Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

&BSTRACTIONe 97
tance between any two objects, he forms exactly the same abstraction which is referred to by Euclid in his second definition.
and which most of his commentators have thought it necessary
to illustrate by prolix metaphysical disquisitions.
Abstraction is possible wit/hout generalization. —I shall only
observe further with respect to the nature and province of' this
faculty of the mind, that notwithstanding its essential subserviency to every act of classification, yet it might have been exercised, although we had only been acquainted with one individual object. Although, for example, we had never seen but one
rose, we might still have been able to attend to its color, without thinking of its other properties. This has led some philosophers to suppose, that another faculty besides abstraction, to
which they have given the name of generalization, is necessary
to account for the formation of genera and species; and they
have endeavored to show, that although generalization without
abstraction is impossible, yet that we might have been so formed
as to be able to abstract without being capable of generalizing.
The grounds of this opinion it is not necessary for me to examine, for any of the purposes which I have at present in view.'
II. Of the Objects of our Thoughts, when we employ general
terms..Further consideration of the ideal theory. - From the
* The words abstraction and generalization are commonly, but improperly, used as synonymous: and the same inaccuracy is frequently committed in speaking of abstract or general ideas, as if the two expressions were
convertible. A person who had never seen but one rose (it has been already remarked) might yet have been able to consider its color apart from
its other qualities; and therefore, (to express myself in conformity to common language,) there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once abstract and particular. After having perceived this quality as belonging to
a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them,
and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be
called a general abstract idea. These words abstract and general, therefore,
when applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any
two words to be found in the language.
It is indeed true, that the formation of every general notion presupposes
abstraction; but it is surely improper on this account, to call a general
term an abstract term, or a general idea an abstract idea.
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