Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

9C8 nREASO. a
colcerning them bear a very striking resemblance to those of
some of our later Scottish logicians. This, at least, strikes me
as the meaning which these writers, in general, annex to the
phrase; although all of them have frequently employed it with
a far greater degree of latitude. When thus limited in its
acceptation, it is obviously liable, in point of scientific accuracy,
to two very strong objections, both of which have been already
sufficiently illustrated. The first is, that it applies the appellation of principles to laws of belief from which no inference can
be deduced; the second, that it refers the origin of these laws
to common sense. Nor is this phraseology more agreeable to
popular use than to logical precision. If we were to suppose
an individual whose conduct betrayed a disbelief of his own
existence, or of his own identity, or of the reality of surrounding objects, it would, by no means, amount to an adequate
description of his condition, to say, that he was destitute of common sense. We should at once pronounce him to be destitute
of reason, and would no longer consider him as a fit subject of
discipline.or of punishment. The former expression, indeed,
would only imply that he was apt to fall into absurdities and
improprieties in the common concerns of life. To denominate,
therefore, such laws of belief as we have now been considering,
constitutent elements of Iunman reason, while it seems quite unexceptionable in point of technical distinctness, cannot be justly
censured as the slightest deviation from our habitual forms of
speech. On the same grounds, it may be fairly questioned,
whether the word Reason would not, on some occasions, be the
best substitute which our language affords for intuition, in that
enlarged acceptation which has been given to it of late. If
not quite so definite and precise as might be wished, it would
be at least employed in one of those significations in which it
is already familiar to every ear; whereas the meaning of intuition, when used for the same purpose, is stretched very fr
beyond its ordinary limits. And in cases of this sort, where we
have to choose between two terms, neither of which is altogether
unexceptionable, it will be found much safer to trust to the con