Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

~3(3 lDIAGINAT'ION.
no exercise to our'o active habits. In real life, we proceed from
the passive impression to those exertions which it was intended
-to produce. In the contemplation of imaginary sufferings, we
stop short at the impression, and whatever benevolent dispositions we may feel, we have no opportunity of carrying them
into action.
Good and evil effects of iction. - From these reasonings it
appears, that an habitual attention to exhibitions of fictitious
distress is, in every view, calculated to check our moral improvement. It diminishes that uneasiness which we feel at the sight
of distress, and which prompts us to relieve it. It strengthens
that disgust which the loathsome concomitants of distress excite
in the mind, and which prompts us to avoid the sight of misery;
while, at the same time, it has no tendency to confirm those
habits of active beneficence, without which, the best dispositions
are useless. I would not, however, be understood to disapprove
entirely of fictitious narratives, or of pathetic compositions. On
the contrary, I think that the perusal of them may be attended
with advantage, when the effects which I have mentioned are
corrected by habits of real business. They soothe the mind
vwhen ruffled by the rude intercourse of society, and stealing the
attention insensibly fromn our own cares, substitute, instead of
discontent and distress, a tender and pleasing melancholy. By
exhibitions of characters a little elevated above the common
standard, they have a tendency to cultivate the taste in life; to
quicken our disgust at what is mean or offensive, and to form
the mind insensibly to elegance and dignity. Their tendency
to cultivate the powers of moral perception has never been disluted; and when the influence, of such perceptions is powerfully
felt, and is united with an active and manly temper, they render
the character not only more amiable, but more happy in itself,
and more useful to others; for although a rectitude of judgment
with respect to conduct, and strong moral feelings, do, by no
means, alone constitute virtue; yet they are frequently necessary to direct our behaviour in the more critical situations of
life; and they increase the interest we take in the general prosperity of' virtue in the world. I believe, likewise, that, by