A history of the Sikhs, from the origin of the nation to the battles of the Sutlej.

282'

HISTORY OF THE SIKHS

CHAP. IX

1845-6. cession of the tracts in question had been desired, their
relinquishment might have been effected without a resort
to arms; but every act of Major Broadfoot was considered
to denote a foregone resolution, and to be conceived in a
spirit of enmity rather than of goodwill.1 Nor did the Sikhs
having their noses slit. It is not improbable that Sir David Ochterlony may, at the early date quoted, have so understood the nature
of the British connexion with reference to some particular case then
before him, but that the Cis-Sutlej states of Lahore were held under
feudal obligations to the English seems scarcely tenable, for the
following reasons: (1) The protection extended by the English to
the chiefs of Sirhind was declared to mean protection to them against
Ranjit Singh, and therefore not protection of the whole country
between the Sutlej and Jumna, a portion of which belonged to Lahore.
(See the Treaty of 1809, and Article I of the declaration of the 3rd
May 1809; and also Government to Sir David Ochterlony, 10th April
1809.) Further, when convenient, the British Government could even
maintain, that although the Treaty of 1809 was binding on Ranjit
Singh, with reference to Cis-Sutlej states, it was not binding on the
English, whom it simply authorized to interfere at their discretion.
(Government to Capt. Wade, 23rd April 1833.) This was indeed
written with reference to Bahawalpur, but the application was made
general. (2) The protection accorded to the chiefs of Sirhind was
afterwards extended so as to give them security in the plains, but not
in the hills, against the Gurkhas as well as against Ranjit Singh
(Government to Sir David Ochterlony, 23rd Jan. 1810); while with
regard to Ranjit Singh's own Cis-Sutlej possessions, it was declared
that he himself must defend them (against Nepal), leaving it a
question of policy as to whether he should or should not be aided in
their defence. It was further added, that he might march through
his Cis-Sutlej districts, to enable him to attack the Gurkhas in the
hills near the Jumna, in defence of the districts in question, should he
so wish. (Government to Sir David Ochterlony, 4th Oct. and
22nd Nov. 1811.) The opinion of Sir Charles Metcalfe, about the
proceedings of the English with regard to Whadni (see ante, p. 163,
note), may also be quoted as bearing on the case in a way adverse to
Major Broadfoot.
1 It was generally held by the English in India that Major Broadfoot's appointment greatly increased the probabilities of a war with
the Sikhs; and the impression was equally strong that had Mr. Clerk,
for instance, remained as Agent, there would have been no war. Had
Mr. Clerk again, or Col. Wade, been the British representative in
1845, either would have gone to Lahore in person, and would have
remonstrated against the selfish and unscrupulous proceedings of the
managers of affairs as obviously tending to bring on a rupture. They
would also have taken measures to show to the troops that the British
Government would not be aggressors; they would have told the chiefs