Abstract

In the present experiment, we asked two interrelated questions: (a) whether the dominant cultural orientation of bilingual female speakers (collectivism versus individualism), as promoted by the language currently in use (Arabic versus English), would lead respondents to treat guilt and shame as distinct or largely similar emotions; and (b) whether the affective profiles of guilt and shame would replicate or diverge from those attributed by the existing literature to members of individualistic cultures whose primary language is English. In the experiment, bilingual female speakers (n = 182) completed a measure of cultural self-orientation, recalled an experience of either guilt or shame, and then rated the emotion recalled on descriptive scales. They accomplished these tasks by relying on either English or Arabic. Although the two emotions were narrowly differentiated, shame was found to be more dominant than guilt. Shame also yielded a greater focus on oneself. Contrary to the expectation of higher emotionality for the first language (Arabic), language differences mostly underlined differences in participants’ focus of attention, either others or oneself. These findings are compared with those reported in the cross-cultural literature, and implications are discussed.

Keywords: guilt, shame, language, culture

Both English and Arabic contain distinct terms for shame (al-'ar; العار ) and guilt (al-dhanb;الذنب ). A review of the literature on the meaning of these words in English, mostly produced by scholars from the Western world (i.e., North America and Western Europe), uncovers a collection of slightly diverse definitions, each underscoring their differences and similarities. Discrepancies exist in both the scholarly literature and the ordinary usage of these terms, raising the obvious question of whether shame and guilt in the everyday life of different cultures are essentially shades of the same affective phenomenon. For instance, although evidence exists that the events that elicit shame tend to be more ambiguous and surprising (Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983), the specific events that people cite as triggers of either shame or guilt can be similar, including cheating, lying, and stealing (Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Stipek (1998) notes that these terms are generally used to refer to situations where personal traits or actions and their outcomes are judged against personal or social standards; failure to meet personal standards is thought to result in the experience of shame, whereas failure to conform to social standards (i.e., transgression) is thought to result in the experience of guilt (see also Ausubel, 1955; Campos & Barrett, 1984; Izard, 2013; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). However, Bierbrauer (1992) refers to shame as a defensive response to the criticism of others, which stems from one’s fears of rejection and retraction of social support, whereas he treats guilt as self-criticism arising from failures to meet internalized standards. Gilbert (2003) takes an evolutionary perspective to differentiate between these two emotions; he argues that shame derives from a threat to the self and the need to be acceptable to others, and thus possesses an inward focus and essentially is an epiphenomenon of a self-defensive mode. Guilt instead originates from one’s responsibility toward others, possesses an outward focus, and is related to competencies for altruism. Other scholars, such as Wong and Tsai (2007), suggest the opposite, that shame involves being evaluated negatively by either real or imagined others (i.e., being focused on others and thus possessing an outward orientation), whereas guilt involves being evaluated by oneself negatively (i.e., being focused on oneself and thus possessing an inward orientation).

Perhaps the most popular characterization of shame and guilt experiences as being fundamentally different from each other is less about the specific undesirable behavior or transgression a person has exhibited, but rather the person’s attributional focus (Lewis, 1971). Namely, shame is said to involve the recognition of a flawed self who is both the agent of an undesirable action (e.g., “I cannot believe I did that”) and the object of analysis and condemnation (e.g., “I am unworthy”). In this form of self-analysis, the audience is the self who is expressing a negative judgment for the person he/she has become. Thus, one’s inadequacies are exposed, though a real audience may or may not be present. Instead, guilt is said to involve the recognition of a flawed action that reflects negatively on the self, but the self is not the central object of the analysis and related condemnation. Namely, a person feels criticized for what he/she has done. The presumed different attentional focus that characterizes guilt and shame leads to the assumption that shame motivates the person who experiences it to conceal or escape, whereas guilt inspires the person who experiences it to engage in actions that repair (e.g., apologies, confessions) and undo the damage that they have caused (Wollheim, 1999). Shame calls for others (either real or imagined) to forget what was done, whereas guilt asks others to forgive. Although most empirical evidence, largely from the Western world, has supported Lewis’s definition of these two self-conscious emotions as substantially different in the manner in which they are felt (Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983), evidence of undifferentiation also exists (Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2013; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 1987). For instance, Wicker and colleagues (1983) found that differences in the ratings of the two emotions on several phenomenological dimensions were mostly of magnitude rather than of valence. Tangney and colleagues (1996) also found no evidence of the distinction between focus on a flawed self and focus on one’s undesirable actions for shame and guilt, respectively. Even Lewis reported that shame and guilt “tend to fuse with each other” (1971, p. 35) and, as such, they are “easily confused with each other” (p. 37).

Self-Conscious Emotions and Culture

Cultures are loose patterns of attitudes, beliefs, schemas, categories, norms, roles, and values that are shared by individuals who speak a common language and generally live in a given territory during a particular time period (Triandis, 1989; 1995). At the individual level, interiorized cultures shape the orientation of the self towards others (i.e., dependent versus independent), the relative importance of personal versus group goals, the extent to which behavior is assumed to result from dispositional versus situational determinants, and one’s emphasis on communal relationships versus equitable exchanges (Kitayama & Markus, 1995).

An interiorized culture can shape not only perceptions of the self and others, but also emotional experiences (Hoffman, Lau, & Johnson, 1986; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). A relevant dimension along which cultural patterns can be described is whether their predominant orientation is collectivistic or individualistic (Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995). As shame and guilt are self-conscious emotions, evidence of differences between shame and guilt gathered from participants whose cultural orientation is individualism may not apply to individuals whose cultural orientation is collectivism. The main reason is that such differences refer to an independent and stable self that is bounded, separate from others, and whose orientation, at any given point in time, can be clearly classified as either internal or external. In collectivism, the self and others are less clearly detached and the boundaries of one’s personal space are more permeable (Feghali, 1997). Because others’ thoughts and feelings are not less important than one’s own thoughts and feelings, the self is much more susceptible to situational forces, and thus variability of the self rather than stability across time is viewed as normative (Wong & Tsai, 2007).

Even though cross-cultural studies on self-conscious emotions exist, the bulk of empirical evidence has come from comparisons involving the collectivistic cultures of east Asia (e.g., China and Japan) and the individualistic culture of the United States (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Empirical evidence from the collectivistic cultures of the Arabian Peninsula in general, and from the culture of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, is missing. Besides the uncertainty that surrounds scholarly attempts to elucidate the meanings of guilt and shame, the ordinary use of these and other emotional words is notoriously imprecise. Thus, the existence of distinct words for shame and guilt in the Arabic language, as in the English language, does not automatically support the postulation that the referent emotions are indeed treated differently in everyday life. Laypersons in Saudi Arabia may use the terms shame and guilt interchangeably, thereby disregarding semantic differences recognized by some Western scholars (see Panayiotou, 2006).

Saudi culture has been described as predominantly collectivistic/interdependent, whereas the culture of the United States, where most of the evidence on guilt and shame has been collected, has been labeled individualistic/independent (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The collectivistic perspective (also called allocentrism) regards the self as interdependent because a person’s identity is shaped by relationships and embodies group cohesion, loyalty to and solidarity with one’s family, tribe, or nation. The individualistic perspective (also called idiocentrism), however, regards the self as capable of existing irrespective of one’s ingroup and thus a person’s identity is driven by intense self-enhancing tendencies, desires to stand on one’s own feet, and persistent efforts towards personal achievement.

According to Kitayama, Mesquita, and Karasawa (2006), cultural patterns can evoke and foster different sets of emotions which people spontaneously categorize and recognize for their valence and social orientation. Socially engaging emotions, irrespective of whether they are positive or negative, are defined as those that reflect and nurture an interdependent self, whereas socially disengaging emotions are defined as those that reflect and nurture an independent self. Evidence exists that people from collectivistic cultures, which emphasize interdependence and engagement (e.g., Japanese nationals), experience more often and more intensely engaging emotions in naturally occurring situations, whereas people from individualistic cultures, which emphasize independence and disengagement (e.g., USA nationals), experience higher frequency and intensity of disengaging emotions (Kitayama, Marcus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kitayama et al., 2006).

Kitayama and colleagues (2006) do not differentiate between guilt and shame. Both are classified as negative engaging emotions. The few studies designed to test cross-cultural differences in shame and guilt experiences have sought to see whether individualistic and collectivistic cultures use guilt and shame differently for social control. For instance, if one assumes that shame is a threat to the self, members of collectivistic societies may be expected to experience greater shame reactions than those of individualistic societies because the boundaries between the self and others, as well as those between public and private selves (Feghali, 1997; Hall, 1966), are less well-defined. The findings of these studies have been inconclusive. Cross-cultural evidence from the collectivistic culture of China and the individualistic culture of the United States has not shown differences in the intensity of either emotion for transgressions involving the self, but merely greater intensity for transgressions carried out by members of one’s kinship (Stipek, 1998). Ghorbani and Liao (2014) report that Chinese people who were born and raised in China experience both more guilt and shame than Chinese people socialized in an individualistic culture (e.g., who were born in Canada or had moved to Canada at an early age). Marsella, Murray, and Golden (1974) find that Chinese immigrants experience stronger shame than individuals of European descent. Bierbrauer (1992) reports that people of Lebanese and Kurdish descent, who exhibit a collectivistic orientation, experience greater shame and guilt than Germans, who exhibit an individualistic orientation. Johnson and colleagues (1987) relate that Koreans, who express a collectivistic orientation, experience less shame and guilt than participants from Taiwan, who also express a collectivistic orientation, as well as American participants, who exhibit an individualistic orientation. The same research reports a high degree of cross-cultural agreement among all groups on the specific undesirable actions that may trigger either emotion and on the severity attributed to these actions.

It is clear that the available cross-cultural evidence raises the question of whether Saudi nationals would exhibit a different affective profile for each of these two emotions, and if so, whether the contents of each profile would differ from the published experiences reported by those whose cultural orientation is individualism. Anecdotal evidence and scholarly observations, rather than solid empirical evidence, suggest that shame and guilt should be experienced as different affective patterns by Saudi nationals. For instance, Sharabi (1977) whose work focuses on urban, middle-class Muslim families, asserts that shame is at the core of the childrearing practices of educational, religious, and family institutions. Specifically, he states that the child “is made to feel ashamed because others see him as having acted wrongly, not because he inwardly regrets having done wrong and judges himself accordingly” (p. 248). In his review of Saudi law, Souryal (1987) states that the misbehavior of a Saudi is thought to bring shame to his/her family and entire tribe, thereby tainting the sharaf (honor) of all parties involved. If shame is viewed as a key aspect of punishment, guilt has a redeeming quality. Namely, according to traditional customs, offenders may be offered pardon if they admit their guilt and repent before they are brought to account for their deeds.

Differences between shame and guilt in Saudi Arabia are also expected if credence is given to the controversial distinction between shame cultures, which allegedly exercise social control primarily by means of external sanctions, and guilt cultures, which purportedly exercise social control mostly by means of their members’ internalized sanctions (Scheff, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). This distinction, which has been criticized for its value judgment and mixed support (Ghorbani & Liao, 2014; Panayiotou, 2006; Scheff, 1994), has been often used to refer to the relative importance of each emotion in collectivistic cultures, where shame is allegedly dominant, and in individualistic cultures, where guilt is purportedly dominant. Furthermore, if any support is found for it, comparisons mostly include the collectivistic cultures of China or Japan and the individualistic cultures of the United States or western Europe (Fessler, 2004; Ho, Fu, & Ng, 2004; Li, Wang, & Fischer, 2004; Marsella, Murray, & Golden, 1974). Saudi Arabia is a state where traditions, religiously colored and developed in the harsh physical environment of the desert and steppe, are placed alongside economic and social forces that emulate Western lifestyles, mostly grown in urban centers and propelled by a rapidly expanding youth population (Ménoret, 2005; Murphy, 2012). Thus, forms of collectivism in Saudi Arabia and in east Asia may not be isomorphic. Indeed, applying the label of collectivism to Saudi Arabia may overlook the cultural complexities of that country, which need to be addressed if sensible predictions are to be formulated. For example, Saudi Arabia and the United States share the dimension of verticality (i.e., they envision an individual who exists within a hierarchical social order; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). Additionally, Saudi Arabia, which came into existence as a nation almost a century ago, has gone through a series of social and economic changes (Al-Ghadhami, 2013, 2014; Omar, 2014): (1) a pre-oil period, characterized by tribal traditions, (2) a modernization phase (circa 1940-1960), characterized by the opening to the West and its economic and cultural influences, (3) the awakening phase (circa 1980-2000), defined by a return to traditional religious values, and (4) the present characterized by attempts at adjusting to two conflicting forces. On one side, Saudi Arabia has faced the pressure to modernize its economic, social, educational, and governmental structures, and has done so mostly by emulating Western models of consumerism (Assad, 2006); on the other side, it has struggled to maintain traditions based on vertical collectivistic values and institutionalized religious doctrine. Most importantly, the forces promoting traditional values and customs have encouraged commitment to one’s kinship, thereby emphasizing solidarity and cohesion towards one’s group, and competition towards other groups, thereby underscoring one’s honor and reputation by comparison with others. Competition is a key aspect of vertical individualism, which defines American culture (Singelis et al., 1995). Not surprisingly, a recent study by Maddux, San Martin, Sinaceur, and Kitayama (2011) has shown that contrary to evidence obtained in other collectivistic cultures, the frequency with which Saudi nationals experience disengaging emotions is comparable to that of Americans. The important caveat of this study is that participants were not only Saudi nationals, but also Arabic-English bilingual speakers who responded to a series of questionnaires and scales written in English (i.e., their second language). A bilingual speaker’s use of English may further promote thinking of oneself as independent rather than interdependent. If so, the findings of Maddux and colleagues may be accounted for by the impact of language as a vehicle of culture.

It is important to note that most of the cross-cultural research devoted to the study of self-conscious emotions has involved comparisons between groups of individuals. An alternative approach to the study of cultural influences originates from the phenomenon of “frame switching”, which refers to the ability of bilingual individuals who have been socialized in two cultures to shift between interiorized cultural frames in response to environmental cues and demands (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). This approach relies on the assumption that internalized cultures, as much as languages, do not necessarily blend, but rather coexist in the bilingual mind as separate constructs that become accessible at different times, depending on the demands and cues of the surrounding environment. Namely, from a functional viewpoint, possessing a culture or a language is analogous to possessing any of the mental constructs that define human cognition in the sense that it does not entail relying on each one continuously. Hence, cross-cultural comparisons (Hong et al., 2000) can be performed on individuals who are fluent speakers of two languages and thus can be considered vehicles of two distinct cultures.

One powerful cue that is capable of triggering frame switching is language (Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997). In this regard, a language “is ‘a veil’ over the reality of the culture in which it is used, involving an agreement of its users about what there is to be seen and how it should be seen” (Kim, 1988, p. 89). Exposure to two cultural frames of reference, the traditional vertical collectivistic culture of the Arab tradition and the vertical individualistic culture of the Western world, can be assumed to be particularly substantial in Saudi Arabic-English bilingual speakers. In fact, as speakers of two languages, they may be accustomed to crossing linguistic and cultural boundaries, and perhaps can identify with each of the two sides of such boundaries (El Alaoui, Mulhem, Pilotti, Aamir, & Ahmad Tallouzi, 2017; Hong et al., 2000). Thus, bilingual speakers may be the ideal population for cross-linguistic/cultural comparisons because they are capable of subjectively experiencing emotions in each language through its corresponding culture (Panayiotou, 2006).

The timing of language acquisition is a factor in evaluating the emotional understanding of words. Sequential bilingual speakers are individuals who have acquired their second language after their first language. Previous studies of sequential bilingual speakers report that they experience their second language as less emotional than their first language. Namely, although they may be proficient in the second language, and thus appreciate the emotional connotation of its words, they do not sense such words as intuitively and automatically as those in their first language (Opitz & Degner; 2012; Pavlenko, 2008). As a result, for instance, they feel less inhibited to talk about embarrassing topics in their second language (Bond & Lai, 1986). As adults, they remember childhood reprimands spoken in their first language with greater emotional resonance and stronger arousal than equivalent reprimands spoken in the second language (Anooshian & Hertel, 1994; Harris, Aycicegi, & Gleason, 2003).

Differences in emotional responsiveness are generally attributed to both the timing and the context of acquisition. The vocabulary of the first language tends to be learned in the context of early relationships through which speakers initially experience the full range of basic human emotions (Schrauf, 2000). The vocabulary of the second language is learned in the context of later social relationships, which tend to develop at work and in school, that is, in settings where codified formalities regulate emotional expression. As a result, the second language is likely to reflect the speaker’s emotional control and distance (Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Ervin, 1964). It follows that sequential bilingual speakers can offer valuable information regarding not only the impact of cultural orientation on the experience of self-conscious emotions, but also the extent to which the age of acquisition of the language in use may modulate the experience.

Overview of the Present Study

In the present study, we examined the extent to which the reported differences in the experience of guilt and shame obtained from individualistic cultures, are reflected in individuals whose dominant cultural orientation, evoked by the language in use, is either collectivistic or individualistic. The approach used was not to compare groups of individuals who pertain to different cultural and/or national groups, but rather to examine self-reports of guilt and shame produced by individuals who are capable of frame switching. As discussed earlier, in investigations whose data involve people who possess an individualistic orientation, a certain degree of uncertainty exists in the attributes of self-conscious emotions proposed by different scholars. Furthermore, empirical support is not always consistent across different studies. Thus, in the absence of definitions that rely on both widespread consensus and solid support, the hypotheses of the present study are phrased to enunciate differences rather than predict specific patterns, and comparisons between the study’s findings and those in the literature are guided by a search for the best fit.

At its core, the study relied on the basic assumption that raw physiological changes in arousal are filtered through and evaluated by the cultural orientation engaged by the speaker’s language in use (Arabic or English). Participants were sequential bilingual speakers to ensure that the independent effects of language as a vehicle of cultural orientation and of language as modulator of emotional intensity could be detected. Furthermore, bilingual young female residents of Saudi Arabia were chosen because of the dearth of direct empirical evidence regarding their experience of self-conscious emotions, and because of their documented ability to use frame switching (El Alaoui, Mulhem, Pilotti, & al-Mqbas, 2017; El Alaoui et al., 2017). Surprisingly, studies on self-conscious emotions in nonclinical populations have largely overlooked the unique status of young women in Saudi Arabia, who are the recipients of onerous restrictions and are the objects of intense debates depicting them as either the “Trojan horse of Westernization” or the “last bastion of religion” (Ménoret, 2005, p. 175). Making observations as a French civil servant working in Riyadh, Ménoret writes that “not a week goes by without several men taking up their pen and writing in the press or on the internet” about Saudi women in either one of the two roles. The mutually exclusive categories to which women have been assigned are unlikely to reflect the complexities of their daily existence in a society where purity of tradition is placed alongside economic forces that demand social changes. At the same time, however, the constructed dichotomy exposes men’s suspicion that women, especially young ones, may hold identities underscoring both Western values (e.g., independent self) and traditional customs (e.g., interdependent self). Ironically, this suspicion is supported by studies in which young females have been found to have preserved an interdependent self-construct (Dwairy, Achoui, Abouserie, & Farah, 2006), and also to switch between independent and interdependent self-constructs, depending on the language in use (El Alaoui et al., 2017).

Two key hypotheses guided the present investigation: First and foremost, it was hypothesized that if a language is a vehicle of cultural orientation and also a modulator of emotional experiences, an interaction of emotional scenario and language would be observed. Namely, the attributes of the emotional patterns of shame and guilt reported by Arabic-English bilingual speakers given instructions and scales in Arabic would be noticeably different from those reported in the literature as exhibited by English speakers who possess an individualistic orientation, and also from Arabic-English bilingual speakers given instructions and scales in English. Furthermore, if indeed shame is a more familiar emotion in a collectivistic culture than in an individualistic culture, and language use entails the activation of its corresponding cultural orientation, shame would be more dominant than guilt when Arabic is the language in use. Second, if sequential bilingualism shapes emotional experiences, as suggested by the existing literature, ratings of self-conscious emotions would be more intense when the language that conveys instructions and scales is Arabic (main effect of language).

Method

Results

Discussion

Because emotions guide and motivate cognition and behavior (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Tomkins, 1970; Weiner, 1992), they are important aspects of how a culture is expressed and experienced by its members. Within this framework, self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, are reactions to undesirable actions and outcomes that can instinctually underscore the demarcation between a culture’s socially desirable and undesirable behaviors. In the present study, we inquired about the defining characteristics of these emotions in young female residents of Saudi Arabia, who could be described as Arabic-English sequential bilingual speakers, and who, as a result of language acquisition processes and acculturation, were thought to have interiorized the dominant cultural orientation evoked by each language. The experimental procedure did not compel participants to compare self-conscious emotions because it was feared that forcing a comparison could lead participants to exaggerate or even imagine differences. Arabic-English bilingual speakers were merely asked to describe either guilt or shame scenarios through both attributes (DA scale) and common emotion adjectives (DE scale).

The findings of the present study can be summarized in two main points based on the scales used: First, DA ratings, obtained from a scale used to gather descriptive information, supported not only the prediction that these emotions are seen as different by Arabic-English bilingual speakers, but also the notion that shame embodies a number of experiences of a self that painfully recognizes its weaknesses in relation to others (either real or imagined). Namely, experiences of shame were reported to be more related to self-consciousness, powerlessness, unhappiness with oneself, inadequate self-confidence, and fear of punishment than those of guilt. Interestingly, the realization of the role played by one’s imagination was more likely to be associated with shame than guilt, thereby reinforcing the impression that an interiorized audience, rather than a real one, is largely responsible for the feelings of shame. However, when lack of control was felt, it was reported to be more intense for guilt than shame experienced in English, whereas there were no differences in Arabic. Additionally, language mattered, but in a way contrary to the hypothesis of higher emotionality for the first language. Language differences mostly underlined differences in participants’ focus of attention, either others or oneself. Namely, for both emotions, Arabic fostered attention to others, such as a feeling of inferiority and fear of ridicule, whereas English fostered attention to oneself, such as unhappiness with oneself and awareness of the role of one’s imagination in the experience of self-conscious emotions. Participants were also more amenable to provide a written description of the situation where they experienced such emotions in English than in Arabic, perhaps as a way of distancing themselves from an unpleasant experience (as reported informally by some participants at the end of the experiment). The latter finding is consistent with the notion that the second language is more likely to reflect the speaker’s emotional control and distance (Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Ervin, 1964).

Second, if differences between guilt and shame were reported on attributes intended to represent descriptive, situational aspects of either emotion, the adjectives of the DE scale were unable to confirm them. The adjectives served as prompts to measure the likely complexities of a real event in which participants might have experienced a self-conscious emotion along with other feelings. Previous research showed the scale as capable of differentiating between guilt and shame if administered to English-speakers who subscribe to an individualistic cultural orientation (e.g., Americans; Mosher & White, 1981). Our participants did not replicate this finding. Spontaneous comments made at the end of the experiment indicated that the adjectives of the DE scale were perceived as too abstract and general to fit the concrete events that our participants recalled.

DE ratings did not support the hypothesis that Arabic-English bilingual speakers would differentiate between shame and guilt, and did not support the hypothesis that Arabic, the first language of our participants, would trigger more intense emotional experiences than English, their second language. In fact, irrespective of the recalled scenario, English induced stronger expressions of shame, sadness, contempt, and disgust. The exception was Arabic inducing stronger expressions of anger and arousal (including interest, curiosity, and alertness). In one isolated instance, when emotional scenario also mattered, findings illustrated elevated sadness for both guilt and shame recalled in English. In Arabic, participants expressed less sadness when guilt instead of shame was experienced, distinguishing between the two scenarios.

Although a descriptive scale with concrete attributes (DA) was more sensitive than a scale of adjectives (DE) to the content of participants’ recollections, important to note is that only a few attributes/expressions were able to differentiate between shame and guilt. The English-speaking, individualistically oriented participants of the study of Wicker and colleagues (1983), for instance, found a greater number of attributes that could distinguish these emotions. In most cases, however, our participants made differentiations mostly in the same direction. A notable exception was the expectation of punishment (i.e., “I thought I would be punished”) which our participants rated as greater for shame, whereas the participants of the Wicker study rated as greater for guilt. Interestingly, a critical dimension of Lewis’s (1971) definition of these self-conscious emotions, which is the person’s focus on one’s self versus one’s behavior (i.e., “I was unhappy with myself in general” versus “I was unhappy only with my behavior”), was captured by the DA measure. Shame scenario yielded a greater focus on oneself. The responses to this critical dimension produced by the English-speaking, individualistically oriented participants of Tangney and colleagues (1996) and those of Wicker and colleagues (1983) did not differentiate between guilt and shame scenarios. Furthermore, whenever our participants’ responses differentiated between these two emotions, they did so in both languages. The influence of language was mostly visible in participants’ self-orientation, in the form of either an interdependent or an independent self, suggesting that Arabic and English can direct attention to cultural constructs that evoke a communal and a solipsistic orientation, respectively. However, such orientations do not share profoundly different conceptualizations of guilt and shame that could be captured by our scales.

Conclusions

Although conclusive answers on the affective patterns of shame and guilt in Saudi nationals would require a larger and more diverse sample, one encompassing different age groups, genders, and socioeconomic backgrounds, the evidence collected in the present study opens a window into the minds of Arabic-English sequential speakers and their affective experiences. In doing so, it dispels the notion that collectivistic and individualistic orientations yield profoundly different experiences of self-conscious emotions. The relative dominance of shame (as evidenced by DA ratings) speaks of a more insidious influence of a vertical collectivistic culture whereby themes of powerlessness, punishment, and exposure of one’s faults and weakness to others are recurrent events in a person’s daily life (Omar, 2014).

Interestingly, the present study brings to the forefront the question of whether diverse collectivistic cultures, such as those of many Asian and Middle Eastern cultures, can be treated as monolithic entities whose members experience self-conscious emotions similarly. The salience and commonality of shame among inhabitants of nations of east Asia (see Wong & Tsai, 2007) as well as of nations of the Arab League (see Bierbrauer, 1992; Feghali, 1997) have been previously documented. Differences yet to be unearthed may exist; consider, for instance, the findings that shame is viewed as a more appropriate response than anger by Chinese youth (Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002), which is consistent with the Confucian roots of Chinese parenting practices focused on restraining emotional expression (Bond & Hwang, 1986). Evidence exists that Saudi nationals experience disengaging emotions (e.g., anger) at levels similar to those reported by Americans (Maddux et al., 2011). Moreover, both groups report higher levels than those experienced by Japanese nationals (Maddux et al., 2011), suggesting variability in either communication practices of affective events or in the actual phenomenology of such events within a single macroscopic cultural orientation.

Another question that this study brings to the forefront is the extent to which demographic differences within Saudi society are accompanied by differences in the experience of self-conscious emotions. In our study, female college students were selected to fill a gap in the non-clinical literature about their experiences of self-conscious emotions. The unique status of young women within Saudi society placed our participants at the center of a struggle between conflicting cultural frames, simplistically rendering them symbols of either change or tradition (Ménoret, 2005). As such, they were the ideal candidates for a study where language was used to activate conflicting cultural frames in order to observe their effects on reports of self-conscious emotions. Yet, a sample of young women, all college students, also limited the generalizability of our results. Thus, one may ask whether other demographic groups, such as young men, older women and men, and individuals of different socioeconomic backgrounds, who are not so much at the center of opposing cultural forces, would respond similarly to measures of self-conscious emotions. Although only future research can directly answer this question, at the present time, we can speculate that the answer will depend on the content of the cultural frames such individuals possess. According to Hong and colleagues (2000), cultural frames, known as interiorized cultures, are meaning systems consisting of loose networks of constructs, which have the ability to control cognition, affect, and behavior when they are active in people’s mind. Although several dimensions may be used to define cultural frames in order to capture the complexities of cultures around the world (see Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005), in our current and earlier studies, including related pilot work, we found one’s self-orientation (i.e., the independent self as advocated by individualism versus the interdependent self as advocated by collectivism) to be the most useful. Perhaps the reason is that this dimension most candidly captures the economic concerns currently faced by people in Saudi Arabia, which involve the excesses of consumerism, diminishing natural resources, and the sustainability of the subsidized welfare state (Assad, 2006). Future research will have to examine whether other dimensions may be equally useful to define the cultural frames possessed by the multitude of individuals who call Saudi Arabia home.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that because cross-cultural studies have used a variety of measurement instruments and cross-group comparisons, it is difficult to determine the extent to which differences in the responses of members of disparate national groups illustrate true differences in affective profiles, including modes of experience and expression, or are merely the effect of methodological differences. Of course, in the age of globalization, diverse cultural orientations may become progressively less diverse. Abdullah Al-Ghadhami, a keen cultural critic, has observed that young people in Saudi Arabia are progressively embracing independence and individualism (2013), implying that in the struggle to integrate collectivism and individualism, the latter is winning. Bilingual speakers, who embody more than one cultural orientation, will continue to be the ideal thermometer for measuring the extent to which diversity can indeed resist globalization.

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