Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

260 MEMORY.
curiosity, the train of our ideas goes on, and we immediately
forget our purpose. When we are employed, therefore, in
studying such an object, it is not an exclusive and steady attention that we give to it, but we are losing sight of it, and recurring to it every instant; and the painful efforts of which we are
conscious, are not, (as we are apt to suppose them to be,)
efforts of uncommon attention, but unsuccessful attempts to
keep the mind steady to its object, and to exclude the extraneous ideas, which are from time to time soliciting its notice.
If these observations be well founded, they afford an explanation of a fact which has often been remarked, that objects
are easily remembered which affect any of the passions.* The
passion assists the Memory, not in consequence of any immediate connection between them, but as it presents, during the time
it continues, a steady and exclusive object to the attention.
The connection between Jlfemory and the association of ideas,
is so striking, that it has been supposed by some, that the whole
of its phenomena might be resolved into this principle. But
this is evidently not the case. The association of ideas connects
our various thoughts with each other, so as to present them to
the mind in a certain order; but it presupposes the existence of
these thoughts in the mind; or, in other words, it presupposes a
faculty of retaining the knowledge which we acquire. It involves,
also, a power of recognizing, as former objects of attention, the
thoughts that from time to time occur to us; a power which is
not implied in that law of our nature which is called the association of ideas. It is possible, surely, that our thoughts might
have succeeded each other, according to the same laws as at;'Si quas res in vita videmus, parvas, usitatas, quotidianas, eas meminisse non solemus; propterea quod nulla nisi nova ant admirabili re
commovetur animus. At si quid videmus ant audimus egregie turpe, aut
honestum, inusitatum, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id din meminisse
consuevimus." [When we witness things that are small, common, and of
daily recurrence, we do not usually remember them; for the mind is not
stirred except by something new and wonderful. But if we see or hear
any thing remarkably base, honorable, unusual, great, incredible, or ridiculous, it generally remains long in the memory.] - Ad. Herenn, lib. 3.