Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

~394d RJiFRASON.
lectual operations, it is plainly unphilosopbical to suppose, that
any new light can be thrown by metaphysical discussion. All
that can be done with propriety in such cases, is to state the
fac t.
3. Other elemental laws of thought. -The belief which all
inea entertain of the existence of the material world, (I mean
their belief of its existence independently of that of percipient
beings,) and their expectation of the continued uniformity of the
laws of natir e, belong to the same class of ultimate or elemental
laws of thouglht with those which have been just mentioned.
The truths which form their objects are of an order so radically
different from what are commonly called truths, in the popular
acceptation of that word, that it might perhaps be useful for
logicians to distinguish them by some appropriate appellation,
such, for example, as that of metaphysical or transcendental
truths. They are not principles or data (as will afterwards
appear) from whlich any consequence can, be deduced; but fori
a part of those original stamina of human, reason, which are
equally essential to all the pursuits of science, and to all the
active concerns of life.
4. Confidence necessarily reposed on memory. - I shall only
take notice further, under this head, of the confidence which we
must necessarily repose in the evidence of memory, (and I may
add, in the continuance of our personal identity,) when we are
employed in carrying on any process of deduction or argumentation; - in following out for instance, the steps of a long mathematical demonstration. In yielding our assent to the conclusion
to which such a demonstration leads, we evidently trust to the
fidelity with which our memory has connected the different links
of the chain together. The reference which is often made, in
the course of a demonstration, to propositions formerly proved,
places the same remark in.a light still stronger; and shows
plainly, that, in this branch of knowledge, which is justly considered as the most certain of any, the authority of the same
laws of belief which are recognized in the ordinary pursuits of
life, is tacitly acknowledged. Deny the evidence of memory as a
ground of certain knowledge, and you destroy the foundations