Dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

658' JUS. JUS.
last title of the fourth book is De Judiciis Pub~- as adopting the Jus Gentium: the In bonis is
licis. The Roman term Jus Publicum also corn- merely recognized by the Praetorian Law, to which
prehended Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, division it therefore belongs. So far as the equity
and Procedure in Civil Actions. It is said by Papi- of the praetor may be said to be based on the Jus
nian (Dig. 28. tit. 1. s. 3) that the Testamenti- Gentitun, so far may the In bonis be said to be
factio belonged to Publicrum Jus. Now the Testa- founded on it also. Properly speaking, the Jus
mentifactio was included in Commercium, and Gentium was only received as Roman law, when
only Roman citizens and Latini had Commer- it did not contradict the Jus Civile; that is, it
cium. This is an instance of the application of could only have its full effect as the Jus Gentium
the term Publicum Jus. All Jus is in a sense when it was not contradicted or limited by the
Publicum, and all Jus is in a sense Privatum; Jus Civile. When it was so contradicted or
but the Roman Publicum Jus directly concerned limited, the praetor could only give it a partial
the constitution of the state and the functions of effect, but in so doing, it is obvious that he was
government and administration; the Privatumr endeavouring to nullify the Jus Civile and so to
Jus directly concerned the interests of individuals. make the Jus Gentiumn as extensive in its opera..
The opposition between these two things is clear, tion, as it would have been but for the limitation
and as well marked as the nature of such things of the Jus Civile. The bounds that were placed
will allow. If the terms be found fault with, the to this power of the praetor were not very definite.
meaning of the terms admits of a defence. Still he generally fashioned his Jus Praetorium
The expression Populus Romanus Quirites has after the analogy of the Jus Civile, and though he
given rise to much discussion. Becker (Handl). der made it of no effect as against his Jus Praetorium,
Rimnisclien Altertniisner, vol. ii. p. 24) concludes he maintained its form and left it to its full opethat Romani and Quirites are so far opposed that ration, except so far as he necessarily limited its
Romani is the historical and political name viewed operation by his own Jus Praetorium.
with respect to foreign states, and Quirites the Jus used absolutely is defined to be " ars boni
political name as viewed with reference to Rome. et aequi" (Dig. 1. tit. 1. s. 1), which is an absurd
Accordingly Quirites is equivalent to Cives. definition. What it really is, may be collected
(Sueton. Caes. 70; Plut. Cues. 51; Liv. xlv. from the above enumeration of its parts or divi37.) It does not seem easy to explain the dif- sions. Its general signification is Law, and in this
ference between Civitas Romana and the Jus sense it is opposed to Lex or a Law. Lex, howQuiritium, yet so much seems clear that Civitas ever, as already shown, is sometimes used generally
Romana was a term large enough to comprehend for Law, as in the instance from Cicero where it is
all who were Cives in any sense. But the Jus opposed to Natura. Lex therefore in this general
Quiritium in its later sense seems to be the pure sense comprehends leges and all the other parts of
Privatum Jus as opposed to the Publicum Jus, and the Jus Civile. In its special sense of a Law, it
thus it differs from Jus Civile viewed as the whole is included in Jus. Jus is also used in the plural
Roman law, or as opposed to the law of other number (jaura) apparently in the sense of the
people. He who claimed a thing exclusively as his component parts of Jus, as in Gaius (i. 2), where
own claimed it to be his ex Jure Quiritium. (Gaius, he says " Constant autem jura ex legibus," &c.;
ii. 40. &c.) Accordingly we find the expressions and in another passage (i. 158), where he says with
Dominuls and Dominium Ex Jure Quiritium, as reference to the Agnationis Jus or Law of Agnatio,
contrasted with In bonis [DoMINIuM]. Such and the CognationisJus or Law of Cognatio, "civilis
part of the Roman law, in its widest sense, as ratio civilia quidem jura corrumpere potest." Inrelated to buying, selling, letting, hiring, and such deed in this passage Agnationis Jus and Cognationis
bbligations as were not founded on the Jus Civile, Jus are two of the Jura or parts of Jus, which
were considered to belong to the Jus Gentium (Dig. with other Jura make up the whole of Jus. A gain
1. tit. 1. s. 5), that is; the Jecs Naturale. (Gains, (Gaius, ii. 62), that provision of the Lex Julia de
ii. 65.) Accordingly when ownership could be Adulteriis, which forbade the alienation of the
acquired by tradition, occupation, or in any other Fundus Dotalis, is referred to thus-" quod quidenm
way, not specially provided for by the Jus Civile, jus," "6 which rule of law" or " which law"-it
such ownership Wazs acquired by the Jus Gentium. being a law comprehended in another law, which
When the Jus Civilt prescribed certain forms by contained this and many other provisions. Thus
which ownership was to be transferred, and such though Lex in its strict sense of a Law is different
forms were not observeds there was no ownership from Jus in its large sense, and though Jus, in its
Jure Civili or Jure Quiritlam, but there was that narrower sense, is perhaps never used for a Lex,
interest which was called In honis. It is not said still Jus, in this its narrower sense, is used to exby Gaius (ii. 40, &c.) that tht In bonis arose by press a rule of law. Thus Gaius (i. 47) speaks of
virtue of the Jus Gentium, and it may perhaps be the jucra or legal provisions comprised in the Lex
concluded that he did not so view it; for in another Aelia Sentia,; and ofjaza as based on the Responsa
passage (ii. 65), he speaks of alienation or change Prudentinum (" responsa prudentiun sent sententine
of ownership being effected either by the Jus et opiniones eorum quibus permissum estjzcra conNaturale, as in the case of tradition, or by the Jus dere," Gaius, i. 7; JURISCONSULTI).
Civile, as in the case of mancipatio, ill jure cessio, Jus has also the meaning of a faculty or legal
and usucapion. In this passage he is speaking of right. Thus Gaius says, " it is an actio in rem,
alienation, which is completely effected by tra- when we claim a corporeal thing as our own, or
dition, so that there is a legal change of ownership claim some jus as our own, such as a jus utendi,
recognized by Roman law; not by Roman law, eundi, agendi." The parental power is called a
specially as such, but by Roman law as adopting'" Jus proprium civimn Romanorum." The meanor derived from theJus Gentiuom. In the other ing of lawe generally, and of a legal rig/it, are apcese (ii. 40) there is no ownership either as re- plied to Jus by Cicero in the same sentence: " I,
cognized by Roman law as such, or by Roman law a man ignorant of law (imperitus juris), seek to