The writings of George Washington; being his correspondence, addresses, messages, and other papers, official and private, selected and published from the original manuscripts; with a life of the author, notes and illustrations. By Jared Sparks.

AET. 44.] LIFE OF WASHINGTON. 193
tions, that for forty-eight hours he did not close his
eyes, and rarely dismounted from his horse.
There have been various strictures on this battle, both
in regard to the action itself, and to the policy of Washington in attempting to oppose the enemy at all on Long
Island. The strange oversight in leaving the Jamaica
road unguarded, and the neglect in procuring early and
constant intelligence of the movements of the British
army, were the immediate causes of the deplorable
events of the day. These faults, however, such as
they were, rested with the officers on the Island. General Washington had given express instructions, that the
strictest vigilance should be observed in every part of
the outer lines. It was unfortunate that the illness of
General Greene deprived the commander on the spot
of his counsel, he being thoroughly acquainted with the
grounds and the roads; whereas General Putnam took
the command only four days before the action, and of
course had not been able from personal inspection to
gain the requisite knowledge. The want of vedettes
was another unfortunate circumstance. To communicate intelligence with sufficient celerity over so wide a
space, without light-horse, was impracticable. At this
time, however, not a single company of cavalry had been
attached to the American army.
As to the other point, the propriety of maintaining a
stand on Long Island, it must be considered, that the
enemy was to be met somewhere, that the works at
Brooklyn offered a fair prospect of defence for a considerable time at least, that the abandonment of the
Island would open a free passage to General Howe to
the very borders of New York, separated only by the
East River, and that to retreat, without even a show of
resistance, as the first operation of the campaign, would
be unsatisfactory to Congress, the country, and the army.
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