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My view of the present condition of the War is about as follows:
The evacuation of Corinth, and our delay by the flood in the Chicahominy, has enabled the enemy to concentrate too much
force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force any where else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or, if a large part of the Western Army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri &c. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and, take Chatanooga & East Tennessee, without more---a reasonable force should, in every event, be kept about Washington for it's protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which added to McClellan, directly or indirectly, will take Richmond, without endangering any other place which we now hold---and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsakes me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow---so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly. Yours very truly A. LINCOLN
[1] ADfS, DLC-RTL. Secretary Seward carried the original letter to New York to show to Union governors in order to get them to issue new calls for troops, but at the New York conference it was decided that a direct official appeal would be preferable, this to be issued in response to a memorial from the governors to the president suggesting the call. See Lincoln's call of June 30 and July 1, infra.