Sketches of the campaign in northern Mexico : in eighteen hundred forty-six and seven / by an officer of the First Regiment of Ohio volunteers.

126 AMPUDIA IN''TEIDED TO ATTACK US AT MAUIN.
continued to regard the statement as one of the many groundless rumors of the calmp, until recently informed by the Mlexican history of the war, that General Ampudia at one time
hadc decided to leave his intrenchluients. lMy surviving
companions in arms will unite in regretting the counsels by
which he was induced to change his plans; for, if on the
beautiful plains around 5tarin, he could have advantageously employed ", his well-appointed and numerous cavalry," he
would there also have enjoyed the pleasure of witnessing
some judicious combinations on our part; and have received
gratis, a few West Point lessons, which he might have turned
to good account in his subsequent professional career. But
the MIexicenm General, it seems, was overruled by hisprauclent
chiefs of brigade, who doubtless entertained a lively recollection of the manner in- which our light artillery was handled
at Palo Alto, and so-knowing that -we brought no siege
train-determined to await the issue behind his walls. A
wise conclusion certainly, since from the advantageous posi* "He (Ampudia) decided to receive the invaders at Marin, by availing himself
in the movement of his well-appointed and numerous cavalry. In the event of a
reverse he still had a point of defense in Monterey. The advantages which the
country from Papagallos to Marin afforded, and other circumstances, confirmed his
hopes. With the object of adopting this plan he called a junta, composed of the
chiefs of brigade. In it he espoused the project, and it was perceived that in
Monterey could be counted, beyond the coTps alreacdy vmentioned, the 3d and 4th Light,
3ld of the Line, the active battalions of Agua Calientes, Queretaro, and San Luis
Potosi, of injfelntry; and the regiments of Guanajuato, San Luis and Jalico, qf
cavalry.
" General Mejia answered to the project of Ampudia, that he was ready to execute it, but the answers of the chiefs of brigade not being equally satisfactory, fiustrated the plan. It was then agreed to prosecute the fortifications of the first line,
and to undertake the second or interior intrenchments, and to so distribute the
worlk that all could labor with indefatigable strength.. The enemy, with their
characteristic energy threatened us with a strong indication of a quick advance. —
jllexican " iotcs of tlhe T'V1 ar."