Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

ABSTRACTION. 133
perceived, and of which we retain a distinct remembrance,*
we are not under the necessity of employing words. It frequently, however, happens, that when the subjects of our consideration are particular, our reasoning with respect to them
may involve very general notions; and, in such cases, although
we may conceive, -without the use of words, the things about
which we reason, yet we must necessarily have recourse to language in carrying on our speculations concerning them. If the
subjects of our reasonings be general, (under which description
I include all our reasonings, whether more or less comprehensive, which do not relate merely to individuals,) words are the
sole objects about which our thoughts are employed. According
as these words are comprehensive or limited in their signification,
the conclusions we form will be more or less general; but this
accidental circumstance does not in the least affect the nature of
the intellectual process; so that it may be laid down as a proposition which holds without any exception, that in every case in
which we extend our speculations beyond individuals, language
is not only a useful auxiliary, but is the sole instrument by
which they are carried on.
Dfficerence between the speculations of the philosopher and of the
* I have thought it proper to add this limitation of the general proposition, because individual objects, and individual events, which have not
fallen under the examination of our senses, cannot possibly be made the
subject of our consideration but by means of language. The manner in
which we think of such objects and events, is accurately described in the
following passage of Wollaston; however unphilosophical the conclusion
may be which he deduces from his reasoning.
"A man is not known ever the more to posterity, because his name is
transmitted to them; he doth not live, because his name does. When it
is said, Julius Caesar subdued Gaul, beat Pompey, changed the commonwealth into a monarchy, etc., it is the same thing as to say the conqueror
of Pompey was Casar; that is, Casar, and the conqueror of Pompey, are
the same thing; and Cmsar is as much known by the one distinction as
the other. The amount is only this: that the conqueror of Pompey conquered Pompey; or somebody conquered Pompey; or rather, since Pompey is as little known now as Cxsar, somebody conquered somebody.
Such a poor business is this boasted immortality; and such, as has been
here described, is the thing called glory among us!"
12