To William S. Rosecrans 
My Dear General Rosecrans Washington, August 10, 1863.
Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must have inferred more than Gen Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded, could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts, in regard to you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I have seen most of your despatches to General Halleck---probably all of them. After Grant invested Vicksburg, I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside, and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone, and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me, it was the exactly proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness, let me say, it so seems to me yet. Finding from your despatches to General Halleck that your judgement was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion told Gen. Halleck, I thought he should direct you to decide at once, to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive, and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed, in substance. Soon after, despatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw a despatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before but would be after the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely; and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him, than you could before he could so return to his assistance.
Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved, it has seemed to me that your chance for a stroke, has been considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee to be occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention. The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you more animals today than you had at the battle of Stone River? and yet have not more been furnished you since then than your entire present stock? I ask the same questions as to your mounted force.
Do not misunderstand. I am not casting blame upon you. IPage 378 rather think, by great exertion, you can get to East Tennessee. But a very important question is, ``Can you stay there?'' I make no order in the case---that I leave to General Halleck and yourself.
And now, be assured once more, that I think of you in all kindness and confidence: and that I am not watching you with an evileye. Yours very truly
 Copy, DLC-RTL. Halleck's despatches to Rosecrans on July 24 and 25 continued to urge the importance of a movement on General Braxton Bragg's army at Chattanooga before Bragg could be reinforced by General Joseph E. Johnston: ``There is great disappointment felt here at the slowness of your advance. Unless you can move more rapidly, your whole campaign will prove a failure . . . .'' (OR, XXIII, II, 552). On August 1, Rosecrans replied to Halleck, explaining the difficulties of terrain and supply which confronted his army (ibid., p. 585), and also wrote Lincoln to the same effect, with the observation that ``Genl. Hallecks dispatches imply that you not only feel solicitude for the advance of this Army but dissatisfaction at its supposed inactivity.'' (DLC-RTL).