Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

MEMORY. 295
occasions may require, an infinite number of particulars associated with them; each of which, considered as a solitary truth,
would have been as burdensome to the Miemory, as the general
principle with which it is connected.'*
classification alone does not constitute philooophy. - I would
not wish it to be understood from these observations, that philosophy consists in classification alone; and that its only use is to
assist the Memory. I have often, indeed, heard this asserted
in general terms; but it rather appears to me to be obvious,
that, although this be one of its most important uses, yet something more is necessary to complete the definition of it. Were
the case otherwise, it would follow, that all classifications are
equally philosophical, provided they are equally comprehensive.
The very great importance of this subject will, I hope, be a
sufficient apology for me, in taking this opportunity to correct
sonle mistaken opinions which have been formed concerning it.
IV. Aid which the Memory derives from philosophical arrangement. - It was before observed, that the great use of the
faculty of Memory, is to enable us to treasure up, for the:future regulation of our conduct, the results of our past experience, and of our past reflections. But in every case in which
we judge of the future from the past, we must proceed on the
belief, that there is, in the course of events, a certain degree, at
least, of uniformity. And, accordingly, this belief is not only
justified by experience, but (as Dr. Reid has shown, in a very
satisfactory manner,) it forms a part of the original constitution
of the human mind. In the general laws of the material world,
this uniformity is found to be complete; insomuch that, in the
s It is very justly and ingeniously remarked by Dr. Priestley, that " the
more we know of any branch of science, the less is the compass into which
we are able to bring its principles, provided the facts fiom which they are
inferred be numerous." The reason is, that, " in an advanced state of
knowledge, we are able to reduce more of the partictlar into general observations; whereas, in the infancy of a science, every observation is an
independent fact; and, in delivering the principles of it, they must all be
distinctly mentioned; so that, though a selection may be made, a proper
abridgment is impossible."