The intimate papers of Colonel House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour.

256 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

'I spoke of the community of interests between England,
Germany, and the United States, and thought if they stood
together the peace of the world could be maintained. He
assented to this quite readily. However, in my opinion,
there could be no understanding between England and Germany so long as he continued to increase his navy. He replied that he must have a large navy in order to protect
Germany's commerce in an adequate way, and one commensurate with her growing power and importance. He also said
it was necessary to have a navy large enough to be able to
defend themselves against the combined efforts of Russia
and France'1
'I asked when he would reach the end of his naval programme. He said this was well known, since they had formulated a policy for building and, when that was completed,
there would be an end; that Great Britain had nothing to
fear from Germany, and that he personally was a friend of
England and was doing her incalculable service in holding
the balance of power against Russia.
'I told him that the President and I thought perhaps an
American might be able to better compose the difficulties
here and bring about an understanding with a view to peace
than any European, because of their distrust and dislike for
one another. He agreed to this suggestion. I had undertaken
the work and that was my reason for coming to Germany, as
I wanted to see him first. After leaving Germany it was my
1 In a memorandum made later, House recorded: 'I forgot to say that I
asked the Kaiser why Germany refused to sign the "Bryan treaty" providing for arbitration and a "cooling-off period" of a year before hostilities could be inaugurated. He replied: "Germany will never sign such a
treaty. Our strength lies in being always prepared for war at a second's
notice. We will not resign that advantage and give our enemies time to
prepare."'
Had Germany signed this treaty, it would not have been possible for
the United States to enter the war on the submarine issue until after the
lapse of a twelvemonth, except on the ground that German use of submarines constituted acts of war against the United States.