Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

256 MEMORY.
Memory relate either to things and their relations, or to events.
In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the
mind may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or
of any modification of time whatever; as when I repeat over a
poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features
of an absent frienid. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers
distinguish the act of the mind by the name of conception; but
in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of Memory. In these and
similar cases, it is obvious, that the operations of this faculty do
not necessarily involve the idea of the past.
The case is different with respect to the Memory of events.
When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former
objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular
point of time; so that, of every such act of Memory, the idea
of the past is a necessary concomitant.
I have been led to take notice of this distinction, in order to
obviate an objection which some of the phenomena of Memory
seem to present, against a doctrine which I formerly stated,
when treating of the powers of conception and imagination.
How conception passes into, or becomes, lemory. - It is evident that, when I think of an event, in which any object of
sense was concerned, my recollection of the event must necessarily involve an act of conception. Thus, when I think of a
dramatic representation which I have recently seen, my recollection of what I saw, necessarily involves a conception of the
different actors by whom it was performed. But every act of
recollection which relates to events, is accompanied with a belief
of their past existence. How then are we to reconcile this conclusion with the doctrine formerly maintained concerning conception, according to which, every exertion of that power is
accompanied with a belief that its object exists before us at the
present moment?
The only way that occurs to me of removing this difficulty, is
by supposing, that the remembrance of a past event is not a
simple act of the mind; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances of the