instance. The phrase comnsmoz sense, as it is generally understood, is nearly
synonymous with 7mother wit, denoting that degree of sagacity, depending
partly on original capacity, and partly on personal experience and observation, which qualifies an individual for those simple and essential occupations which all men are called on to exercise habitually by their common
nature. In this acceptation, it is opposed to those mental acquiremnents
which are derived from a regular education and fiom the study of books; and
refers, not to the speculative convictions of the understanding, but to that
prudence and discretion which are the foundation of successful conduct.
Such is the idea which Pope annexes to the word, when, speaking of good
sense, which means only a more than ordinary share of commnion sense, he
calls it
"the gift of heaven,
And though no science, fairly worth the seven."
"To speak, accordingly, of appealing from the conclusions of philosop~hy
to commzon sense, had the appearance, to title-page readers, of appealing
from the verdict of the learned to the voice of the multitude; or of attenmpting to silence free discussion, by a reference to some arbitrary and
undefinable standard, distinct fiom any of the intellectual powers hitherto
enumerated by logicians. Whatever countenance may be supposed to
have been given by some writers to such an interpretation of this mode
of expression, I may venture to assert that none is afforded by the works
of Dr. Reid. The standard to which he appeals, is neither the creed of
a particular sect, nor the inward light of enthusiastic presumption; but
that constitultion of haman nature, without which all the bumsiness of the wsorld
would immediately cease; and the substance of his doctrine amounts merely
to this, that those essential laws of belief; to awhich skeptics have objected whens
cuosidered inm connection with our scientific reasonings, are inmplied in every step