Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 6 [Dec. 13, 1862-Nov. 3, 1863].

To Henry W. Halleck1Jump to section

Executive Mansion
Major General Halleck: Washington, Sept. 19. 1863.

By Gen. Meade's despatch to you of yesterday it appears that he desires your views and those of the government, as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order, or even advise an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great, and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two

armies confront each other across a small river, substantially midway between the two Capitals, each defending it's own Capital, and menacing the other. Gen. Meade estimates the enemies infantry in front of him at not less than forty thousand. Suppose we add fifty per cent to this, for cavalry, artillery, and extra duty men stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy sixty thousand. Gen. Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over ninety thousand. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a per centage in as the other. For a battle, then, Gen. Meade has three men to Gen. Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground, and standing on the defensive, gives so great advantage that the three can not safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemies sixty thousand are sufficient to keep our ninety thousand away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not forty thousand of ours keep their sixty thousand away from Washington, leaving us fifty thousand to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to misle[a]d myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy man for man. I hope you will consider it.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac, to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, it's objective point. If our army can not fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city. Yours truly A. LINCOLN

Annotation

[1]   ADfS, DLC-RTL; LS, IHi. Meade's despatch to Halleck of 3 P.M., September 18, is as follows:

``I have reached such a position that I do not feel justified in making a further advance without some more positive authority than was contained in your last letter enclosing one from the President. If I apprehend rightly the views of the President and yourself it was to the effect that I might advance on Lee and threaten him with an attack and not permit him to cross the Rapidan without

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giving him battle. After accomplishing this my feint might be converted into a real attack if the development of the movement and subsequent information justified the same. It is precisely this question which now embarrasses me and which I desire to be advised upon. The situation is simply this---Lee in command of Ewells and Hills Corps estimated at not less than forty thousand Infantry occupies the south bank of the Rapidan with every available point covered with artillery and prepared to dispute the passage. The character of the south bank and its command forbids any attempt being made till Morton's ford is reached which is some ten miles below the Railroad. At this place the command is on this side and I think a passage can be forced but it would undoubtedly result in a considerable sacrifice and would also most certainly involve a general engagement immediately on crossing. Presuming for the discussion that the crossing was effected and the Enemy overcome he would probably fall back on Gordonsville, as I suppose his policy is to check and retard my advance as long and where he can. I do not deem it necessary to discuss the contingencies of a failure as they will of course present themselves to your mind. The whole question however in my judgement hangs upon the advantages to be gained and the course to be pursued in event of success. I am not in condition to follow Lee to Richmond and will be less so after being weakened by a severe battle. The only thing I could do would be to change my base to the Fredericksburg Rail Road and after taking a position in front of that place await an increase of force. The men I should have to sacrifice in the operation would be sufficient to secure the longer line of communication I now have. In fine I can get a battle out of Lee under very disadvantageous circumstances which may render his inferior force my superior and which is not likely to result in any very decided advantage, even in case I should be victorious. In this view I am reluctant to run the risks involved without the positive sanction of the Government. If any demonstration on the Peninsula were practicable or a force could threaten an advance on the Fredericksburg Road Lee would I think retire from my front but I take it for granted, either of these contingencies is out of the question.

``I send this by an aide-de-camp who will bring your reply.''(DLC-RTL).