Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

OJ),iS~~~ REAtsON.
IH1. Of certain laws of belief, insepacabbly connected with the
exercise of consciousness, memory, perception, and reasoning. —
1. It is by the immediate evidence of consciousness,* that we
are assured of the present existence of our various sensations,
whether pleasant or painful; of all our affections, passions,
hopes, fears, desires, and volitions. It is thus, too, we are assured
of the present existence of those thoughts which, during our
waking hours, are continually passing through the mind, and of
all the different effects which they produce in furnishing employment to our intellectual faculties.
How we come to a knowledge of our own existence. - According to the common doctrine of our best philosophers, it is by the
evidence of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves
exist. The proposition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately true; for our own existence, as I have elsewhere observed,
is not a direct or immediate object of consciousness, in the strict
and logical meaning of that term. We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition; but we are not conscious of the
existence of mind itse~l; nor would it be possible for us to
arrive at the knowledge of it, (supposing us to be created in the
full possession of all the intellectual capacities which belong to
human nature,) if no impressions were ever made on our external senses. The moment that, in consequence of such an impression, a sensation'is excited, we learn two facts at once; -
the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient
beings;- in other words, the very first exercise of consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which
feels and thinks; or (to employ plainer language) the present
existence of that being which I denote by the words I and
myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which
than to an expression of the same idea, by means of two different terms.
On such occasions, the mind only turns to no purpose about its own axis,
without adva.ncing forwvard a single step. Accordingly, axioms are so far
fiom holding the highest rank in philosophy, that they scarcely deserve
the distinction of being formally enunciated."
[H See note to page 3.]