The life of Napoleon Buonaparte, emperor of the French. By Sir Walter Scott.

834 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.
pose Ney was detached with 43,000 men. * Oil that village.+ A large body of French cavalry,
reference to the above orders, it appears that not and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the
much resistance was expected in getting possession height between Brie and Sonlbref, immediately in
both of Sombref and Quatre-Bras. t Nevy has been the rear of Ligny, and quite in the heart of the
accused of delaying to attack, but reference to those Prussian position, where they were attacked by
orders will show, that Ney had not been commanded Blucher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to
to attack ** until two o'clock, M. P., in consequence re-establish the action failed, and the Prussian caof the allies having assembled in force at Quatre- valry were driven back upon the infantry.'t It was
Bras. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the
successful, would have led to important results. lFrench fromn advancing farther, and they contented
After obtaining possession of Quatre-Bras, he was themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The
to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussians did not evacuate Brie before three o'clock
Prussian right flank in rear of St-Amand, whilst Bo- A. M. on the 17th.+' In the course of the night,
naparte was making the chief attack on that village, the Prussians fell back on Tilly and Gembloux.
the strongest in the position, and at the same time The loss of the Prussians, according to their own
keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces
Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnes, to be of artillery; the French official account in the Moin readiness either to support tile attacks on Quiatre- niteur, raises it to 15,000.it The French acknowBras or St-Amand, and in the event of both succeed- ledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Bonaparte,
ing, to turn the Prussian right by marching direct on in changing the point of attack fioin the Prussian
Wagnele or Brie. it right at St-Amand, to the centre at Ligny, in a manner
The village of St-Amand was well defended; it forced the Prussians, if defeated) to retreat upon
formed the strength of the Prussian right, and, the British army, and give up their own line of'
from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, operations; but still, at that hour in thie evening,
was very capable of defence; although so nmuch in when the situation of the armies is considered, the
advance of the rest of the Prussian position. The change of attack appears to be the only Ilope he
f:ace of the country in front of this position possesses had of obtaining even a partial success; ulnder such
no remarkable features; the slopes towards the circumstances it was perhaps the best course he
stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a could pursue.'+*
continued attack for two hours, the enemy had It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in ary
only obtained possession of half the village of St- case, would have been such as to lrevent their
Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, junction, since each army had such colosider:l)le
which was taken and retaken several titnes.*** At reinforcements moving up, and close upon thletit;
this time Bonaparte sent for the corps of reserve but even in an extreme case, they could each a11se'
left by Ney at Frasnes; before, however, it reached retired on their fortresses, and formed entrenchled
St-Amand, in consequence of the check they had camps of perfect security, with every tmeans of resuistained at Quatre-Bras, it was countermarched, pairing the losses they sustained.-ttand fromn this circumstance became of little use
either to Bonaparte or Ne*y. Bonaparte having Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive tlie battle was.
observed the masses of troops which Blucher had La batl aiile de LPeooi no li qte vers aeof' oers i le
brought up behind St-Amand (and probably in col- eeme ors a r e es uss
sequence of the corps above mentioned being neces- ste.
t Here it was that Blucher was so nearly fal!ing into th;e
sary at Quatre-Brasf —t-), appears to have change dvalry.
the disposition of his reserves, who were nmarching ** Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on tihe 17th, it. was
upon St-Arnand, and moved them towards the right supposed the Prussians had retired upon NatTur, so feebly
to attack tile Prussian centre at Ligny, which they were they fol!owed; the light cavalry of General Pajol
succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of pursuing thenl in this direction on thie 17th, capturel a ltwv
gunsi which, with some stragglers, as are fontnd in &al Irr Liv. ix, p. 103, Official Papers. mies, was his whole success.
t See Grouchay, p. 47. Golurgaucd, Liv. ix, p. 102. tt The St Helena productions raise tile amount to 20,00o0
~* It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold men, 40 guns, standards, etc. See Grouchy on that smlmject,
and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would in answer to Goulrgand, pp.48, 49.-Montholon says they lost
bave hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his 60,000.-Liv. x.,. 148, says that the Prussian alrmy was retroops in readiness, but it appears that he could not have duced to 40 000 mien by the loss they had,sustained; 30,000
had time to mmove to that point at the early hour stated by men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, miho had disbandBonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the ed, andl aaged the baiks of the Meuse, and by the denature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly. tachments sent to cover theirretreat, and that of the bagtt' The French did not attack until 3 P. M., the different gage, isn the direction of Namur.
corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements Time intention of the allied marshals to remain togeat an earlier hour-G'rouchy, p. 30. Rogniat, p. 311. ther, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Welling*** Ney's letter to the Dtuke d'Otranto: Paris, 1815.- ton had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected.tI/sffnlug, p. 14. to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been
Ptt M'ffling, pp.15-64.-Blucher had emiployed his reserves abandoned to their own strength, and had the events c I
to support his right at St-Amand, and was not prepared for the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give
this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both
instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St- armies would have retired.
A mnand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and ftt Had earlier or more positive information of the onegained the action,. my's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the