Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

ABSTRACTION. 129
bet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in form.
ing, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked,) had
some relation to his universal language.
The new nomenclature which has been introduced into chemistry, seems to me to furnish a striking illustration of the effect
of appropriate and well defined expressions, in aiding the intellectual powers; and the period is probably not far distant,
when similar innovations will be attempted in some of the other
sciences.
V. Of the purposes to which the powers of Abstraction and
Generalization are subservient. — It has been already shown,
that, without the use of signs, all our knowledge must necessarily have been limited to individuals, and that we should have
been perfectly incapable both of classification and general reasoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power
of generalization, (which, I have endeavored to show, means
nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it
would have been impossible for us to have carried on any species of reasoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that
this opinion is erroneous; or, at least, that it is very imperfectly
stated. The truth is, it appears to me to be just in one sense
of the word reasoning, but false in another; and I even suspect
it is false in that sense of the word in which it is most commonly
employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general proposition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, should be ascertained with precision.
One hind of reasoning can be carried on without generalization, and without language. - It has been remarked by several
writers, that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of
the laws of nature, is not founded upon reasoning; and different
theories have of late been proposed to account for its origin.
Mr. Hume resolves it into the association of ideas. Dr. Reid,
on the other hand, maintains, that it is an original principle of
our constitution, which does not admit of any explanation; and
which, therefore, is to be ranked among those general and ultimate facts, beyond which philosophy is unable to proceed.
Without this principle of expectation, it would be impossible