Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

ABSTRACTION. 149
sition to science and philosoplhy. Both philosophy and good
sense imply the exercise of our reasoning powers; and they
differ from each other only according as these powers are applied to particulars or to generals. It is on good sense (in the
acceptation in which I have now explained the term), that the
success of men in the inferior walks of life chiefly depends;
tut, that it does not always indicate capacity for abstract science
or for general speculation, or for able conduct in situations
which require comprehensive views, is matter even of vulgar
remark.
Natural stuperiority of the men of general views. - Although,
however, each of these defects has a tendency to limit the
utility of the individuals in whom it is to be found, to certain
stations in society; no comparison can be made, in point of
original value, between the intellectual capacities of the two
classes of men to which they characteristically belong. The
one is the defect of a vigorous, an ambitious, and a comprehensive genius, improperly directed; the other, of an understanding minute and circumscribed in its views, timid in its exertions, and formed for servile imitation. Nor is the former
defect, (however difficult it may be to remove it when confirmed
by long habit,) by any means so incurable as the latter; for it
arises, not from original constitution, but from some fault in
early education; while every tendency to the opposite extreme
is more or less characteristical of a mind, useful, indeed, in a
high degree, when confined to its proper sphere, but destined,
by the hand that formed it, to borrow its lights from another.
As an additional proof of the natural superiority which men
of general views possess over.the common drudges in business,
it may be further observed, that the habits of inattention incident to the former arise in part from the little interest which
they take in particular objects and particular occurrences, and
are not wholly to be ascribed to an incapacity of attention.
When the mind has been long accustomed to the consideration
of classes of objects and of comprehensive theorems, it cannot,
without some degree of effort, descend to that humble walk of
experience, or of action, in which the meanest of mankindl arc
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