The works of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England.

308 READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES.'I he fourth word is hereditament, which is to of the statute crosseth that which was to execute
be understood of those things whereof an inherit- such uses, as were confidences and trust, which
ance may be, and not of those things whereof an could not be in case of disseisin; for if there
Inheritance is in esse; for if I grant a rent charge were a commandment precedent, then the land
de novo for life to a use, this is good enough; and was vested in cestuy que use upon the entry; and
yet there is no inheritance in being of this rent. if the disseisin were of the disseisor's own head,
This word likewise excludes annuities and uses then no trust. And thus much for the case of
themselves, so that a use cannot be to a use. exposition of this statute: here follow the ordiThe first words on the part of cestuy que use are nance and purview thereupon.
the words, use, trust, or confidence; whereby it The purview hath two parts: the Purvie or
is plain that the statute meant not to make voct- first, operalio statuti, the effect that the oldinance
bulatunm artis, but it meant to remedy statute worketh; and there is modus t.
3roughton v.
Langley. matter, and not word; and in all the operandi, a fiction or explanation how the statute
Salk. 679.
1 Lutw. 83. clauses it still carrieth the words. doth work that effect. The effect is,
Contr. Burchett Colemar v.
u. nDurant. The second word is the word person, that ceslt'y que use shall be in posses- Senhos.e.
2 Ventr. 312. Pollexf.
again, which excludeth all abeyance; sion of like estate as he hath in the use; 525. ss6.
Lisle v. Gray.
it excludeth also dead uses, which are not to the fiction quomodo is, that the statute Rep. 10.28.
bodies lively and natural, as the building of a will have the possession of cestUy que Chudlkigh's
church, the making of a bridge; but here, as was use, as a new body compounded of mat- cooper v.
Frnnklyn.
noted before, is ever coupled with body politic. ter and form; and that the feoffees shall R no. Ab. 70O.
The third word is the word other: The statute give matter and substance, and the use
meant not to cross the common law. Now, at this shall give form and quality. The material words
time uses were grown into such familiarity, as in the first part of the purview are four.
men could not think of a possession, but in course The first words are, remainder and reverter, the
of use; and so every man was said to. be seised to statute having spoken before of uses in fee-simple,
his own use, as well as to the use of others; in tail, for life, or years, addeth, or otherwise in
therefore, because the statute would not stir nor remainder or reverter; whereby it is manifest,
turmoil possessions settled at common law, it that the first words are to be understood of uses
putteth in precisely this word, other; meaning in possession. For there are two substantial and
the divided use, and not the conjoined use; and essential differences of estates; the one limiting
this word causeth the clause in joint feoffees to the times, for all estates are but times of their
follow in a branch by itself; for else that case continuances; the former maketh like difference
had been doubtful upon this word, other. of fee-simple, fee-tail, for life or years; and theCollnard v. Cal. The words that are common to both other maketh difference of possession as remain2 R. Abr. 78 are words expressing the conveyance der; all other differences of estate are but accisar v. Dsne.
Sid. 26. whereby the use ariseth, of which dents, as shall be said hereafter. These two the
words those that breed any question are, agree- statute meant to take hold of, and at the words,
ment, will, otherwise, whereby some have infer- remainder and reverter, it stops: it adds not words,
red that uses might be raised by agreement parole, right, title, or possibility, nor it hath not general
so there were a consideration of money or other words, or otherwise; whereby it is most plain,
matter valuable; for it is expressed in the words that the statute meant to execute no inferior uses
before, bargain, sale, and contract, but of blood, to remainder or reverter: that is to say, no possior kindred; the error of which collection ap- bility or contingencies, but estates, only such as
peareth in the word immediately following, the feoffees might have executed by conscience
namely, will, whereby they might as well include, made. Note, also, that the very letter of the stathat a man seised of land might raise a use by tute doth take notice of a difference between a use
will, especially to any of his sons or kindred, in remainder and a use in reverter; which though it
where there is a real consideration; and by that cannot be properly, because it doth notdepend upon
reason, mean, betwixt this statute and by the particular estates, as remainders do, neither did
statute of 32 of wills, lands were devisable, then before the statute draw any tenures as reverespecially to any man's kindred, which was sions do; yet, the statute intends there is a difclearly otherwise-; and, therefore, those words ferencewhen the particular use, and the uselimitedwere put in, but in regard of uses formerly trans- upon the particular use, are both new uses, in
ferred by those conveyances; for it is clear that which case it is a use in remainder; and where
a use in esse by simple agreement, with con- the particular use is a new use, and the remnant
sideration, or without, or likewise by will, might of the use is the old use, in which case it is a use
be transferred; and there was a person seised to in reverter.
a use, by force of that agreement or will, namely, The next material words are, from henceforth,
to the use of the assignee; and, for the word which doth exclude all conceit of relation that
otherwise, it should by the generality of the word cestuy que use shall not come in: as from the
n.clde a disseisin to a use. But the whole scope time of the fir.t feoffm.ents to uoe, as Brudnell's