Knowledge, Foundations, and Discourse: Philosophical Support for Service-Learning
Typically, these lines are drawn between discourses in which commensuration is possible and
those in which it is not. That is, we view science
as "hard" or objective in its methodology and
epistemic criteria because there exists some common ground-empirical observation, for example-for adjudicating knowledge claims. On
the other hand, we conceive of politics, art, and
literature as fields that lack an independent ground
for resolving disagreement, fields in which points
of view cannot achieve the status of genuine
cognition but remain simply matters of taste or
opinion. The distinction, we believe, is one that
separates inquiry into what is "out there" from
inquiry into what we "make up,"4 and it is in
virtue of the indeterminate ontological status of
the subject matter that we cast a suspicious eye
toward the latter.
Pragmatism argues that the line between commensurable and incommensurable discourses does
not reveal deep distinctions between where certain knowledge is possible and where it is not.
The key premise of the pragmatic view is that the
line between different discourses is contingent
not necessary, and that it has not been and will not
be drawn in the same place throughout the course
of intellectual history. Rorty (1979) recasts the
substance of this distinction between discourses
by generalizing Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science into a distinction
between normal and abnormal discourse:
[N]ormal discourse is that which is conducted
within an agreed-upon set ofconventions about
what counts as a relevant contribution, what
counts as answering a question, what counts as
having a good argument for that answer or a
good criticism of it. Abnormal discourse is
what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or
who sets them aside. [T]he product of normal
discourse [is] the sort of statement which can
be agreed to be true by all participants whom
the other participants count as "rational." The
product of abnormal discourse can be anything
from nonsense to intellectual revolution...(p.
320)
On this conception, commensuration in a given
discourse does not precede the discourse itself.
Instead, it is a by-product of agreed-upon practices of inquiry that have continued long enough
for shared conventions, rules, and standards of
evidence to develop and come into plain view. It
is an indication that the discourse and its norms
are useful, productive, or effective in the context
in which it occurs. It is not a revelation of
something deep about the underlying structure of
knowledge, for neither commensuration nor
incommensuration are permanent or necessary
features of any discourse. In certain periods, it
may be as easy to determine the aesthetic merit of
a painting as it is to determine the scientific
validity ofa measurement, while in other periods,
"it may be as difficult to know which scientists
are actually offering reasonable explanations as it
is to know which painters are destined for immortality" (Rorty, 1979, p. 322).
Thus, the line between commensurability and
incommensurability is nothing more than the line
between normal and abnormal discourses. And
this latter distinction does not parallel the distinctions between "hard" and "soft," objective and
subjective, finding and making, nature and spirit,
or facts and values.' Natural science and other
fields of inquiry do not necessarily line up as
normal and abnormal discourses, respectively,
although they may at particular slices in time.
Both modes of discourse occur within science as
well as non-science, and on a long view of intellectual history, we will find that the patterns of
argumentation and justification in the natural
sciences do not differ qualitatively from the types
of discourse in the humanities and social sciences.
The point of distinguishing between normal
and abnormal discourses is not to prioritize one or
the other as a better way of knowing. It would be
ineffective if not impossible to teach, to learn, or
to conduct a program of research without rules,
conventions, shared vocabularies, and other means
of systematizing inquiry. Normal discourse allows us to apply foundational reasoning when it
is useful to do so. In a sense, it is the starting point
for intellectual activity, for abnormal discourse is
possible and meaningful only when it occurs with
a consciousness of how it departs from a wellunderstood norm. Abnormal discourse always
presents itself as an alternative (e.g., to tradition,
to a dominant view). As a consequence, it "is
always parasitic upon normal discourse" (Rorty,
1979, pp. 365-366).
Nevertheless, because normal discourses are
the products of substantial intellectual and material investments, perhaps we need a more forceful
reminder that "normal participation in normal
discourse is merely one project, one way of being
in the world" (Rorty, 1979, p. 365). Instead of
"reducing all possible views to one" through
some means of universal commensuration (p.
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