To William B. Franklin and William F. Smith1Jump to section
Major General Smith Washington, Dec. 22. 1862.
Yours of the 20th. suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan, and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men. Meanwhile let me say it seems to me to present the old questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula, and the line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out as pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as heretofore, if you go to James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line, to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty.
When I saw Gen. Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River last July, I can not be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the Army away from there2Jump to section
Yours very truly A. LINCOLN
Annotation
[1] ADfS, DLC-RTL. The lengthy letter of December 20 from Major Generals Franklin and Smith advocated the return to a plan of attack via the James River and expressed the generals' opinion that ``the plan of campaign already commenced will not be successful'' (OR, I, XXI, 868-70). On January 23, 1863, Burnside issued an order relieving Smith and Franklin from their commands: ``It being evident [they] can be of no further service to this army. . . .'' (Ibid.,999); but the order was not approved by Lincoln, and Burnside himself was removed a few days later.
[2] General Franklin's reply of December 26 is not in the Lincoln Papers or in the Official Records, but a copy in the Butler Papers (DLC) reads:
``In arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River, we supposed Washington to be garrisoned sufficiently and the Potomac impassable except by bridges. The fortifications of Harpers Ferry is another important requisite. These matters were considered as of course and did not enter into our discussion of the two plans of campaign.
``I presume that you are right in supposing that I advised the withdrawal of the army from James River in July last. I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice. The Army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there