Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

DREAMING. 207
philosophizing which, since the time of N ewton, are commonly
appealed to, as the tests of sound investigation. For, in the
first place, I have not supposed any causes which are not
known to exist; and, secondly, I have shown, that the phenomena under our consideration are necessary consequences of the
causes to which I have referred them. I have not supposed
that the mind acquires in sleep any new faculty of which we
are not conscious while awake; but only (what we know to be
a facet) that it retains some of its powers, while the exercise of
others is suspended; and I have deduced synthetically the known
phenomena of dreaming, from the operation of a particular
class of our faculties, uncorrected by the operation of another.
I flatter myself, therefore, that this inquiry will not only throw
some light on the state of the mind in sleep; but that it will
have a tendency to illustrate the mutual adaptation and subserviency which exist among the different parts of our constitution, when we are in complete possession of all the faculties
and principles which belong to our nature.*
the will. All the active principles of our nature then reign unchecked,
and one is quite as likely to be governed by the more noble, as by the more
debasing, among their number. In an instance described by Pinel, brutal
and violent as were most of the actions of the young man, we learn that
he readily gave way, at times, to motions of beneficence and compassion.
He was literally the creature of his impulses, and blindly followed them,
whether they pointed to good or evil. His condition, then, was very like
that of other maniacs, who are commonly said to be subject to insane impulses; only, in his case, the will seemed to be absolutely bereft of its
rightful authority over the passions, while in theirs, it is powerless only at
intervals, or under particular excitement. Strictly speaking, the inmpulse
is not a mark of insanity, nor unusual in its character. The thought of
killing may frequently enter the mind of a passionate, but perfectly sane,
person; but it is instantly put aside, as an idle or wicked fancy, by the
conscience. The will masters such vague but horrible thoughts, almost
without the consciousness of effort. But as the gradual approach of disease weakens its command over the succession of ideas, the devilish
thought intrudes more frcquently, and will not " down at his bidding."
An air-drawn dagger becomes visible to the " heat-oppressed brain," and
the patient chltches the real weapon at last, in what is, fobr the moment,
an uncontrollable frenzy.]
* Soon after the publication of the first edition of this work, a difficulty