Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 6 [Dec. 13, 1862-Nov. 3, 1863].

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Title
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 6 [Dec. 13, 1862-Nov. 3, 1863].
Author
Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865.
Publication
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press
1953.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/lincoln6
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"Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 6 [Dec. 13, 1862-Nov. 3, 1863]." In the digital collection Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/lincoln6. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 18, 2024.

Pages

Page 341

To Oliver O. Howard1Jump to section

Executive Mansion,
My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863.

Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very truly A. LINCOLN

Annotation

[1]   ADfS, DLC-RTL. General Howard's letter of July 18, marked ``Unofficial'' by Howard, reads:

``Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battles [sic] of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding General prior to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during the war been thrown in at just the right moment. . . . Moreover I have never seen a more hearty co-operation on the part of General officers as since General Meade took the command.

``As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us; at any rate the Commanding General was in favor of an immediate attack but with the evident difficulties in our way the uncertainty of a success and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risk, I must say, that I think the General acted wisely.

``As to my request to make a reconnaissance on the morning of the 14th which the papers state was refused; the facts are, that the General had required me to reconnoitre the evening before and give my opinion as to the practicability of making a lodgement on the enemy's left, and his answer to my subsequent request was, that the movements he had already ordered would subserve the same purpose.

``We have, if I may be allowed to say it, a Commanding General in whom all the officers, with whom I have come in contact, express complete confidence. I have said this much because of the censure and of the misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee's army.'' (DLC-RTL).

Howard doubtless referred to a Washington dispatch of July 17, entitled ``The Escape of Lee's Army,'' appearing in the New York Tribune of July 18, stating: ``The President sent two dispatches to Gen. Meade a day or two before the escape of the enemy across the river, in both of which he urged the necessity of an immediate attack. In one of these dispatches he said he thought all the appearances indicated that no other occasion would speedily arise offering circumstances

Page 342

so favorable to us and so unfavorable to the enemy. He therefore wished a battle to be delivered at once. In the council of war which decided against attacking Gen. Lee, at a time when subsequent disclosures have shown only two-thirds of his army, perhaps forty thousand men would have been in line to receive our soldiers flushed with victory, the other third having already crossed, the Generals who pronounced against the attack were [John] Sedgwick, [George] Sykes, [William H.] French, [Alexander] Hays and [Henry W.] Slocum. Those in favor of attack were Generals Meade, Howard, Pleasonton, and [James S.] Wadsworth, temporarily commanding the First Corps, (Gen. John Newton being sick), with Generals [Andrew A.] Humphreys and [Gouverneur K.] Warren, of Gen. Meade's staff. The last named made a powerful speech, in which he showed the necessity of immediate movement. Gen. Wadsworth also, adding his voice to his vote, insisted with all his might that there was the occasion to destroy Lee's army.''

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