Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

104 NOiMINALISM AND REALISM.
hered to the principles of Aristotle, Of these sects, the former
are known in literary history by the name of the Nlominalists,
the latter, by that of the Realists.
As it is with the doctrine of the Nominalists that my own
opinion on this subject coincides, and as I propose to deduce
from it some consequences, which appear to me important, I
shall endeavor to state it as clearly and precisely as I am able,
pursuing, however, rather the train of my own thoughts, than
guided by the reasons of any particular author.
iThe doctrine of the Nominalists stated and defended. - I formerly explained in what manner the words, which, in the infancy
of language, were proper names, became gradually appellatives;
in consequence of which extension of their signification, they
would express, when applied to individuals, those qualities only
which are common to the whole genus. Now, it is evident,
that, with respect to individuals of the same genus, there are
two classes of truths; the one, particular truths relating to each
individual apart, and deduced from a consideration of its peculiar and distinguishing properties; the other, general truths, deduced from a consideration of their common qualities, and
equally applicable to all of them. Such truths may be conveniently expressed by means of general terms; so as to form
propositions, comprehending under them as many particular
truths, as there are individuals comprehended under the general
terms. It is further evident, that there are two wa.ys in which
such general truths may be obtained; either by fixing the attention
on one individual, in such ac manner that our reasoning may involve no circumstances beut those which are common to the whole
genus; or, (laying aside entirely the consideration of things,) by
means of the general terms with which language supplies us. In
either of these cases, our investigations must necessarily lead us
to general conclusions. In the first case, our attention being
limited to those circumstances, in which the subject of our reasoning resembles all other individuals of the same genus, whatever we demonstrate with respect to this subject must be true
of every other to which the same attributes belong. In the second ease, the subject of our reasoning being expressed by a