Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

INTRODUCTION. tS
m-.,rely relative; if we know the one only by such sensible
qualities as extension, figure, and solidity; and the other, by
such operations as sensation, thought, and volition; we are certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, considered as objects of human study, are essentially different; the science of
the former resting ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to
our senses; that of the latter, on the phenomena of which we
are conscious. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of
materialism, that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a
misapprehension of the proper object of science; the difficulty
which it professes to remove being manifestly placed beyond
the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain
the nature of that principle which feels and thinks and wills, by
saying that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of
material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting, that matter as well as mind is known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the
essence of either.*
The Philosophy of Mind susceptible of cultivation and progress. - It would probably contribute much to accelerate the
progress of the philosophy of mind, if, (1.) a distinct explanation were given of its nature and object; and if, (2.) some genhard or soft, hot or cold, etc.; that is, by enumerating those properties or
attributes, by means of which it manifests itself to our senses. So we can
define mind only by saying, that it is somethi2g which feels, thinks, remembers, conceives, etc.; that is, we enumerate the qualities or faculties
through which it manifests itself in consciousness. In both cases, this
unknown somethihng is called substance, which word, in plain English, means
that which stands under, or upholds, its various qualities.]
Some metaphysicians, who appear to admit the truth of the foregoing
reasoning, have further lurged, that for any thing we can prove to the contrary, it is possible, that the unknown substance which has the qualities of
extension, figure, and color, may be the same with the unknown substance
which has the attributes of feeling, thinking, and willing. But besides
that this is only an hypothesis, which amounts to nothing more than a
mere possibility, even if it were true, it would no more be proper to say
of mind, that it is material, than to say of body. that it is spiritual
1'*