Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

REAS SOx'. 3 9 3
of mathemmaical science as completely as if you were to deny
the truth of the axioms assumed by Euclid.
The foregoing examples sufficiently illustrate the nature of
that class of truths which I have called Fundamental Laws of
iontman Belief, or Primary Elements of Human ]eeason. A
variety of others, not less important, might be added to the
list; * but these I shall not at present stop to enumerate, as my
chief object in introducing, the subject here, was to explain the
common relation in which they all stand to deductive evidence.
In this point of view, two analogies, or rather coincidences, between the truths which we have been last considering, and the
mathematical axioms which were treated of formerly, immediately present themselves to our notice.
Analogies between these elemental truths and mathematical
axioms. — 1. Fromn neither of these classes of truths can any
direct inference be drawn for the further enlargement of our
knowledge. This remark has been already shown to hold universally withll respect to the axioms of geometry; and it applies
equally to what I have called Fundamental Laws of ZHueman
Belief. From such propositions as these, - I exist; I am thie
same person to-day, that I was yesterday; the material world has
an existence independent of my mind; the general laws of natzre
will continuze, in fiuture, to operate tun'zformly as in time past,no inference can be deduced, any more than from the intuitive
truths prefixed to the Elements of Euclid. Abstracted fioml
other data, they are perfectly barren in themselves; nor can
any possible combination of them help the mind forward one
single step in its progress. It is for this reason, that instead of
calling them, with some other writers, first principles, I have distilnguished them by the title of fundamental laws of belief; the
former word seeming to me to denote, according to common
usage, some fact or some supposition, from which a series of
consequences may be deduced.
* Such, for example, as our belief of the existence of efficient causes;
our belief of the existence of other intelligent beings besides ourselves,
etc. etc.