Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

106 NOMINALISMI AND REALISM.o
for these objects, words, or other arbitrary signs. The difference between the employment of language in such cases, aiid in
our speculations concerning classes or genera, is, that in the former case, the use of words is, in a great measure, optional;
whereas, in the latter, it is essentially necessary. This observation deserves our attention the more, that, if I am not mlistaken, it has contributed to mislead some of the Realists, by giving
rise to an idea, that the use of language, in thinking about universals, however convenient, is not more necessary than in
thinking about individuals.
According to this view of the process of the mind, in carrying
on general speculations, that IDEA, which the ancient philosophers considered as the essence of an individual, is nothing
more than the particular quality or qualities in which it resembles other individuals of the same class; and in consequence of
which, a generic name is applied to it. It is the possession of
this quality, that entitles the individual to the generic appellation, and which, therefore, may be said to be essential to its
classification with that particular genus; but as all classifications are to a certain degree arbitrary, it does not necessarily
follow, that it is more essential to its existence as an individual,
than various other qualities which we are accustomed to regard
as accidental. In other words, (if I may borrow thle language
of modern philosophy,) this quality forms its nominal, but not
its real essence.
These observations will, I trust, be sufficient for the satisfaction of such of my readers as are at all conversant with philosophical inquiries. For the sake of others, to whom this disquisition may be new, I have added the following illustrations.
All reasoning may take place by symbols, or arbitrary signs,
alone. -I shall have occasion to examine, in another part of
my work, how far it is true, (as is commonly believed,) that
every process of reasoning may be resolved into a series of syllogisms; and to point out some limitations, with which, I apprehend, it is necessary that this opinion should be received. As
it would lead me, however, too far from my present subject, to
anticipate any part of the doctrine which I am then to propose,