Dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

INTERCESSIO. INTERCESSIO. 641
matter; but the heres of a fidejussor was bound. Women generally were incapacitated from doing
By the Lex Furia, a sponsor and fidepromissor many acts on account of the weakness of the sex.
were free from all liability after two years, which It was a general rule that any person might " inappears to mean two years after the obligation had tercedere." who was competent to contract and to
become a present demand; but the Lex Furia only dispose of his property; but minores xxv and woapplied to Italy. All of them who were alive at men had only a limited capacity in respect of their
the time when the money became due could be contracts and the disposition of their estates. In
sued, but each only for his share (singuli viriles the early part of the reign of Augustus and in that
partes). Fidejussores were never released from their of Claudius, it was declared by the Edict that woobligation by length of time, and each was liable men should not " intercedere " for their husbands.
for the whole sum (singuli in soliduns ohliyantur); Subsequently the Senatusconsultum Velleianum
but by a rescript (epistola) of Hadrian, the creditor [SENATUSCONSULTUJM VELLEmIACUm] absolutely
was required to sue the solvent fidejussores sepa- prohibited all Intercessio by women; and the
rately, each according to his proportion. If any Novella 1 34. c. 8, had for its special object to make
one of thenl was not solvent, his share became a null all Intereessio of a wife for her husband. A
burden to the rest. woman who was sued in respect of her Intercessio,
A Lex Apuleia, which was passed before the or her heres, might plead the Senatusconsultum,
Lex Furia, gave one of several sponsores or fide- and she might recover anything that she had paid
promissores, who had paid more than his share, an in respect of her Intercessio. The Senatusconsultum,
action against the rest for contribution. Before though it made null the intercessio of a woman,
the passing of this Lex Apuleia., any one sponsor or protected the creditor so far as to restore to him a
fidepromissor might be sued for the whole amount; former right of action against his debtor and fidebut this lex was obviously rendered useless by the jussores: this action was called Restitutoria or
subsequent Lex Furia, at least in Italy, to which Rescissoria. In the case of a new contract, to
country alone, as already observed, the Lex Furia which the woman was a party, the Intercessio was
applied, while the Lex Apuleia extended to place5 null by the Senatusconsultum, and the creditor bad
out of Italy; yet not to fidejussores. the samne action against the person for whom the
A fidejussor, who had been compelled to pay woman " intercessit," as he would have had
the whole amount, had no redress if his principal against the woman: this action, inasmuch as the
was insolvent; though, as already observed, lie contract had no reference to a former right, but to
could by the rescript of Hadrian compel the credi- a right arising out of the contract, was Institutoria.
tor to limit his demand against him to his share. In certain cases, a woman was permitted to reA creditor was obliged formally to declare his nounce the benefit of the Senatusconsultum; and
acceptance of the sponsores or fidepromnissores who there was a considerable num ber of exceptions to
were offered to him, and also to declare what was the rule that a woman could plead the senatusthe object as to which they were security; if lie consultum.
did not comply with this legal requisition, the (Dig. 16. tit. 1. ad S. C. Velleienumz; Paulus,
sponsores and fidepromissores might, within thirty S. R. ii. tit. 11; Vangerow, Pandekten, &c. iii.
days (it is not said what thirty days, but probably p. 149.) [G. L.]
thirty days from the time of the sureties being INTERCE'SSIO was the interference of a maoffered), demand a praejudicium (praejsudiciumz pos- gistratus to whom an appeal [APPELLATIO] was
tulare), and if they proved that the creditor had nmade. The object of the Intercessio was to put a
not complied with the requisitions of the law, they stop to proceedings, on the ground of informality
were released. (Gains, iii. 123.) or other sufficient cause. Any magistratus might
A Lex Cornelia limited the amount for which "intercedere," who was of equal rank with or of
any person could be a security for the same person rank superior to the magistratus from or against
to the same person within the same year, but with whom the appelIatio was. Cases occur in which
some exceptions, one of which was a security one of the praetoLrs interposed (intescessit) against
" dotis nomine." No person could be bound in a the proceedirngs of his colleague. (Cic. in Ves'r.
greater amount than his principal, but he might be i. 46.)
bound in less; and every surety could recover on The Intercessio is most frequently spoken of with
a mandati judicium from his principal whatever he reference to the Tribunes who originally had not
had been compelled to pay on his account. By a jurisdictio, but used the Intercessio for the purpose
Lex Publilia sponlsores had a special action ill of preventing wrong which was offered to a person
duplum, which was called an actio depensi. in their presence (Gell. xiii. 12). The Intercessio
There is a passage in the Epitome of Gaius ill of the Tribunes of the Plebs, was Auxilium (Liv.
the Breviarium (ii. 9. ~ 2), which is not taken vi. 38; Cic. pro Qeintio, 7, 20); and it might be
from Gains: it is to this effect: —The creditor may exercised either in jure or il judicio. The tribune
sue either the debtor or his fidejussor; but after he qui intercessit could prevent a judicium from being
has chosen to sue one of them, he cannot sue the instituted. That there coauld be an Illtercessio
other. -Cicero appears to allude to the same doc- after the Litis Contestatio appears from Cicero
trine (ad Att. xvi. 15) in apassage which is some- (psa Tullio, 38). The tribunes could also use
what obscure, and is variously explained. The the Intercessio to prevent execution of a judicial
subject of the sponsio often occurs in Cicero's sentence. (Liv. vi. 27.) T. Gracchus interfered
letters; and in one case he was called upon in re- (ietercessit) against the praetor Terentius, who was
spect of a sponsio alleged to have been given by going to order execution, in the case of L. Scipio
him twellty-five years before (ad Att. xii. 17). who was condemned for peculation (Liv. xxxviii.
Cicero uses the expression " appellare " to express 60; Gell. vii. 1 9), and he prevented Scipio being
calling on a surety to pay (ad Att. i. 8). sent to prison, but he did not interfere to prevelnt
((Gaius, iii. 115-127; Inst. iii. tit. 20; Dig. 44. execution being had oni his property. A single
tit. 7; 46. tit. 1.) in'ilh;ne could effect this, and againist the opinion of
Tr T