Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

INTRODUCTION. 7
In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the
prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first,
says J. S. Mill, " was needed to teach men that food nourishes, that water
drowns, or quenches thirst, that the sun gives light and heat, that bodies
fall to the ground." These laws, also, are not necessary truths, but are
tunded on mere induction, - often on a not very extensive one. A
newly discovered metal, being found, by a single experiment, to be fusible
at a certain temperature, it is at once declared to be a Law of Nature, that
it does melt, always has melted, and always will melt, at the ascertained
degree of heat. It is certainly possible, though not probable, that another
piece of the metal should be discovered which will not melt at this temperature; such an instance would be only a parallel to the case of the
black swans. A particular event, comprehended under the statement of a
Law, is not properly said to be caused by the Law, but only to be a case,
or instance, hlappenilq under the Law. A cow does not suckle its calf because it is a Mammifer, but it is called a Mammifer because it suckles its
calf. So, it is not a law of Hydrostatics which causes water to remain at
the same level in the two arms of a bent tube; but the fact, that the water
stands at this level, is ranked among many other facts, which are comprehended under the general statement, called a Law, of Hydrostatics. Gravitation does not make the stone fall, but the particular fact, that this stone
fell, is comprehended under the General Fact, or Law, of Gravitation. In
like manner, Gravitation does not make the earth revolve in an elliptical
orbit round the sun; but the fact, that the earth revolves in this manner,
is ranked with the falling of a stone, and with many other facts of a similar
character, under the general statement, or Law, of Gravitation.
HIence it is abundantly evident, to adopt Mr. Mill's language, that " the
expression, Laws of Nature, mLeans nothing but the uniformities which exist
among natural phenomena, when reduced to their simplest expression."
The Laws of Nature do not account for, or explain, the phenomena of nature; they only describe them. Description and classification are the sole
employments of Phliysical science.
To account for, or explain, the operations of nature, we must have
recourse to M1letaphl/sics - to something after, or above, nature. We must
ascend to the notion of Cause. The maxim, " every event must have a cause,"
is not, like the so-called Laws of Nature, a mere induction, founded on
experience, and holding good only until an instance is discovered to the
contrary; it is a necessary and immutable truth. It is not derived from
observation of natural phenomena, but is superimposed upon such observation by a necessity of the human intellect. It is not made known through
the senses; and its falsity, under any circumstances, is not possible - is not
even conceivable. The Cause, to which it points us, is not to be found in