Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

MEllORY. 261
present, without suggesting to us at all the idea of the past;
and, in fact, this supposition is realized to a certain degree in
the case of some old men, who retain pretty exactly the information which they receive, but are sometimes unable to recollect
in what manner the particulars which they find connected
together in their thoughts, at first came into the mind; whether
they occurred to them in a dream, or were communicated to
them in conversation.
On the other hand, it is evident, that without the associating
principle, the powers of retaining our thoughts, and of recognizing them when they occur to us, would have been of little
use; for the most important articles of' our knowledge might
have remained latent in the mind, even when those occasions
presented themselves to which they are immediately applicable.
In consequence of this law of our nature, not only are all our
various ideas made to pass, from time to time, in review before
us, and to offer themselves to our choice as subjects of meditation, but when an occasion occurs which calls for the aid of our
past experience, the occasion itself recalls to us all the information upon the subject which that experience has accumulated.
The foregoing observations comprehend an analysis of Memory
sufficiently accurate for my present purpose; some other remarks; tending to illustrate the same subject more completely,
will occur in the remaining sections of this chapter.
JMemory itself is an ultimate and inexplicable fact. —It is
hardly necessary for me to add, that when we have proceeded so far in our inquiries concerning Memory, as to obtain
an analysis of that power, and to ascertain the relation in which
it stands to the other principles of our constitution, we have
advanced as far towards an explanation of it as the nature of
the subject permits. The various theories which have attempted
to account for it by traces or impressions in the sensorium, are
obviously too unphilosophical to deserve a particular refutation.*
* The following passage from Malebranche will be a sufficient specimen
of the common theories with respect to memory.
"In order to give an explanation of memory, it should be called to
mind, that all our different perceptions are affixed to the changes which