Annotation
[1] ALS, RPB. Schurz's seven-page letter written from Fremont's headquarters on June 12 reads in part as follows: ``When I took leave of you, you authorized me to send you a confidential report about the condition of things in this Department. . . . I have already seen and heard enough to give a reliable opinion. . . . It is a fact. . . that, when you ordered Gen. Fremont to march from Franklin to Harrisonburg, it was absolutely impossible to carry out the order. The army was in a starving condition and literally unable to fight. . . . it is undoubtedly a very fortunate circumstance that Gen. Fremont did not succeed in placing himself across Jacksons line of retreat; for Jacksons force was so much superior (all the Generals. . . put at 25,000 as the very lowest) that he would in all probability have been beaten. . . .'' (DLC-RTL).
[2] Schurz replied to Lincoln's questions in a telegram received at 5:40 P.M. on June 16, as follows: ``Your Despatch received About the correctness of Genl Fremonts report there can be no question When he attacked Jackson at Cross Keyes the cooperation of Genl Shields was expected Jackson being immediately between them when Shields withdrew and Jackson was largely reinforced. The conditions were no longer the same and it was in reference to this new state of things that my letter was written. As to Shields I wrote on the information I had More by letter'' (DLC-RTL). In a four-page letter written on the same day Schurz explained in detail Fremont's strategy and need for withdrawal (DLC-Nicolay Papers).