Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

14 INTRODUCTION.
any; the light whiclh a philosophical analysis of the principles
of tlhe mind would necessarily throw on the subjects of intellectual
and moral education.
The nature and purposes of education. - The most essential
objects of education are the two following: First, to cultivate
all the various principles of our nature, both speculative and
active," in such a manner as to bring them to the greatest perfection of which they are susceptible; and, secondly, by watching over the impressions and associations which the mind receives in early life, to secure it against the influence of prevailing errors; and, as far as possible, to engage its prepossessions
on the side of truth. It is only upon a philosophical analysis
of the mind, that a systematical plan can be founded for the accomplishment of either of these purposes.
There are few individuals whose education has been conducted in every respect with attention and judgment. Almost
every man of reflection is conscious, when he arrives at maturity, of many defects in his mental powers, and of many inconvenient habits, which might have been prevented or remedied in his infancy or youth. Such a consciousness is the first
step towards improvement; and the person who feels it, if he: [By the speculative principles of our nature, Stewart here means the
various powers or faculties of the intellect or the sunderstancldba, in the narrowest sense of these terms; such as the faculties of perception, menory,
tjudgment, imayination, etc. All these powers we might conceive to be in
full employment, though man should lead a life of mere contemplation or
reverie, never putting forth any voluntary exertion whatsoever, either of
mind or body. What Stewart calls the active principles of human nature
might be more properly termed principles of action, or rather imptlses to action, —such as the cappetites, desires, afections, sel-love, and conscience.
These stimulate us to exertion; these point out ends to be pursued, while
tle intellect furnishes, as it were, the means for their attainment.
"l Reason the cardl but passion is the galc.1:
Stewart's phraseology here is faulty, for tile intellectual powers, such as
memory and imagination, may be just as active (that is, in as fill exercise,)
as the appetites or the conscience; but the former do not stimulate man to
voluntary exertion, unless they are conjoined with some desire.]