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My dear Sir: You and I have distinct, and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac---yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the Railroad on the York River---, mine to move directly to a point on the Railroad South West of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time, and money than mine?
2nd. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
3rd. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?
4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable, in this, that it would break no great line of the enemie's communications, while mine would?
5th. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than by mine? Yours truly A. LINCOLN
[Memorandum accompanying Letter of President to General McClellan, dated February 3, 1862]2Jump to section
1. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the Ocoquan, what? In view of the possibility of this, might it not be safest to have our entire force to move together from above the Ocoquan.
2. Suppose the enemy, in force, shall dispute the crossing of the Ocoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross the Ocoquan at Colchester rather than at the village of Ocoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us, but would, on the contrary, leave us two miles further from our ultimate destination.
3. Suppose we reach Maple valley without an attack, will we not be attacked there, in force, by the enemy marching by the several roads from Manassas? and if so, what?
[1] ALS and AD (enclosure?), DLC-Stanton Papers. The supposition that the memorandum was enclosed with this letter is based upon the fact that the memorandum is so described in the Official Records. The undated memorandum is not, however, with the letter in the Stanton Papers, and the particular references in it to crossing the Occoquan suggest that it may have antedated the letter, as a memo of questions which Lincoln intended to put to McClellan verbally during a conference later than the memorandum of c. December 1, 1861 (supra), but prior to the issuing of his Special War Order of January 31, 1862 (supra). The memorandum may have been jotted down as early as January 13, on which day Lincoln held a council of war with McClellan and several other generals, as well as cabinet members, but could scarcely have been written on February 3, since by that date Lincoln was already aware that McClellan would not favor his plan.
Upon receipt of Lincoln's Special War Order, McClellan wrote Stanton a twenty-two page letter under the same date, January 31. Although there is no mistaking the date as McClellan wrote it on the letter, the containing envelope is endorsed by Lincoln ``From Gen. McClellan Jan. 30. 1862.'' Lincoln's endorsement is certainly dated one day too soon, unless both the Special Order and McClellan's letter were prepared in advance of the dates which they bear. Beyond
reasonable doubt, however, the date under which McClellan incorporated his letter in his official ``report of the operations of Army of the Potomac while under my charge,'' is wrong. McClellan's report, dated at New York, August 4, 1863, prints the letter with numerous details at variance with the original letter in the Lincoln Papers, and in dating his letter February 3, instead of January 31, McClellan either deliberately falsified the record in an effort to support his own case or inadvertently committed an error which had the same effect.
McClellan's report (OR, I, V, 41 ff.) stated that, after receiving Lincoln's Special Order, ``I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded as final, or whether I could be permitted to submit in writing my objections to his plan and my reasons for preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared the letter to the Secretary of War which is given below [under date of February 3 in McClellan's report, but dated January 31 in the original in the Lincoln Papers].
``Before this had been submitted to the President he addressed me the following note: [Lincoln's letter of February 3, but without the enclosure, is here given by McClellan.]
``These questions were substantially answered by the following letter of the same date to the Secretary of War:''
Immediately following, under date of February 3, is the letter of January 31, altered somewhat in minor details in the early paragraphs and marked by the significant omission of important passages toward the end. The letter is too long for reproduction here in its entirety, but because the original contains important passages not in the Official Records, and because of the strange circumstances surrounding the question of date, the heart of McClellan's statement is reproduced below. Portions in italic type are the passages which McClellan omitted in his official report:
``Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac.---
I. That of Washington---its present position---involving a direct attack upon the enemy's entrenched positions at Centreville, Manassas etc, or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans.
``The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks.
``An attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication & cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right & left.
``Should we attack his right by the line of the Occoquan & a crossing of the Potomac below the Occoquan & near his batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's extreme right with his centre (we might destroy the former), we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, & strike more directly his main railway communication.
``The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of Bull Run are watched by the rebels, batteries are said to be placed on the heights in rear (concealed by the woods), & the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of the stream. Information has just been received to the effect that the enemy are entrenching a line of heights extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union Mills?) towards Evansport. Early in Jany. Sprigg's ford was occupied by Genl Rhodes with 3600 men & 8 guns; there are strong reasons for believing that Davis' Ford is occupied.
``These circumstances indicate, or prove, that the enemy anticipate the movement in question & are prepared to resist it. Assuming for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress.
``In the present state of affairs our columns (for the movement of so large a
force must be made in several columns, at least 5 or 6) can reach the Accotinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangster's & Union Mills;---this danger must be met by occupying in some force either the two first named places, or, better, the point of junction of the roads leading thence to the village of Occoquan---this occupation must be continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won.
``The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's Run to the mouth, the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force we must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line or be taken in flank himself.
``Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries, partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac, partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Acquia, & lastly to establish our communication with the river by the best roads, & thus give us new depots.
``The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bulls Run, holding Brentsville in force & perhaps extending his lines somewhat farther to the S.W.
``Our next step would be to prevent the enemy from crossing the Occoquan between Bull Run & Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank while moving on Brentsville; this might be effected by occupying Bacon [?] Church & the cross roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more effectually by moving to the fords themselves & preventing him from debouching on our side. These operations would probably be resisted, & would require some time to effect them. As nearly at the same time as possible we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad Run.
``Having secured our right flank it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between our right flank & main body. The final movement on the Railroad must be determined by circumstances existing at the time.
``This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, & a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the defensive with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.
``Should we place a portion of our force in front of Centreville while the rest crosses the Occoquan we commit the error of dividing our Army by a very difficult obstacle & by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in check.
``I should perhaps have dwelled more decidedly on the fact that the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan, until the decisive battle is over, to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select & entrench a new base somewhere near Dumfries---a proceeding involving much time.
``After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could be drawn in to a more central & less exposed position, say Brimstone Hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will for a considerable period be very uncertain, & a movement commenced in force on roads in tolerably firm condition will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains & snow. It will therefore be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid manoeuvres;---our slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes & take his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we possess, that he has improved the roads leading to his lines of defense, while we must work as we advance.
``Bearing in mind what has been said, & the present unprecedented, & impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line, nor can its duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse it is possible to commence the march.
``Assuming the success of this operation & the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained.
``I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, & the moral effect of the victory---important results it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army; for he could fall back upon other positions, & fight us again & again, should the condition of his troops permit.
``If he is in no condition to fight us again out of range of the entrenchments at Richmond we would find it a very difficult & tedious matter to follow him up there---for he would destroy the railroad bridges & otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; & we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the entire theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond with a smaller available force & at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once.
``We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces & perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to strike him where least prepared.
``II. The second base of operations available for the Army of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land routes to Richmond, & strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East.
``The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.
``The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable)---much more level---more cleared land---the woods less dense---soil more sandy---the spring some two or three weeks earlier.
``A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his entrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond & Norfolk.
``He must do this, for should he permit us to occupy Richmond his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which he must be the assailant.
``This movement if successful gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power; & the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee & North Carolina
``The alternatives presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves; disperse; or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. [McClellan referred to a well-known episode in military history when the Samnites hemmed in the Romans at the ``Caudine Forks'' in southern Italy, in 321 B.C.] Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly secured by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water, our right is secure for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time---he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play.
``After a successful battle our position would be---Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh & Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee & Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville & Memphis. The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington & Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina & Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the Naval Expedition from New Orleans.
``We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississip[p]i; to reestablish our Govt & arms in Arkansas, Louisiana & Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the rebels;---to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I have ever had in view: this is the general plan which I have hoped to accomplish. For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme; from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that they too could perform their allotted duties. Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant results is Urbana on the lower Rappahanock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one long march from West Point, the Key of that region, & thence but two marches to Richmond.
``A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, & enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced. Should we fail in that we could, with the cooperation of the Navy, cross the James & throw ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out & attack us---for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank of the river.
``Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana we can use Mob Jack Bay,---or---the worst coming to the worst---we can take Fort Monroe as a base, & operate with complete security, altho' with less celerity & brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula. To reach whatever point may be selected as the base, a large amount of cheap water transportation must be collected---consisting mainly of canal boats, barges, wood boats, schooners etc towed by small steamers---all of a very different character from those required for all previous expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within 30 days from the time the order is given.
``I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as the landing place of the first detachments. To transport by water four (4) Divisions of Infantry, with their batteries, the Regular Infty, a few wagons, one bridge train & a few squadrons of cavalry---making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible. To move the Regular Cavalry, & Reserve Artillery, the remaining bridge trains, & wagons to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry boats, march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the movement by an Infantry force placed near Heathsville), cross the Rappahannock in a similar way. The expense & difficulty of the movement will thus be much diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses!), & the result none the less certain.
``The concentration of the cavalry etc in the lower counties of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, & the movement made without delay from that cause. This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be (according to circumstances) from 110,000 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter number, by bringing fresh troops into Washington, & still leaving it quite safe.
``I fully realize that, in all projects offered, time is probably the most valuable consideration---it is my decided opinion that in that point of view the 2nd plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay highly probable, that the weather & state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results & great risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan.
``IN THE FIRST CASE, we can fix no definite time for an advance---the roads have gone from bad to worse---nothing like their present condition has ever been known here before---they are impassable at present, we are entirely at the mercy
of the weather. In the second plan, we can calculate almost to a day, & with but little regard to the season. ``If at the expense of 30 days delay we can gain a decisive victory which will probably end the war, it is far cheaper than to gain a battle tomorrow that produces no final results, & may require years of warfare & expenditure to follow up. ``Such, I think, is precisely the difference between the two plans discussed in this long letter. A battle gained at Manassas will result merely in the possession of the field of combat---at best we can follow it up but slowly, unless we do what I now propose, viz:---change the line of operations. ``On the Mannassas line the rebels can, if well enough disciplined (& we have every reason to suppose that to be the case) dispute our advance, over bad roads, from position to position. ``When we have gained the battle, if we do gain it, the question will at once arise---`What are we to do next?'---
``It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas.
``On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war.
``We demoralize the enemy, by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, & where success must produce immense results. My judgement as a General is clearly in favor of this project.
``Nothing is CERTAIN in war---but all the chances are in favor of this movement.
``So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fort Monroe as a base, as a certain, tho' less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.
``I know that his Excellency the President, you & I all agree in our wishes---& that our desire is to bring this war to as prompt a close as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us---I am sure of it---let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished, & disregard everything else.
``In conclusion I would respectfully, but firmly, advise that I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana ``I believe that it can be carried into execution so nearly simultaneously with the final advance of Buell & Halleck that the columns will support each other ``I will stake my life, my reputation on the result---more than that, I will stake upon it the success of our cause. ``I hope but little from the attack on Manassas;---my judgment is against it. Foreign complications may entirely change the state of affairs, & render very different plans necessary. In that event I will be ready to submit them.'' (DLC-RTL).
McClellan's report (loc. cit., p. 45) continued as follows:
``This letter must have produced some effect upon the mind of the President, since the execution of his order was not required, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been issued. . . .''
As a possible solution to the apparent contradictions in dates, it may be concluded that McClellan composed his letter of January 31 following a prior conference with Lincoln at which the two plans were discussed, that Stanton failed to forward McClellan's letter to the president until after Lincoln had written McClellan on February 3, and that McClellan changed the date of his letter from January 31 to February 3 when he drew up his report in 1863, in order to avoid the apparent contradiction in dates. If this conclusion is correct, the error of one day appearing in Lincoln's endorsement on the envelope containing McClellan's letter becomes more understandable, in that Lincoln probably so endorsed it upon receiving it from Stanton sometime after February 3. In this event McClellan never did specifically reply to Lincoln's questions of February 3, but on January 31 had anticipated them in some degree and in part answered
them before Lincoln put them in writing. In conclusion it may be noted that the questions posed in Lincoln's undated memorandum, which the Official Records describe as an enclosure with Lincoln's letter, are more adequately disposed of by McClellan than are the questions posed by Lincoln in the letter itself. This fact tends to confirm the supposition that the memorandum was written prior to both Lincoln's letter of February 3 and McClellan's letter of January 31.
[2] The bracketed title is not on the autograph document but is given to the memorandum as printed in the Official Records (I, V, 713). It is worth noting also that McClellan's report does not include this memorandum along with the letter of February 3, the two items being related by means of a footnote.