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[1] ADfS, DLC-RTL; LS, IHi. Meade's despatch to Halleck of 3 P.M., September 18, is as follows:
``I have reached such a position that I do not feel justified in making a further advance without some more positive authority than was contained in your last letter enclosing one from the President. If I apprehend rightly the views of the President and yourself it was to the effect that I might advance on Lee and threaten him with an attack and not permit him to cross the Rapidan without
giving him battle. After accomplishing this my feint might be converted into a real attack if the development of the movement and subsequent information justified the same. It is precisely this question which now embarrasses me and which I desire to be advised upon. The situation is simply this---Lee in command of Ewells and Hills Corps estimated at not less than forty thousand Infantry occupies the south bank of the Rapidan with every available point covered with artillery and prepared to dispute the passage. The character of the south bank and its command forbids any attempt being made till Morton's ford is reached which is some ten miles below the Railroad. At this place the command is on this side and I think a passage can be forced but it would undoubtedly result in a considerable sacrifice and would also most certainly involve a general engagement immediately on crossing. Presuming for the discussion that the crossing was effected and the Enemy overcome he would probably fall back on Gordonsville, as I suppose his policy is to check and retard my advance as long and where he can. I do not deem it necessary to discuss the contingencies of a failure as they will of course present themselves to your mind. The whole question however in my judgement hangs upon the advantages to be gained and the course to be pursued in event of success. I am not in condition to follow Lee to Richmond and will be less so after being weakened by a severe battle. The only thing I could do would be to change my base to the Fredericksburg Rail Road and after taking a position in front of that place await an increase of force. The men I should have to sacrifice in the operation would be sufficient to secure the longer line of communication I now have. In fine I can get a battle out of Lee under very disadvantageous circumstances which may render his inferior force my superior and which is not likely to result in any very decided advantage, even in case I should be victorious. In this view I am reluctant to run the risks involved without the positive sanction of the Government. If any demonstration on the Peninsula were practicable or a force could threaten an advance on the Fredericksburg Road Lee would I think retire from my front but I take it for granted, either of these contingencies is out of the question.
``I send this by an aide-de-camp who will bring your reply.''(DLC-RTL).