Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

RBEASON. 375
although it cannot fail to appear obvious, on the slightest reflection, that, in strict propriety, reasoning only expresses one of tzhe
various functions or operations of Reason; and that an extraordinary capacity for the former by no means affords a test, by
which the other constituent elements of the latter may be
measured." Nor is it to common and popular language that
this inaccuracy is confined. It has extended itself to the systems of some of our most acute philosophers, and has, in various
instances, produced an apparent diversity of opinion, where there
was little or none in reality.
In the use which I make of the word Reason, in the title of
the following disquisitions, I employ it in a manner to which no
philosopher can object, - to denote merely the power by which
qwe distinguish truth from falsehood, and combine means for the
attainment of our ends; omitting, for the present, all consideration of that function which many have ascribed to it, of distinguishing right from wrong; without, however, presuming to call
in question the accuracy of those by whom the term has been
thus explained. Under the title of Reason, I shall consider also
whatever faculties and operations appear to be more immediately and essentially connected with the discovery of truth, or
the attainment of the objects of our pursuit, - more particularly the power of reasoning or deduction; but distinguishing,
as carefully as I can, our capacity of carrying on this logical
* "The two most different things in the world," says Locke, " are, a logical chicaner, and a man of reason." The adjective reasonable, as employed
in our language, is not liable to the same ambiguity with the substantive
firom which it is derived. It denotes a character in which Reason, (taking
that word in its largest acceptation,) possesses a decided ascendant over the
temper and the passions; and implies no particular propensity to a display
of the discursive power, if, indeed, it does not exclude the idea of such a
propensity. In the following stanza, Pope certainly had no view to the
logical talents of the lady whom he celebrates: -
"I know a thing that's most uncommon,
(Envy, be silent and attend!)
I know a reasonable woman,
Handsomne and witty, yet a friend,"