A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God / by Samuel Clarke, D.D.

A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING
THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS OF
NATURAL RELIGION
AND THE
TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
OF THE
CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

BEING EIGHT SERMONS PREACHED AT THE CATHEDRAL
CHURCH OF ST. PAUL, IN THE YEAR 1705, AT THE
LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HONOURABLE
ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.

BY SAMUEL CLARKE, DD.
LATE RECTOR OF ST. JAMES'S, WESTMINSTER.

TO THE
MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD
THOMAS,
LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY AND PRIMATE OF ALL
ENGLAND;
SIR HENRY ASHURST, BARONET;
SIR JOHN ROTHERAM, KNIGHT, SERGEANT AT LAW
JOHN EVELIN, ESQ.
TRUSTEES APPOINTED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ.
THIS DISCOURSE
IS HUMBLY DEDICATED.

THE PREFACE.

I SHOULD not have presumed to publish these papers in vindication of natural and revealed religion, after so many excellent discourses already written upon that subject, had I not thought myself obliged to it, in order to pursue more fully the design of the honourable founder of this lecture, and to answer the expectation of the most reverend and the honourable trustees appointed by him. The honourable Robert Boyle, Esq. was a person no less zealously solicitous for the propagation of true religion, and the practice of piety and virtue, than diligent and successful in improving experimental philosophy, and enlarging our knowledge of nature; and it was his settled opinion, that the advancement and increase of natural knowledge would always be of service to the cause and interest of true religion, in opposition to atheists and unbelievers of all sorts. Accordingly he, in his life-time, made excellent use of his own observations to this purpose in all his writings, and made provision after his death for carrying on the same design perpetually. In pursuance of which end I endeavoured, in my former discourse, to strengthen and confirm the arguments which prove to us the being and attributes of God, partly by metaphysical reasoning, and partly from the discoveries (principally those that have been lately made,) in natural philosophy. And in the present treatise I have attempted, in a plainer and easier method, to establish the unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the truth and certainty of the Christian revelation. If what I have said, may, in any measure, promote the interest of true religion in this sceptical and profane age, and answer the design for which this lecture was founded, I have my end.

It may perhaps be expected, that I should take some notice of certain remarks which have been published upon my former sermons. Had the author of those remarks entered into the merits of the cause, or offered any considerable reasons in opposition to what I had laid down, I should have thought myself obliged to give him a particular answer; but since his book is made up chiefly of railing and gross misconstructions, and all that he pretends to say, by way of argument,

depends entirely upon supposition of the truth of the Cartesian hypothesis, which the best mathematicians in the world have demonstrated to be false, I presume it may be sufficient to show here the insincerity of that author, and the weakness of his reasoning, by a few brief observations.

The only argument he alleges against me, in his whole book, is this: that if we know not distinctly what the essence of God,1 1.1 and what the essence of matter is, wé cannot possibly demonstrate them at all to be two different essences.

To which I answer: It is plain we know not the essences of things by intuition, but can only reason about them from what we know of their different properties or attributes. Now, from the demonstrable attributes of God, and from the known properties of matter, we have as unanswerable reasons to convince and satisfy us that their essences are entirely different, though we know not distinctly what those essences are, as our faculties can afford us, in judging of any the certainest things whatsoever. For instance: the demonstrable attributes of God are, that he is self-existent, independent, eternal, infinite, unchangeable, incorruptible, intelligent, free, all-powerful, wise, just, and good: The known properties of matter are, that it is not necessary or self-existent, but dependent, finite; (nay, that it fills but a few very small and inconsiderable portions of space,) that it is divisible, passive, unintelligent, and consequently incapable of any active powers. Now nothing can be more certain and evident, than that the substances to which these incompatible attributes or properties belong, or the essences from which they flow, are entirely different one from the other, though we do not distinctly know what the inmost substances or essences themselves are. If any man will think a mere hypothesis (the Cartesian or any other,) concerning the inmost nature of substances to be a more satisfactory discovery of the different essences of things than we can attain by reasoning thus from their demonstrable properties, and will choose rather to draw fond consequences from such hypotheses and fictions founded upon no proof at all, than to make use of such philosophy as is grounded only upon clear reason or good experiments,—I know no help for it, but he must be permitted to enjoy his opinion quietly.

The rest of the book is all either an indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned Mr Locke, from whom I neither cited any one passage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argument from him; and therefore is altogether impertinent: or else it consists of gross misrepresentations of my sense, and very unfair constructions and false citations of my words, of which I shall presently give some instances.

The first 8, and the 35th and 36th pages of the remarks, are spent in attempting to prove, that, if we do not first know what the essence of God, and what the essence of matter is, (that is, if the Cartesian hypothesis or fiction concerning the essences of spiritual and material substance be not granted to be true,)—there is no way left by which it can be proved at all that the essence of God and matter is not one and the same: To which I have already given an answer, viz. that, from the demonstrable artributes of God, and from the known properties of matter (being incompatible with each other,) we have as absolute certainty of their essences or substances being different, though we do not distinctly know what those essences are, as our faculties enable us to attain in any metaphysical question; for incompatible properties can no more possibly be in any unknown than in any known subject.

Page 12.—The author of the Remarks asserts, that Des Cartes and his followers have mathematically proved that the essence of matter consists in length, breadth, and depth: And upon this confident assertion, his whole book depends in every part. To this, therefore, I answer, that that hypothesis is really so far from being mathematically proved to be true, that, on the contrary, he cannot but know (if he knows any thing of these matters,) that the greatest mathematicians of the present age, men confessedly greater in that science than any that ever lived before them, have clearly proved (as I before said) that it is absolutely false.1 1.2 And not to take the least notice of this throughout his whole book argues either great insincerity or great ignorance.

I had affirmed, that to imagine an eternal and infinite nothing was being reduced to the necessity of imagining a contradiction or impossibility: For this he argues against me (Remark. pag. 14,) as if I had asserted, that it was possible to imagine an eternal and infinite nothing, whereas I asserted that it was impossible, and an express contradiction so to do: This is great insincerity.

I had charged the Cartesians with being unavoidably reduced to the absurdity of making matter a necessarily-existing being. In citing this passage, (Remark, pages 14 and 15,) he ridiculously represents me as saying that this absurdity consisted in making extension necessary; though he knew that in that very passage I supposed matter and extension to be entirely different things: This likewise is great insincerity.

I have said, that the idea of immensity was an idea that no way belonged to matter. Instead of this, he cites me asserting, senselessly, (Remark, page 15,) that extension no way belongs to matter; as if that which is not immense or infinite, is, therefore, not extended at all: This is the greatest disingenuity in the world.

Remark, page 15.—He says, I am sure this author cannot produce one, no not one Cartesian, that ever made matter a necessarily-existing being,—that ever contradicted himself in words upon this subject,—that ever was mightily, or not mightily, or at all perplexed with what Mr Clarke calls his argument;—nay, that ever heard of that thing he calls his argument. Why are they thus misrepresented and imposed upon? To this I answer: it had been sufficient to make good my charge, to have shown, that, from the Cartesian hypothesis, it followed, by unavoidable consequence, that matter must be a necessarily-existing being, though the Cartesians themselves had not seen that consequence. Yet I cited, moreover, a passage out of Regis, wherein it is plain he perceived and owned that consequence. But, because the Remarker seems not satisfied with this, and pretends to triumph here with great pleasure and assurance, I will for once comply with his challenge, and produce him another, and that an unexceptionable Cartesian, even Des Cartes himself, who was greatly perplexed with the argument I mentioned, and was unavoidably reduced to make matter a necessarily-existing being, and at the same time did contradict himself in words upon this subject. It was objected to Des Cartes by some very learned men, that1 1.3 if extension and matter were the same thing, it seemed to them to follow, that God could neither possibly make the world finite, nor annihilate any part of matter, without creating, at the same time, just as much more to

supply its place. To this he answers;1 1.4 that, according to his hypothesis, it does indeed imply a contradiction to suppose the world to be finite, or to suppose God annihilating any part of matter; but yet he will not say God cannot do it, or that God cannot cause that two and three shall not make five, or any other contradiction whatsoever: Is not this making matter a necessarily-existing being, to own that it is a contradiction to suppose God annihilating it, or setting bounds to it? Is not this contradicting himself, for a man to affirm (as Cartes does in all his writings,) that the world was created by God, and depends upon him, and yet at the same time to declare that it implies as plain a contradiction to suppose any part of matter annihilable by the power of God, as to suppose that two and three should not make five? Is not this really a ridiculing of the power of God? And was not Des Cartes, therefore, greatly perplexed with the argument I mentioned? And is not an hypothesis, from which such consequences unavoidably and confessedly follow, a fine land-mark of distinction between spiritual and material substances? and whatever opposes this hypothesis,2 1.5 a depriving us of the means of proving the existence of the one only true God?

The Remarker humbly desires his reader (page 16,) to be persuaded that he is of no particular sect in matters of philosophy, but only of the party of truth wherever he meets with it. Yet the same man had declared before, (page 12,) that he believed Des Cartes had mathematically proved his hypothesis; and takes not the least notice of its having since been fully confuted by mathematicians confessedly far more eminent in that science than Des Cartes was. This is a very singular mark of impartiality, and of being addicted to no party in matters of philosophy.

Speaking of the Cartesian argument drawn from the idea of God, I had used these words:—Our first certainty of the existence of God arises not from this, that, in the idea we frame of him in our minds, or rather in the definition that we make of the word [God,] as signifying a being of all possible perfections, we include self-existence:

but, &c.—meaning, that, according to that argument, self-existence was rather made only a part of the definition of the word than proved to be a real attribute of the being itself. Instead of this the Remarker, (pages 17 and 19,) by a childish misunderstanding of the syntax of the sentence, and referring the particle [or] to a wrong member of the period, cites my words in a quite different manner: as if I had said, in the idea we frame of God in our own minds, or rather in the idea we frame of him in the definition that we make of the word, &c. and he is very facetious (pages 17 and 19,) in ridiculing this framing of an idea in a definition, which he calls, as it truly is, a real piece of nonsense. But when, upon the review, he finds himself the true and only author of it, for want of understanding grammar, I suppose it will make him more modest and careful.

He accuses me (Remark, pages 18, 20, &c.) of not understanding the Cartesian argument drawn from the idea of God. I confess myself very ready to submit to this charge; and I can show him much more learned writers than either of us, who have likewise1 1.6 not understood that argument. If he does understand it, he will do the world a very acceptable piece of service to make it out.

What he says in his 21st, 22d, 23d, and 24th pages, is such a heap of misconstructions, and so entirely void of sense, that I confess I cannot at all tell what he means.

From my using the word mere matter, he concludes (page 29,) that I imagine there is another sort of matter which is not a mere bare, pure, incogitative matter; and that these terms necessarily import this sense. Whereas, in every one of the places he cites, it is as express and evident as words can make it, that by mere matter I understand the matter of which the world consists, not as opposed to another sort of matter, but either as opposed to motion and to the form of the world, or as considered by itself, and without the government and direction of a supreme intelligent mind. This, therefore, is the highest degree of insincerity.

He charges me, (pages 4 and 29, and 30,) with making a translation quite different from Spinoza's sense and words. How I could mistranslate what I did not translate at all, I understand not: but whether I have misrepresented Spinoza's sense, or no, (as I think I have not,) this I can only leave to the learned world to judge.

I reduced Spinoza's opinion to this, that the material world, and every part of it, with the order and manner of being of each part, is the only self-existing or necessarily-existing being; and this I

think is as clearly contained in the words I cited from him1 1.7 as any thing can be. Here the Remarker asserts (page 30,) that Spinoza never taught this doctrine; nay, that he taught the quite contrary. To prove which, he cites a passage, where Spinoza affirms, that2 1.8 all who have in any degree considered the divine nature, deny that God is corporeal. Now, this also is extremely insincere; for, had this author cited here the whole sentence of Spinoza, as he had cited it before in his 26th page, it would have appeared evidently, that Spinoza, by denying God to be corporeal, meant only fallaciously to deny his being any particular piece of matter, any3 1.9 finite body, and of a certain figure. For, that he believed infinite corporeal substance, that is, the whole material universe, to be God, (besides the places I had cited from him,) he in express words acknowledges,4 1.10 in a passage which this very author cites in the 4th page of his remarks; and he maintains it at large through the whole of that very scholium5 1.11 from whence the remarker has with the greatest insincerity taken the present objection. But, besides; suppose Spinoza had not explained himself in this place, and had in this single passage contradicted what he had plainly taught throughout the rest of his book, would this have been any just reason to say that Spinoza never taught the doctrine I imputed to him? nay, that he taught the quite contrary?

He charges me (page 32,) with arguing only against the accessories of atheism, and leaving the essential hypothesis in its full force; nay, with confirming and establishing (page 11,) Spinoza's atheism. It seems, in the opinion of this author, that proving the material world to be, not a necessary but a dependent being, made, preserved, and governed, by a self-existent, independent, eternal, infinite mind, of perfect knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, goodness

and truth—is arguing only against the accessories of atheism, and that the essential hypothesis of atheism is left untouched, nay, confirmed and established, by all who will not presume to define the essence of that supreme mind according to the unintelligible language of the schools and the groundless imagination of Des Cartes concerning the substance or essence of matter and spirit. I confess it appears to me, on the contrary, that the essence of atheism lies in making God either an unintelligent being, [such as is the material world,] or at least a necessary agent, [such as Spinoza makes his one substance to be,] void of all freedom, wisdom, power, and goodness; and that other metaphysical disputes are only about the accessories; and that there is much more ground, on the other side, to suspect that very hypothesis, of which this writer is so fond, to be favourable to the atheist's main purpose. For if, from Des Cartes's notion of the essence of matter, it follows (as he himself, in the places now cited, confesses in express words,) that it implies a contradiction to suppose the material world finite, or to suppose any part of matter can be annihilated by the power of God, I appeal to this author, whether this does not naturally tend to make men think matter a necessary and self-existent being?

He charges me (page 33,) with falsely accusing Spinoza of making God a mere necessary agent; and cites a passage or two out of Spinoza, wherein that author seems to assert the contrary. The words which I cited from Spinoza do as clearly express what I charged him with, as it is possible for any thing to be expressed; for he asserts plainly,1 1.12 that from the power of God all things proceed necessarily; that all things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature; that whatever is in the power of God must necesarily exist; that things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than they now are; and that God does not act by a liberty of will. All this the Remarker very insincerely passes over, without the least notice. And the words which he cites out of Spinoza do not at all prove the contrary to what I asserted. For when Spinoza says,2 1.13 that God alone is a free cause, and that

God acts by the laws of his own nature, without being forced by any; it is evident he does not there mean a freedom of will, but only fallaciously signifies, that the necessity by which all things exist in the manner they do, is an inward necessity in the nature of the things themselves, in opposition to any force put upon them from without; which external force, it is plain indeed that [the τὸ πᾶν] the whole universe (the God of Spinoza) cannot be subject to; because it is supposed to contain all things within itself. But, besides, supposing (as I said before) that Spinoza had directly contradicted himself in this one passage, how would that have proved my charge against him to have been false?

He says (page 34,) that I am guilty myself of what I groundlessly imputed to Spinoza, viz. of making God a mere necessary agent; namely, by affirming that there is a necessary difference between good and evil, and that there is such a thing as fitness and unfitness, eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably in the nature and reason of things, antecedently to will and to all positive or arbitrary appointment whatsoever. This, he says, is a groundless and positive assertion, and plainly imports the eternal necessary co-existence of all things as much as Spinoza's hypothesis does. Is not this an admirable consequence? because I affirm the proportions of things, and the differences of good and evil, to be eternal and necessary, that therefore I affirm the existence of the things themselves to be also eternal and necessary? because I affirm the proportion, suppose between a sphere and a cylinder, to be eternal and necessary, that therefore I affirm the existence of material spheres and cylinders to be likewise eternal and necessary? because I affirm the difference between virtue and vice to be eternal and necessary, that therefore I affirm men, who practise virtue or vice, to have existed eternally? This accusation shows both extreme ignorance, and great malice, in the author of the remarks.

I had used these words, (Demonstrat, page 8:)—"How an eternal duration can now be actually past, is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow understandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an express contradiction can be imagined to be; and yet, to deny the truth of the proposition, that an eternal duration is now actually past, is to assert something still far more unintelligible, even a real and express contradiction." Instead of this, the Remarker, (page 39,) citing my words, with extreme disingenuity leaves out one half of the sentence and makes me to say, absolutely, that something is still far more unintelligible than that which is utterly impossible

to be understood. Such gross misrepresentations as these, in leaving out one part of a sentence, to make the rest nonsense, can very hardly proceed but from want of honesty.

Lastly, (page 41,) he says, that in my Sermons there is not one argument offered to prove, against Spinoza, that God is a spirit. I persuaded myself, that the proving God to be a being absolutely distinct from the material world, self-existent, intelligent, free, all-powerful, wise, and good, had been proving him to be a spirit. But it seems no proof is of any force with this author, if it be not agreeable to the Cartesian philosophy, in which alone he seems to have any knowledge. To this, therefore, I am not obliged to trouble either myself or the reader with giving any further answer.

A
DISCOURSE
CONCERNING
THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS OF
NATURAL RELIGION,
AND THE
TRUTH AND CERTAINTY OF THE
CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

Isa. v. 20.

Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter.

Rom. i. 22.

Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.

1 Cor. ii. 10.

But God hath revealed them unto us by his spirit.

Introduction

HAVING, in a former discourse, endeavoured to lay* 1.14 firmly the first foundations of religion, in the certainty of the existence and of the attributes of God, by proving, severally and distinctly:—

That something must needs have existed from eternity, and how great soever the difficulties are, which perplex the conceptions and apprehensions we attempt to frame of an eternal duration, yet they neither ought nor can raise in any man's mind any doubt or scruple concerning the truth of the assertion itself that something has really been eternal:

That there must have existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent being, because, to suppose an eternal succession of merely dependent

beings, proceeding one from another in an endless progression, without any original independent cause at all, is supposing things that have in their own nature no necessity of existing, to be from eternity caused or produced by nothing; which is the very same absurdity and express contradiction as to suppose them produced by nothing at any determinate time:

That that unchangeable and independent being, which has existed from eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily-existing:

That it must of necessity be infinite or everywhere present; a being most simple, uniform, invariable, indivisible, incorruptible, and infinitely removed from all such imperfections as are the known qualities and inseparable properties of the material world:

That it must of necessity be but one; because, to suppose two, or more, different self-existent independent principles may be reduced to a direct contradiction:

That it must necessarily be an intelligent being:

That it must be a free and voluntary, not a necessary agent:

That this being must of necessity have infinite power, and that in this attribute is included, particularly, a possibility of creating or producing things, and also a possibility of communicating to creatures the power of beginning motion, and a possibility of induing them with liberty or freedom of will; which freedom of will is not inconsistent with any of the divine attributes:

That he must of necessity be infinitely wise:

And lastly, that he must necessarily be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections; such as become the supreme governor and judge of the world.

It remains now, in order to complete my design of proving and establishing the truth and excellency of the whole superstructure of our most holy religion,

that I proceed, upon this foundation of the certainty of the being and attributes of God, to demonstrate in the next place the unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the certainty of divine revelation, in opposition to the vain arguings of certain vicious and profane men, who, merely upon account of their incredulity, would be thought to be strict adherers to reason, and sincere and diligent inquirers into truth; when, indeed, on the contrary, there is but too much cause to fear that they are not at all sincerely and really desirous to be satisfied in the true state of things, but only seek, under the pretence and cover of infidelity, to excuse their vices and debaucheries which they are so strongly inslaved to that they cannot prevail with themselves upon any account to forsake them: And yet a rational submitting to such truths, as just evidence and unanswerable reason would induce them to believe, must necessarily make them uneasy under those vices, and self condemned in the practice of them. It remains therefore, (I say) in order to finish the design I proposed to myself, of establishing the truth and excellency of our holy religion, in opposition to all such vain pretenders to reason as these, that I proceed at this time, by a continuation of the same method of arguing, by which I before demonstrated the being and attributes of God, to prove distinctly the following propositions:—

I. That the same necessary and eternal different relations that different things bear one to another, and the same consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe, ought likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their respective stations: That is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures

so to act: they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them, so to do, even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive will or command of God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension, of any particular private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or future, annexed, either by natural consequence, or by positive appointments, to the practising or neglecting those rules.

II. That though these eternal moral obligations are, indeed, of themselves incumbent on all rational beings, even antecedent to the consideration of their being the positive will and command of God, yet that which most strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and indispensably enforces them upon us, is this, that both from the nature of things, and the perfections of God, and from several other collateral considerations, it appears, that as God is himself necessarily just and good in the exercise of his infinite power in the government of the whole world, so he cannot but likewise positively require that all his rational creatures should in their proportion be so too, in the exercise of each of their powers in their respective spheres: That is, as these eternal moral obligations are really in perpetual force merely from their own nature and the abstract reason of things, so also they are moreover the express and unalterable will, command, and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect should, in obedience to his supreme authority, as well as in compliance with the natural reason of things, be regularly and constantly observed through the whole creation.

III. That, therefore, though these eternal moral obligations are also incumbent, indeed, on all rational creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular reward or punishment, yet they must certainly and necessarily be attended with rewards and punishments; because the same reasons which prove God himself to be necessarily just and good, and the rules of justice,

equity, and goodness, to be his unalterable will, law, and command, to all created beings, prove also that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such creatures as imitate and obey him by observing those rules, and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto; and, consequently, that he cannot but some way or other make a suitable difference in his dealings with them, and manifest his supreme power and absolute authority, in finally supporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the honour of these his divine laws, as becomes the just and righteous governor and disposer of all things.

IV. That consequently, though, in order to establish this suitable difference between the fruits or effects of virtue and vice, so reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the vindication of the honour of God, the nature of things and the constitution and order of God's creation was originally such, that the observance of the eternal rules of justice, equity, and goodness does indeed of itself tend, by direct and natural consequence, to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to make them miserable; yet since, through some great and general corruption and depravation, (whencesoever that may have arisen, the particular original whereof could hardly have been known now without revelation;) since, I say, the condition of men in this present state is such, that the natural order of things in this world is an event manifestly perverted, and virtue and goodness are visibly prevented, in great measure, from obtaining their proper and due effects in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice; therefore it is absolutely impossible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final design, of God's creating such rational beings as men are, and placing them in this globe of earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (may we not say) the only inhabitants, for whose sake alone this part at least of the creation is evidently fitted up and accommodated; it is absolutely

impossible (I say) that the whole of God's design in all this should be nothing more than to keep up eternally a succession of such short-lived generations of men as at present are, and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly state of things as we see the world is now in, without any due observation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary differences of things, and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God in the proportionable reward of the best, or punishment of the worst of men. And consequently it is certain and necessary, (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonstrated,) that, instead of continuing an eternal succession of new generations in the present form and state of things, there must at some time or other be such a revolution and renovation of things, such a future state of existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact distribution of rewards or punishments therein, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right, and that the whole scheme of providence, which to us who judge of it by only one small portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and much confused, may appear at its consummation to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness.

V. That, though the indispensable necessity of all the great and moral obligations of natural religion, and also the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, be thus in general deducible even demonstrably, by a chain of clear and undeniable reasoning, (yet in the present state of the world, by what means soever it came originally to be so corrupted, of which more hereafter,) such is the carelessness, inconsiderateness, and want of attention of the greater part of mankind; so many the prejudices and false notions imbibed by evil education; so strong and violent the unreasonable lusts, appetites, and desires of sense; and so great the blindness, introduced by superstitious opinions, vicious customs, and debauched practices, through the world,—that very few

are able, in reality and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves; but men have great need of particular teaching, and much instruction, to convince them of the truth and certainty, and importance of these things; to give them a due sense, and clear and just apprehensions concerning them; and to bring them effectually to the practice of the plainest and most necessary duties.

VI. That, though in almost every age there have indeed been in the heathen world some wise, and brave, and good men, who have made it their business to study and practice these things themselves, and to teach and exhort others to do the like, who seem therefore to have been raised up by providence as instruments to reprove in some measure, and put some kind of check to the extreme superstition and wickedness of the nations wherein they lived: Yet none of these have ever been able to reform the world with any considerably great and universal success; because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves about this excellent work; and they that have indeed sincerely done it have themselves been entirely ignorant of some doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary for the bringing about that great end; and those things which they have been certain of and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and explain clearly enough, and those that they have been able both to prove and explain by sufficiently clear reasoning, they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with so strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice of the world.

VII. That therefore there was plainly wanting a divine revelation to recover mankind out of their universally degenerate estate, into a state suitable to the original excellency of their nature; which divine revelation, both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expct and hope for, as appears from the acknowledgments

which the best and wisest of the heathen philosophers themselves have made, of their sense of the necessity and want of such a revelation, and from their expressions of the hopes they had entertained that God would some time or other vouchsafe it unto them.

VIII. That there is no other religion now in the world, but the Christian, that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of reason to be esteemed such a divine revelation; and therefore if Christianity be not true, there is no revelation of the will of God at all made to mankind.

IX. That the Christian religion, considered in its primitive simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures, has all the marks and proofs of its being actually and truly a divine revelation that any divine revelation, supposng it was true, could reasonably be imagined or desired to have.

X. That the practical duties which the Christian religion enjoins, are all such as are most agreeable to our natural notions of God, and most perfective of the nature, and conducive to the happiness and well-being of men: That is, Christianity,—even in this single respect, as containing alone, and in one consistent system, all the wise and good precepts (and those improved, augmented, and exalted to the highest degree of perfection,) that ever were taught singly and scatteredly, and many times but very corruptly, by the several schools of the philosophers; and this without any mixture of the fond, absurd, and superstitious practices of any of those philosophers,—ought to be embraced and practised by all rational and considering deists, who will act consistently, and steadily pursue the consequences of their own principles; as at least the best scheme and sect of philosophy that ever was set up in the world, and highly probable, even though it had no external evidence, to be of divine original.

XI. That the motives, by which the Christian religion enforces the practice of these duties, are such

as are must suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural expectations of men.

XII. That the peculiar manner and circumstances with which it enjoins these duties and urges these motives, are exactly consonant to the dictates of sound reason, or the unprejudiced light of nature, and most wisely perfective of it.

XIII. That all the [credenda, or] doctrines, which the true, simple, and uncorrupted Christian religion teaches,—(that is, not only those plain doctrines which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal salvation, but even all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truths,)—are, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare reason unassisted with revelation, yet, when discovered by revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound unprejudiced reason, have every one of them a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence, to reform men's lives and correct their manners, and do together make up an infinitely more consistent and rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest of the ancient philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern unbelievers can invent or contrive.

XIV. That as this revelation, to the judgment of right and sober reason, appears even of itself highly credible and probable, and abundantly recommends itself in its native simplicity, merely by its own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most rational and considering men, who are desirous in all their actions to have satisfaction, and comfort, and good hope within themselves, from the conscience of what they do; so it is moreover positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible signs and miracles which the Author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commission, by the exact completion both of the prophecies that went before concerning him, and of those that he

himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after, and by the testimony of his followers, which in all its circumstances was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence, that was ever given to any matter of fact in the world.

XV. And lastly, that they who will not, by such arguments and proofs as these, be convinced of the truth and certainty of the Christian religion, and be persuaded to make it the rule and guide of all their actions, would not be convinced, (so far as to influence their hearts, and reform their lives,) by any other evidence whatsoever; no, not though one should rise on purpose from the dead to endeavour to convince them.

* 1.15 I might here, before I enter upon the particular proof of these several propositions, justly be allowed to premise, that, having now to deal with another sort of men than those against whom my former discourse was directed, and being consequently in some parts of this treatise to make use of some other kinds of arguments than those which the nature of that discourse permitted and required, the same demonstrative force of reasoning, and even mathematical certainty, which in the main argument was there easy to be obtained, ought not here to be expected; but that such moral evidence, or mixed proofs, from circumstances and testimony, as most matters of fact are only capable of, and wise and honest men are always satisfied with, ought to be accounted sufficient in the present case: Because all the principles indeed upon which atheists attempt to build their schemes, are such as may, by plain force of reason, and undeniably demonstrative argumentations, be reduced to express and direct contradictions. But deists pretend to own all the principles of reason, and would be thought to deny nothing but what depends entirely on testimony and evidence of matter of fact, which they think they can easily evade.

But, if we examine things to the bottom, we shall

find that the matter does not in reality lie here. For I believe there are in the world, at least in any part of the world where the Christian religion is in any tolerable purity professed, very few such deists as will truly stand to all the principles of unprejudiced reason, and sincerely, both in profession and practice, own all the obligations of natural religion, and yet oppose Christianity merely upon account of their not being satisfied with the strength of the evidence of matter of fact. A constant and sincere observance of all the laws of reason and obligations of natural religion, will unavoidably lead a man to Christianity, if Christianity be fairly proposed to him in its natural simplicity and he has due opportunities of examining things and will steadily pursue the consequences of his own principles. And all others, who pretend to be deists without coming up to this, can have no fixed and settled principles at all, upon which they can either argue or act consistently, but must of necessity sink into downright atheism, (and consequently fall under the force of the former arguments,) as may appear by considering the several sorts of them.

1. Some men would be thought to be deists, because* 1.16 they pretend to believe the existence of an eternal, infinite, independent, intelligent being; and, to avoid the name of Epicurean atheists, teach also that this supreme being made the world: though1 1.17 at

the same time they agree with the Epicureans in this, that they fancy God does not at all concern himself in the government of the world, nor has any regard to, or care of, what is done therein. But if we examine things duly, this opinion must unavoidably terminate in absolute atheism. For though to imagine that God, at the creation of the world, or at the formation of any particular part of it, could (if he had pleased,) by his infinite wisdom, foresight, and unerring design, have originally so ordered, disposed, and adapted all the springs and series of future necessary and unintelligent causes, that, without the immediate interposition of his almighty power upon every particular occasion, they should regularly, by virtue of that original disposition, have produced effects worthy to proceed from the direction and government of infinite wisdom: though this, I say, may possibly by very nice and abstract reasoning be reconcileable with a firm belief both of the being and attributes of God, and also with a consistent notion even of providence itself; yet to fancy that God originally created a certain quantity of matter and motion, and left them to frame a world at adventures, without any determinate and particular view, design, or direction; this can no way be defended consistently, but must of necessity recur to downright atheism, as I shall show presently, after I have made only this one observation, that as that opinion is impious in itself, so the late improvements in mathematics and natural philosophy have discovered that, as things now are, that scheme is plainly false and impossible in fact. For, not to say, that, seeing matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, the very original laws of motion themselves cannot continue to take place but by something superior to matter, continually exerting on it a certain force of power according to such certain and determinate laws; it is now evident, beyond question, that the bodies of all plants and animals, much the most considerable parts of the world, could not possibly have

been formed by mere matter, according to any general laws of motion. And not only so, but that most universal principle of gravitation itself, the spring of almost all the great and regular inanimate motions in the world, answering (as I hinted in my former discourse,) not at all to the surfaces of bodies, (by which alone they can act one upon another,) but entirely to their solid content; cannot possibly be the result of any motion originally impressed on matter, but must of necessity be caused (either immediately or mediately) by something which penetrates the very solid substance of all bodies, and continually puts forth in them a force or power entirely different from that by which matter acts on matter: Which is, by the way, an evident demonstration, not only of the world's being made originally by a supreme intelligent cause, but moreover that it depends every moment on some superior being, for the preservation of its frame; and that all the great motions in it are caused by some immaterial power, not having originally impressed a certain quantity of motion upon matter, but perpetually and actually exerting itself every moment in every part of the world. Which preserving and governing power, whether it be immediately the power and action of the same supreme cause that created the world, of him without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground, and with whom the very hairs of our head are all numbered; or whether it be the action of some subordinate instruments appointed by him to direct and preside respectively over certain parts thereof; does either way equally give us a very noble idea of providence. Those men, indeed, who, merely through a certain vanity of philosophising, have been tempted to embrace that other opinion, of all things being produced and continued only by a certain quantity of motion, originally impressed on matter without any determinate design or direction, and left to itself to form a world at adventures; those men, I say, who, merely through a vanity of philosophising, have been

tempted to embrace that opinion, without attending whither it would lead them, ought not, indeed, to be directly charged with all the consequences of it. But it is certain, that many, under that cover, have really been atheists; and the opinion itself (as I before said) leads necessarily, and by unavoidable consequence, to plain atheism. For if God be an all-powerful, omnipresent, intelligent, wise, and free being, (as it hath been before demonstrated that he necessarily is), he cannot possibly but know, at all times and in all places, every thing that is; and foreknow what at all times and in all places it is fittest and wisest should be; and have perfect power, without the least labour, difficulty, or opposition, to order and bring to pass what he so judges fit to be accomplished: and consequently it is impossible but he must actually direct and appoint1 1.18 every particular thing and circumstance that is in the world, or ever shall be, excepting only what by his own pleasure he puts under the power and choice of subordinate free agents. If, therefore, God does not concern himself in the government of the world, nor has any regard to what is done therein, it will follow that he is not an omnipresent, all-powerful, intelligent and wise being; and, consequently, that he is not at all. Wherefore the opinion of this sort of deists stands not upon any certain consistent principles, but leads unavoidably to downright atheism; and, however in words they may confess a God,2 1.19 yet in reality and in truth they deny him.

* 1.20 If, to avoid this, they will own God's government and providence over the greater and more considerable parts of the world, but deny his inspection and regard to human affairs here upon earth, as being too minute and small for the supreme governor of

all things to concern himself in;1 1.21 this still amounts to the same. For if God be omnipresent, all-knowing, and all-powerful, he cannot but equally know, and with equal ease be able to direct and govern,2 1.22 all things as any, and the minutest things3 1.23 as the greatest. So that if he has no regard nor concern for these things, his attributes must, as before, be denied, and consequently his being. But, besides, human affairs are by no means the minutest and most inconsiderable part of the creation: For, (not to consider now, that excellency of human nature which Christianity discovers to us,) let a deist suppose the universe as large as the widest hypothesis of astronomy will give him leave to imagine, or let him suppose it as immense as he himself pleases, and filled with as great numbers of rational creatures as his own fancy can suggest; yet the system wherein we are placed will at least, for ought he can reasonably suppose, be as considerable as any other single system; and the earth whereon we dwell as considerable as most of the other planets in this system, and mankind manifestly the only considerable inhabitants on this globe of earth. Man, therefore, has evidently a better claim to the particular regard and concern of providence than any thing else in this globe of ours; and this our globe of earth as just a pretence to it as most other planets in the system;

and this system as just a one, as far as we can judge, as any system in the universe. If therefore there be any providence at all, and God has any concern for any part of the world, mankind, even separate from the consideration of that excellency of human nature which the Christian doctrine discovers to us, may as reasonably be supposed to be under its particular care and government as any other part of the universe.

* 1.24 2. Some others there are that call themselves deists, because they believe, not only the being, but also the providence of God; that is, that every natural thing that is done in the world is produced by the power, appointed by the wisdom, and directed by the government of God. Though not allowing any difference between moral good and evil, they suppose that God takes no notice of the morally good or evil actions of men; these things depending, as they imagine, merely on the arbitrary constitution of human laws. But how handsomely soever these men may seem to speak of the natural attributes of God, of his knowledge, wisdom, and power, yet neither can this opinion be settled on any certain principles, nor defended by any consistent reasoning; nor can the natural attributes of God be so separated from the moral but that he who denies the latter may be reduced to a necessity of denying the former likewise. For since (as I have formerly proved,) there cannot but be eternal and necessary differences of different things, one from another, and, from these necessary differences of things, there cannot but arise a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; and infinite knowledge can no more fail to know, or infinite wisdom to choose, or infinite power to act, according to these eternal reasons and proportions of things, than knowledge can be ignorance, wisdom be folly, or power weakness; and consequently the justice and goodness of God are as certain and necessary as his wisdom and power;—it follows unavoidably,

that he who denies the justice or goodness of God, or, which is all one, denies his exercise of these attributes in inspecting and regarding the moral actions of men, must also deny, either his wisdom, or his power, or both; and, consequently, must needs be driven into absolute atheism: For though in some moral matters men are not indeed to be judged of by the consequences of their opinions, but by their profession and practice, yet in the present case1 1.25 it matters not at all what men affirm, or how honourably they may seem to speak of some particular attributes of God; but what, notwithstanding such profession, must needs in all reason be supposed to be their true opinion; and their practice generally appears answerable to it.

For, concerning these two sorts of deists, it is observable* 1.26, that as their opinions can terminate consistently in nothing but downright atheism, so their practice and behaviour is generally agreeable to that of the most openly professed atheists. They not only oppose the revelation of Christianity, and reject all the moral obligations of natural religion, as such, but generally they despise also the wisdom of all human constitutions made for the order and benefit of mankind, and are as much contemners of common decency as they are of religion. They endeavour to ridicule and banter all human as well as divine accomplishments; all virtue and government of a man's self, all learning and knowledge, all wisdom and honour, and every thing for which a man can justly be commended or be esteemed more excellent than a beast. They pretend commonly, in their discourse and writings, to expose the abuses and corruptions of religion; but (as is too manifest in some of their books as well as in their talk, they aim really against all virtue in general, and all good manners, and against whatsoever is truly

valuable and commendable in men. They pretend to ridicule certain vices and follies of ignorant or superstitious men; but the many very profane and very lewd images, with which they industriously affect to dress up their discourse, show plainly that they really do not so much intend to expose and deride any vice or folly, as on the contrary to foment and please the debauched and vicious inclinations of others as void of shame as themselves. They discover clearly, that they have no sense at all of the dignity of human nature, nor of the superiority and excellency of their reason above even the meanest of the brutes. They will sometimes in words seem to magnify the wisdom, and other natural attributes of God, but in reality, by ridiculing whatever bears any resemblance to it in men, they show undeniably that they do not indeed believe there is any real difference in things, or any true excellency in one thing more than in another. By turning every thing alike, and without exception, into ridicule and mockery, they declare plainly that they do not believe any thing to be wise, any thing decent, any thing comely or praiseworthy at all. They seem not to have any esteem or value for those distinguishing powers and faculties; by induing them wherewith God has "taught them more than the beasts of the field, and made them wiser than the fowls of heaven."1 1.27 In a word; "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise;"2 1.28 these things they make the constant subject of their mockery and abuse, ridicule and raillery. On the contrary, whatsoever things are profane, impure, filthy, dishonourable, and absurd; these things they make it their business to represent as harmless and indifferent, and to laugh men out of their natural shame and abhorrence of them; nay, even to recommend

them with their utmost wit. Such men as these are not to be argued with, till they can be persuaded to use arguments instead of drollery: For banter is not capable of being answered by reason; not because it has any strength in it, but because it runs out of all the bounds of reason and good sense, by extravagantly joining together such images as have not in themselves any manner of similitude or connexion; by which means all things are alike easy to be rendered ridiculous, by being represented only in an absurd dress. These men, therefore, are first to be convinced of the true principles of reason before they can be disputed with; and then they must of necessity either retreat into downright atheism, or be led by undeniable reasoning to acknowledge and submit to the obligations of morality, and heartily repent of their profane abuse of God and religion.

3. Another sort of deists there are, who, having* 1.29 right apprehensions concerning the natural attributes of God, and his all-governing providence, seem also to have some notion of his moral perfections also. That is, as they believe him to be a being infinitely knowing, powerful, and wise, so they believe him to be also in some sense a being of infinite justice, goodness, and truth, and that he governs the universe by these perfections, and expects suitable obedience from all his rational creatures. But then, having a prejudice against the notion of the immortality of human souls, they believe that men perish entirely at death, and that one generation shall perpetually succeed another, without any thing remaining of men after their departure out of this life, and without any future restoration or renovation of things. And imagining that justice, and goodness in God, are not the same as in the ideas we frame of these perfections, when we consider them in men, or when we reason about them abstractly in themselves, but that in the supreme governor of the world they are something transcendent, and of which we cannot make any true judgment, nor argue with any certainty

about them: they fancy, though there does not indeed seem to us to be any equity or proportion in the distributions of rewards and punishments in this present life, yet that we are not sufficient judges concerning the attributes of God, to argue from thence with any assurance for the certainty of a future state. But neither does this opinion stand on any consistent principles. For if justice and goodness be not1 1.30 the same in God, as in our ideas, then we mean nothing, when we say that God is necessarily just and good; and for the same reason it may as well be said that we know not what we mean, when we affirm that he is an intelligent and wise being, and there will be no foundation at all left on which we can fix any thing. Thus the moral attributes of God, however they be acknowledged in words, yet in reality they are by these men entirely taken away; and upon the same grounds the natural attributes may also be denied. And so upon the whole, this opinion likewise, if we argue upon it consistently, must finally recur to absolute atheism.

* 1.31 4. The last sort of deists are those who, if they did indeed believe what they pretend, have just and right notions of God, and of all the divine attributes in every respect; who declare they believe that there is one eternal, infinite, intelligent, all-powerful, and wise being, the creator, preserver, and governor of all things; that this supreme cause is a being of infinite justice, goodness, and truth, and all other moral as well as natural perfections; that he made the world for the manifestation of his power and wisdom, and to communicate his goodness and happiness to his creatures; that he preserves it by his continual all-wise providence, and governs it according to the eternal rules of infinite justice, equity, goodness, mercy, and truth; that all created rational beings, depending continually upon him, are bound

to adore, worship, and obey him, to praise him for all things they enjoy, and to pray to him for every thing they want; that they are all obliged to promote, in their proportion, and according to the extent of their several powers and abilities, the general good and welfare of those parts of the world wherein they are placed, in like manner as the divine goodness is continually promoting the universal benefit of the whole; that men, in particular, are every one obliged to make it their business, by an universal benevolence, to promote the happiness of all others; that, in order to this, every man is bound always to behave himself so towards others, as in reason he would desire they should in like circumstances deal with him; that, therefore, he is obliged to obey and submit to his superiors in all just and right things, for the preservation of society and the peace and benefit of the public; to be just and honest, equitable and sincere, in all his dealings with his equals, for the keeping inviolable the everlasting rule of righteousness, and maintaining an universal trust and confidence, friendship and affection, amongst men; and, towards his inferiors, to be gentle, and easy, and affable,—charitable, and willing to assist as many as stand in need of his help, for the preservation of universal love and benevolence amongst mankind, and in imitation of the goodness of God, who preserves and does good to all creatures, which depend entirely upon him for their very being and all that they enjoy; that, in respect of himself, every man is bound to preserve, as much as in him lies, his own being, and the right use of all his faculties, so long as it shall please God, who appointed him his station in this world, to continue him therein; that, therefore, he is bound to have an exact government of his passions, and carefully to abstain from all debaucheries or abuses of himself, which tend either to the destruction of his own being, or to the disordering of his faculties, and disabling him from performing his duty, or hurrying him into the practice of unreasonable and unjust things: Lastly, that accordingly

as men regard or neglect these obligations, so they are proportionably acceptable or displeasing unto God, who, being supreme governor of the world, cannot but testify his favour or displeasure at some time or other; and, consequently, since this is not done in the present state, therefore there must be a future state of rewards and punishments in a life to come. But all this, the men we are now speaking of profess to believe only so far as it is discoverable by the light of nature alone, without believing any divine revelation. These, I say, are the only true deists, and indeed the only persons who ought in reason to be argued with, in order to convince them of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of the Christian revelation. But, alas! there is, as I before said, too much reason to believe, that there are very few such deists as these, among modern deniers of revelation. For such men as I have now described, if they would at all attend to the consequences of their own principles, could not fail of being quickly persuaded to embrace Christianity. For, being fully convinced of the obligations of natural religion, and the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments; and yet observing, at the same time, how little use men generally are able to make of the light of reason, to discover the one, or to convince themselves effectually of the certainty and importance of the other; it is impossible but they must be sensible of the want of a revelation; it is impossible but they must earnestly desire God would be pleased, by some direct discovery of his will, to make these things more clear and plain, more easy and obvious, more certain and evident to all capacities; it is impossible but they must wish God would be pleased particularly to signify expressly the acceptableness of repentance, and his willingness to forgive returning sinners; it is impossible but they must be very solicitous to have some more particular and certain information concerning the nature of that future state, which reason teaches them in general to expect. The consequence of this, is;

that they must needs be possessed beforehand with a strong hope that the Christian revelation may, upon a due examination, appear to be true. They must be infinitely far from ridiculing and despising any thing that claims to be a divine revelation, before they have sincerely and thoroughly examined it to the bottom. They must needs be before-hand very much disposed in its favour; and be very willing to be convinced that what tends to the advancing and perfecting the obligation of natural religion, to the securing their great hopes, and ascertaining the truth of a future state of rewards and punishments, and can any way be made appear to be worthy of God, and consistent with his attributes, and has any reasonable proof of the matters of fact it depends upon— is, really and truly, what it pretends to be, a divine revelation. And now, is it possible that any man, with these opinions and these dispositions, should continue to reject Christianity, when proposed to him in its original and genuine simplicity, without the mixture of any corruptions or inventions of men? Let him read the sermons and exhortations of our Saviour as delivered in the gospels, and the discourses of the apostles, preserved in their acts and their epistles, and try if he can withstand the evidence of such a doctrine, and reject the hopes of such a glorious immortality so discovered to him. The heathen philosophers* 1.32, those few of them who taught and lived up to the obligations of natural religion, had indeed a consistent scheme of deism so far as it went; and they were very brave and wise men, if any of them could keep steady and firm to it. But the case is not so now. The same scheme of deism is not any longer consistent with its own principles, if it does not now lead men to embrace and believe revelation, as it then taught them to hope for it. Deists, in our days, who obstinately reject revelation when offered to them, are not such men as Socrates and Tully were; but, under pretence of deism, it is plain they are generally ridiculers of all that is truly excellent even

in natural religion itself. Could we see a deist, whose mind was heartily possessed with worthy and just apprehensions of all the attributes of God, and a deep sense of his duty towards that supreme author and preserver of his being,—could we see a deist who lived in an exact performance of all the duties of natural religion, and by the practice of righteousness, justice, equity, sobriety, and temperance, expressed in his actions, as well as words, a firm belief and expectation of a future state of rewards and punishments; in a word, could we see a deist, who, with reverence and modesty, with sincerity and impartiality, with a true and hearty desire of finding out and submitting to reason and truth, would inquire into the foundations of our belief, and examine thoroughly the pretensions which pure and uncorrupt Christianity has to be received as a divine revelation,—I think we could not doubt to affirm, of such a person, as our Saviour did of the young man in the Gospel, that he was not far from the kingdom of God; and that, being willing to do his will, he should know of the doctrine whether it was of God. But, as I have said, there is great reason to doubt there are few or none such deists as these among the infidels of our days. This, indeed, is what they sometimes pretend, and seem to desire should be thought to be their case. But, alas, their trivial and vain cavils; their mocking and ridiculing, without and before examination; their directing the whole stress of their objections against particular customs, or particular and perhaps uncertain opinions, or explications of opinions, without at all considering the main body of religion; their loose, vain, and frothy discourses; and, above all, their vicious and immoral lives,—show plainly and undeniably, that they are not really deists, but mere atheists; and consequently not capable to judge of the truth of Christianity. If they were truly and in earnest such deists as they pretend, and would sometimes be thought to be, those principles (as has been already shown in part, and

will more fully appear in the following discourse,) would unavoidably lead them to Christianity; but, being such as they really are, they cannot possibly avoid recurring to downright atheism.

The sum is this: There is now1 1.33 no such thing as a consistent scheme of deism. That which alone was once such, namely, the scheme of the best heathen philosophers, ceases now to be so, after the appearance of revelation; because (as I have already shown, and shall more largely prove in the sequel of this discourse,) it directly conducts men to the belief of Christianity. All other pretences to deism may, by unavoidable consequence, be forced to terminate in absolute atheism. He that cannot prevail with himself to obey the Christian doctrine, and embrace those hopes of life and immortality which our Saviour has brought to light through the Gospel, cannot now be imagined to maintain with any firmness, steadiness, and certainty, the belief of the immortality of the soul and a future state of rewards and punishments after death; because all the main difficulties and objections lie equally against both. For the same reason, he who disbelieves the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, cannot defend, to any effectual purpose, or enforce with any sufficient strength, the obligations of morality and natural religion, notwithstanding that they are indeed incumbent upon men, from the very nature and reason of the things themselves. Then, he who gives up the obligations of morality and natural religion, cannot possibly have any just and worthy notion of the moral attributes of God, or any true sense of the nature and necessary difference of things; and he that once goes thus far has no foundation left upon which he can be sure of the natural attributes or even of the existence of God; because, to deny what unavoidably follows from the supposition of

his existence and natural attributes, is in reality denying those natural attributes and that existence itself. On the contrary, he who believes the being and natural attributes of God, must of necessity (as has been shown in my former discourse) confess his moral attributes also. Next, he who owns, and has just notions of the moral attributes of God, cannot avoid acknowledging the obligations of morality and natural religion. In like manner, he who owns the obligations of morality and natural religion must needs, to support those obligations, and make them effectual in practice, believe a future state of rewards and punishments. And, finally, he who believes both the obligations of natural religion and the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, has no manner of reason left why he should reject the Christian revelation, when proposed to him in its original and genuine simplicity. Wherefore, since those arguments which demonstrate to us the being and attributes of God are so closely connected with those which prove the reasonableness and certainty of the Christian revelation, that there is now no consistent scheme of deism left,—all modern deists being forced to shift from one cavil to another, and having no fixed and certain set of principles to adhere to;—I thought I could no way better prevent their ill designs, and obviate all their different shifts and objections, than by endeavouring, in the same method of reasoning by which I before demonstrated the being and attributes of God, to prove, in like manner, by one direct and continued thread of arguing, the reasonableness and certainty of the Christian revelation also.

To proceed therefore to the proof of the propositions themselves.

Proposition I.

I. The same necessary and eternal different relations that different things bear one to another, and the same consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, with regard to which the will of God always

and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe, ought likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public, in their respective stations; that is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act; They cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them so to do, even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive will or command of God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension, of any particular private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those rules.

The several parts of this proposition may be proved distinctly, in the following manner.

I. That there are differences of things, and different* 1.34 relations, respects, or proportions, of some things towards others, is as evident and undeniable as that one magnitude or number is greater, equal to, or smaller than another. That from these different relations of different things there necessarily arises an agreement or disagreement of some things with others, or a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, is likewise as plain as that there is any such thing as proportion or disproportion in geometry and arithmetic, or uniformity or difformity in comparing together the respective figures of bodies. Further, that there is a fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuitableness of others, founded in the nature of things and the qualifications of persons antecedent to all positive appointment whatsoever; also, that, from the different relations of different persons one to another, there necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness of certain manners

of behaviour of some persons towards others; is as manifest as that the properties which flow from the essences of different mathematical figures have different congruities or incongruities between themselves, or that, in mechanics, certain weights or powers have very different forces, and different effects one upon another, according to their different distances, or different positions and situations in respect of each other: For instance; that God is infinitely superior to men is as clear as that infinity is larger than a point, or eternity longer than a moment; and it is as certainly fit that men should honour and worship, obey and imitate God, than on the contrary in all their actions endeavour to dishonour and disobey him, as it is certainly true that they have an entire dependence on him, and he, on the contrary, can in no respect receive any advantage from them; and not only so, but also that his will is as certainly and unalterably just and equitable in giving his commands as his power is irresistible in requiring submission to it. Again: It is a thing absolutely and necessarily fitter in itself, that the supreme author and creator of the universe should govern, order, and direct all things to certain and constant regular ends, than that every thing should be permitted to go on at adventures, and produce uncertain effects merely by chance and in the utmost confusion, without any determinate view or design at all. It is a thing manifestly fitter in itself, that the all-powerful governor of the world should do always what is best in the whole, and what tends most to the universal good of the whole creation, than that he should make the whole continually miserable, or that, to satisfy the unreasonable desires of any particular depraved natures, he should at any time suffer the order of the whole to be altered and perverted. Lastly, it is a thing evidently and infinitely more fit, that any one particular innocent and good being should, by the supreme ruler and disposer of all things, be placed and preserved in an easy and happy estate, than that,

without any fault or demerit of its own, it should be made extremely, remedilessly, and endlessly miserable. In like manner, in men's dealing and conversing one with another, it is undeniably more fit, absolutely and in the nature of the thing itself, that all men should endeavour to promote the universal good and welfare of all, than that all men should be continually contriving the ruin and destruction of all. It is evidently more fit, even before all positive bargains and compacts, that men should deal one with another according to the known rules of justice and equity, than that every man, for his own present advantage, should, without scruple, disappoint the most reasonable and equitable expectations of his neighbours, and cheat and defraud, or spoil by violence, all others, without restraint. Lastly, it is, without dispute, more fit and reasonable in itself, that I should preserve the life of an innocent man, that happens at any time to be in my power, or deliver him from any imminent danger, though I have never made him any promise so to do, than that I should suffer him to perish, or take away his life, without any reason or provocation at all.

These things are so notoriously plain and self-evident* 1.35 that nothing but the extremest stupidity of mind, corruption of manners, or perverseness of spirit, can possibly make any man entertain the least doubt concerning them. For a man indued with reason, to deny the truth of these things, is the very same thing as if a man that has the use of his sight should, at the same time that he beholds the sun, deny that there is any such thing as light in the world; or as if a man that understands geometry or arithmetic, should deny the most obvious and known proportions of lines or numbers, and perversely contend that the whole is not equal to all its parts, or that a square is not double to a triangle of equal base and height. Any man of ordinary capacity, and unbiassed judgment, plainness, and simplicity, who had never read, and had never been told, that there were

men and philosophers who had in earnest asserted, and attempted to prove, that there is no natural and unalterable difference between good and evil, would, at the first hearing, be as hardly persuaded to believe that it could ever really enter into the heart of any intelligent man to deny all natural difference between right and wrong, as he would be to believe that ever there could be any geometer who would seriously and in good earnest lay it down, as a first principle, that a crooked line is as straight as a right one. So that indeed it might justly seem altogether a needless undertaking to attempt to prove and establish the eternal difference of good and evil, had there not appeared certain men, as Mr. Hobbes and some few others, who have presumed, contrary to the plainest and most obvious reason of mankind, to assert, and not without some subtilty endeavoured to prove, that there is no such real difference originally, necessarily, and absolutely in the nature of things; but that all obligation of duty to God arises merely from his absolute irresistible power, and all duty towards men merely from positive compact; and have founded their whole scheme of politics upon that opinion: Wherein, as they have contradicted the judgment of all the wisest and soberest part of mankind, so they have not been able to avoid contradicting themselves also; for, not to mention now, that they have no way to show how compacts themselves come to be obligatory, but by inconsistently owning an eternal original fitness in the thing itself, which I shall have occasion to observe hereafter: Besides, this, I say, if there be naturally and absolutely in things themselves no difference between good and evil, just and, unjust, then, in the state of nature, before any compact be made, it is equally as good, just, and reasonable, for one man to destroy the life of another, not only when it is necessary for his own preservation, but also arbitrarily and without any provocation at all,1 1.36 or any appearance of advantage

to himself, as to preserve or save another man's life, when he may do it without any hazard of his own: The consequence of which is, that not only the first and most obvious way for every particular man to secure himself effectually, would be, (as Mr Hobbes teaches) to endeavour to prevent and cut off all others, but also that men might destroy one another upon every foolish and peevish, or arbitrary humour, even when they did not think any such thing necessary for their own preservation: And the effect of this practice must needs be, that it would terminate in the destruction of all mankind; which being undeniably a great and insufferable evil, Mr Hobbes himself confesses it reasonable that, to prevent this evil, men should enter into certain compacts to preserve one another. Now, if the destruction of mankind by each other's hands be such an evil, that, to prevent it, it was fit and reasonable that men should enter into compacts to preserve each other, then, before any such compacts, it was manifestly a thing unfit and unreasonable in itself that mankind should all destroy one another. And if so, then for the same reason it was also unfit and unreasonable, antecedent to all compacts, that any one man should destroy another arbitrarily and without any provocation, or at any time when it was not absolutely and immediately necessary for the preservation of himself; which is directly contradictory to Mr. Hobbes's first supposition,1 1.37 of there being no natural and absolute difference between good and evil, just and unjust, antecedent to positive compact. And in like manner, all others, who, upon any pretence whatsoever, teach that good and evil depend originally on the constitution of positive laws, whether divine or human, must unavoidably run into the same absurdity: For, if there be no such thing asgood andevil in the nature of things, antecedent to all laws, then neither can any one law

be better than another, norany one thing whatever be more justly established and enforced by laws, than the contrary; nor can1 1.38 any reason be given why any laws should ever be made at all: But all laws equally will be either arbitrary and tyrannical,2 1.39 or frivolous and needless, because the contrary might with equal reason have been established, if, before the making of the laws, all things had been alike indifferent in their own nature. There is no possible way to avoid this absurdity, but by saying, that, out of things in their own nature absolutely indifferent, those are chosen by wise governors to be made obligatory by law, the practice of which they judge will tend to the public benefit of the community. But this is an express contradiction in the very terms. For, if the practice of certain things tends to the public benefit of the world, and the contrary would tend to the public disadvantage, then those things are not in their own nature indifferent, but were good and reasonable to be practised before any law was made, and can only for that very reason be wisely enforced by the authority of laws. Only here it is to be observed, that, by the public benefit, must3 1.40 not be understood the interest of any one particular nation, to the plain injury or prejudice of the rest of mankind, any more than the interest of one city or family, in opposition to their neighbours of the same country. But those things only are truly good in their own nature which either tend to the universal benefit and welfare of all men, or at least are not destructive of it. The true state, therefore, of this case, is plainly this: Some

things are in their own nature good and reasonable, and fit to be done; such as keeping faith, and performing equitable compacts, and the like; and these receive not their obligatory power from any law or authority, but are only declared, confirmed, and enforced by penalties upon such as would not perhaps be governed by right reason only. Other things are in their own nature absolutely evil; such as breaking faith, refusing to perform equitable compacts, cruelly destroying those who have neither directly nor indirectly given any occasion for any such treatment, and the like: And these cannot, by any law or authority whatsoever, be made fit and reasonable, or excusable to be practised. Lastly, other things are in their own nature indifferent; that is, (not absolutely and strictly so; as such trivial actions, which have no way any tendency at all either to the public welfare or damage; for, concerning such things, it would be childish and trifling to suppose any laws to be made at all; but they are) such things, whose tendency to the public benefit or disadvantage is either so small or so remote, or so obscure and involved, that the generality of people are not able of themselves to discern on which side they ought to act; and these things are made obligatory by the authority of laws, though perhaps every one cannot distinctly perceive the reason and fitness of their being enjoined; of which sort are many particular penal laws in several countries and nations. But to proceed:

The principal thing that can, with any colour of* 1.41 reason, seem to countenance the opinion of those who deny the natural and eternal difference of good and evil, (for Mr. Hobbes's false reasonings I shall hereafter consider by themselves,) is the difficulty there may sometimes be, to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong, the variety1 1.42 of opinions that have

obtained even among understanding and learned men concerning certain questions of just and unjust, especially in political matters, and the many contrary laws that have been made in divers ages and in different countries concerning these matters. But as, in painting, two very different colours, by diluting each other very slowly and gradually, may, from the highest intenseness in either extreme, terminate in the midst insensibly, and so run one into the other, that it shall not be possible even for a skilful eye to determine exactly where the one ends and the other begins; and yet the colours may really differ as much as can be, not in degree only, but entirely in kind, as red and blue, or white and black; so, though it may perhaps be very difficult, in some nice and perplexed cases, (which yet are very far from occurring frequently,) to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong, just and unjust, and there may be some latitude in the judgment of different men and the laws of divers nations; yet right and wrong are nevertheless in themselves totally and essentially different; even altogether as much as white and black, light and darkness. The Spartan law, perhaps, which1 1.43 permitted their youth to steal, may, as absurd as it was, bear much dispute whether it was absolutely unjust or no, because every man having an absolute right in his own goods, it may seem that the members of any society may agree to transfer or alter their own properties upon what conditions they shall think fit; but if it could be supposed that a law had been made at Sparta, or at Rome, or in India, or in any other part of the world, whereby it had been commanded or allowed, that every man might rob by violence, and murder whomsoever he met with, or that no faith should be kept with any man, nor any equitable compacts performed, no man, with any tolerable use

of his reason, whatever diversity of judgment might be among them in other matters, would have thought that such a law could have authorised or excused, much less have justified such actions, and have made them become good; because, it is plainly not in men's power to make falsehood be truth, though they may alter the property of their goods as they please. Now, if, in flagrant cases, the natural and essential difference between good and evil, right and wrong, cannot but be confessed to be plainly and undeniably evident, the difference between them must be also essential and unalterable in all, even the smallest, and nicest, and most intricate cases, though it be not so easy to be discerned and accurately distinguished; for, if, from the difficulty of determining exactly the bounds of right and wrong in many perplexed cases, it could truly be concluded that just and unjust were not essentially different by nature, but only by positive constitution and custom, it would follow equally, that they were not really, essentially, and unalterably different, even in the most flagrant cases that can be supposed; which is an assertion so very absurd, that Mr. Hobbes himself could hardly vent it without blushing, and discovering plainly, by his shifting expressions, his secret self-condemnation. There are, therefore, certain necessary and eternal differences of things, and certain consequent fitnesses or unfitnesses of the application of different things, or different relations one to another, not depending on any positive constitutions, but founded unchangeably in the nature and reason of things, and unavoidably arising from the differences of the things themselves; which is the first branch of the general proposition I proposed to prove.

2. Now, what these eternal and unalterable relations* 1.44, respects, or proportions of things, with their consequent agreements or disagreements, fitnesses, or unfitnesses, absolutely and necessarily are in themselves, that also they appear to be, to the understandings of all intelligent beings, except those only who

understand things to be what they are not, that is, whose understandings are either very imperfect or very much depraved. And by this understanding or knowledge of the natural and necessary relations, fitnesses, and proportions of things, the wills likewise of all intelligent beings are constantly directed, and must needs be determined to act accordingly, excepting those only who will things to be what they are not and cannot be; that is, whose wills are corrupted by particular interest or affection, or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing passion. Wherefore, since the natural attributes of God, his infinite knowledge, wisdom, and power, set him infinitely above all possibility of being deceived by any error, or of being influenced by any wrong affection, it is manifest his divine will cannot but always and necessarily determine itself to choose to do what in the whole is absolutely best and fittest to be done; that is, to act constantly according to the eternal rules of infinite goodness, justice, and truth; as I have endeavoured to show distinctly in my former discourse, in deducing severally the moral attributes of God.

* 1.45 3. And now that the same reason of things, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to act in constant conformity to the eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth, ought also constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, is very evident. For, as it is absolutely impossible in nature that God should be deceived by any error, or influenced by any wrong affection, so it is very unreasonable and blame-worthy in practice, that any intelligent creatures, whom God has made so far like unto himself, as to indue them with those excellent faculties of reason and will, whereby they are enabled to distinguish good from evil, and to choose the one and refuse the other, should either negligently suffer themselves to be imposed upon and deceived in matters

of good and evil, right and wrong, or wilfully and perversely allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd passions, and corrupt or partial affections, to act contrary to what they know is fit to be done. Which two things, viz. negligent misunderstanding, and wilful passions or lusts, are, as I said, the only causes which can make a reasonable creature act contrary to reason, that is, contrary to the eternal rules of justice, equity, righteousness, and truth: For, was it not for these inexcusable corruptions and depravations, it is impossible but the same proportions and fitnesses of things, which have so much weight, and so much excellency, and beauty in them, that the all-powerful creator and governor of the universe, (who has the absolute and uncontrollable dominion of all things in his own hands, and is accountable to none for what he does, yet) thinks it no diminution of his power to make this reason of things the unalterable rule and law of his own actions in the government of the world, and does nothing by mere will and arbitrariness; it is impossible, (I say,) if it was not for inexcusable corruption and depravation, but the same eternal reason of things must much more have weight enough to determine constantly the wills and actions of all subordinate, finite, dependent, and accountable beings. For originally, and in reality, it is as natural and* 1.46 (morally speaking) necessary, that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing, and the right of the case, as it is natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary, that the understanding should submit to a demonstrated truth; and it is as absurd and blame-worthy, to mistake negligently plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things in morality to be what they are not, or wilfully to act contrary to known justice and equity, that is, to will things to be what they are not and cannot be, as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man, in arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four, or wilfully and obstinately to contend, against his own clear knowledge, that the whole is not equal to all

its parts. The only difference is, that assent to a plain speculative truth is not in a man's power to withhold; but to act according to the plain right and reason of things, this he may, by the natural liberty of his will, forbear; but the one he ought to do, and it is as much his plain and indispensable duty, as the other he cannot but do, and it is the necessity of his nature to do it: He that will-fully refuses to honour and obey God, from whom he received his being, and to whom he continually owes his preservation, is really guilty of an equal absurdity and inconsistency in practice, as he that in speculation denies the effect to owe any thing to its cause, or the whole to be bigger than its part. He that refuses to deal with all men equitably, and with every man as he desires they should deal with him, is guilty of the very same unreasonableness and contradiction in one case, as he that in another case should affirm one number or quantity to be equal to another, and yet that other at the same time not to be equal to the first: Lastly, he that acknowledges himself obliged to the practice of certain duties both towards God and towards men, and yet takes no care either to preserve his own being, or at least not to preserve himself in such a state and temper of mind and body, as may best enable him to perform those duties, is altogether as inexcusable and ridiculous as he that in any other matter should affirm one thing at the same time that he denies another, without which the former could not possibly be true; or undertake one thing at the same time that he obstinately omits another, without which the former is by no means practicable: Wherefore all rational creatures, whose wills are not constantly and regularly determined, and their actions governed by right reason and the necessary differences of good and evil, according to the eternal and invariable rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth, but suffer themselves to be swayed by unaccountable arbitrary humours and rash passions, by lusts, vanity, and pride, by private interest, or present sensual pleasures;

these, setting up their own unreasonable self-will in opposition to the nature and reason of things, endeavour (as much as in them lies) to make things be what they are not, and cannot be; which is the highest presumption and greatest insolence, as well as the greatest absurdity imaginable: It is acting contrary to that understanding, reason, and judgment, which God has implanted in their natures, on purpose to enable them to discern the difference between good and evil;—it is attempting to destroy that order by which the universe subsists;—it is offering the highest affront imaginable to the creator of all things, who made things to be what they are, and governs every thing himself according to the laws of their several natures;—in a word, all wilful wickedness and perversion of right is the very same insolence and absurdity in moral matters, as it would be in natural things for a man to pretend to alter the certain proportions of numbers,—to take away the demonstrable relations and properties of mathematical figures,—to make light darkness, and darkness light,—or to call sweet bitter, and bitter sweet.

Further: As it appears thus, from the abstract and* 1.47 absolute reason and nature of things, that all rational creatures ought, that is, are obliged to take care that their wills and actions be constantly determined and governed by the eternal rule of right and equity: so the certainty and universality of that obligation is plainly confirmed, and the force of it particularly discovered and applied to every man by this; that, in like manner as no one who is instructed in mathematics can forbear giving his assent to every geometrical demonstration, of which he understands the terms, either by his own study, or by having had them explained to him by others; so no man, who either has patience and opportunities to examine and consider things himself, or has the means of being taught and instructed in any tolerable manner by others, concerning the necessary relations and dependencies of things, can avoid giving his assent to the fitness and

reasonableness of his governing all his actions by the law or rule before mentioned, even though his practice, through the prevalence of brutish lusts, be most absurdly contradictory to that assent. That is to say, by the reason of his mind, he cannot but be compelled to own and acknowledge that there is really such an obligation indispensably incumbent upon him; even at the same time that in the actions of his life he is endeavouring to throw it off and despise it: For the judgment and conscience of a man's own mind, concerning the reasonableness and fitness of the thing, that his actions should be conformed to such or such a rule or law, is the truest and formallest obligation, even more properly and strictly so than any opinion whatsoever of the authority of the giver of a law, or any regard he may have to its sanction by rewards and punishments. For whoever acts contrary to this sense and conscience of his own mind, is necessarily self-condemned; and the greatest and strongest of all obligations is that which a man cannot break through without condemning himself. The dread of superior power and authority, and the sanction of rewards and punishments, however, indeed, absolutely necessary to the government of frail and fallible creatures, and truly the most effectual means of keeping them in their duty, is yet really in itself only a secondary and additional obligation or enforcement of the first. The original obligation of all (the ambiguous use of which word, as a term of art, has caused some perplexity and confusion in this matter,) is the eternal reason of things; that reason, which God himself, who has no superior to direct him, and to whose happiness nothing can be added nor any thing diminished from it, yet constantly obliges himself to govern the world by: And the more excellent and perfect (or the freer from corruption and depravation) any creatures are, the more cheerfully and steadily are their wills always determined by this supreme obligation, in conformity to the nature, and in imitation of the most perfect will of God: So far, therefore, as men

are conscious of what is right and wrong, so far they are under an obligation to act accordingly; and, consequently, that eternal rule of right which I have been hereto describing, it is evident ought as indispensably to govern men's actions, as it cannot but necessarily determine their assent.

Now that the case is truly thus; that the eternal* 1.48 differences of good and evil, the unalterable rule of right and equity, do necessarily and unavoidably determine the judgment, and force the assent of all men that use any consideration, is undeniably manifest from the universal experience of mankind; for no man willingly and deliberately transgresses this rule in any great and considerable instance, but he acts contrary to the judgment and reason of his own mind, and secretly reproaches himself for so doing: And no man observes and obeys it steadily, especially in cases of difficulty and temptation, when it interferes with any present interest, pleasure, or passion, but his own mind commends and applauds him for his resolution in executing what his conscience could not forbear giving its assent to, as just and right: And this is what St. Paul means, when he says, (Rom. ii. 14, 15,) that when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another.

It was a very wise observation of Plato, which he* 1.49 received from Socrates, that if you take a young man, impartial and unprejudiced, one that never had any learning, nor any experience in the world, and examine him about the natural relations and proportions of things, [or the moral differences of good and evil,] you may, only by asking him questions, without teaching him any thing at all directly, cause him to express in his answers just and adequate notions of geometrical truths, [and true and exact determinations

concerning matters of right and wrong.] From whence he thought it was to be concluded, that all knowledge and learning is nothing but memory, or only a recollecting, upon every new occasion, what had been before known in a state of pre-existence. And some others, both ancients and moderns, have concluded that the ideas of all first and simple truths, either natural or moral, are innate and originally impressed or stamped upon the mind. In their inference from the observation, the authors of both these opinions seem to be mistaken; but thus much it proves unavoidably,—that the differences, relations, and proportions of things, both natural and moral, in which all unprejudiced minds thus naturally agree, are certain, unalterable, and real in the things themselves, and do not at all depend on the variable opinions, fancies, or imaginations of men prejudiced by education, laws, customs, or evil practices: And also that the mind of man naturally and unavoidably gives its assent, as to natural and geometrical truth, so also to the moral differences of things, and to the fitness and reasonableness of the obligation of the everlasting law of righteousness, whenever fairly and plainly proposed.

* 1.50 Some men, indeed, who, by means of a very evil and vicious education, or through a long habit of wickedness and debauchery, have extremely corrupted the principles of their nature, and have long accustomed themselves to bear down their own reason by the force of prejudice, lust, and passion, that they may not be forced to confess themselves self-condemned, will confidently and absolutely contend that they do not really see any natural and necessary difference between what we call right and wrong, just and unjust; that the reason and judgment of their own mind does not tell them they are under any such indispensable obligations as we would endeavour to persuade them; and that they are not sensible they ought to be governed by any other rule than their own will and pleasure. But even

these men, the most abandoned of all mankind, however industriously they endeavour to conceal and deny their self-condemnation, yet they cannot avoid making a discovery of it sometimes when they are not aware of it. For example, there is no man so vile and desperate who commits at any time a murder and robbery, with the most unrelenting mind, but would choose,1 1.51 if such a thing could be proposed to him to obtain all the same profit or advantage, whatsoever it be that he aims at, without committing the crime, rather than with it, even though he was sure to go unpunished for committing the crime. Nay, I believe there is no man even in Mr Hobbes's state of nature, and of Mr Hobbes's own principles, but if he was equally assured of securing his main end, his self-preservation, by either way, would choose to preserve himself rather without destroying all his fellow-creatures, than with it, even supposing all impunity, and all other future conveniences of life, equal in either case. Mr. Hobbes's own scheme, of men's agreeing by compact to preserve one another, can hardly be supposed without this. And this plainly evinces, that the mind of man unavoidably acknowledges a natural and necessary difference between good and evil, antecedent to all arbitrary and positive constitution whatsoever.

But the truth of this, that the mind of man naturally* 1.52 and necessarily assents to the eternal law of righteousness, may still better, and more clearly, and more universally appear, from the judgment that men pass upon each other's actions, than from what we can discern concerning their consciousness of their own. For men may dissemble and conceal from the world the judgment of their own conscience; nay, by a strange partiality, they may even impose upon

and deceive themselves, (for who is there that does not sometimes allow himself, nay, and even justify himself in that wherein he condemns another?) But men's judgments concerning the actions of others, especially where they have no relation to themselves, or repugnance to their interest, are commonly impartial; and from this we may judge what sense men naturally have of the unalterable difference of right and wrong. Now the observation which every one cannot but make in this matter is this; that virtue and true goodness, righteousness and equity, are things so truly noble and excellent, so lovely and venerable in themselves, and do so necessarily approve themselves to the reason and consciences of men, that even those very persons who, by the prevailing power of some interest or lust, are themselves drawn aside out of the paths of virtue,1 1.53 can yet hardly ever forbear to give it its true character and commendation in others. And this observation holds true, not only in the generality of vicious men, but very frequently even in the worst sort of them, viz. those who persecute others for being better than themselves. Thus the officers who were sent by the Pharisees to apprehend our Saviour, could not forbear declaring2 1.54 that he spake as never man spake; and the Roman governor, when he gave sentence that he should be crucified, could not at the same instant forbear openly declaring that he found no fault in him.3 1.55 Even in this case men cannot choose but think well of those persons whom the dominion of their lusts will not suffer them to imitate, or whom their present interest and the necessity of their worldly affairs compels them to discourage. They cannot but desire, that they themselves were the men they are not, and wish, with Balaam, that though they imitate not the life, yet at least they might die the death of the righteous, and that their last end might be like theirs.

And hence it is that Plato judiciously observes,1 1.56 that even the worst of men seldom or never make so wrong judgment concerning persons as they do concerning things, there being in virtue an unaccountable and as it were divine force, which, whatever confusion men endeavour to introduce in things by their vicious discourses and debauched practices, yet almost always compels them to distinguish right concerning persons, and makes them admire and praise just and equitable, and honest men. On the contrary, vice and injustice, profaneness and debauchery, are things so absolutely odious in their own nature, that however they insinuate themselves into the practice, yet they can never gain over to themselves the judgment of mankind. They who do evil, yet see and approve what is good, and condemn in others what they blindly allow in themselves; nay, and very frequently condemn even themselves also, not without great disorder and uneasiness of mind, in those very things wherein they allow themselves. At least, there is hardly any wicked man, but when his own case is represented to him under the person of another, will freely enough pass sentence against the wickedness he himself is guilty of; and, with sufficient severity, exclaim against all iniquity. This shows abundantly, that all variation from the eternal rule of right is absolutely and in the nature of the thing itself to be abhorred and detested, and that the unprejudiced mind of man as naturally disapproves injustice in moral matters, as in natural things it cannot but dissent from falsehood, or dislike incongruities. Even in reading the histories of past and far distant ages, where it is plain we can have no concern for the events of things, nor prejudices concerning the characters of persons; who is there, that does not praise

and admire, nay highly esteem, and in his imagination love (as it were) the equity, justice, truth, and fidelity of some persons, and, with the greatest indignation and hatred, detest the barbarity, injustice, and treachery of others? Nay, further, when the prejudices of corrupt minds lie all on the side of injustice, as when we have obtained some very great profit or advantage through another man's treachery or breach of faith; yet1 1.57 who is there, that, upon that very occasion, does not (even to a proverb,) dislike the person and the action, how much soever he may rejoice at the event? But when we come ourselves to suffer by iniquity, then where are all the arguments and sophistries by which unjust men, while they are oppressing others, would persuade themselves that they are not sensible of any natural difference between good and evil? When it comes to be these men's own case to be oppressed by violence, or overreached by fraud, where then are all their pleas against the eternal distinction of right and wrong? How, on the contrary, do they then cry out for equity, and exclaim against injustice? How do they then challenge and object against Providence, and think neither God nor man severe enough, in punishing the violators of right and truth? Whereas if there was no natural and eternal difference between just and unjust, no man could have any reason to complain of injury, any other than what laws and compacts made so; which in innumerable cases will be always to be evaded.

* 1.58 There is but one thing that I am sensible of, which can here with any colour be objected against what has been hitherto said concerning the necessity of the mind's giving its assent to the eternal law of righteousness; and that is, the total ignorance which some whole nations are reported to lie under of the nature and force of these moral obligations. I am not satisfied the matter of fact is true; but if it was, yet

mere ignorance affords no just objection against the certainty of any truth. Were there upon earth a nation of rational and considerate persons, whose notions concerning moral obligations, and concerning the nature and force of them, were universally and directly contrary to what I have hitherto represented, this would be indeed a weighty objection; but ignorance and stupidity are no arguments against the certainty of any thing. There are many nations and people almost totally ignorant of the plainest mathematical truths; as, of the proportion, for example, of a square to a triangle of the same base and height: And yet these truths are such, to which the mind cannot but give its assent necessarily and unavoidably, as soon as they are distinctly proposed to it. All that this objection proves, therefore, supposing the matter of it to be true, is only this; not, that the mind of man can ever dissent from the rule of right, much less that there is no necessary difference in nature between moral good and evil, any more than it proves that there are no certain and necessary proportions of numbers, lines, or figures; but this it proves only, that men have great need to be taught and instructed in some very plain and easy, as well as certain truths; and if they be important truths, that then men have need also to have them frequently inculcated, and strongly enforced upon them: Which is very true; and is (as shall hereafter be particularly made to appear,) one good argument for the reasonableness of expecting a revelation.

4. Thus it appears, in general, that the mind of * 1.59 man cannot avoid giving its assent to the eternal law of righteousness, that is, cannot but acknowledge the reasonableness and fitness of men's governing all their actions by the rule of right or equity; and also that this assent is a formal obligation upon every man, actually and constantly to conform himself to that rule. I might now from hence deduce, in particular, all the several duties of morality or natural religion; but, because this would take up too large

a portion of my intended discourse, and may easily be supplied abundantly out of several-late excellent writers, I shall only mention the three great and principal branches from which all the other and smaller instances of duty do naturally flow, or may without difficulty be derived.

* 1.60 First, then; in respect of God, the rule of righteousness is, that we keep up constantly in our minds the highest possible honour, esteem, and veneration for him, which must express itself in proper and respective influences upon all our passions, and in the suitable direction of all our actions;—that we worship and adore him, and him alone, as the only supreme author, preserver, and governor of all things;—that we employ our whole being, and all our powers and faculties in his service, and for his glory, that is, in encouraging the practice of universal righteousness, and promoting the designs of his divine goodness amongst men, in such way and manner as shall at any time appear to be his will we should do it;—and, finally, that, to enable us to do this continually, we pray unto him constantly for whatever we stand in need of, and return him continual and hearty thanks for whatever good things we at any time receive. There is no congruity or proportion in the uniform disposition and correspondent order of any bodies or magnitudes, no fitness or agreement in the application of similar and equal geometrical figures one to another, or in the comparing them one with another, so visible and conspicuous as is the beauty and harmony of the exercise of God's several attributes, meeting with suitable returns of duty and honour from all his rational creatures throughout the universe;—the consideration of his eternity and infinity, his knowledge and his wisdom, necessarily commands our highest admiration;—the sense of his omnipresence forces a perpetual, awful regard towards him;—his supreme authority, as being the creator, preserver, and absolute governor of all things, obliges us to pay him all possible honour

and veneration, adoration, and worship, and his unity requires that it be paid to him alone;—his power and justice demand our fear;—his mercy and placableness encourage our hope;—his goodness necessarily excites our love;—his veracity and unchangeableness secure our trust in him;—the sense of our having received our being, and all our powers from him, makes it infinitely reasonable that we should employ our whole being and all our faculties in his service;—the consciousness of our continual dependence upon him both for our preservation and the supply of every thing we want, obliges us to constant prayer;—and every good thing we enjoy, the air we breathe, and the food we eat, the rain from heaven, and the fruitful seasons, all the blessings and comforts of the present time, and the hopes and expectations we have of what is to come, do all demand our heartiest gratitude and thanksgiving to him.1 1.61 The suitableness and proportion, the correspondency and connexion of each of these things respectively, is as plain and conspicuous as the shining of the sun at noon-day;2 1.62 and it is the greatest absurdity and perverseness in the world for creatures, indued with reason, to attempt to break through and transgress this necessary order and dependency of things: All inanimate and all irrational beings, by the necessity of their nature, constantly obey the laws of their creation, and tend regularly to the ends for which they were appointed; how monstrous then is it that reasonable creatures, merely because they are not necessitated, should abuse that glorious privilege of liberty by which they are exalted

in dignity above the rest of God's creation, to make themselves the alone unreasonable and disorderly part of the universe!—that a tree planted in a fruitful soil, and watered continually with the dew of heaven, and cherished constantly with the kindly warmth and benign influence of the sunbeams, should yet never bring forth either leaves or fruit, is in no degree so irregular, and contrary to nature, as that a rational being, created after the image of God, and conscious of God's doing every thing for him that becomes the relation of an infinitely good and bountiful Creator to his creatures, should yet never on his part make any return of those duties which arise necessarily from the relation of a creature to his Creator.

* 1.63 Secondly. In respect of our fellow-creatures, the rule of righteousness is; that in particular we so deal with every man, as in like circumstances we could reasonably expect he should deal with us, and that in general we endeavour, by an universal benevolence, to promote the welfare and happiness of all men: The former branch of this rule is equity, the latter is love.

* 1.64 As to the former, viz. equity; the reason which obliges every man in practice, so to deal always with another as he would reasonably expect that others should in like circumstances deal with him, is the very same as that which forces him, in speculation, to affirm, that if one line or number be equal to another, that other is reciprocally equal to it. Iniquity is the very same in action as falsity or contradiction in theory, and the same cause which makes the one absurd makes the other unreasonable. Whatever relation or proportion one man in any case bears to another, the same that other, when put in like circumstances, bears to him. Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable, for another to do for me, that, by the same judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case should do for him. And to deny this either in word or action, is as if a man should contend, that though two and three are equal to five, yet five are not equal to

two and three.1 1.65 Wherefore, were not men strangely and most unnaturally corrupted by perverse and unaccountably false opinions, and monstrous evil customs and habits, prevailing against the clearest and plainest reason in the world, it would be impossible that universal equity should not be practised by all mankind, and especially among equals, where the proportion of equity is simple and obvious, and every man's own case is already the same with all others, without any nice comparing or transposing of circumstances. It would be as impossible2 1.66 that a man, contrary to the eternal reason of things, should desire to gain some small profit to himself, by doing violence and damage to his neighbour, as that he should be willing to be deprived of necessaries himself, to satisfy the unreasonable covetousness or ambition of another. In a word, it would be impossible for men not to be as much ashamed of doing iniquity, as they are of believing contradictions. In considering indeed the duties of superiors in various relations, the proportion of equity is somewhat more complex, but still it may always be deduced from the same rule of doing as we would be done by, if careful regard be had at the same time to the difference of relation; that is, if, in considering what is fit for you to do to another, you always take into the account, not only every circumstance of the action, but also every circumstance wherein the person differs from you, and in judging what you would desire that another, if your circumstances were transposed, should do to you, you always consider not what any

unreasonable passion or private interest would prompt you, but what impartial reason would dictate to you to desire. For example, a magistrate, in order to deal equitably with a criminal, is not to consider what fear or self-love would cause him in the criminal's case to desire, but what reason and the public good would oblige him to acknowledge was fit and just for him to expect. And the same proportion is to be observed in deducing the duties of parents and children, of masters and servants, of governors and subjects, of citizens and foreigners, in what manner every person is obliged, by the rule of equity, to behave himself in each of these and all other relations. In the regular and uniform practice of all which duties among all mankind, in their several and respective relations, through the whole earth, consists that universal justice which is the top and perfection of all virtues: which, if, as Plato says,1 1.67 it could be represented visibly to mortal eyes, would raise in us an inexpressible love and admiration of it; which would introduce into the world such a glorious and happy state as the ancient poets have attempted to describe in their fiction of a golden age; which in itself is so truly beautiful and lovely, that, as Aristotle2 1.68 elegantly expresses it, the motions of the heavenly bodies are not so admirably regular and harmonious, nor the brightness of the sun and stars so ornamental to the visible fabric of the world, as the universal practice of this illustrious virtue would be conducive to the glory and advantage of the rational part of this lower creation; which, lastly, is so truly noble and excellent in its own nature, that the wisest and

most considering men have always declared,1 1.69 that neither life itself, nor2 1.70 all other possible enjoyments in the world, put together, are of any value or esteem in comparison of, or in competition with, that right temper and disposition of mind from which flows the practice of this universal justice and equity. On the contrary, injustice and iniquity, violence, fraud, and oppression, the universal confusion of right and wrong, and the general neglect and contempt of all the duties arising from men's several relations one to another, is the greatest and most unnatural corruption of God's creation that it is possible for depraved and rebellious creatures to introduce: As they themselves who practise iniquity most, and are most desirous to defend it, yet whenever it comes to be their own turn to suffer by it, are not very backward to acknowledge. To comprise this matter, therefore, in one word; what the sun's forsaking that equal course, which now, by diffusing gentle warmth and light, cherishes and invigorates every thing in a due proportion through the whole system, and on the contrary, his burning up, by an irregular and disorderly motion, some of the orbs with insupportable heat, and leaving others to perish in extreme cold and darkness; what this, I say, would be to the natural world, that very same thing, injustice, and tyranny, iniquity, and all wickedness, is to the moral and rational part of the creation. The only difference is this; that the one is an obstinate and wilful corruption, and most perverse depravation of creatures made after the image of God, and a violating the

eternal and unalterable law or reason of things, which is of the utmost importance; whereas the other would be only a revolution or change, of the arbitrary and temporary frame of nature.

* 1.71 The second branch of the rule of righteousness, with respect to our fellow-creatures, I said, was universal love or benevolence; that is, not only the doing barely what is just and right in our dealings with every man, but also a constant endeavouring to promote, in general, to the utmost of our power, the welfare and happiness of all men. The obligation to which duty, also, may easily be deduced from what has been already laid down. For if (as has been before proved) there be a natural and necessary difference between good and evil, and that which is good is fit and reasonable, and that which is evil is unreasonable to be done; and that which is the greatest good, is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen: Then, as the goodness of God extends itself universally over all his works through the whole creation, by doing always what is absolutely best in the whole; so every rational creature ought, in its sphere and station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the good it can to all its fellow-creatures. To which end, universal love and benevolence is as plainly the most direct, certain, and effectual means, as1 1.72 in mathematics the flowing of a point is to produce a line, or, in arithmetic, the addition of

numbers to produce a sum; or in physics, certain kind of motions to preserve certain bodies, which other kinds of motions tend to corrupt. Of all which, the mind of man is so naturally sensible, that, except in such men whose affections are prodigiously corrupted by most unnatural and habitual vicious practices, there is no duty whatsoever, the performance whereof affords a man so ample pleasure1 1.73 and satisfaction, and fills his mind with so comfortable a sense of his having done the greatest good he was capable to do, of his having best answered the ends of his creation, and nearliest imitated the perfections of his Creator, and consequently of his having fully complied with the highest and principal obligations of his nature; as the performance of this one duty, of universal love and benevolence, naturally affords. But further; the obligation to this great duty may also otherwise be deduced from the nature of man, in the following manner. Next to that natural self-love, or care of his own preservation, which every one necessarily has in the first place for himself, there is in all men a certain natural affection for their children and posterity, who have a dependence upon them; and for their near relations and friends, who have an intimacy with them. And because the nature of man is such, that they cannot live comfortably in independent families, without still further society and commerce with each other; therefore they naturally desire to increase their dependences, by multiplying affinities, and to enlarge their friendships by mutual good offices, and to establish societies by

a communication of arts and labour, till,1 1.74 by degrees, the affection of single persons becomes a friendship of families, and this enlarges itself to society of towns, and cities, and nations, and terminates in the agreeing community of all mankind: The foundation, preservation, and perfection of which universal friendship or society is mutual love and benevolence. And nothing hinders the world from being actually put into so happy a state but perverse iniquity, and unreasonable want of mutual charity. Wherefore, since men are plainly so constituted by nature, that they stand in need of each other's assistance to make themselves easy in the world, and are fitted to live in communities, and society is absolutely necessary for them, and mutual love and benevolence is the only possible means to establish this society in any tolerable and durable manner; and in this respect2 1.75 all men stand upon the same level, and have the same natural wants and desires, and are in the same need of each other's help, and are equally capable of enjoying the benefit and advantage of society, it is evident every man is bound by the law of his nature, and as he is also prompted by the3 1.76 inclination of his uncorrupted affections, to4 1.77 look upon himself as a part and member of that one universal body or community which is made up of all mankind, to think

himself1 1.78 born to promote the public good and welfare of all his fellow-creatures, and consequently obliged, as the necessary and only effectual means to that end, to2 1.79 embrace them all with universal love and benevolence, so that he cannot,3 1.80 without acting contrary to the reason of his own mind, and transgressing the plain and known law of his being, do willingly any hurt and mischief to any man, no, not even to those who have first injured him,4 1.81 but ought, for the public benefit, to endeavour to appease with gentleness rather than exasperate with retaliations; and finally, to comprehend all in one word, (which is the top and complete perfection of this great duty,) ought to5 1.82 love all others as himself. This is the argumentation of that great master Cicero, whose knowledge and understanding of the true state of things, and of the original obligations of human nature, was as much greater than Mr. Hobbes's as his helps and advantages to attain that knowledge were less.

Thirdly. With respect to ourselves, the rule of* 1.83 righteousness is; that every man preserve his own being, as long as he is able, and take care to keep himself at all times in such temper and disposition both of body and mind, as may best fit and enable him to perform his duty in all other instances. That is; he ought to bridle his appetites, with temperance; to govern his passions, with moderation; and to

apply himself to the business of his present station in the world, whatsoever it be, with attention and contentment. That every man ought to preserve his own being as long as he is able, is evident; because what he is not himself the author and giver of, he can never of himself have just power or authority to take away. He that sent us into the world, and alone knows for how long time he appointed us our station here, and when we have finished all the business he intended we should do, can alone judge when it is fit for us to be taken hence, and has alone authority to dismiss and discharge us. This reasoning has been admirably applied by Plato, Cicero, and others of the best philosophers. So that though the stoics of old, and the deists of late, have, in their ranting discourses, and some few of them in their rash practice, contradicted it, yet they have never been able, with any colour of reason, to answer or evade the force of the argument; which, indeed, to speak the truth, has been urged by the fore-mentioned philosophers with such singular beauty, as well as invincible strength, that it seems not capable of having any thing added to it. Wherefore I shall give it you, only in some of their own words. We men, (says1 1.84 Plato, in the person of Socrates,) are all, by the appointment of God, in a certain prison or custody, which we ought not to break out of, and run away. We are as servants, or as cattle, in the hand of God. And would not any of us, saith he, if one of our servants should, contrary to our direction, and to escape out of our service, kill himself, think that we had just reason to be very angry, and if it was in our power, punish him for it? So likewise Cicero; God,

says he,1 1.85 the supreme governor of all things, forbids us to depart hence without his order: and though, when the divine providence does itself offer us a just occasion of leaving this world, (as when a man chooses to suffer death rather than commit wickedness,) a wise man will then indeed depart joyfully, as out of a place of sorrow and darkness into light; yet he will not be in such haste as to break his prison contrary to law; but will go when God calls him, as a prisoner when dismissed by the magistrate or lawful power. Again: that short remainder of life, saith he,2 1.86 which old men have a prospect of, they ought neither too eagerly to desire, nor yet on the contrary unreasonably and discontentedly deprive themselves of it: for, as Pythagoras teaches, it is as unlawful for a man, without the command of God, to remove himself out of the world, as for a soldier to leave his post without his general's order. And in another place: unless that God, saith he,3 1.87 whose temple and palace this whole world is, discharges you himself out of the prison of the body, you can never be received to his favour. Wherefore you, and all pious men, ought to have patience to continue in the body, as long as God shall please, who sent us hither; and not force yourselves out of the world, before he calls for you, lest you be found deserters of the station appointed you of God. And

to mention no more,—that excellent author, Arrian: wait, saith he,1 1.88 the good pleasure of God: when he signifies it to be his will that you should be discharged from this service, then depart willingly; but, in the meantime, have patience, and tarry in the place where he has appointed you: wait, and do not hurry yourselves away wilfully and unreasonably. The objections, which the author of the defence of self-murder, prefixed to the Oracles of Reason, has attempted to advance against this argument, are so very weak and childish that it is evident he could not, at the time he wrote them, believe in earnest that there was any force in them; as when he says, that the reason why it is not lawful for a centinel to leave his station without his commander's order, is because he entered into the service by his own consent; as if God had not a just power to lay any commands upon his creatures without their own consent: Or when he says, that there are many lawful ways to seek death in; as if, because a man may lawfully venture his life in many public services, therefore it was lawful for him directly to throw it away upon any foolish discontent. But the author of that discourse has since been so just as to confess his folly, and retract it publicly himself. Wherefore, to proceed. For the same reason that a man is obliged to preserve his own being at all, he is bound likewise to preserve himself, as far as he is able, in the right use of all his faculties: that is, to keep himself constantly in such temper, both of body and mind, by regulating his appetites and passions, as may best fit and enable him to perform his duty in all other instances, For, as it matters not whether a soldier deserts his post, or by drunkenness renders himself incapable of performing his duty in it; so for a man to disable himself, by any intemperance

or passion, from performing the necessary duties of life, is, at least for that time, the same thing as depriving himself of life. And neither is this all. For great intemperance and ungoverned passions not only incapacitate a man to perform his duty, but also expose him to run headlong into the commission of the greatest enormities: there being no violence or injustice whatsoever, which a man, who has deprived himself of his reason by intemperance or passion, is not capable of being tempted to commit. So that all the additional obligations which a man is any way under, to forbear committing the most flagrant crimes, lie equally upon him to govern his passions and restrain his appeties: without doing which, he can never secure himself effectually from being betrayed into the commission of all iniquity. This is indeed the great difficulty of life, to subdue and conquer our unreasonable appetites and passions. But it is absolutely neccessary to be done: And it is1 1.89 moreover the bravest and most glorous conquest in the world. Lastly: For the same reason that a man is obliged not to depart wilfully out of this life, which is the general station that God has appointed him, he is obliged likewise to attend the duties of that particular station or condition of life, whatsoever it be, wherein povidence has at present placed him, with diligence, and contentment: Without being either uneasy and discontented, that others are placed by povidence in different and superior stations in the world; or so extremely and unreasonably solicititous to change his state for the future, as thereby to neglect his present duty,

From these three great and general branches, all* 1.90 the smaller and more particular instances of moral obligations may (as I said) easily be deduced.

5. And now this, (this eternal rule of equity, which I have been hitherto discribing,) is that right reason

which makes the principal distinction between man and beasts. This is the law of nature, which (as Cicero excellently expresses it) is1 1.91 of universal extent, and everlasting duration, which can neither be wholly abrogated, nor repealed in any part of it, nor have any law made contrary to it, nor be dispensed with by any authority; which2 1.92 was in force before ever any law was writen, or the foundation of any city or commonwealth was laid; which3 1.93 was not invented by the wit of man, nor established by the authority of any people, but its obligation was from eternity, and the force of it reaches throughout the universe; which, being founded in the nature and resaon of things, did not then begin to be a law, when it was first writen and enacted by men, but is of the same original with the eternal reasons or proportions of things, and the perfections or attributes of God himself, so4 1.94 that if there was no law at Rome against rapes at that time when Tarquin offered violence to Lucretia, it does not therefore follow that he was at

all the more excusable, or that his sin against the eternal rule of equity was the less heinous. This is that law of nature to which the reason of all men,1 1.95 everywhere as naturally and necessarily assents, as all animals conspire in the pulse and motion of their heart and arteries, or as all men agree in their judgment concerning the whiteness of snow or the brightness of the sun. For though in some nice cases, the bounds of right and wrong may indeed (as was before observed,) be somewhat difficult to determine; and in some few even plainer cases, the laws and customs of certain barbarous nations may be contrary one to another, (which some have been so weak as to think a just objection against there being any natural difference between good and evil at all,) yet in reality this2 1.96 no more disproves the natural assent of all men's unprejudiced reason to the rule of right and equity than the difference of men's countenances in general, or the deformity of some few monsters in particular, proves that there is no general likeness or uniformity in the bodies of men. For, whatever difference there may be in some particular laws, it is certain, as to the main and principal branches of morality, there never was any nation upon earth but owned that to love and honour God, to be grateful to benefactors, to perform equitable compacts, to preserve the lives of innocent and harmless men, and the like, were things fitter and better to be practised

than the contrary. In fine, this is the law of nature, which, being founded in the eternal reason of things, is as absolutely unalterable, as natural good and evil, as mathematical, or arithmetical truths,1 1.97 as light and darkness, as sweet and bitter, as pleasure and pain: The observance of which,2 1.98 though no man should commend it, would yet be truly commendable in itself. Which to suppose depending on the opinions of men, and the customs of nations, that is to suppose that what shall be accounted the virtue of a man depends merely on imagination or customs to determine, is3 1.99 as absurd as it would be to affirm that the fruitfulness of a tree, or the strength of a horse, depends merely on the imagination of those who judge of it. In a word, it is that law, which if it had its original from the authority of men, and could be changed by it, then4 1.100 all the commands of the cruellest and most barbarous tyrants in the world would be as just and equitable as the wisest laws that ever were made, and5 1.101 to murder men without

distinction, to confound the rights of all families by the grossest forgeries, to rob with unrestrained violence, to break faith continually, and defraud and cheat without reluctance, might, by the decrees and ordinances of a mad assembly, be made lawful and honest: In which matters, if any man thinks that the votes and suffrages of fools have such power as to be able to change the nature of things, why do they not likewise decree (as Cicero admirably expresses himself) that poisonous things may become wholsome, and that any other thing which is now destructive of mankind may become preservative of it.

6. Further yet: As this law of nature is infinitely* 1.102 superior to all authority of men, and independent upon it, so its obligation, primarily and originally, is antecedent also even to this consideration,1 1.103 of its being the positive will or command of God himself: For,2 1.104 as the addition of certain numbers necessarily produces a certain sum, and certain geometrical or mechanical operations give a constant and unalterable solution of certain problems or propositions; so in moral matters there are certain necessary and unalterable respects or relations of things which have not their original from arbitrary and positive constitution, but are of eternal necessity in their own nature.

For example;1 1.105 as, in matters of sense, the reason why a thing is visible is not because it is seen, but it is therefore seen because it is visible; so in matters of natural reason and morality, that which is holy and good (as creatures depending upon and worshiping God, and practising justice and equity in their dealings with each other, and the like,) is not therefore holy and good, because it is commanded to be done, but is therefore commanded of God, because it is holy and good. The existence, indeed, of the things themselves, whose proportions and relations we consider, depends entirely on the mere arbitrary will and good pleasure of God; who can create things when he pleases, and destroy them again whenever he thinks fit. But when things are created, and so long as it pleases God to continue them in being, their proportions, which are abstractly of eternal necessity, are also in the things themselves absolutely unalterable. Hence God himself, though he has no superior from whose will to receive any law of his actions, yet disdains not to observe the rule of equity and goodness, as2 1.106 the law of all his actions in the government of the world, and condescends to appeal even to men for * 1.107 the equity and righteousness of his judgments. To this law, the infinite perfections of his divine nature make it necessary for him (as has been before proved,) to have constant regard, and (as a learned prelate of our own has excellently shown,3 1.108) not barely his infinite

power, but the rules of this eternal law are the true foundation and the measure of his dominion over his creatures. (For, if infinite power was the rule and measure of right, it is evident that goodness and mercy, and all other divine perfections, would be empty words without any signification at all.) Now, for the same reason that God, who hath no superior to determine him, yet constantly directs all his own actions by the eternal rule of justice and goodness; it is evident all intelligent creatures, in their several spheres and proportions, ought to obey the same rule according to the law of their nature, even though it could be supposed separate from that additional obligation of its being the positive will and command of God; and, doubtless there have been many men in all ages, in many parts of the heathen world, who, not having philosophy enough to collect from mere nature any tolerably just and explicit apprehensions concerning the attributes of God, much less having been able to deduce from thence any clear and certain knowledge of his will, have yet had a very great sense of right and truth, and been fully persuaded in their own minds of many unalterable obligations of morality:

But this speculation, though necessary to be taken notice of in the distinct order and method of discourse, is in itself too dry, and of less use to us, who are abundantly assured that all moral obligations are, moreover, the plain and declared will of God, as shall be shown particularly in its proper place.

* 1.109 7. Lastly, This law of nature has its full obligatory power, antecedent to all consideration of any particular private and personal reward or punishment, annexed, either by natural consequence or by positive appointment, to the observance or neglect of it. This also is very evident; because if good and evil, right and wrong, fitness and unfitness of being practised, be (as has been shown) originally, eternally, and necessarily, in the nature of the things themselves, it is plain that the view of particular rewards or punishments, which is only an after-consideration, and does not at all alter the nature of things, cannot be the original cause of the obligation of the law, but is only an additional weight to enforce the practice of what men were before obliged to by right reason: There is no man, who has any just sense of the difference between good and evil, but must needs acknowledge that virtue and goodness are truly amiable,1 1.110 and to be chosen for their own sakes and intrinsic worth, though a man had no prospect of gaining any particular advantage to himself, by the practice of them; and that, on the contrary, cruelty, violence, and oppression, fraud, injustice, and all manner of wickedness, are of themselves hateful, and by all means to be be avoided; even though a man had absolute assurance that he should bring no manner of inconvenience upon himself by the commission of any or all of these crimes.2 1.111 This likewise is excellently

and admirably expressed by Cicero:1 1.112 Virtue, saith he, is that which, though no profit or advantage whatsoever was to be expected to a man's self from the practice of it, yet must, without all controversy, be acknowledged to be truly desirable for its own sake alone. And, accordingly,2 1.113 all good men love right and equity, and do many things without any prospect of advantage at all, merely because they are just and right and fit to be done: On the contrary, vice is so odious in its own nature, and so fit to be avoided, even though no punishment was to ensue, that no man,3 1.114 who has made any tolerable proficiency in moral philosophy, can in the least doubt, but, if he was sure the thing could be for ever concealed entirely both from God and men, so that there should not be the least

suspicion of its being ever discovered, yet he ought not to do any thing unjustly, covetously, wilfully, passionately, licentiously, or any way wickedly, Nay,1 1.115 if a good man had it in his power to gain all his neighbour's wealth by the least motion of his finger, and was sure it would never be at all suspected either by God or man, unquestionably he would think he ought not to do it; and whoever wonders at this, has no notion what it is to be really a good man:2 1.116 Not that any such thing is possible in nature, that any wickedness can be indeed concealed from God, but only, upon such a supposition, the natural and necessary difference between justice and injustice is made to appear more clearly and undeniably.

* 1.117 Thus far is clear. But now from hence it does not at all follow, either that a good man ought to have no respect to rewards and punishments, or that rewards and punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the practice of virtue and righteousness in this present world. It is certain, indeed, that virtue and vice are eternally and necessarily different; and that the one truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake, and the other ought by all means to be avoided, though a man was sure, for his own particular, neither to gain nor lose any thing by the practice of either. And if this was truly the state of things in the world, certainly that man must have a very corrupt mind, indeed, who could in the least doubt, or so much as once deliberate with himself, which he would choose. But the case does not stand thus. The question now in the general practice of the world, supposing all expectation of rewards and punishments set aside, will not be, whether a man would

choose virtue for its own sake, and avoid vice; but the practice of vice is accompanied with great temptations and allurements of pleasure and profit; and the practice of virtue is often threatened with great calamities, losses, and sometimes even with death itself. And this alters the question, and destroys the practice of that which appears so reasonable in the whole speculation, and introduces a necessity of rewards and punishments. For though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be chosen for its own sake, even without any expectation of reward, yet it does not follow that it is therefore entirely self-sufficient, and able to support a man under all kinds of sufferings, and even death itself, for its sake, without any prospect of future recompense. Here, therefore, began the error of the Stoics, who taught that the bare practice of virtue was itself the chief good, and able of itself to make a man happy, under all the calamities in the world. Their defence indeed of the cause of virtue was very brave: they saw well that its excellency was intrinsic, and founded in the nature of things themselves, and could not be altered by any outward circumstances; that therefore virtue must needs be desirable for its own sake, and not merely for the advantage it might bring along with it; and if so, then consequently neither could any external disadvantage, which it might happen to be attended with, change the intrinsic worth of the thing itself, or ever make it cease to be truly desirable. Wherefore, in the case of sufferings and death, for the sake of virtue; not having any certain knowledge of a future state of reward, (though the wisest of them did indeed hope for it, and think it highly probable;) they were forced, that they might be consistent with their own principles, to suppose the practice of virtue a sufficient reward to itself in all cases, and a full compensation for all the sufferings in the world. And accordingly they very bravely indeed taught, that the practice of virtue was not only1 1.118 infinitely to be preferred before all the

sinful pleasures in the world; but also1 1.119 that a man ought without scruple to choose, if the case was proposed to him, rather to undergo all possible sufferings with virtue, than to obtain all possible worldly happiness by sin. And the suitable practice of some few of them, as of Regulus, for instance, who chose to die the cruelest death that could be invented, rather than break his faith with an enemy, is indeed very wonderful, and to be admired. But yet, after all this, it is plain that the general practice of virtue in the world can never be supported upon this foot. The discourse is admirable, but it seldom goes further than mere words: And the practice of those few who have acted accordingly, has not been imitated by the rest of the world. Men never will generally, and indeed it is not very reasonable to be expected they should, part with all the comforts of life, and even life itself, without expectation of any future recompense. So that, if we suppose no future state of rewards, it will follow, that God has indued men with such faculties, as put them under a necessity of approving and choosing virtue in the judgment of their own minds; and yet has not given them wherewith to support themselves in the suitable and constant practice of it. The consideration of which inexplicable difficulty ought to have led the philosophers to a firm belief and expectation of a future state of rewards and punishments, without which their whole scheme of morality cannot be supported. And because a thing of such necessity and importance to mankind was not more clearly

and directly and universally made known, it might naturally have led them to some farther consequences also, which I shall have occasion particularly to deduce hereafter.

Thus have I endevoured to deduce the original obligations of morality from the necessary and eternal reason and proportions of things. Some have chosen to found1 1.120 all difference of good and evil, in the mere positive will and power of God: But the absurdity of this, I have shown elsewhere. Others have contended, that all difference of good and evil, and all obligations of morality, ought to be founded originally upon considerations of public utility. And true indeed it is, in the whole, that the good of the universal creation does always coincide with the necessary truth and reason of things. But otherwise, (and separate from this consideration, that God will certainly cause truth and right to terminate in happiness,) what is for the good of the whole creation, in very many cases, none but an infinite understanding can possibly judge. Public utility is one thing to one nation, and the contrary to another: And the governors of every nation will and must be judges of the public good: And by public good they will generally mean the private good of that particular nation. But truth and right (whether public or private) founded in the eternal and necessary reason of things, is what every man can judge of, when laid before him. It is necessarily one and the same, to every man's understanding, just as light is the same to every man's eyes.

He who thinks it right and just, upon account of public utility, to break faith (suppose) with a robber, let him consider that it is much more useful to do the same by a multitude of robbers, by tyrants, by a nation of robbers: And then all faith is evidently at an end. For, mutato nomine de tc, &c. What fidelity and truth are, is understood by every man; but between two nations at war, who shall be judge which

of them are the robbers? Besides: To rob a man of truth and of eternal happiness, is worse than robbing him of his money and of his temporal happiness: And therefore it will be said that heretics may even more justly, and with much greater utility to the public, be deceived and destroyed by breach of truth and faith, than the most cruel robbers. Where does this terminate?

* 1.121 And now, from what has been said upon this head, it is easy to see the falsity and weakness of Mr Hobbes's doctrines, that there is no such thing as just and unjust, right and wrong, originally in the nature of things; that men in their natural state, antecedent to all compacts, are not obliged to universal benevolence, nor to any moral duty whatsoever; but are in a state of war, and have every one a right to do whatever he has power to do; and that, in civil societies, it depends wholly upon positive laws or the will of governors to define what shall be just or unjust. The contrary to all which having been already fully demonstrated, there is no need of being large, in further disproving and confuting, particularly, these assertions themselves. I shall therefore only mention a few observations, from which some of the greatest and most obvious absurdities of the chief principles, upon which Mr Hobbes builds his whole doctrine in this matter, may most easily appear.

1. First, then, the ground and foundation of Mr Hobbes's scheme, is this,1 1.122 that all men being equal by nature, and naturally desiring the same things, have2 1.123 every one a right to every thing, are every one desirous to have absolute dominion over all others; and may every one justly do whatever at

any time is in his power, by violently taking from others either their possessions or lives, to gain to himself that absolute dominion. Now this is exactly the same thing as if a man should affirm that a part is equal to the whole, or that one body can be present in a thousand places at once. For to say that one man has a full right to the same individual things, which another man at the same time has a full right to, is saying that two rights may be1 1.124 contradictory to each other; that is, that a thing may be right, at the same time that it is confessed to be wrong. For instance; if every man has a right to preserve his own life, then2 1.125 it is manifest I can have no right to take any man's life away from him, unless he has first forfeited his own right, by attempting to deprive me of mine. For otherwise, it might be right for me to do that which, at the same time, because it could not be done but in breach of another man's right, it could not be right for me to do; which is the greatest absurdity in the world. The true state of this case, therefore, is plainly this. In Mr Hobbes's state of nature and equality, every man having an equal right to preserve his own life, it is evident every man has a right to an equal proportion of all those things which are either necessary or useful to life. And consequently, so far is it from being true, that any one has an original right to possess all, that, on the contrary, whoever first attempts, without the consent of his fellows, and except it be for some public benefit, to take to himself more than his proportion, is the beginner of iniquity, and the author of all succeeding mischief.

2. To avoid this absurdity, therefore, Mr Hobbes is forced to assert, in the next place, that since every

man has confessedly a right to preserve his own life, and consequently to do every thing that is necessary to preserve it, and since, in the state of nature, men will necessarily have1 1.126 perpetual jealousies and suspicions of each other's encroaching, therefore just precaution gives every one a right to endeavour,2 1.127 for his own security, to prevent, oppress, and destroy all others, either by secret artifice or open violence, as it shall happen at any time to be in his power, as being the only certain means of self-preservation.3 1.128 But this is even a plainer absurdity, if possible, than the former. For (besides that, according to Mr Hobbes's principles, men, before positive compacts, may justly do what mischief they please, even without the pretence of self-preservation,) what can be more ridiculous that to imagine a war of all men against all, the directest and certainest means of the preservation of all? Yes, says he, because it leads men to a necessity of entering into compact for each other's security. But then to make these compacts obligatory, he is forced (as I shall presently observe more particularly) to recur to an4 1.129 antecedent law of nature, and this destroys all that he had before said. For the same law of nature which obliges men to fidelity, after having made a compact, will unavoidably, upon all the same accounts, be found to oblige them before all compacts, to contentment and mutual benevolence, as the readiest and certainest means to the preservation and happiness of them all. It is true, men, by entering into compacts, and making laws, agree to compel one another to do what perhaps the mere sense of duty, however really obligatory in the highest degree, would not, without such

compacts, have force enough of itself to hold them to in practice; and so, compacts must be acknowledged to be in fact a great addition and strengthening of men's security. But this compulsion makes no alteration in the obligation itself, and only shows that that entirely lawless state, which Mr Hobbes calls the state of nature, is by no means truly natural, or in any sense suitable to the nature and faculties of man, but, on the contrary, is a state of extremely unnatural and intolerable corruption, as I shall presently prove more fully from some other considerations.

3. Another notorious absurdity and inconsistency in Mr. Hobbes's scheme, is this: That he all along supposes some particular branches of the law of nature (which he thinks necessary for the foundation of some parts of his owndoctrine,) to be originally obligatory from the bare reason of things; at the same time that he denies and takes away innumerable others, which have plainly in the nature and reason of things the same foundation of being obligatory as the former, and without which the obligation of the former can never be solidly made out and defended. Thus, he supposes that, in the state of nature, before any compact be made, every1 1.130 man's own will is his only law; that2 1.131 nothing a man can do, is unjust: and that3 1.132 whatever mischief one man does to another is no injury nor injustice; neither has the person, to whom the mischief is done, how great soever it be, any just reason to complain of wrong; (I think

it may here reasonably be presumed, that if Mr. Hobbes had lived in such a state of nature, and had happened to be himself the suffering party, he would in this case have been of another opinion:) And yet at the same time he supposes, that in the same state of nature men are by all means obliged1 1.133 to seek peace, and2 1.134 to enter into compacts to remedy the fore-mentioned mischiefs. Now if men are obliged, by the original reason and nature of things to seek terms of peace, and to get out of the pretended natural state of war, as soon as they can; how come they not to be obliged originally by the same reason and nature of things, to live from the beginning in universal benevolence, and avoid entering into the state of war at all? He must needs confess they would be obliged to do so, did not self-preservation necessitate them every man to war upon others: But this cannot be true of the first aggressor; whom yet Mr Hobbes, in the place3 1.135 now cited, vindicates from being guilty of any injustice; and therefore herein he unavoidably contradicts himself. Thus, again; in most instances of morality, he supposes right and wrong, just and unjust, to have no foundation in the nature of things, but to depend entirely on positive laws; that4 1.136 the rules or distinctions of good and evil, honest and dishonest, are mere civil constitutions; and whatever the chief magistrate commands, is to be accounted

good; whatever he forbids, evil; that it is the law of the land only which makes robbery to be robbery;1 1.137 or adultery to be adultery; that the commandments,2 1.138 to honour our parents, to do no murder, not to commit adultery, and all the other laws of God and nature, are no further obligatory than the civil power shall think fit to make them so; nay, that where the supreme authority commands men to worship God by an image or idol, in heathen countries,3 1.139 (for in this instance he cautiously excepts Christian ones,) it is lawful, and their duty to do it; and (agreeably, as a natural consequence to all this,) that it is men's positive duty to obey the commands of the civil power in all things, even in things4 1.140 clearly and directly against their conscience; (that is, that it is their positive duty to do that which at the same time they know plainly it is their duty not to do;)5 1.141 keeping up indeed always in their own minds an inward desire to observe the laws of nature and conscience, but not being bound to observe them in their outward actions, except when it is safe so to do;

(He might as well have said that human laws and constitutions have1 1.142 power to make light be darkness, and darkness light; to make sweet be bitter, and bitter sweet: And, indeed, as one absurdity will naturally lead a man into another, he does say something very like it; namely, that the2 1.143 civil authority is to judge of all opinions and doctrines whatsoever; to3 1.144 determine questions philosophical, mathematical; and, because indeed the signification of words is arbitrary, even4 1.145 arithmetical ones also; as whether a man shall presume to affirm that two and three make five or not:) And yet at the same time, some particular things, which it would either have been too flagrantly scandalous for him to have made depending upon human laws; as that5 1.146 God is to be loved, honoured, and adored;6 1.147 that a man ought not to murder his parents; and the like: Or else, which were of necessity to be supposed for the foundation of his own scheme;7 1.148 as that compacts ought to be faithfully performed, and8 1.149 obedience to be duly paid to civil powers: The obligation of these things he is forced to deduce entirely from the internal reason and fitness of the things themselves;9 1.150 antecedent

to, independent upon, and unalterable by all human constitutions whatsoever: In which matter he is guilty of the grossest absurdity and inconsistency that can be. For if those greatest and strongest of all our obligations; to love and honour God, for instance, or, to perform compacts faithfully; depend not at all on any human constitution, but must of necessity (to avoid making obligations reciprocally depend on each other in a circle,) be confessed to arise originally from, and be founded in, the eternal reason and unalterable nature and relations of things themselves; and the nature and force of these obligations be sufficiently clear and evident; so that he who dishonours God,1 1.151 or wilfully breaks his faith,2 1.152 is (according to Mr Hobbes's own reasoning) guilty of as great an absurdity in practice, and of as plainly contradicting the right reason of his own mind, as he who in a dispute is reduced to a necessity of asserting something inconsistent with itself; and the original obligation to these duties can from hence only be distinctly deduced: Then, for the same reason, all the other duties likewise of natural religion; such as universal benevolence, justice, equity, and the like, (which I have before proved to receive in like manner their power of obliging from the eternal reason and relations of things,) must needs be obligatory, antecedent to any consideration of positive compact, and unalterably and independently on all human constitutions whatsoever: And consequently Mr Hobbes's whole

scheme, (both of a state of nature at first wherein there was no such thing as right or wrong, just or unjust, at all; and of these things depending afterwards, by virtue of compact, wholly and absolutely on the positive and arbitrary determination of the civil power;) falls this way entirely to the ground, by his having been forced to suppose some particular things obligatory, originally, and in their own nature. On the contrary, if the rules of right and wrong, just and unjust, have none of them any obligatory force in the state of nature, antecedent to positive compact, then, for the same reason, neither will they be of any force after the compact, so as to afford men any certain and real security; (excepting only what may arise from the compulsion of laws, and fear of punishment, which, therefore, it may well be supposed, is all that Mr Hobbes really means at the bottom.) For if there be no obligation of just and right antecedent to the compact, then whence arises the obligation of the compact itself, on which he supposes all other obligations to be founded? If, before any compact was made, it was no injustice for a man to take away the life of his neighbour, not for his own preservation, but merely to satisfy an arbitrary humour1 1.153 or pleasure, and without any reason or provocation at all, how comes it to be an injustice, after he has made a compact, to break and neglect it? Or what is it that makes breaking one's word, to be a greater and more unnatural crime, than killing a man merely for no other reason but because no positive compact has been made to the contrary? So that2 1.154 this

way also, Mr Hobbes's whole scheme is entirely destroyed.

4. That state, which Mr Hobbes calls the state of nature, is not in any sense a natural state; but a state of the greatest, most unnatural, and most intolerable corruption that can be imagined. For reason, which is the proper nature of man, can never (as has been before shown) lead men to any thing else than universal love and benevolence; and wars, hatred, and violence, can never arise but from extreme corruption. A man may sometimes, it is true, in his own defence, be necessitated, in compliance with the laws of nature and reason, to make war upon his fellows: But the first aggressors, who, upon Mr Hobbes's principles, (that all men1 1.155 have a natural will to hurt each other, and that every one in the state of nature has a right2 1.156 to do whatever he has a will to;)—the first aggressors, I say, who, upon these principles, assault and violently spoil as many as they are superior to in strength, without any regard to equity or proportion; these can never, by any colour whatsoever, be excused from having utterly3 1.157 divested themselves of human nature, and having introduced into the world,4 1.158 contrary to all the laws of nature and reason, the greatest calamities, and most unnatural confusion, that mankind, by the highest abuse of their natural powers and faculties,

are capable of falling under. Mr Hobbes pretends, indeed, that one of the first and most natural principles of human life1 1.159 is a desire necessarily arising in every man's mind, of having power and dominion over others; and that this naturally impels men to use force and violence to obtain it. But neither is it true, that men, following the dictates of reason and uncorrupted nature, desire disproportionate power and dominion over others; neither, if it was natural to desire such power, would it at all follow that it was agreeable to nature to use violent and hurtful means to obtain it. For since the only natural and good reason to desire power and dominion, (more than what is necessary for every man's self-preservation) is, that the possessor of such power may have a larger compass, and greater abilities, and opportunities of doing good, (as is evident from God's exercise of perfectly absolute power,) it is plain that no man obeying the uncorrupted dictates of nature and reason can desire to increase his power by such destructive and pernicious methods, the prevention of which is the only good reason that makes the power itself truly desirable: All violence, therefore, and war, are plainly the effects, not of natural desires, but of unnatural and extreme corruption; and this Mr Hobbes himself unwarily proves against himself by those very arguments whereby he endeavours to prove that war and contention is more natural to men than to bees or ants; for his arguments on this head are all drawn from men's using themselves (as the animals he is speaking of cannot do,) to strive about honours and dignities, till the contention grows up into hatred, seditions, and wars;2 1.160 to separate each one his private

interest from the public,1 1.161 and value himself highly above others, upon getting and engrossing to himself more than his proportion of the things of life, to find fault with each other's management,2 1.162 and, through self-conceit, being in continual innovation and distractions, to impose one upon another by lies,3 1.163 falsifying, and deceit, calling good evil, and evil good, to grow envious at the prosperity of others,4 1.164 or proud and domineering when themselves are in ease and plenty, and to keep up tolerable peace and agreement among themselves,5 1.165 merely by artificial compacts and the compulsion of laws; all which things are so far from being truly the natural effects and result of men's reason and other faculties, that, on the contrary, they are evidently some of the grossest abuses and most unnatural corruptions thereof, that any one who was arguing on the opposite side of the question could easily have chosen to have instanced in.

5. Lastly; The chief and principal argument, which is one of the main foundations of Mr Hobbes's and his followers' system, namely, that God's irresistible power is the only foundation of his dominion,6 1.166 and the only measure of his right over his creatures; and, consequently, that every other being has just so

much right as it has natural power, that is, that it is naturally right for every thing to do whatever it has power to do:1 1.167 This argument, I say, is of all his others the most notoriously false and absurd; as may sufficiently appear, (besides what has been already said of God's other perfections being as much the measure of his right as his power is,2 1.168) from this single consideration, suppose the devil, (for when men run into extreme impious assertions, they must be answered with suitable suppositions,) suppose, I say, such a being as we conceive the devil to be, of extreme malice, cruelty, and iniquity, was indued with supreme absolute power, and made use of it only to render the world as miserable as was possible, in the most cruel, arbitrary, and unequal manner that can be imagined; would it not follow undeniably, upon Mr Hobbes's scheme, since dominion is founded on power, and power is the measure of right, and consequently absolute power gives absolute right, that such a government as this would not only be as much of necessity indeed to be submitted to, but also that it would be as just and right, and with as little reason to be complained of,3 1.169 as is the present government of the world in the hands of the ever-blessed and infinitely good God, whose love and goodness and tender mercy appear everywhere over all his works?

Here Mr Hobbes, as an unanswerable argument in defence of his assertion, urges,4 1.170 that the only reason

why men are bound to obey God is plainly nothing but weakness or want of power; because, if they themselves were all-powerful, it is manifest they could not be under any obligation to obey; and, consequently, power would give them an undoubted right to do what they pleased. That is to say; if men were not created and dependent beings, it is true they could not indeed be obliged to the proper relative duty of created and dependent beings, viz. to obey the will and command of another in things positive. But from their obligation to the practice of moral virtues, of justice, righteousness, equity, holiness, purity, goodness, beneficence, faithfulness, and truth, from which Mr Hobbes fallaciously, in this argument, and most impiously in his whole scheme,1 1.171 endeavours to discharge them; from this they could not be discharged by any addition of power whatsoever; because the obligation to these things is not, as the obligation to obey in things of arbitrary and positive constitution, founded only in the weakness, subjection, and dependency of the persons obliged; but also, and chiefly, in the eternal and unchangeable nature and reason of the things themselves: For these things are the law of God himself, not only to his creatures, but also to himself, as being the rule of all his own actions in the government of the world.

I have been the longer upon this head, because moral virtue is the foundation and the sum, the essence and the life, of all true religion; for the security whereof all positive institution was principally designed; for the restoration whereof all revealed religion was ultimately intended; and inconsistent wherewith, or in opposition to which, all doctrines

whatsoever, supported by what pretence of rea son or authority soever, are as certainly and necessarily false, as God is true.

Proposition II.

II. Though these eternal moral obligations are indeed of themselves incumbent on all rational beings, even antecedent to the consideration of their being the positive will and command of God, yet that which most strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and indispensably enforces them upon us, is this; that both from the perfections of God, and the nature of things, and from several other collateral considerations, it appears, that as God is himself necessarily just and good in the exercise of his infinite power in the government of the whole world, so he cannot but likewise positively require that all his rational creatures should in their proportion be so too, in the exercise of each of their powers in their several and respective spheres: That is; as these eternal moral obligations are really in perpetual force, merely from their own nature, and the abstract reason of things; so also they are moreover the express and unalterable will, command, and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect should, in obedience to his supreme authority, as well as in compliance with the natural reason of things, be regularly and constantly observed through the whole creation.

This proposition is very evident, and has little need of being particularly proved.

* 1.172 For 1st. The same reasons which prove to us that God must of necessity be himself infinitely holy, and just, and good, manifestly prove, that it must also be his will, that all his creatures should be so likewise, according to the proportions and capacities of their several natures. That there are eternal and necessary differences of things, agreements and disagreements, proportions and disproportions, fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, absolutely in their own nature, has been before largely demonstrated. That, with

regard to these fixed and certain proportions and fitnesses of things, the will of God, which can neither be influenced by any external power, nor imposed upon by any error or deceit, constantly and necessarily determines itself to choose always what in the whole is best and fittest to be done, according to the unalterable rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth; has likewise been already proved. That the same considerations ought also regularly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to act in constant conformity to the same eternal rules, has in like manner been shown before. It remains therefore only to prove, that these very same moral rules, which are thus of themselves really obligatory, as being the necessary result of the unalterable reason and nature of things, are moreover the positive will and command of God to all rational creatures; and, consequently, that the wilful transgression or neglect of them, is as truly an insolent contempt of the authority of God, as it is an absurd confounding of the natural reasons and proportions of things. Now this also plainly follows from what has been already laid down: For, the same absolute perfection of the divine nature, which (as has been before shown) makes us certain that God must himself be of necessity infinitely holy, just, and good; makes it equally certain, that he cannot possibly approve iniquity in others. And the same beauty, the same excellency, the same weight and importance of the rules of everlasting righteousness, with regard to which God is always pleased to make those rules the measure of all his own actions, prove it impossible but he must likewise will and desire that all rational creatures should proportionably make them the measure of theirs. Even among men, there is no earthly father, but in those things which he esteems his own excellencies, desires and expects to be imitated by his children. How much more is it necessary that God, who is infinitely far from being subject to such passions and variableness as frail men are; and who has

an infinitely tenderer and heartier concern for the happiness of his creatures, than mortal men can have for the welfare of their posterity; must desire to be imitated by his creatures in those perfections which are the foundation of his own unchangeable happiness? In the exercise of his supreme power, we cannot imitate him; in the extent of his unerring knowledge, we cannot attain to any similitude with him* 1.173. We cannot at all thunder with a voice like him; nor are we able to search out and comprehend the least part of the depth of his unfathomable wisdom. But his holiness and goodness, his justice, righteousness, and truth; these things we can understand; in these things we can imitate him; nay, we cannot approve ourselves to him as obedient children, if we do not imitate him therein. If God be himself essentially of infinite holiness and purity; (as, from the light of nature, it is of all things most manifest that he is,) * 1.174 it follows, that it is impossible but he must likewise be of purer eyes than to behold with approbation any manner of impurity in his creatures; and consequently it must needs be his will, that they should all (according to the measure of their frail and finite nature) be holy as he is holy. If God is himself a being of infinite justice, righteousness, and truth, it must needs be his will, that all rational creatures, whom he has created after his own image, to whom he has communicated some resemblance of his divine perfections, and whom he has indued with excellent powers and faculties to enable them to distinguish between good and evil, should imitate him in the exercise of those glorious attributes, by conforming all their actions to the eternal and unalterable law of righteousness. If God is himself a being of infinite * 1.175 goodness, making the sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sending rain on the just and on the * 1.176 unjust; having never left himself wholly without witness, but always doing good, given men rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, and filling their hearts with food and gladness; it cannot but be his will

that all reasonable creatures should, by mutual love and benevolence, permit and assist each other to enjoy in particular the several effects and blessings of the divine universal goodness. Lastly, if God is himself a being of infinite mercy and compassion, as it is plain he bears long with men before he punishes them for their wickedness, and often freely forgives them his ten thousand talents; it must needs be his* 1.177 will, that they should forgive one another their hundred pence; being merciful one to another, as he is* 1.178 merciful to them all; and having compassion each* 1.179 on his fellow-servants, as God has pity on them. Thus from the attributes of God, natural reason leads men to the knowledge of his will: All the same reasons and arguments, which discover to men the natural fitnesses or unfitnesses of things, and the necessary perfections or attributes of God, proving equally at the same time, that1 1.180 that which is truly the law of nature, or the reason of things, is in like manner the will of God. And from hence the soberest and most intelligent persons among the heathens in all ages, very rightly and wisely concluded that the best and certainest part of natural religion, which was of the greatest importance, and wherein was the least danger of their being mistaken, was2 1.181 to imitate the moral attributes of God, by a life of holiness, righteousness,

and charity: Whereas in the external part of their worship, there was nothing but uncertainty and doubtfulness; it being absolutely impossible, without express revelation, to discover what in that particular they might be secure would be truly acceptable to God.

This method of deducing the will of God from his attributes, is of all others the best and clearest, the certainest and most universal, that the light of nature affords: Yet there are also (as I said) some other collateral considerations, which help to prove and confirm the same thing; namely, that all moral obligations, arising from the nature and reason of things, are likewise the positive will and command of God: As

* 1.182 2. This appears in some measure from the consideration of God's creation. For God, by creating things, manifests it to be his will that things should be what they are. And as providence wonderfully preserves things in their present state; and all necessary agents, by constantly and regularly obeying the laws of their nature, necessarily employ all their natural powers in promoting the same end; so it is evident it cannot but be the will of God,1 1.183 that all rational creatures, whom he has indued with those singular powers and faculties of understanding, liberty, and free-choice, whereby they are exalted in dignity above the rest of the world; should likewise employ those their extraordinary faculties in preserving the order and harmony of the creation, and not in introducing disorder and confusion therein. The nature indeed and relations, the proportions and

disproportions, the fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, are eternal and in themselves absolutely unalterable; but this is only upon supposition that the things exist, and that they exist in such manner as they at present do. Now that things exist in such manner as they do, or that they exist at all, depends entirely on the arbitrary will and good pleasure of God. At the same time, therefore, and by the same means, that God manifests it to be his will that things should exist, and that they should exist in such manner as they do; (as by creating them he at first did, and by preserving them he still continually does, declare it to be his will they should;) he at the same time evidently declares, that all such moral obligations as are the result of the necessary proportions and relations of things, are likewise his positive will and command. And consequently, whoever acts contrary to the forementioned reasons and proportion of things, by dishonouring God, by introducing unjust and unequal dealings among equals, by destroying his own being, or by any way corrupting, abusing, and misapplying the faculties wherewith God has indued him, (as has been above more largely explained,) is unavoidably guilty of transgressing at the same time the positive will and command of God, which in this manner also is sufficiently discovered and made known to him.

3. The same thing may likewise further appear* 1.184 from the following consideration:—Whatever tends directly and certainly to promote the good and happiness of the whole, and (as far as is consistent with that chief end,) to promote also the good and welfare of every particular part of the creation, must needs be agreeable to the will of God;1 1.185 who, being infinitely

self-sufficient to his own happiness, could have no other motive to create things at all, but only that he might communicate to them his goodness and happiness; and who consequently cannot but expect and require, that all his creatures should, according to their several powers and faculties, endeavour to promote the same end. Now that the exact observance of all those moral obligations, which have before been proved to arise necessarily from the nature and relations of things; (that is to say, living agreeably to the unalterable rules of justice, righteousness, equity, and truth,) is the certainest and directest means to promote the welfare and happiness, as well of every man in particular, both in body and mind, as of all men in general, considered with respect to society, is so very manifest, that even the greatest enemies of all religion, who suppose it to be nothing more than a worldly or state-policy, do yet by that very supposition confess thus much concerning it; and, indeed, this it is not possible for any one to deny: For the practice of moral virtues does1 1.186 as plainly and undeniably tend to the natural good of the world, as any physical effect or mathematical truth is naturally consequent to the principles on which it depends, and from which it is regularly derived. And without such practice, in some degree, the world can never be happy in any tolerable measure; as is sufficiently evident from Mr Hobbes's own description of the extreme miserable condition that men would be in through the total defect of the practice of all moral virtue, if they were to live in that state which he styles (falsely and contrary to all reason, as has been

before fully proved,) the state of nature; but which really is a state of the grossest abuse and most unnatural corruption and misapplication of men's natural faculties that can be imagined. For, since God has plainly so constituted the nature of men, that they stand continually in need of each other's help and assistance, and can never live comfortably without society and mutual friendship, and are indued with the faculties of reason and speech, and with other natural powers, evidently fitted to enable them to assist each other in all matters of life, and mutually to promote universal love and happiness; it is manifestly agreeable to nature, and to the will of God, who gave them these faculties, that they should employ them wholly to this regular and good end; and, consequently, it is on the contrary evident likewise, that all abuse and misapplication of these faculties, to hurt and destroy, to cheat and defraud, to oppress, insult, and domineer over each other, is directly contrary both to the dictates of nature and to the will of God, who, necessarily doing always what is best, and fittest, and most for the benefit of the whole creation, it is manifest cannot will the corruption and destruction of any of his creatures, any otherwise than as his preserving their natural faculties, (which in themselves are good and excellent, but cannot but be capable of being abused and misapplied,) necessarily implies a consequential permission of such corruption.

And this now is the great aggravation of the sin and folly of all immorality; that it is an obstinate setting up the self-will of frail, finite, and fallible creatures; as in opposition to the eternal reason of things, the unprejudiced judgment of their own minds, and the general good and welfare both of themselves and their fellow-creatures; so also in opposition to the will of the supreme author and creator of all things, who gave them their beings and all the powers and faculties they are indued with: In opposition to the will of the all-wise preserver and governor of the universe, on whose gracious protection

they depend every moment for the preservation and continuance of their beings: And in opposition to the will of their greatest benefactor, to whose bounty they wholly owe whatever they enjoy at present, and all the hopes of what they expect hereafter, this is the highest of all aggravations. The utmost ureasonableness, joined with obstinate disobedience, and with the greatest ingratitude.

Proposition III.

III. Though the fore-mentioned eternal moral obligations are incumbent indeed on all rational creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular reward or punishment, yet they must certainly and necessarily be attended with rewards and punishments: Because the same reasons, which prove God himself to be necessarily just and good, and the rules of justice, equity, and goodness, to be his unalterable will, law, and command, to all created beings; prove also that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such creatures as imitate and obey him by observing those rules, and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto; and consequently, that he cannot but some way or other, make a suitable difference in his dealings with them; and manifest his supreme power and absolute authority, in finally supporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the honour of these his divine laws, as becomes the just and righteous governor and disposer of all things.

This proposition also is in a manner self-evident.

* 1.187 For 1st, If God is himself necessarily a being (as has been before shown) of infinite goodness, justice, and holiness; and if the same reasons which prove the necessity of these attributes in God himself, prove moreover (as has likewise been shown already,) that the same moral obligations must needs be his positive will, law, and command, to all rational creatures; it follows also necessarily, by the very same argument, that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such creatures as imitate and obey him by observing those rules, and be displeased with such as act contrary

thereto. And if so; then in the nature of the thing itself it is evident, that having absolute power and uncontrollable authority, as being supreme governor and disposer of all things, he cannot but signify, by some means or other, his approbation of the one, and his displeasure against the other. And this can no way be done to any effectual purpose but by the annexing of respective rewards and punishments. Wherefore, if virtue goes finally unrewarded, and wickedness unpunished, then God never signifies his approbation of the one, nor his displeasure against the other; and if so, then there remains no sufficient proof that he is really at all pleased or displeased with either, and the consequence of that will be, that there is no reason to think the one to be his will and command, or that the other is forbidden by him; which being once supposed, there will no longer remain any certain evidence of his own moral attributes contrary to what has been already demonstrated.

2. The certainty of rewards and punishments in* 1.188 general may also somewhat otherwise be deduced from their being necessary to support the honour of God and of his laws and government, in the following manner. It is evident we are obliged, in the highest ties of duty and gratitude, to pay all possible honour to God, from whom we receive our being, and all our powers and faculties, and whatever else we enjoy. Now it is plain likewise, that we have no other way to honour God, (whose happiness is capable of no addition from any thing that any of his creatures are capable of doing,) than by honouring, that is, by obeying, his laws. The honour therefore that is thus done to his laws, God is pleased to accept as done immediately to himself. And though we were indeed absolutely obliged, in duty, to honour him in this manner, notwithstanding that there had been no reward to be expected thereupon, yet it is necessary, in the government of the world, and well-becoming an infinitely wise and good governor, that those who honour him he should honour; that is,* 1.189

should distinguish them with suitable marks of his favour. On the contrary; though nothing that weak and finite creatures are able to do, can in the least diminish from the absolute glory and happiness of God, yet, as to us, the dishonouring, that is, the disobeying his laws, is a dishonouring of himself: that is, it is, as much as in us lies, a despising his supreme authority, and bringing his government into contempt:—Now the same reason that there is, why honour should be paid to the laws of God at all; the same reason there is, that that honour should be vindicated, after it has been diminished and infringed by sin: For no lawgiver who has authority to require obedience to his laws, can or ought to see his laws despised and dishonoured, without taking some measures to vindicate the honour of them, for the support and dignity of his own authority and government. And the only way, by which the honour of a law, or of its author, can be vindicated after it has been infringed by wilful sin, is either by the repentance and reformation of the transgressor, or by his punishment and destruction. So that God is necessarily obliged, in vindication of the honour of his laws and government, to punish those who presumptuously and impenitently disobey his commandments. Wherefore if there be no distinction made by suitable rewards and punishments, between those who obey the laws of God and those who obey them not, then God suffers the authority of his laws to be finally trampled upon and despised, without evermaking any vindication of it: Which being impossible, it will follow that these things are not really the laws of God, and that he has no such regard to them as we imagine. And the consequence of this must needs be the denial of his moral attributes, contrary, as before, to what has been already proved: And consequently the certainty of rewards and punishments, in general, is necessarily established.

Proposition IV.

IV. Though in order to establish this suitable difference

between the fruits or effects of virtue and vice, so reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the vindication of the honour of God, the nature of things, and the constitution and order of God's creation, was originally such, that the observance of the eternal rules of justice, equity, and goodness, does indeed of itself tend by direct and natural consequence to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to make them miserable; yet since, through some great and general corruption and depravation, (whencesoever that may have arisen,) the condition of men in this present state is such, that the natural order of things in this world is an event manifestly perverted, and virtue and goodness are visibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effects in establishing men's happiness, proportionable to their behaviour and practice; therefore, it is absolutely impossible that the whole view and intention, the original and the final design, of God's creating such rational beings as men are, and placing them on this globe of earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (to speak more properly) the only inhabitants, for whose sake alone this part at least of the creation is manifestly fitted up and accommodated; it is absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole of God's design in all this should be nothing more than to keep up eternally a succession of such short-lived generations of men as we at present are, and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly state of things, as we see the world is now in; without any due observation of the eternal rules of good and evil; without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary difference of things; and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God, in the proportionable reward of the best, or punishment of the worst of men. And, consequently, it is certain and necessary (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal succession of new generations in the present form and state of things,

there must at some time or other be such a revolution and renovation of things, such a future state of existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact distribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right, and that the whole scheme of providence, which, to us who judge of it by only one small portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and confused, may appear, at its consummation, to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness.

* 1.190 1. In order to establish a just and suitable difference between the respective fruits or effects of virtue and vice, the nature of things, and the constitution and order of God's creation, was originally such that the observance of the eternal rules of piety, justice, equity, goodness, and temperance, does of itself plainly tend, by direct and natural consequence, to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to make them miserable. This is evident in general; because the practice of universal virtue is (in imitation of the divine goodness) the practice of that which is best in the whole; and that which tends to the benefit of the whole, must, of necessary consequence, originally, and in its own nature, tend also to the benefit of every individual part of the creation. More particularly; a frequent and habitual contemplating the infinitely excellent perfections of the almighty creator and all-wise governor of the world, and our most bountiful benefactor; so as to excite in our minds a suitable adoration, love, and imitation of those perfections; a regular employing all our powers and faculties, in such designs and to such purposes only, as they were originally fitted and intended for by nature; and a due subjecting all our appetites and passions to the government of sober and modest reason; are evidently the directest means to obtain such settled peace and solid satisfaction of mind, as the first foundation, and the principal and most necessary ingredient of all true happiness. The temperate and moderate enjoyment of all the

good things of this present world, and of the pleasures of life, according to the measures of right reason and simple nature, is plainly and confessedly the certainest and most direct method to preserve the health and strength of the body. And the practice of universal justice, equity, and benevolence, is manifestly (as has been before observed) as direct and adequate a means to promote the general welfare and happiness of men in society, as any physical motion, or geometrical operation, is to produce its natural effect. So that if all men were truly virtuous, and practised these rules in such manner that the miseries and calamities arising usually from the numberless follies and vices of men were prevented, undoubtedly this great truth would evidence itself visibly in fact, and appear experimentally in the happy state and condition of the world. On the contrary; neglect of God, and insensibleness of our relation and duty towards him; abuse and unnatural misapplication of the powers and faculties of our minds; inordinate appetites, and unbridled and furious passions,—necessarily fill the mind with confusion, trouble, and vexation. And intemperance naturally brings weakness, pains, and sicknesses into the body. And mutual injustice and iniquity; fraud, violence, and oppression; wars, and desolation; murders, rapine, and all kinds of cruelty,—are sufficiently plain causes of the miseries and calamities of men in society. So that the original constitution, order, and tendency of things, is evidently enough fitted and designed to establish naturally a just and suitable difference in general between virtue and vice, by their respective fruits or effects.

2. But though originally the constitution and* 1.191 order of God's creation was indeed such, that virtue and vice are, by the regular tendency of things, followed with natural rewards and punishments; yet, in event, through some great and general corruption and depravation, (whencesoever that may have arisen, of which more hereafter;) the condition of men

in the present state is plainly such, that this natural order of things in the world is manifestly perverted. Virtue and goodness are visibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effect, in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice; and wickedness and vice very frequently escape the punishment which the general nature and disposition of things tends to annex unto it. Wicked men, by stupidity, inconsiderateness, and sensual pleasure, often make shift to silence the reproaches of conscience, and feel very little of that confusion and remorse of mind which ought naturally to be consequent upon their vicious practices. By accidental strength and robustness of constitution, they frequently escape the natural ill consequences of intemperance and debauchery; and enjoy the same proportion of health and vigour as those who live up to the rules of strict and unblameable sobriety. And injustice and iniquity, fraud, violence, and cruelty, though they are always attended indeed with sufficiently calamitous consequences in the general; yet the most of those ill consequences fall not always upon such persons in particular as have the greatest share in the guilt of the crimes, but very commonly on those that have the least. On the contrary; virtue and piety, temperance and sobriety, faithfulness, honesty and charity; though they have indeed both in themselves the true springs of happiness, and also the greatest probabilities of outward causes to concur in promoting their temporal prosperity; though they cannot indeed be prevented from affording a man the highest peace and satisfaction of spirit, and many other advantages both of body and mind in respect of his own particular person; yet in respect of those advantages which the mutual practice of social virtues ought to produce in common, it is in experience found true, that the vices of a great part of mankind do so far prevail against nature and reason, as frequently to oppress the virtue of the best; and not only hinder

them from enjoying those public benefits, which would naturally and regularly be the consequences of their virtue; but oft-times bring upon them the greatest temporal calamities, even for the sake of that very virtue. For it is but too well known that good men are very often afflicted and impoverished, and made a prey to the covetousness and ambition of the wicked; and sometimes most cruelly and maliciously persecuted, even upon account of their goodness itself. In all which affairs the providence of God seems not very evidently to interpose for the protection of the righteous. And not only so, but even in judgments also, which seem more immediately to be inflicted by the hand of heaven, it frequently suffers the righteous to be involved in the same calamities with the wicked, as they are mixed together in business and the affairs of the world.

3. Which things being so; (viz. that there is plainly* 1.192 in event no sufficient distinction made between virtue and vice; no proportionable and certain reward annexed to the one, nor punshment to the other, in this present world:) And yet it being no less undeniably certain in the general, as has been before shown, that if there be a God, (and that God be himself a being of infinite justice and goodness; and it be his will, that all rational creatures should imitate his moral perfections; and he1 1.193 cannot but see and take notice how every creature behaves itself; and cannot but be accordingly pleased with such as obey his will and imitate his nature, and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto;) it being

certain, I say, that if these things be so, God must needs, in vindication of the honour of his laws and government, signify at some time or other this his approbation or displeasure, by making finally a suitable difference between those who obey him, and those who obey him not; it follows unavoidably, either that all these notions which we frame concerning God, are false; and that there is no providence, and God sees not, or at least has no regard to what is done by his creatures, and consequently the ground of all his own moral attributes is taken away, and even his being itself; or else that there must necessarily be a future state of rewards and punishments after this life, wherein all the present difficulties of providence shall be cleared up, by an exact and impartial administration of justice. But now, that these notions are true, that there is a God, and a providence, and that God is himself a being induced with all moral perfections, and expects and commands that all his rational creatures should govern all their actions by the same rules, has been particularly and distinctly proved already. It is therefore directly demonstrated, that there must be a future state of rewards and punishments. Let not thine heart envy sinners, but be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long, for surely there is a reward, and thine expectation shall not be cut off.—Prov. xxiii. 17 and 18.

* 1.194 4. This argument is indeed a common one, but it is nevertheless strongly conclusive and unanswerable; so that, whoever denies a future state of rewards and punishments, must, of necessity, by a chain of unavoidable consequences, be forced to recur to down-right atheism. The only middle opinion that can be invented, is that assertion of the Stoics that virtue is self-sufficient to its own happiness, and a full reward to itself in all cases, even under the greatest sufferings that can befal a man for its sake. Men who were not certain of a future state, (though most of them did indeed believe it highly probable,) and

yet would not give up the cause of virtue, had no other way left to defend it than by asserting that it was in all cases, and under all circumstances, absolutely self-sufficient to its own happiness; whereas, on the contrary, because it is manifestly not self-sufficient, and yet undoubtedly the cause of virtue is not to be given up; therefore, they ought from thence to have concluded the certainty of a future state: That virtue is truly worthy to be chosen, even merely for its own sake, without any respect to any recompense or reward, must indeed necessarily be acknowledged; but it does not from hence follow, that he who dies for the sake of virtue is really any more happy than he that dies for any fond opinion, or any unreasonable humour or obstinacy whatsoever; if he has no other happiness than the bare satisfaction arising from the sense of his resoluteness in persisting to preserve his virtue, and in adhering immoveably to what he judges to be right, and there be no future state wherein he may reap any benefit of that his resolute perseverance. On the contrary, it will only follow, that God has made virtue necessarily amiable, and such as men's judgment and conscience can never but choose, and yet that he has not annexed to it any sufficient encouragement to support men effectually in that choice. Brave indeed, and admirable, were the things which some of the philosophers have said upon this subject, and which some very few extraordinary men (of which Regulus is a remarkable instance,) seem to have made good in their practice, even beyond the common abilities of human nature; but it is very plain, as I before intimated, that the general practice of virtue in the world can never be supported upon this foot; it being, indeed, neither possible nor truly reasonable that men, by adhering to virtue, should part with their lives,1 1.195 if thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all possibility of receiving any advantage from that adherence. Virtue, it is true, in its proper seat, and

with all its full effects and consequences unhindered, must be confessed to be the chief good, as being truly the enjoyment, as well as the imitation of God; but,1 1.196 as the practice of it is circumstantiated in this present world, and in the present state of things, it is plain it is not itself the chief good, but only the means to it, as running in a race is not in itself the prize, but the way to obtain it.

* 1.197 5. It is therefore absolutely impossible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final design of God's creating such rational beings as men are, indued with such noble faculties, and so necessarily conscious of the eternal and unchangeable differences of good and evil; it is absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole design of an infinitely wise, and just, and good God, in all this, should be nothing more than to keep up eternally a succession of new generations of men, and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly state of things as we see the present world is in, without any due and regular observation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and most necessary differences of things, without any sufficient discrimination of virtue and vice, by their proper and respective fruits, and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God, in the proportionable reward of the best, or punishment of the worst of men: And consequently it is certain and necessary, (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal succession of new generations in the present form and state of things, there must at some time or other be such a revolution and renovation

of things, such a future state of existence of the same persons, as that, by an exact distribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right; and that the whole scheme of Providence, which to us who judge of it by only one small portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and much confused, may appear at its consummation to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness. Without this1 1.198 all comes to nothing. If this scheme be once broken, there is no justice, no goodness, no order, no reason, nor any thing upon which any argument in moral matters can be founded, left in the world. Nay, even though we should set aside all consideration of the moral attributes of God, and consider only his natural perfections, his infinite knowledge and wisdom, as framer and builder of the world; it would even in that view only appear infinitely improbable that God should have created such beings as men are, and indued them with such excellent faculties, and placed them on this globe of earth, as the only inhabitants for whose sake this part at least of the creation is manifestly fitted up and accommodated; and all this without any further design2 1.199 than only for the maintaining a perpetual succession of such short-lived generations of mortals as we at present are; to live in the utmost confusion and disorder for a very few years, and then perish eternally into nothing.3 1.200 What can be imagined more vain and empty? What more absurd?

What more void of all marks of wisdom, than the fabric of the world, and the creation of mankind, upon this supposition? But then, take in also the consideration of the moral attributes of God, and it amounts (as I have said) to a complete demonstration that there must be a future state.

* 1.201 6. It may here at first sight seem to be a very strange thing, that through the whole system of nature in the material, in the inanimate, in the irrational part of the creation, every single thing should have in itself so many and so obvious, so evident and undeniable marks of the infinitely accurate skill and wisdom of their Almighty Creator, that, from the brightest star in the firmament of heaven to the meanest pebble upon the face of the earth, there is no one piece of matter which does not afford such instances of admirable artifice and exact proportion and contrivance, as exceeds all the wit of man (I do not say to imitate, but even) ever to be able fully to search out and comprehend; and yet, that in the management of the rational and moral world, for the sake of which all the rest was created, and is preserved only to be subservient to it, there should not in many ages be plain evidences enough, either of the wisdom, or of the justice and goodness of God, or of so much as the interposition of his divine providence at all, to convince mankind clearly and generally of the world's being under his immediate care, inspection, and government. This, I say, may indeed at first sight seem very wonderful. But if we consider the matter more closely and attentively, it will appear not to be so strange and astonishing as we are apt to imagine: For as, in a great machine, contriv ed by the skill of a consummate artificer, fitted up and adjusted with all conceivable accuracy for some very difficult and deep-projected design, and polished and fine wrought in every part of it with admirable niceness and dexterity, any man who saw and examined one or two wheels thereof could not fail to observe, in those single parts of it, the admirable

art and exact skill of the workman; and yet the excellency of the end or use for which the whole was contrived he would not at all be able, even though he was himself a skilful artificer, to discover and comprehend, without seeing the whole fitted up and put together: So though in every part of the natural world, considered even single and unconnected, the wisdom of the great creator sufficiently appears, yet his wisdom, and justice, and goodness in the disposition and government of the moral world, which necessarily depends on the connexion and issue of the whole scheme, cannot perhaps be distinctly and fully comprehended by any finite and created beings, much less by frail and weak and short-lived mortals, before the period and accomplishment of certain great revolutions. But it is exceedingly reasonable to believe, that as the great discoveries, which by the diligence and sagacity of later ages have been made in astronomy and natural philosophy, have opened surprising scenes of the power and wisdom of the creator, beyond what men could possibly have conceived or imagined in former times; so at the unfolding of the whole scheme of providence in the conclusion of this present state, men will be surprised with the amazing manifestations of justice and goodness which will then appear to have run through the whole series of God's government of the moral world.

This is the chief and greatest argument on which the natural proof of a future state of rewards and punishments must principally be founded. Yet there are also several other collateral evidences which jointly conspire to render the same thing extremely credible to mere natural reason: As,

1st. There is very great reason, even from the bare* 1.202 nature of the thing itself, to believe the soul to be immortal, separate from all moral arguments drawn from the attributes of God, and without any consideration of the general system of the world, or of the universal order and constitution, connexion, and dependencies

of things: The immortality of the soul has been commonly believed in all ages and in all places,1 1.203 by the unlearned part of all civilized people, and by the almost general consent of all the most barbarous nations under heaven, from a tradition so ancient and so universal, as cannot be conceived to owe its original either to chance or to vain imagination, or to any other cause than to the author of nature himself: And the most learned and thinking part of mankind, at all times and in all countries, where the study of philosophy has been in any measure cultivated, have almost generally agreed, that it is capable of a just proof from the abstract consideration of the nature and operations of the soul itself: That none of the known qualities of matter can in any possible variation, division, or composition, produce sense, and thought, and reason, is abundantly evident, as has been demonstrated in the former discourse:2 1.204 That matter consists of innumerable, divisible, separable, and for the most part actually disjoined parts, is acknowledged by all philosophers: That, since the powers and faculties of the soul are the most remote and distant from all the known properties of matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great violence upon our reason to imagine them superadded by omnipotence to one and the same substance, cannot easily be denied: That it is highly unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made up of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter is necessarily made up of innumerable parts; and, on the contrary, that it is highly reasonable to believe the seat of thought to be a simple substance, such as cannot naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is manifestly subject to be, must of necessity be confessed: Consequently the soul will not be liable

to be dissolved at the dissolution of the body, and therefore it will naturally be immortal. All this seems to follow, at least with the highest degree of probability, from the single consideration of the soul's being indued with sense, thought, or consciousness. I cannot imagine, saith Cyrus,1 1.205 (in that speech which Xenophon relates he made to his children a little before his death,) that the soul, while it is in this mortal body, lives, and that when it is separated from it, then it should die: I cannot persuade myself that the soul, by being separated from this body, which is devoid of sense, should thereupon become itself likewise devoid of sense: On the contrary, it seems to me more reasonable to believe that, when the mind is separated from the body, it should then become most of all sensible and intelligent; thus he: But then further; if we take also into the consideration all the higher and nobler faculties, capacities, and improvements of the soul, the argument will still become much stronger. I am persuaded, saith Cicero,2 1.206 when I consider with what swiftness of thought the soul is indued, with what a wonderful memory of things past, and forecast of things to come; how many arts, how many sciences, how many wonderful inventions it has found out, that that nature, which is possessor of such faculties, cannot be mortal: Again; the memory, saith he,3 1.207 which the soul has of things that have been, and its foresight of things that will be, and its large comprehension of things that at present

are, are plainly divine powers; nor can the wit of man ever invent any way by which these faculties could possibly come to be in men, but by immediate communication from God: Again; though we see not, saith he,1 1.208 the soul of man, as indeed neither are we able to see God; yet, as from the works of God we are certain of his being, so, from the faculties of the soul, its memory, its invention, its swiftness of thought, its noble exercise of all virtue, we cannot but be convinced of its divine original and nature: And, speaking of the strength and beauty of that argument, which, from the wonderful faculties and capacities of the soul, concludes it to be of an immaterial and immortal nature; though all the vulgar and little philosophers in the world, saith he,2 1.209 (for so I cannot but call all such as dissent from Plato and Socrates, and those superior geniuses,) should put their heads together; they will not only never, while they live, be able to explain any thing so neatly and elegantly; but even this argument itself they will never have understanding enough fully to perceive and comprehend how neat, and beautiful, and strong it is. The chief prejudice against the belief of the soul's existing thus, and living after the death of the body, and the sum of all the objections brought against this doctrine by the Epicurean philosophers of old, who denied the immortality of the soul, and by certain atheistical persons of late, who differ very little from them in their manner of reasoning, is this: That they cannot apprehend how the soul can have any sense of perception,3 1.210 without the body wherein evidently are

all the organs of sense; But neither can they any better apprehend or explain how the soul in the body,1 1.211 (that is, the body itself, according to their opinion,) is capable of sense or perception, by means of the organs of sense: And besides, this argument, that the soul can have no perception, when all the ways of perception that we have at present ideas of, are removed, is exactly the very same argument, and no other, than what a man born blind might make use of, with the very same force, to prove that none of us can possibly have in our present bodies any perception of light or colours, as I have explained more particularly in the former discourse.2 1.212

This consideration, of the soul's appearing in all* 1.213 reason to be naturally immortal, afforded great pleasure and satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men in the heathen world; was a great support under calamities and sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by being virtuous; filled them with great hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter, and was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and particularly to take pains in subduing the body and keeping it in subjection to the reason of the mind. First, it afforded great pleasure and satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men in the heathen world, from the bare contemplation of the thing itself. Nobody,

saith Cicero,1 1.214 shall ever drive me from the hope of immortality; and,2 1.215 if this my opinion concerning the immortality of the soul should at last prove an error, yet it is a very delightful error, and I will never suffer myself to be undeceived in so pleasing an opinion as long as I live. Secondly, it was a great support to them under calamities and sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by being virtuous: These and the like contemplations, saith Cicero,3 1.216 had such an effect upon Socrates, that when he was tried for his life, he neither desired any advocate to plead his cause, nor made any supplication to his judges for mercy; and on the very last day of his life made many excellent discourses upon this subject, and a few days before, when he had an opportunity offered him to have escaped out of prison, he would not lay hold of it: For thus he believed, and thus he taught; that when the souls of men depart out of their bodies, they go two different ways; the virtuous to a place of happiness, the wicked and the sensual to misery. Thirdly, it filled them with great hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter: O happy day, saith the good old man in Cicero,4 1.217 when I shall go to that blessed assembly of spirits, and depart out of this wicked and miserably confused world! Lastly, it was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and particularly

to take pains in subduing the body and keeping it in subjection to the reason of the mind: We ought to spare no pains, saith Plato,1 1.218 to obtain the habit of virtue and wisdom in this life; for the prize is noble, and the hope is very great. Again; having reckoned up the temporal advantages of virtue in the present world, he adds:2 1.219 But we have not yet mentioned the greatest and chiefest rewards which are proposed to virtue; for what can be truly great in so small a portion of time?—The whole age of the longest liver in this our present world, being inconsiderable, and nothing in comparison of eternity. And again; these things, saith he,3 1.220 are nothing, either in number or greatness, in comparison with those rewards of virtue, and punishments of vice, which attend men after death. And to mention no more places, they, saith he,4 1.221 who in the games hope to obtain a victory in such poor matters as wrestling, running, and the like, think not much to prepare themselves for the contest by great temperance and abstinence; and shall our scholars, in the study of virtue, not have courage and resolution enough to persevere, with patience, for a far nobler prize? Words very like those of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 24. Know ye not that they which run in a race, run all; and every man that striveth for the mastery, is temperate in all things? Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible.

2. Another argument which may be used in proof* 1.222 of a future state, so far as to amount to a very great probability, is, that necessary desire of immortality,

which seems to be naturally implanted in all men, with an unavoidable concern for what is to come hereafter. If there be no existence after this life, it will seem that the irrational creatures who always enjoy the present good, without any care or solicitude for what may happen afterwards, are better provided for by nature than man, whose reason and foresight, and all other those very faculties, by which they are made more excellent than beasts, serve them, upon this supposition, scarcely for any other purpose, than to render them uneasy and uncertain, and fearful and solicitous about things which are not. And it is not at all probable that God should have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied; desires which had no objects to answer them; and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never really to come to pass.

* 1.223 3. Another argument, which may be brought to prove a future state, is that conscience which all men have of their own actions, or that inward judgment which they necessarily pass upon them in their own minds; whereby they that have not any law, are a law unto themselves, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing one another. There is no man, who at any time does good, and brave, and generous things, but the reason of his own mind applauds him for so doing; and no man at any time does things base and vile, dishonourable and wicked, but at the same time he condemns himself in what he does. The one is necessarily accompanied with good hope, and expectation of reward; the other with continual torment and fear of punishment. And hence, as before, it is not probable that God should have so framed and constituted the mind of man as necessarily to pass upon itself a judgment which shall never be verified, and stand perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a sentence which shall never be confirmed.

* 1.224 4. Lastly, another argument, which may be drawn from right reason, in proof of a future state, is this;

that man is plainly in his nature an accountable creature, and capable of being judged. Those creatures, indeed, whose actions are all determined by something without themselves, or by what we call mere instinct, as they are not capable of having a rule given them, so it is evident that neither can they be accountable for their actions. But man, who has entirely within himself a free principle or power of determining his own actions upon moral motives, and has a rule given him to act by, which is right reason, can be, nay, cannot but be, accountable for all his actions, how far they have been agreeable or disagreeable to that rule. Every man, because of the natural liberty of his will, can and ought to govern all his actions by some certain rule, and give a reason for every thing he does. Every moral action he performs, being free and without any compulsion or natural necessity, proceeds either from some good motive or some evil one; is either conformable to right reason, or contrary to it; is worthy either of praise or dispraise, and capable either of excuse or aggravation: Consequently, it is highly reasonable to be supposed, that since there is a Superior Being, from whom we received all our faculties and powers, and since in the right use or in the abuse of those faculties, in the governing them by the rule of right reason, or in the neglecting that rule, consists all the moral difference of our actions; there will at some time or other be an examination or inquiry made, into the grounds, and motives, and circumstances of our several actions, how agreeable or disagreeable they have been to the rule that was given us; and a suitable judgment be passed upon them. Upon these considerations the wisest of the ancient heathens believed and taught that the actions of every particular person should all be strictly tried and examined after his death, and he have accordingly a just and impartial sentence passed upon him: Which doctrine though the poets indeed wrapped up in fables and obscure riddles, yet the wisest of the philosophers

had a better notion of it, and more agreeable to reason. From this judgment, saith Plato,1 1.225 let no man hope to be able to escape: For though you could descend into the very depth of the earth, or fly on high to the extremities of the heavens; yet should you never escape the just judgment of the gods, either before or after death: An expression very agreeable to that of the Psalmist; Psal. cxxxix. 8, 9.

These, I say, are very good and strong arguments for the great probability of a future state: But that drawn as above, from the consideration of the moral attributes of God, seems to amount even to a demonstration.

Proposition V.

V. Though the necessity and indispensableness of all the great and moral obligations of natural religion, and also the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, be thus in general deducible, even demonstrably, by a chain of clear and undeniable reasoning; yet (in the present state of the world, by what means soever it came originally to be so corrupted, the particular circumstances whereof could not now be certainly known but by revelation,) such is the carelessness, inconsiderateness, and want of attention of the greater part of mankind; so many the prejudices and false notions taken up by evil education; so strong and violent the unreasonable lusts, appetites, and desires of sense; and so great the blindness introduced by superstitious opinions, vicious customs, and debauched practices through the world; that very few are able, in reality and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves: But men have great need of particular

teaching, and much instruction, to convince them of the truth, and certainty, and importance of these things; to give them a due sense, and clear and just apprehensions concerning them, and to bring them effectually to the practice of the plainest and most necessary duties.

1. There is naturally in the greater part of mankind * 1.226 such a prodigious carelessness, inconsiderateness and want of attention, as not only hinders them from making use of their reason, in such manner as to dis cover these things clearly and effectually for themselves, but is the cause of the grossest and most stupid ignorance imaginable. Some seem to have little or hardly any notion of God at all; and more take little or no care to frame just and worthy apprehensions concerning him, concerning the divine attributes and perfections of his nature; and still many more are entirely negligent and heedless to consider and discover what may be his will. Few make a due use of theirnatural faculties, to distinguish rightly the essential and unchangeable difference between good and evil; fewer yet so attend to the natural notices which God has given them, as by their own understanding to collect that what is good is the express will and command of God, and what is evil is forbidden by him; and still fewer consider with themselves the weight and importance of these things, the natural rewards or punishments that are frequently annexed in this life to the practice of virtue or vice, and the much greater and certainer difference that shall be made between them in a life to come. Hence it is that (as travellers assure us) even some whole nations seem to have very little notion of God, or at least very poor and unworthy apprehensions concerning him; and a very small sense of the obligations of morality; and very mean and obscure expectations of a future state. Not that God has anywhere left himself wholly without witness; or that the difference of good and evil is to any rational being undiscernible; or that men at any time or in

any nation, could ever be firmly and generally persuaded in their own minds that they perished absolutely at death: But through supine negligence and want of attention, they let their reason (as it were) sleep,1 1.227 and are deaf to the dictates of common understanding; and, like brute beasts, minding only the things that are before their eyes, never consider any thing that is abstract from sense, or beyond their present private temporal interest. And it were well if even in civilized nations this was not very nearly the case of too many men, when left entirely to themselves, and void of particular instruction.

* 1.228 2. The greater part of mankind are not only inattentive, and barely ignorant, but commonly they have also, through a careless and evil education, taken up early prejudices, and many vain and foolish notions, which pervert their natural understanding, and hinder them from using their reason in moral matters to any effectual purpose. This cannot be better described than in the words of Cicero: If we had come into the world, saith he,2 1.229 in such circumstances as that we could clearly and distinctly have discerned nature herself, and have been able in the course of our lives to follow her true and uncorrupted directions, this alone might have been sufficient, and there

would have been little need of teaching and instruction. But now nature has given us only some small sparks of right reason, which we so quickly extinguish with corrupt opinions and evil practices, that the true light of nature nowhere appears: As soon as we are brought into the world, immediately we dwell in the midst of all wickedness, and are surrounded with a number of most perverse and foolish opinions, so that we seem to suck in error even with our nurse's milk: Afterwards, when we return to our parents, and are committed to tutors, then we are further stocked with such variety of errors, that truth becomes perfectly overwhelmed with falsehood, and the most natural sentiments of our minds are entirely stifled with confirmed follies; but when, after all this, we enter upon business in the world, and make the multitude, conspiring everywhere in wickedness, our great guide and example, then our very nature itself is wholly transformed, as it were, into corrupt opinions. A livelier description of the present corrupt estate of human nature is not easily to be met with.

3. In the generality of men the appetites and desires* 1.230 of sense are so violent and importunate, the business and the pleasures of the world take up so much of their time, and their passions are so very strong and unreasonable, that of themselves they are very backward and unapt to employ their reason, and fix their attention upon moral matters, and still more backward to apply themselves to the practice of them. The love of pleasure is (as Aristotle elegantly expresses it,1 1.231) so nourished up with us from our very childhood, and so incorporated (as it were) into the whole course of our lives, that it is very difficult for men to withdraw their thoughts from sensual objects, and fasten them upon things remote from sense; and if perhaps they do attend a little, and begin to see the

reasonableness of governing themselves by a higher principle than mere sense and appetite, yet with such variety of temptations are they perpetually encompassed and continually solicited,1 1.232 and the strength of passions and appetites, make so great opposition to the motions of reason, that commonly they yield and submit to practise those things which at the same time the reason of their own mind condemns,2 1.233 and what they allow not that they do; which observation is so true of too great a part of mankind, that Plato upon this ground declares all arts and sciences to have, in his opinion,3 1.234 less of difficulty in them than that of making men good; insomuch that it is well, saith he,4 1.235 if men can come to attain a right sense, and just and true notions of things, even by that time they arrive at old age.

* 1.236 4. But that which, above all other things, most depraves men's natural understanding, and hinders them from discerning and judging rightly of moral truths, is this; that as stupid and careless ignorance leads them into fond and superstitious opinions, and the appetites of sense overcome and tempt them into practices contrary to their conscience and judgment; so, on the reverse, the multitude of superstitious opinions, vicious habits, and debauched practices, which prevail in all ages through the greater part of the world, do reciprocally increase men's gross ignorance, carelessness, and stupidity. False and unworthy notions of God, or superstitious apprehensions concerning

him, which men carelessly and inconsiderately happen to take up at first; do (as it were) blind the eyes of their reason for the future, and hinder them from discerning what of itself originally was easy enough to be discovered. That which may be known* 1.237 of God has been manifest enough unto men in all ages, for God hath showed it unto them: For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead: So that they who are ignorant of him cannot but be without excuse. But notwithstanding all the heathen world had so certain means of knowing God, yet generally they glorified him not as God; neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into images of the meanest and most contemptible creatures; and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever: The natural consequence of which absurd idolatry, and also the just judgment of God upon them for it was, that they were given up to a reprobate mind, to uncleanness, and to all vile affection to such a degree, that not only their common practices, but even their most sacred rites and religious performances became themselves the extremest abominations. And when men's morals are thus corrupted, and they run with greediness into all excess of riot and debauchery; then, on the other hand, by the same natural consequence, and by the same just judgment of God, both their vicious customs and actions, as well as superstitious opinions, reciprocally increase the blindness of their hearts,* 1.238 darken the judgment of their understandings, stupify and sear their consciences so as to become past feeling,1 1.239 and by degrees extinguish wholly that light of

nature in their own minds, which was given them originally to enable them to discern between good and evil.

* 1.240 By these means it comes to pass, that though the great obligations and the principal motives of morality, are indeed certainly discoverable and demonstrable by right reason; and all considerate men, when those motives and obligations are fairly proposed to them, must of necessity (as has been fully proved in the foregoing heads) yield their assent to them as certain and undeniable truths; yet under the disadvantages now mentioned, (as it is the case of most men to fall under some or other of them,) very few are of themselves able, in reality and effect, discover those truths clearly and plainly for themselves: But most men have great need of particular teaching and much instruction, not without some weight of authority, as well as reason and persuasion;

1st. To raise and stir up their attention,—to move them to shake off their habitual carelessness, stupidity, and inconsiderateness,—to persuade them to make use of their natural reason and understanding, and to apply their minds to apprehend and study the truth and certainty of these things: For, as men, notwithstanding all the rational faculties they are by nature indued with, may yet, through mere neglect and incogitancy, be grossly and totally ignorant of the plainest and most obvious mathematical truths; so men may also, for want of consideration, be very ignorant of some of the plainest moral obligations, which, as soon as distinctly proposed to them, they cannot possibly avoid giving their assent unto.

2. To give them a due sense, and right and just apprehensions concerning these things,—to convince them of the great concern and vast importance of them,—to correct the false notions, vain prejudices, and foolish opinions, which deprave their judgment,—and to remove that levity and heedlessness of spirit which makes men frequently to be in their practice very little influenced by what in abstract opinion they may seem firmly to believe: For there are many men

who will think themselves highly injured if any one should make any doubt of their believing the indispensable obligations of morality, and the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, who yet in their lives and actions seem to have upon their minds but a very small sense of the weight and infinite importance of these great truths.

3. To inculcate these things frequently upon them, and press them effectually to the practice of the plainest and most necessary duties,—to persuade them to moderate those passions,—to subdue those lusts,—to conquer those appetites,—to despise those pleasures of sense,—and (which is the greatest difficulty of all) to reform and correct those vicious customs and evil habits which tempt and hurry them too often into the commission of such things, as they are convinced at the same time, in the reason of their own minds, ought not to be practised: For it is very possible men may both clearly understand their duty and also be fully convinced of the reasonableness of practising it, and yet at the same time find a law in their members* 1.241 warring and prevailing against the law of their mind, and bringing them into captivity to the law of sin and death. Men may be pleased with the beauty and excellency of virtue,1 1.242 and have some faint inclinations and even resolutions to practise it, and yet, at the return of their temptations, constantly fall back into their accustomed vices, if the great motives of their duty be not very frequently and very strongly inculcated upon them, so as to make very deep and lasting impressions upon their minds, and they have not some greater and higher assistance afforded them than the bare conviction of their own speculative reason.

For these reasons (I say) it is very fit, that, not-withstanding the natural demonstrableness both of the obligations and motives of morality, yet considering the manifest corruptness of the present estate which human nature is in, the generality of men should not by any means be left wholly to the workings of their own minds, to the use of their natural faculties, and to the bare convictions of their own reason, but should be particularly taught and instructed in their duty, should have the motives of it frequently and strongly pressed and inculcated upon them with great weight and authority, and should have many extraordinary assistances afforded them, to keep them effectually in the practice of the great and plainest duties of religion.

* 1.243 And hence we may, by the way, justly observe the exceeding great use and necessity there is, of establishing an order or succession of men, whose peculiar office and continual employment it may be, to teach and instruct people in their duty, to press and exhort them perpetually to the practice of it, and to give them all possible assistances for that purpose. To which excellent institution, the right and worthy notion of God and his divine perfections, the just sense and understanding of the great duties of religion, and the universal belief and due apprehension of a future state of rewards and punishments; with the generality even of the meaner and more ignorant sort of people among us, are now possessed of; is manifestly and undeniably almost wholly owing: As I shall have occasion hereafter more particularly to observe.

Proposition VI.

VI. Though in almost every age there have indeed been in the heathen world some wise and brave and good men, who have made it their business to study and practise the duties of natural religion themselves, and to teach and exhort others to do the like, who seem therefore to have been raised up by Providence, as instruments to reprove in some measure,

and put some kind of check to the extreme superstition and wickedness of the nations wherein they lived; yet none of these have ever been able to reform the world with any considerable great and universal success, because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves about this excellent work; and they that have indeed sincerely done it have themselves been entirely ignorant of some doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary for the bringing about that great end; and those things which they have been certain of, and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and explain clearly enough; and those that they have been able both to prove and explain by sufficiently clear reasoning, they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with so strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice of the world.

1. There have, indeed, in almost every age been, in the heathen world, some wise, and brave, and good men, who have made it their business to study and practise the duties of natural religion themselves, and to teach and exhort others to do the like: An eminent instance whereof, in the eastern nations, the Scripture itself affords us in the history of Job; concerning whom it does not certainly appear that he knew any positive revealed institution of religion, or that, before his sufferings, any immediate revelation was made to him, as there was to Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs. Among the Greeks Socrates seems to be an extraordinary example of this kind, concerning whom Plato tells us, in his apology,1 1.244 that he did nothing else but go continually about, persuading both old and young, not to be so

much solicitous to gratify the appetites of the body, or to heap up wealth, or to raise themselves to honour, or gain any outward advantage whatsoever: as to improve the mind, by the continual exercise of all virtue and goodness: Teaching them, that a man's true value did not arise from his riches, or from any outward circumstances of life; but that true riches, and every real good, whether public or private, proceeded wholly from virtue. After him, Plato and Aristotle and others followed his example, in teaching morality. And among the Romans, Cicero, and in later times, Epictetus and Antoninus, and several others, gave the world admirable systems of ethics, and noble moral instructions and exhortations, of excellent use and benefit to the generations wherein they live, and deservedly of great value and esteem even unto this day.

* 1.245 2. So that I think, it may very justly be supposed, that these men were raised up and designed by Providence, (the abundant goodness of God having never left itself wholly without witness, notwithstanding the greatest corruptions and provocations of mankind,) as instruments to reprove in some measure, and put some kind of check to the extreme superstition and wickedness of the nations wherein they lived; or at least to bear witness against, and condemn it. Concerning Job, the case is evident and confessed. And for the same reason, some of the ancientest writers of the church have not scrupled to call even Socrates also,1 1.246 and some others of the best of the heathen moralists, by the name of Christians; and to affirm, that,2 1.247 as the law was as it were

a schoolmaster to bring the Jews unto Christ, so true moral philosophy was to the gentiles a preparative to receive the gospel. This perhaps was carrying the matter somewhat to far: But, to be sure, thus much we may safely assert, that1 1.248 whatever any of these men were at any time enabled to deliver wisely and profitably, and agreeably to divine truth, was as a light shining in a dark place, derived to them by a ray of that infinite overflowing goodness, which does good to all even both just and unjust; from God the sole fountain of all truth and wisdom: And this, for some advantage and benefit to the rest of the world, even in its blindest and most corrupt estate.

3. But then, notwithstanding the most that can* 1.249 be made of this supposition, it is certain the effect of all the teaching and instruction even of the best of the philosophers in the heathen world, was in comparison very small and inconsiderable. They never were able to reform the world with any great and universal success, nor to keep together any considerable number of men in the knowledge and practice of true virtue. With respect to the worship of God, idolatry prevailed universally in all nations; and, notwithstanding men did indeed know God, so as to be without excuse, yet "they did not like to retain him in their knowledge, but became vain in their* 1.250 imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened, and they changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into images" of the vilest creatures; and no philosophers ever turned any great number of men from this absurd idolatry, to the acknowledgment and worship of the only true God. In respect of men's dealings one with another, honour and interest, and friendship, and laws, and the necessity of society, did indeed cause justice to be practised in many heathen nations to a great degree; but very few men

among them were just and equitable upon right and true principles, a due sense of virtue, and a constant fear and love of God. With respect to themselves, intemperance and luxury, and unnatural uncleanness, was commonly practised, even in the most civilized countries; and this not so much in opposition to the doctrine of the philosophers, as by the consent indeed and encouragement of too great a part of them. I shall not enlarge upon this ungrateful and melancholy subject: There are accounts enough extant of the universal corruption and debauchery of the heathen world. St. Paul's description of it, in the whole first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, is alone sufficient; and the complaints of their own writers abundantly confirm it.1 1.251 The disciples of the best moralists, at least the practisers of their doctrine were, in their own lifetime,2 1.252 very few, as too plainly appears from the evil treatment which that great man Socrates met withal at Athens: And at their deaths their doctrine in great measure died with them, not having any sufficient evidence or authority to support it; and their followers quickly fell back into the common idolatry, superstition, uncleanness, and debauchery, of which the character the Roman writers give of those that called themselves the disciples of Socrates is a particular and remarkable instance. These considerations (so very early

did they appear to be true,) affected in such a manner that great admirer of Socrates, Plato, that he sometimes seems to give over all hopes of working any reformation in men by philosophy; and says that a good man,1 1.253 when he considers these things, would even choose to sit quiet, and shift for himself, like a man that in a violent hurricane creeps under a wall for his defence; and seeing the whole world round about him filled with all manner of wickedness, be content if, preserving his single self from iniquity and every evil work, he can pass away the present life in peace, and at last die with tranquillity and good hope. And, indeed, for many reasons, it was altogether impossible that the teaching of the philosophers should ever be able to reform mankind, and recover them out of their very degenerate and corrupt estate, with any considerably great and universal success.

1. In the first place, because the number of those* 1.254 who have in earnest set themselves about this excellent work have been exceeding few: Philosophers, indeed, that called themselves so, there were enough in every place, and in every age: But those who truly made it their business to improve their reason to the height, to free themselves from the superstition which overwhelmed the whole world, to search out the obligations of morality, and the will of God their creator, to obey it sincerely themselves, as far as they could discover it by the light of nature, and to encourage and exhort others to do the like; were but a very few names. The doctrine of far the greatest part of the philosophers consisted plainly in nothing but words, and subtilty, and strife, and empty contention; as did not at all amend even

their own manners, much less was fitted to reform the world. Their scholars,1 1.255 as Aristotle excellently describes them, thought themselves greatly improved in philosophy, and that they were become gallant men if they did but hear and understand and learn to dispute about morality, though it had no effect at all nor influence upon their manners; just as if a sick man should expect to be healed by hearing a physician discourse, though he never followed any of his directions. Undoubtedly, saith he, the mind of the one was exactly as much improved by such philosophy, as the health of the other's body by such physic: And no wonder the generality of the common hearers judged of their own improvement in philosophy by such false measures, when the enormous viciousness of the lives of the philosophers themselves2 1.256 made it plainly appear that their art was not so much intended and fitted for the reformation of men's manners, as to be an exercise of wit and subtilty, and an instrument of vainglory: Excepting, perhaps, Socrates and Plato, and some others of that rank, this account is too plainly true of the greatest part of the philosophers. The argument is too unpleasant to instance in particulars. Whoever pleases, may, in Diogenes Laertius, and other writers, find accounts enough of the lewdness and unnatural vices of most of the philosophers. It is a shame for us, so much as to speak of those things, which were done of them, not only in secret, but even in the most public manner. I shall here only add the judgment of Cicero, a man as able to pass a right judgment in this

matter as ever lived. Do you think,1 1.257 says he, that these things (meaning the precepts of morality,) had any influence upon those men, (excepting only a very few of them,) who taught, and wrote, and disputed about them? No; who is there of all the philosophers, whose mind, and life, and manners were conformable to right reason? Whoever made his philosophy to be the law and rule of his life, and not a mere boast and show of his wit and parts? who observed his own instructions, and lived in obedience to his own precepts? On the contrary; many of them were slaves to filthy lusts, many to pride, many to covetousness, &c.

2. Those few extraordinary men of the philosophers* 1.258, who did indeed in good measure sincerely obey the laws of natural religion themselves, and make it their chief business to instruct and exhort others to do the same, were yet themselves entirely ignorant of some doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about this great end, of the reformation and recovery of mankind.

In general: Having no knowledge of the whole scheme, order, and state of things, the method of God's governing the world, his design in creating mankind, the original dignity of human nature, the ground and circumstances of men's present corrupt condition, the manner of the divine interposition necessary to their recovery, and the glorious end to which God intended finally to conduct them: Having no knowledge (I say) of all this, their whole attempt to discover the truth of things, and to instruct others therein, was like wandering in the wide sea,2 1.259

without knowing whither they were to go, or which way they were to take, or having any guide to conduct them: And accordingly the wisest of them were never backward to confess their own ignorance and great blindness;1 1.260 that truth was hid from them2 1.261 as it were in an unfathomable depth; that they were much in the dark,3 1.262 and very dull and stupid, not only as to the profounder things of wisdom, but as to such things also which seemed very capable of being in great part discovered: Nay, that even those things which in themselves were of all others the most manifest,4 1.263 (that is, which, whenever made known, would appear most obvious and evident,) their natural understanding was of itself as unqualified to find out and apprehend as the eyes of bats to behold the light of the sun; that the very first and most necessary thing of all,5 1.264 the nature and attributes of God himself, were, notwithstanding all the general helps of reason, very difficult to them to find out in particular, and still more difficult to explain; it being much more easy to say what God was not than what he was:6 1.265 And finally, that the method of instructing men effectually, and making them truly wise and good, was a thing very obscure and dark, and difficult

to be found out:1 1.266 In a word, Socrates himself always openly professed, that he pretended to be wiser than other men only in this one thing, that he was duly sensible of his own ignorance, and believed that it was merely for that very reason that the oracle pronounced him the wisest of men.2 1.267

More particularly; the manner in which God* 1.268 might be acceptably worshipped these men were entirely and unavoidably ignorant of. That God ought to be worshipped is, in the general, as evident and plain from the light of nature as any thing can be; but in what particular manner, and with what kind of service he will be worshipped, cannot be certainly discovered by bare reason. Obedience to the obligations of nature, and imitation of the moral attributes of God, the wisest philosophers easily knew was undoubtedly the most acceptable service to God: But some external adoration seemed also to be necessary, and how this was to be performed they could not with any certainty discover. Accordingly even the very best of them complied therefore generally with the outward religion of their country, and advised others to do the same; and so, notwithstanding all their wise discourses, they fell lamentably into the practice of the most foolish idolatry. Plato,3 1.269 after having delivered very noble, and almost divine truths concerning the nature and attributes of the Supreme God, weakly

advises men to worship likewise inferior gods,1 1.270 demons, and spirits, and dared not to condemn the worshipping even of statues also and images, dedicated according to the laws of their country; as if the honour they paid to lifeless idols could procure the favour and good-will of superior intelligences;2 1.271 And so he corrupted and spoiled the best philosophy in the world by adding idolatry to that worship which he had wisely and bravely before proved to be due to the creator of all things.3 1.272 After him, Cicero, the greatest and best philosopher that Rome or perhaps any other nation ever produced, allowed men to continue the idolatry of their ancestors;4 1.273 advised them to conform themselves to the superstitious religion of their country,5 1.274 in offering such sacrifices to different gods as were by law established; and disapproves and finds fault with the Persian Magi,6 1.275 for burning the temples of the Grecian gods, and asserting that the whole universe was God's temple: In7 1.276

all which he fondly contradicts himself, by inexcusably complying with the practices of those men, whom in many of his writings he largely and excellently proves to be extremely foolish upon account of those very practices: And to mention no more, (for indeed those of a lower rank, the minuter philosophers, as Tully calls them, are not worth mentioning,) that admirable moralist Epictetus, who, for a true sense of virtue, seems to have had no superior in the heathen world; even he also advises men to offer libations and sacrifices to the gods,1 1.277 every one according to the religion and custom of his country:

But still more particularly: That which of all other* 1.278 things, these best and wisest of the philosophers were most absolutely and unavoidably ignorant of, and yet which, of all other things, was of the greatest importance for sinful men to know, was the method by which such as have erred from the right way, and have offended God, may yet again restore themselves to the favour of God, and to the hopes of happiness. From the consideration of the goodness and mercifulness of God, the philosophers did indeed very reasonably hope, that God would show himself placable to sinners, and might be some way reconciled; but when we come to inquire more particularly what propitiation he will accept, and in what manner this reconciliation must be made, here nature stops, and expects with impatience the aid of some particular revelation. That God will receive returning sinners, and accept of repentance instead of perfect obedience, they cannot certainly know to whom he has not declared that he will do so; for though this be the most probable and only means of reconciliation that nature suggests, yet whether this will be alone sufficient, or whether God will not require something further for the vindication of his justice, and of the honour and dignity of his laws and government, and for the

expressing more effectually his indignation against sin, before he will restore men to the privileges they have forfeited, they cannot be satisfactorily assured; for it cannot positively be proved, from any of God's attributes, that he is absolutely obliged to pardon all creatures all their sins, at all times, barely and immediately upon their repenting. There arises, therefore, from nature, no sufficient comfort to sinners, but anxious and endless solicitude about the means of appeasing the Deity. Hence those divers ways of sacrificing, and numberless superstitions, which overspread the face of the heathen world, but were so little satisfactory to the wiser part of mankind, even in those times of darkness, that the more considering philosophers could not forbear frequently declaring that1 1.279 they thought those rites could avail little or nothing towards appeasing the wrath of a provoked God, or making their prayers acceptable in his sight; but that something still seemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what.

* 1.280 3. Some other doctrines absolutely necessary, likewise, to the bringing about this great end of the reformation of mankind, though there was indeed so much proof and evidence of the truth of them to be drawn from reason, as that the best philosophers could not by any means be entirely ignorant of them; yet so much doubtfulness, uncertainty, and unsteadiness, was there in the thoughts and assertions of these philosophers concerning them, as could not but2 1.281 very much diminish their proper effect and influence upon the hearts and lives of men. I instance, in the immortality of the soul, the certainty of a future state, and the rewards and punishments to be distributed in a life to come. The arguments, which may be drawn from reason and from the nature of things, for the proof of these great truths, seem

really (as I have before shown) to come very little short of strict demonstration: And accordingly the wisest philosophers (as has likewise been shown before) did indeed sometimes seem to have reasoned themselves into a firm belief of them, and to have been fully convinced of their certainty and reality; even so far as to apply them to excellent purposes and uses of life. But then, on the other hand, a man cannot without some pity and concern of mind observe, how strangely, at other times, the weight of the same arguments seems to have slipped (as it were) out of their minds; and with what wonderful diffidence, wavering, and unsteadiness, they discourse about the same things. I do not here think it of any very great moment, that there were indeed some whole sects of philosophers, who absolutely denied the immortality of the soul, and peremptorily rejected all kind of expectation of a life to come; (though, to be sure, this could not but in some measure shock the common people, and make them entertain some suspicion about the strength of the arguments used on the other side of the question by wiser men:) Yet, I say,) it cannot be thought of any very great moment, that some whole sects of philosophers did indeed absolutely deny the immortality of the soul; because these men were weak reasoners in other matters also, and plainly low and contemptible philosophers, in comparison of those greater geniuses we are now speaking of. But that which I now observe, and which I say cannot be observed without some pity and concern of mind, is this; that even those great philosophers themselves, the very best and wisest and most considerate of them that ever lived, notwithstanding the undeniable strength of the arguments which sometimes convinced them of the certainty of a future state, did yet at other times express themselves with so much hesitancy and unsteadiness concerning it, as, without doubt, could not but extremely hinder the proper effect and influence which that most important consideration

ought to have upon the hearts and lives of men. I am now, said Socrates1 1.282 a little before his death, about to leave this world; and ye are still to continue in it: Which of us have the better part allotted to us, God only knows:2 1.283 Seeming to express some doubtfulness, whether he should have any existence after death, or not. And again, at the end of his most admirable discourse concerning the immortality of the soul; I would have you to know,3 1.284 said he to his friends who came to pay him their last visit, that I have great hopes I am now going into the company of good men: Yet I would not be too peremptory and confident concerning it. But4 1.285 if death be only as it were a transmigration from hence unto another place; and those things, which are told us, be indeed true; that those who are dead to us, do all live there: Then, &c. So likewise Cicero, speaking of the same subject: I will endeavour, saith he,5 1.286 to explain what you desire; yet I would not have you depend upon what I shall say, as certain and infallible; but I may guess, as other men do, at what shall seem most probable: And further than this, I cannot pretend to go. Again: Which of those two opinions,6 1.287 saith he, [that the soul is mortal, or that it is immortal,] be true, God only knows; which

of them is most probable, is a very great question. And again in the same discourse, having brought all those excellent arguments before mentioned in proof of the immortality of the soul; yet we ought not, saith he,1 1.288 to be overconfident of it: For it often happens that we are strongly affected at first with an acute argument; and yet, a little while after, stagger in our judgment, and alter our opinion, even in clearer matters than these: For these things must be confessed to have some obscurity in them. And again: I know not how, saith he,2 1.289 when I read the arguments in proof of the soul's immortality, methinks I am fully convinced; and yet after I have laid aside the book, and come to think and consider of the matter alone by myself, presently I find myself slipt again insensibly into my old doubts. From all which it appears, that notwithstanding all the bright argumens and acute conclusions, and brave sayings of the best philosophers, yet life and immortality were not fully and satisfactorily brought to light by bare natural reason;3 1.290 but men still plainly stood in need of some farther and more complete discovery.

4. Those things which the philosophers were indeed* 1.291 the most fully certain of, and did in good measure understand; such as the obligations of virtue, and the will of God in matters of morality; yet they were never able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, to persons of capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation. First, because

most of their discourses upon these subjects have been rather speculative and learned, nice and subtile disputes, than practical and universally useful instructions. They proved, by strict and nice argumentation, that the practice of virtue is wise and reasonable, and fit to be chosen, rather than that it is of plain, necessary, and indispensable obligation; and were able to deduce the will of God only by such abstract and subtile reasonings as the generality of men had by no means either abilities or opportunities to understand or to be duly affected by. Their very profession and manner of life led them to make their philosophy rather an entertainment of leisure time,1 1.292 a trial of wit and parts, an exercise of eloquence, and of the art and skill of good speaking, than an endeavour to reform the manners of men, by showing them their plain and necessary duty: And accordingly the study of it, was, as Cicero2 1.293 himself observes, unavoidably confined to a few, and by no means fitted for the bulk and common sort of mankind, who, as they cannot judge of the true strength of nice and abstract arguments, so they will always be suspicious of some fallacy in them. None but men of parts and learning, of study and liberal education, have been able to profit by the sublime doctrine of Plato, or by the subtile disputations of other philosophers; whereas the doctrine of morality, which is the rule of life and manners, ought to be plain, easy, and familiar, and suited fully to the capacities of all men.3 1.294 Secondly, another

reason why the philosophers were never able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, even those things of which they were the most certain, to persons of all capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation, was because they never were able to frame to themselves any complete, regular, and consistent system or scheme of things; but the truths which they taught1 1.295 were single and scattered, accidental as it were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any knowledge of the whole true state of things; and consequently less universally convictive. Nothing could be more certain, (as they all well knew,) than that virtue was unquestionably to be chosen, and the practice of it to be recommended necessarily above all things; and yet they could never clearly and satisfactorily make out upon what principles originally, and for what end ultimately, this choice was to be made; and upon what grounds it was universally to be supported. Hence they perpetually disagreed,2 1.296 opposed, and contradicted one another in all their disputations, to such a degree that St. Austin, somewhere out of Varro, reckons up no less than 280 opinions concerning that one question, What was the chief good or final happiness of man? The effect of all which differences could not, without doubt, but be a mighty hindrance to that conviction and general influence which that great truth, in the certainty whereof they all clearly agreed,

(namely, that the practice of virtue was necessary and indispensable,) ought to have had upon the minds and lives of men. This whole matter is excellently set forth by Lactantius: The philosophers, saith he,1 1.297 take them altogether, did indeed discover all the particular doctrines of true religion; but because each one endeavoured to confute what the others asserted, and no one's single scheme was in all its parts consistent, and agreeable to reason and truth, and none of them were able to collect into one whole and entire scheme the several truths dispersed among them all, therefore they were not able to maintain and defend what they had discovered. And again, having set down a brief summary of the whole doctrine and design of true religion, from the original to the consummation of all things; this entire scheme, says he,2 1.298 because the philosophers were ignorant of, therefore they were not able to comprehend the truth, notwithstanding that they saw and discovered singly almost all the particulars of which the whole scheme consists: But this was done by different men, and at different times, and in different manners, (with various mixtures of different errors, in what every one discovered of truth singly;) and without finding the connexion of the causes, and consequences, and reasons of things, from the mutual dependencies of which the completeness and perfection of the whole

scheme arises; whereas, had there been any man who could have collected and put together in order all the several truths which were taught singly and scatteredly by philosophers of all the different seets, and have made up out of them one entire consistent scheme, truly he would not have differed much from us Christians: But this it was not possible for any man to do, without having the true system of things first revealed to him.

5. Lastly: Even those things which the philosophers* 1.299 were not only themselves certain of, but which they have also been able to prove and explain to others, with sufficient clearness and plainness,—such as are the most obvious and necessary duties of life,—they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with so strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice of the world. The truths which they proved by speculative reason wanted still some more sensible authority to back them,1 1.300 and make them of more force and efficacy in practice; and the precepts which they laid down, however evidently reasonable and fit to be obeyed,2 1.301 seemed still to want weight, and to be but the precepts of men. Hence none of the philosophers, even of those who taught the clearest and certainest truths, and offered the best and wisest instructions, and enforced them with the strongest motives that could be,3 1.302 were yet ever able

to work any remarkable change in the minds and lives of any considerable part of mankind, as the preaching of Christ and his apostles undeniably did. Nor does it appear in history1 1.303 that any number of Socrates's or Plato's followers were convinced of the excellency of true virtue, or the certainty of its final reward, in such a manner as to be willing to lay down their lives for its sake, as innumerable of the disciples of Christ are known to have done. In speculation, indeed, it may, perhaps, seem possible, that notwithstanding it must be confessed philosophy cannot discover any complete and satisfactory remedy for past miscarriages, yet the precepts and motives offered by the best philosophers might at least be sufficient to amend and reform men's manners for the future: But in experience and practice it hath, on the contrary, appeared to be altogether impossible for philosophy and bare reason to reform mankind effectually, without the assistance of some higher principle: For though the bare natural possibility of the thing cannot indeed easily be denied, yet in this case (as Cicero excellently expresses it2 1.304,) in like manner as in physic it matters nothing whether a disease be

such as that no man does, or no man can recover from it; so neither does it make any difference whether by philosophy no man is, or no man can be made wise and good: So that, without some greater help and assistance, mankind is plainly left in a very bad state. Indeed, in the original uncorrupted state of human nature, before the mind of man was depraved with prejudicate opinions, corrupt affections, and vicious inclinations, customs, and habits, right reason may justly be supposed to have been a sufficient guide, and a principle powerful enough to preserve men in the constant practice of their duty. But, in the present circumstances and condition of mankind, the wisest and most sensible of the philosophers themselves have not been backward to complain, that they found the understandings of men so dark and cloudy, their wills so biassed and inclined to evil, their passions so outrageous and rebelling against reason, that they looked upon the rules and laws of right reason as very hardly practicable, and which they had very little hopes of ever being able to persuade the world to submit to. In a word they confessed that human nature was strangely corrupted; and they acknowledged this corruption to be a disease whereof they knew not the true cause, and could not find out a sufficient remedy. So that the great duties of religion were laid down by them as matters of speculation and dispute, rather than as the rules of action; and not so much urged upon the hearts and lives of men, as proposed to the admiration of those who thought them hardly possible to be effectually practised by the generality of men. To remedy all these disorders, and conquer all these corruptions, there was plainly wanting some extraordinary and supernatural assistance, which was above the reach of bare reason and philosophy to procure, and yet without which the philosophers themselves were sensible there could never be any truly great men.1 1.305

Proposition VII.

VII. For these reasons there was plainly wanting a divine revelation, to recover mankind out of their universally degenerate estate, into a state suitable to the original excellency of their nature: Which divine revelation both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for; as appears from the acknowledgments which the best and wisest of the heathen philosophers themselves have made of their sense of the necessity and want of such a revelation; and from their expressions of the hopes they had entertained that God would some time or other vouchsafe it unto them.

* 1.306 1. There was plainly wanting a divine revelation, to recover mankind out of their universal corruption and degeneracy; and without such a revelation it was not possible that the world should ever be effectually reformed; for if (as has been before particularly shown) the gross and stupid ignorance, the innumerable prejudices and vain opinions, the strong passions and appetites of sense, and the many vicious customs and habits which the generality of mankind continually labour under, make it undeniably too difficult a work for men of all capacities to discover every one for himself, by the bare light of nature, all the particular branches of their duty; but most men, in the present state of things, have manifestly need of much teaching and particular instruction; if those who were best able to discover the truth, and instruct others therein, namely the wisest and best of the philosophers, were themselves unavoidably altogether ignorant of some doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great end, the reformation of mankind; if those truths, which they were themselves very certain of, they were not yet able to prove and explain clearly enough to vulgar understandings; if even those things which they proved sufficiently, and explained with all clearness, they had not yet authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's

minds with so strong an impression as to influence and govern the general practice of the world; nor pretended to afford men any supernatural assistance, which yet was very necessary to so great a work; And if, after all, in the discovery of such matters as are the great motives of religion, men are apt to be more easily worked upon, and more strongly affected, by good testimony, than by the strictest abstract arguments; so that, upon the whole, it is plain the philosophers were never by any means well qualified to reform mankind with any considerable success; then there was evidently wanting some particular revelation, which might supply all these defects. There was plainly a necessity of some particular revelation, to discover in what manner,1 1.307 and with what kind of external service, God might acceptably be worshipped. There was a necessity of some particular revelation, to discover what expiation God would accept for sin, by which the authority, honour, and dignity of his laws might be effectually vindicated. There was a necessity of some particular revelation, to give men full assurance of the truth of those great motives of religion, the rewards and punishments of a future state, which, not withstanding the strongest arguments of reason, men could not yet forbear doubting of.2 1.308 In fine, there was a necessity of some particular divine revelation,3 1.309 to make the whole doctrine of religion clear and obvious to all capacities, to add weight and authority to the plainest precepts, and to

furnish men with extraordinary assistances, to enable them to overcome the corruptions of their nature: And, without the assistance of such a revelation, it is manifest it was not possible that the world could ever be effectually reformed. Ye may even give over, saith Socrates,1 1.310 all hopes of amending men's manners for the future, unless God be pleased to send you some other person to instruct you. And Plato: Whatever, saith he,2 1.311 is set right and as it should be, in the present evil state of the world, can be so only by the particular interposition of God.

* 1.312 2. Since, therefore, there was plainly and confessedly wanting a divine revelation, to relieve the necessities of men in their natural state; and since no man can presume to say that it is inconsistent with any of the attributes of God, or unbecoming the wisdom of the Creator of all things, to supply that want; to reveal to his creatures more fully the way to happiness; to make more particular discoveries of his will to them; to set before them in a clearer light the rewards and punishments of a future state; to explain in what manner he will be pleased to be worshipped; and to declare what satisfaction he will accept for sin, and upon what conditions he will receive returning sinners: Nay, since, on the contrary, it seems more suitable to our natural notions of the goodness and mercy of God, to suppose that he should do all this than not; it follows undeniably, that it was most reasonable and agreeable to the dictates of nature to expect or hope for such a divine revelation. The generality of the heathen world, who were far more equal and less prejudiced judges in this matter than modern deists, were so fully persuaded that the great rules for the conduct of human life must receive

their authority from heaven, that their chief lawgivers thought it not a sufficient recommendation of their laws that they were agreeable to the light of nature, unless they pretended also that they received them from God. But I have no need, in this argument, to make use of the examples of idolatrous lawgivers. The philosophers themselves, the best and wisest, and the least superstitious of them that ever lived, were not ashamed to confess openly their sense of the want of a divine revelation, and to declare their judgment that it was most natural and truly agreeable to right and sound reason to hope for something of that nature. There is, besides the several places before cited, a most excellent passage in Plato to this purpose; one of the most remarkable passages, indeed, in his whole works, though not quoted by any that I have met with, which therefore I think highly worthy to be transcribed at large, as a just and unanswerable reproach to all those who deny that there is any want or need of a revelation. It seems best to me, saith Socrates1 1.313 to one of his disciples,

that we expect quietly; nay, it is absolutely necessary, that we wait with patience till such time as we can learn certainly how we ought to behave ourselves both towards God and towards men. When will that time come, replies the disciple, and who is it that will teach us this? For, methinks, I earnestly desire to see and know who the person is that will do it. It is one, answers Socrates, who has now a concern for you. But in like manner, as Homer relates, that Minerva took away the mist from before Diomede's eyes, that he might be able to distinguish one person from another, so it is necessary that the mist, which is now before your mind, be first taken away, that afterwards you may learn to distinguish rightly between good and evil; for, as yet, you are not able to do it. Let the person you mentioned, replies the disciple, take away this mist, or whatever else it be, as soon as he pleases; for I am willing to do any thing he shall direct, whosoever this person be, so that I may but become a good man. Nay, answers Socrates, that person has a wonderful readiness and willingness to do all this for you. It will be best, then, replies the disciple, to forbear offering any more sacrifices till the time that this person appears. You judge very well, answers Socrates; it will be much safer so to do, than to run so great a hazard of offering sacrifices, which you know not whether they are acceptable to God or no. Well then, replies the disciple, we will then make our offerings to the Gods, when that day comes; and I hope, God willing, it may not be far off. And, in another place, the same author having given a large account of that most excellent discourse, which Socrates made a little before his death, concerning the great doctrines of religion, the immortality of the soul, and the certainty of a life to come, he introduces one of his disciples replying in the following manner: I am,1 1.314 saith

he, of the same opinion with you, O Socrates, concerning these things; that to discover the certain truth of them, in this present life, is either absolutely impossible for us, or at least exceeding difficult. Yet not to inquire, with our utmost diligence, into what can be said about them, or to give over our inquiry before we have carried our search as far as possible, is the sign of a mean and low spirit. On the contrary, we ought therefore by all means to do one of these two things, either, by hearkening to instruction, and by our own diligent study, to find out the truth, or, if that be absolutely impossible, then to fix our foot upon that which to human reason, after the utmost search, appears best and most probable; and, trusting to that, venture upon that bottom to direct the course of our lives accordingly; unless a man could have still some more sure and certain conduct to carry him through this life, such as a divine discovery of the truth would be. I shall mention but one instance more, and that is of Porphyry, who, though he lived after our Saviour's time, and had a most inveterate hatred to the Christian revelation in particular, yet confesses in general,1 1.315 that

he was sensible there was wanting some universal method of delivering men's souls, which no sect of philosophy had yet found out.

* 1.316 3. This sense of the ancient and wisest philosophers is much departed from by modern deists, who contend that there was no want, no need of a revelation; that philosophy and right reason was of itself sufficiently able to instruct and preserve men in the practice of their duty; and that nothing was to be expected from revelation. But besides what has been already intimated concerning the extreme barbarity of the present heathen world, and what the philosophers, both Greeks and Latins, have confessed concerning the state of the more civilized nations wherein they lived; I think we may safely appeal even to our adversaries themselves, whether the testimony of Christ, (without considering at present what truth and evidence it has,) concerning the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments of a future state, have not had (notwithstanding all the corruptions of Christians) visibly in experience and effect a greater and more powerful influence upon the lives and actions of men than the reasonings of all the philosophers that ever were in the world:1 1.317 Whether credible testimony, and the belief and authority of revelation, be not in itself as it were a light held to the consciences of stupid and careless men; and the most natural and proper means that can be imagined to awaken and rouse up many of those who would be little affected with all the strict arguments and abstract reasonings in the world. And, to bring this matter to a short issue; whether in Christian countries, (at least where Christianity is professed in any tolerable degree of purity,) the generality even2 1.318 of the meaner and most vulgar and ignorant

people have not truer and worthier notions of God, more just and right apprehensions concerning his attributes and perfections, a deeper sense of the difference of good and evil, a greater regard to moral obligations and to the plain and most necessary duties of life, and a more firm and universal expectation of a future state of rewards and punishments; than in any heathen country any considerable number of men were ever found to have had.

It may here perhaps be pretended, by modern deists,* 1.319 that the great ignorance and undeniable corruptness of the whole heathen world has always been owing, not to any absolute insufficiency of the light of nature itself, but merely to the fault of the several particular persons, in not sufficiently improving that light; and that deists now, in places where learning and right reason are cultivated, are well able to discover and explain all the obligations and motives of morality, without believing any thing of revelation. But this, even though it were true, (as, in the sense they intend, it by no means is; because, as has been before shown, there are several very necessary truths not possible to be discovered with any certainty by the bare light of nature; but) supposing it, I say, to be true, that all the obligations and motives of morality could possibly be discovered and explained clearly, by the mere light of nature alone, yet even this would not at all prove that there is no need of revelation: For, whatever the bare natural possibility was, it is certain in fact the wisest philosophers of old1 1.320 never were able to do it to any effectual purpose, but always willingly acknowledged that they still wanted some higher assistance. And as to the

great pretences of modern deists, it is to be observed, that the clearness of moral reasonings was much improved, and the regard to a future state very much increased, even in heathen writers, after the coming of Christ. And almost all the things that are said wisely and truly by modern deists, are plainly borrowed from that revelation which they refuse to embrace, and without which they could never have been able to have said the same things. Now, indeed, when our whole duty, with its true motives, is clearly revealed to us, its precepts appear plainly agreeable to reason; and conscience readily approves what is good, as it condemns what is evil: Nay, after our duty is thus made known to us, it is easy not only to see its agreement with reason, but also to begin and deduce its obligation from reason. But had we been utterly destitute of all revealed light, then, to have discovered our duty in all points, with the true motives of it, merely by the help of natural reason, would have been a work of nicety, pains and labour; like groping for an unknown way, in the obscure twilight. What ground have any modern deists to imagine, that if they themselves had lived without the light of the gospel, they should have been wiser than Socrates, and Plato, and Cicero? How are they certain they should have made such a right use of their reason as to have discovered the truth exactly, without being any way led aside by prejudice or neglect? If their lot had been among the vulgar, how are they sure they should have been so happy, or so considerate, as not to have been involved in that idolatry and superstition which overspread the whole world? If they had joined themselves to the philosophers, which sect would they have chosen to have followed? And what book would they have resolved upon to be the adequate rule of their lives and conversations? Or, if they should have set up for themselves, how are they certain they should have been skilful and unprejudiced enough to have deduced the several branches of their duty, and applied

them to the several cases of life, by argumentation and dint of reason? It is one thing to see that those rules of life, which are beforehand plainly and particularly laid before us, are perfectly agreeable to reason; and another thing to find out those rules merely by the light of reason, without their having first been any otherwise made known. We see that even many of those, who profess to govern their lives by the plain written rule of an instituted and revealed religion, are yet most miserably ignorant of their duty; and how can any man be sure he should have made so good improvement of his reason, as to have understood it perfectly in all its parts, without any such help? We see that many of those who profess to believe firmly that great and everlasting happiness which Christ has promised to obedience, and that great and eternal misery which Christ has threatened to disobedience, are yet hurried away, by their lusts and passions, to transgress the conditions of that covenant to which these promises and these threatenings are annexed: And how can any man be sure he should be able to overcome those great temptations, if these mighty motives were less distinctly known, or less powerfully enforced? But suppose he could, and that by strength of reason he could demonstrate to himself these things with all clearness and distinctness, yet could all men do so? Assuredly all men are not equally capable of being philosophers, though all men are equally obliged to be religious. At least thus much is certain, that the rewards and punishments of another world, the great motives of religion, cannot be so powerfully enforced, to the influencing the lives and practice of all sorts of men, by one who shall undertake to demonstrate the reality of them by abstract reason and arguments, as by one who, showing sufficient credentials of his having been himself in that other state, shall assure them of the truth and certainty of these things. But, after all, the question does not really lie here. The truth, at the bottom, is plainly this: All the great things that modern deists affect to say of right reason, as to its sufficiency

in discovering the obligations and motives of morality, is only a pretence to be made use of when they are opposing Christianity. At other times, and in reality, they have no hearty regard for morality, nor for the natural evidences of the certainty of a future state: They are willing enough to believe that men perish absolutely at death; and so they have no concern to support effectually the cause of virtue, nor care to make out any consistent scheme of things, but unavoidably recur, in truth, to downright atheism; at least, in the manners of most of them it is too plain and apparent that absolute libertinism is the thing they really aim at; and, however their creed may pretend to be the creed of deists, yet almost always their practice is the practice of very atheists.

* 1.321 4. To return therefore to the argument: From what has been said upon this head, it appears plainly that it is agreeable to the natural hopes and expectations of men, that is, of right reason duly improved, to suppose God making some particular revelation of his will to mankind, which may supply the undeniable defects of the light of nature: And, at the same time, it is evident that such a thing is by no means unworthy of the divine wisdom, or inconsistent with any of the attributes of God, but rather, on the contrary, most suitable to them. Consequently, considering the manifold wants and necessities of men, and the abundant goodness and mercy of God, there is great ground, from right reason and the light of nature, to believe that God would not always leave men wholly destitute of so needful an assistance, but would at some time or other actually afford it them: Yet it does not from hence at all follow, (as some have imagined,) that God is obliged to make such a revelation; for then it must needs have been given in all ages, and to all nations; and might have been claimed and demanded as of justice, rather than wished for and desired as of mercy and condescending goodness. But the fore-mentioned considerations are such as might afford men reasonable ground to hope

for some favour of this kind, to be conferred at such time, and in such manner, and upon such persons, as should seem best to supreme infinite wisdom; at least they might well dispose and prepare men before-hand, whenever any doctrine should come accompanied with just and good evidence of its being such a revelation to believe and embrace it with all readiness.

It has been made use of by a modern author,1 1.322 as* 1.323 his principal and strongest argument against the reasonableness of believing any revelation at all, that it is confessed there has been no revelation universally owned and embraced as such, either in all ages, or by all nations in any age. He pretends to acknowledge, that if the doctrine of Christianity was universally entertained, he would not doubt of its being truly a revelation of the will of God to mankind. But since, in fact, there is no instituted religion universally received as a divine revelation, and there are several nations to whom the Christian doctrine in particular was never so much as preached, nor ever came to their knowledge at all, he concludes, that what is not universal and equally made known to all men, cannot be needful for any; and consequently, that there never was any real want of a revelation at all, nor any ground to think any further assistance necessary to enable men to answer all the ends of their creation than the bare light of nature. This is the sum and strength of this author's reasoning; and herein all the deniers of revelation agree with him. Now, (not to take notice here that it is by no means impossible but all men may be capable of receiving some benefit from a revelation, which yet a great part of them may have never heard of,) if these men's reasoning was true, it would follow, by the same argument, that neither was natural religion necessary to enable men to answer the ends of their creation: For, though all the truths of natural religion are indeed

certainly discoverable by the due use of right reason alone, yet it is evident all men are not indued with the same faculties and capacities, nor have they all equally afforded to them the same means of making that discovery; as these gentlemen themselves upon some occasions are willing enough to own, when they are describing the barbarous ignorance of some poor Indian nations. And, consequently, the knowledge of natural religion being, in fact, by no means universal, it will follow that there is no great necessity even of that, but that men may do very well without it, in performing the functions of the animal life, and directing themselves wholly by the inclinations of sense: And thus these gentlemen must at last be forced to let go all moral obligations, and so recur unavoidably to absolute atheism. The truth is: As God was not obliged to make all his creatures equal, to make men angels, or to indue all men with the same faculties and capacities as any, so neither is he bound to make all men capable of the same degree or the same kind of happiness, or to afford all men the very same means and opportunities of obtaining it.—There is ground enough, from the consideration of the manifest corruption of human nature, to be so far sensible of the want of a divine revelation, as that right reason and the light of nature itself will lead a wise and considerate man to think it very probable that the infinitely merciful and good God may actually vouchsafe to afford men some such supernatural assistance; and consequently such a person will be very willing, ready, and prepared to entertain a doctrine which shall at any time come attended with just and good evidence of its being truly a revelation of the will of God. But it does not at all from hence follow, either that God is absolutely bound to make such a revelation, or that, if he makes it, it must equally be made to all men; or that, since in fact it is not made to all, therefore there is no reason to believe that there is any need or any probability of its being made to any.

Proposition VIII.

VIII. There is no other religion now in the world but the Christian that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of reason, to be esteemed such a divine revelation; and, therefore, if Christianity be not true, there is no revelation of the will of God at all made to mankind.

This proposition will easily be granted by all modern unbelievers; and therefore I need not be particular in the proof of it.

The Mahometan religion was founded by a vicious* 1.324 person, proposes ridiculous and trifling doctrines to be believed, was propagated merely by violence and force of arms, was confirmed by no public and incontestable miracles, promises vain and sensual rewards to its professors, and is every way encompassed with numberless such absurdities and inconsistencies (as those who have given us accounts of the life of Mahomet, and the nature of his religion, have abundantly made out; and is sufficiently evident even from the Alcoran itself;) that there is no great danger of its imposing upon rational and considerate men.

The Jewish religion was founded wholly upon the* 1.325 expectation of a Messiah to come: And the time of his appearance was limited by such plain and determinate prophecies that what difficulties soever there may be in computing the very nice and exact time of their completion, or what different periods soever may be fixed from whence to begin several computations; yet the time of their being fulfilled is now, in all possible ways of computing, so very far elapsed, that if the Christian doctrine be false, there is no supposition left, upon which the Jewish religion can, with any colour of reason, be believed to be true.

It being evident, therefore, that either the Christian revelation is true, or else (how great want soever there may be of it) there is no such thing as revelation at all;—it remains that I proceed to consider what positive and direct evidence there is to prove the actual truth of this divine revelation.

Proposition IX.

IX. The Christian religion, considered in its primitive simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures, has all the marks and proofs of being actually and truly a divine revelation, that any divine revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or desired to have.

* 1.326 The necessary marks and proofs of a religion coming from God, are these. First, that the duties it enjoins be all such as are agreeable to our natural notions of God, and perfective of the nature and conducive to the happiness and well-being of men. And that the doctrines it teaches be all such, as, though not indeed discoverable by the bare light of nature, yet, when discovered by revelation, may be consistent with and agreeable to sound and unprejudiced reason; for otherwise no evidence whatsoever can be of so great force to prove that any doctrine is true; as its being either contradictory in itself, or wicked in its tendency, is to prove that it must necessarily be false. Secondly, for the same reason, the motives likewise, by which it is recommended to men's belief and practice, and all the peculiar circumstances with which it is attended, must be such as are suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and fitted to amend the manners and perfect the minds of men. Lastly, it must moreover be positively and directly proved to come from God, by such certain signs and matters of fact as may be undeniable evidences of its author's having actually a divine commission: For otherwise, as no evidence can prove a doctrine to come from God, if it be either impossible or wicked in itself, so, on the other hand, neither can any degree of goodness or excellency in the doctrine itself make it demonstrably certain, but only highly probable, to have come from God; unless it has moreover some positive and direct evidence of its being actually revealed.

The entire proof therefore of this proposition must be made by an induction of particulars, as follows.

Proposition X.

X. First, the practical duties which the Christian

religion enjoins, are all such as are most agreeable to our natural notions of God, and most perfective of the nature, and conducive to the happiness and well-being of men. That is, Christianity even in this single respect, as containing alone, and in one consistent system, all the wise and good precepts (and those improved, augmented, and exalted to the highest degree of perfection,) that ever were taught singly and scatteredly, and many times but very corruptly by the several schools of the philosophers; and this without any mixture of the fond, absurd, and superstitious practices of any of these philosophers; ought to be embraced and practised by all rational and considering deists, who will act consistently, and steadily pursue the consequences of their own principles; as at least the best scheme and sect of philosophy that ever was set up in the world; and highly probable, even though it had no external evidence to be of divine original.

This proposition is so very evident, that the greatest* 1.327 adversaries of the Christian institution have never been able to deny it any otherwise than by confounding the inventions of men, the superstitious practices of particular persons, or the corrupt additions of certain particular churches or societies of Christians, with the pure and simple precepts of the gospel of Christ. In all those instances of duty which pure and uncorrupt Christianity enjoins, the proposition is manifest, and altogether undeniable; the duties of love, fear, and adoration, which the Christian religion obliges us to render unto God, are so plainly incumbent upon us from the consideration of the excellent attributes of the divine nature, and our relation to him as our creator and preserver, that no man who considers can think himself free from the obligations which our religion lays upon him to practise these duties, without denying the very being of God, and acting contrary to the reason and all the natural notions of his own mind. It is placing the true and acceptable worship of God, not so much in any positive and ritual observances, as in approaching him with pure

hearts and undefiled bodies, with unfeigned repentance for all past miscarriages, and sincere resolutions of constant obedience for the future, in praying to him for whatever we want, and returning him our most hearty thanks for whatever good things we receive, with such dependence and humility, such submission, trust, and reliance, as are the proper affections of dutiful children: All this is plainly most agreeable to our natural notions and apprehensions of God; and that the prayers of sinful and depraved creatures, sincerely repenting, should be offered up to God, and become prevalent with him, through and by the intercession of a mediator, is very consonant to right and unprejudiced reason, as I shall have occasion to show more particularly hereafter, when I come to consider the articles of our belief. Again: The duties of justice, equity, charity, and truth, which the Christian religion obliges us to exercise towards men, are so apparently reasonable in themselves, and so directly conducive to the happiness of mankind, that their unalterable obligations are not only in great measure deducible from the bare light of nature and right reason, but even those men also, who have broken through all the bonds of natural religion itself, and the original obligations of virtue, have yet thought it necessary, for the preservation of society and the well-being of mankind, that the observation of these duties, to some degree, should be enforced by the penalties of human laws; and the additional improvements * 1.328 which our Saviour has made to these duties, by commanding his disciples to be, as it were, lights in the world, and examples of good works to all men; to be so far from injuring others, that, on the contrary, they should not indulge themselves in any degree of anger or passion; to seek reconciliation immediately upon any difference or offence that may arise; to bear injuries patiently, rather than return evil for evil; to be always willing to forgive one another their trespasses, as they all expect forgiveness at the hands of God; to be kind and charitable to all men;

to assist readily, and be willing to do all good offices, not only to their friends, but even to their bitterest enemies also; in a word, to raise their virtue and goodness far above the common practice of men, extending their charity universally in imitation of the goodness of God himself, who maketh the sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust; these precepts, I say, are such as no unprejudiced philosopher would have been unwilling to confess were the utmost improvements of morality, and to the highest degree perfective of human nature. In like manner, the duties of sobriety, temperance, patience, and contentment, which our religion enjoins us to practise in ourselves, are so undeniably agreeable to the inward constitution of human nature, and so perfective of it, that the principal design of all true philosophy has ever been to recommend and set off these duties to the best advantage, though, as the philosophers themselves have always confessed, no philosophy was ever able to govern men's practice effectually in these respects: But the additional precepts, and the new weight and authority, which our Saviour has added to his instructions of this kind, teaching his disciples to govern* 1.329 their very thoughts, desires, and inclinations, to contemn and get above all the desires of this present world, and to set their affections principally upon that which is to come; these are the things which, when the Christian religion was in its primitive and purest state, worked men up actually to such a pitch of cheerful and generous obedience to the laws of God, and taught them to obtain such a complete victory over the world, and over all the desires and appetites of sense, as the best philosophers have acknowledged their instructions were never able to do. Lastly, even those positive and external observances, (the two sacraments,) which are instituted in the Christian religion, as means and assistances to keep men stedfast in the practice of those great and moral duties which are the weightier matters of the

law; even those positive institutions (I say) are so free from all appearance of superstition and vanity, and so wisely fitted to the end for which they were designed, that no adversaries of Christianity have ever been able to object any thing at all against the things themselves, but only against certain corruptions and superstitions, which some who call themselves Christians, have, directly in opposition to the true design of Christianity, introduced and annexed to them. For what reasonable man can pretend to say, that it is any way unreasonable or superstitious for every member of the society to be solemnly admitted into his profession, by a plain and significant rite, entitling him to all the privileges, and charging him with all the obligations, which belong to the members of that society as such? which is the design of one of the sacraments: Or that it is unreasonable and superstitious for men frequently to commemorate, with all thankfulness, the love of their greatest benefactor, and humbly and solemnly to renew their obligations and promises of obedience to him? which is the design of the other.

* 1.330 Let now any impartial person judge whether this be not a wise and excellent institution of practical religion, highly conducive to the happiness of mankind, and worthy to be established by a revelation from God; when men had confessedly corrupted themselves to such a degree, that not only the light of nature, and right reason, was altogether insufficient to restore true piety; but even that light itself (as Cicero expressly acknowledges) nowhere appeared.1 1.331 Let any impartial person judge, whether a religion that tends thus manifestly to the recovery of the rational part of God's creation, to restore men to the imitation and likeness of God, and to the dignity and highest improvement of their nature, has not within itself an intrinsic and very powerful evidence of its being truly divine. Let any one read the fifth,

sixth, and seventh chapters of St Matthew's Gospel, and judge if they do not, as it were, set before his eyes such a lovely image and representation of true virtue, as Plato said, could not but charm men with the highest degree of love and admiration imaginable.1 1.332 In a word, let any man of an honest and sincere mind consider, whether that practical doctrine has not even in itself the greatest marks of a divine original; wherein whatsoever things are true, whatsoever* 1.333 things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any thing praiseworthy; all these, and these only are the things that are earnestly recommended to men's practice. What wise precept was ever delivered by any philosopher of any sect which is not more plainly laid down by our Saviour and his apostles? And not only so, but enforced moreover with greater efficacy and strength? founded upon nobler and more consistent principles? urged with greater weight and authority? and pressed with more powerful and affecting arguments? Nay, neither is this all the difference, even in respect barely of the excellency of the doctrine itself. For the philosophers taught indeed many excellent moral truths, but some upon one occasion and upon one set of principles; some upon another; and every one of them were mistaken in some instances of duty, and mingled particular superstitions and false notions with their good instructions, and built their doctrine upon no sure foundation of consistent principles; and all of them (as has been before shown) were very imperfect and deficient, and far from being able to make up an entire and complete scheme of the whole duty of man in all cases. But now,2 1.334 to put together all

the wise and good precepts that ever were delivered by any wise men of any sect and in any age, to improve and exalt every one of them to the highest possible degree of excellency and perfection, to separate and lay aside all the superstitious opinions and practices that had been mixed by all or any of the different sects of philosophers, or teachers of religion in any nation, with their respective moral instructions, and to supply all those doctrines wherein both moral philosophy and the additional institutions of all religions in the world had in the whole been hitherto altogether deficient; and all this, in one plain, entire, and regular system upon the foundation of certain and consistent principles: This is the peculiar character of the Christian institution; and all this cannot, with any colour of reason, be imagined to have ever been done by any man but one sent immediately from God: Upon this consideration alone, by all sincere deists (if any such there be) who really are what they pretend to be, who believe the being and attributes of God, and are firmly convinced of the obligations of virtue and natural religion, and the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments, must needs, by their own principles, be strongly inclined to embrace the Christian religion, to believe, at least to hope confidently, that a doctrine so plainly fitted to recover men out of their universally corrupt estate, and restore them to the knowledge and favour of God, is truly divine; and to entertain it with all cheerfulness, as what in itself has those manifold marks of goodness and perfection which are themselves sufficient, though not indeed to prove it demonstrably, yet to satisfy a good man,

that it cannot be any thing else than a revelation from God, even though it had wanted all those outward proofs,1 1.335 and divine and miraculous testimonies, which shall hereafter be mentioned in their proper place.

Proposition XI.

XI. Secondly, The motives by which the Christian religion enforces the practice of the duties it enjoins are such as are most suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural expectations of men.

1. The acceptableness of true repentance, in the* 1.336 sight of God, and the certain assurance of pardon upon such repentance, which the Christian religion affords us, is a most powerful and necessary motive to frail and sinful creatures, to encourage and support them effectually in the practice of their duty. It is indeed in general evidently most agreeable to right reason, and to men's natural notions of God, to believe him placable, and merciful, and willing to forgive. But since at the same time it cannot be proved, by any arguments from reason, that God is absolutely obliged to forgive, and it is confessedly evident that it becomes the supreme governor of the universe to vindicate the honour and authority of his laws and government, to give some evidences of his hatred and indignation against sin, and sometimes, by instances of severity, to prevent sinners from abusing his mercy and patience, no less than that it is agreeable to his infinite wisdom and goodness to suffer his anger to be by some means appeased: No motive in this case can be imagined more expedient and powerful to encourage sinners to return to the practice of their duty, and to persuade them to continue therein immoveably for the future; nothing can be imagined more seasonable and satisfactory to the mind of man, and

more agreeable to the excellent wisdom of God, and worthy of the supreme and infinitely merciful governor of all things, than such a positive declaration of the acceptableness of sincere repentance, and such an authentic assurance of pardon and forgiveness thereupon, as under the Christian dispensation the divine goodness and mercy has found means to afford unto us, in such manner as is at the same time abundantly consistent with the honour and dignity of the laws of God, and with his irreconcileable hatred against all unrighteousness and sin.

* 1.337 2. That divine and supernatural assistance, which, under the Christian dispensation, they who sincerely endeavour to obey the will of God, have encouragement to hope for, upon all necessary occasions, is another powerful motive to support men effectually in the practice of their duty. The wisest of the philosophers were so far sensible of the great corruption and depravity of human nature in its present state; they were sensible that such was the carelessness, stupidity, and want of attention, of the greater part of mankind; so many the early prejudices and false notions taken in by evil education; so strong and violent the unreasonable lusts, appetites, and desires of sense; and so great the blindness, introduced by supperstitious opinions, vicious customs, and debauched practices through the world; that (as has been before shown,) they themselves openly confessed they had very little hope of ever being able to reform mankind with any considerably great and universal success, by the bare force of philosophy and right reason; but that, to produce so great a change, and enable men effectually to conquer all their corrupt affections, there was need of some supernatural and divine assistance, or the immediate interposition of God himself. Now this divine assistance is vouchsafed to men under the Christian dispensation, in such a manner, as (from what has been already said concerning the judgment of the wisest of the ancient philosophers in this matter,) appears to be undeniably agreeable to

the natural expectations of right reason, and suitable to the best and worthiest notions that men have ever by the light of nature been able to frame to themselves, concerning the attributes and perfections of God. If* 1.338 ye, says our Saviour, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly father give the holy spirit to them that ask him? The effect of this divine assistance evidenced itself in a very visible and remarkable manner in the primitive times,1 1.339 by the sudden, wonderful, and total reformation of far greater numbers of wicked men than ever were brought to repentance by the teaching and exhortations of all the philosophers in the world. And even at this day, notwithstanding all the corruption introduced among Christians, I think it can hardly be denied by any unbelievers of revelation, but that there are among us many more persons of all conditions, who worship God in sincerity and simplicity of heart, and live in the constant practice of all righteousness, holiness, and true virtue, than ever were found in any of the most civilized nations, and most improved by philosophy in the heathen world.

3. The rewards and punishments which the Christian* 1.340 religion proposes, to obedience or disobedience, are a motive perfectly agreeable to men's natural hopes and fears, and worthy of God to make known by positive and express revelation. For since it is confessedly suitable to the divine wisdom, to make variety of creatures, indued with very different powers and faculties, and capable of very different kinds and degrees of improvement, and since all rational creatures, by reason of that natural liberty of will which is essentially necessary to their being such, cannot but be capable of exalting and improving their nature

by the practice of virtue and the imitation of God, and on the contrary of depraving and debasing their nature by the practice of vice and alienation of themselves from God; it follows undeniably, (as has been before shown by a more particular deduction,) that it is highly agreeable to the light of nature and to right reason to suppose that God, the supreme governor and disposer of all things, will finally make a just and suitable distinction between his creatures, by the distribution of proportionable rewards and punishments. Nevertheless, both the truth itself of these final rewards and punishments was so far called in question, and rendered doubtful and uncertain, by the disputations even of the wisest philosophers that ever lived; and those who did in general believe the truth and certainty of them, had yet so very blind and obscure notions of what nature and kind they were to be, having their imaginations strangely prejudiced with poetical fictions and fabulous stories, that the setting this matter clear and right, and the supplying this single defect in the light of nature, was a thing highly worthy of divine revelation: It being plainly a very different thing, and of very different force as to the influencing men's actions, for men to be able to argue themselves into a reasonable expectation of future rewards and punishments; and to be certainly assured of the reality of them by express testimony of divine revelation. And accordingly, by divine revelation in the gospel, this defect of the light of nature is now actually supplied in such a manner; life and immortality are so brought to light, and the wrath of God is so revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, that this very thing, the clear and distinct and consistent account which the gospel gives us of these final rewards and punishments, (which, though indeed in themselves so absolutely necessary, that without them no tolerable vindication could be made of the attributes of God, yet neither by the light of nature, nor by any positive

institution of religion, excepting only the Christian, were they ever so clearly and plainly represented to mankind, as to have their full and proper effect upon the hearts and lives of men;) this very thing (I say) the clear, distinct, and consistent account which the gospel gives us of these final rewards and punishments, is itself no contemptible argument of the truth and divine authority of the Christian revelation. By the certain knowledge of these rewards and punishments it is that the practice of virtue is now established upon a sure foundation. Men have now abundantly sufficient encouragement to support them in their choice of virtue, and in their constant adherence to it, in all cases and under all circumstances that can be supposed. There is now sufficient weight on the side of virtue to enable men to conquer all the temptations of the devil, the flesh, and the world; and to despise the severest threatenings, even death itself. This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. The only difficulty in this matter, arising from the duration of the final punishment of the wicked, shall be considered when I come to discourse of the articles of our belief.

Proposition XII.

XII. Thirdly, the peculiar manner and circumstances with which the Christian religion enjoins the duties, and urges the motives before mentioned, are exactly consonant to the dictates of sound reason, or the unprejudced light of nature, and most wisely perfective of it.

For what can be more agreeable to the light of nature* 1.341, and more evidently perfective of it, than to have those duties, which nature hints at only in general, explained fully and largely, and urged in particular, and inculcated upon the meanest capacities with great weight and authority, and exemplified in the lives of holy persons, proposed as patterns for our imitation? What can be more perfective of the light of nature than to have those great motives of religion, the rewards and punishments of a future state, which

nature only obscurely points at, described to us most plainly, affectionately, and lively? What can be more perfective of the light of nature, than to have the means of atoning for sin, which nature discovers only the want of, plainly declared and exhibited to us? What can be more perfective of the light of nature, than such a discovery of the heinousness of sin and the necessity of holiness, as the death of Christ and the purity of the gospel does make unto us? In fine, what can more effectually perfect the religion of nature, than the gathering together the worshippers of the true God into one body; the causing them to enter into solemn obligations to live suitably to their holy profession? The giving them gracious assurances that true repentance shall be accepted for what is past, and sincere renewed obedience for the future? The uniting them by a few positive rites in one religion as well as civil communion, for mutual assistance and improvement? And the establishing a certain order or perpetual succession of men, whose constant business it may be to explain the great duties of religion to persons of meaner capacities; to urge and enforce the practice of them; to set before men the reasons of their duty, and the necessity of it; to show them clearly and impartially the danger of neglecting it, and the great advantage of performing it sincerely; in a word, to instruct the ignorant, and to admonish the wicked; to reclaim those that err, to comfort the doubting, to reprove the obstinate; and to be instruments of conveying to men all proper assistances, to enable them to perform their whole duty effectually?

If these things be the ordinances of one who came to contradict the dictates of right reason, and not to perfect the law of nature, but to destroy it; then let all wise men for ever forsake the assemblies of Christians, and profess themselves again disciples of the philosophers. But if these things be perfectly agreeable to nature and right reason, and tend exceedingly to the supplying the deficiences there of; then let none,

under pretence of maintaining natural religion, revile and blaspheme the Christian, lest they be found liars unto God.

The many contentions, indeed, about opinions of* 1.342 great uncertainty and little importance, which, to the very great scandal of Christianity, have in several ages of the church been, with unreasonable zeal, kept up, instead of promoting the universal interest of true practical religion and virtue, have, it must be confessed, given some occasion to the enemies of our most holy religion to blaspheme and revile both it and the teachers of it. But though such things as these have indeed afforded them too plausible an occasion, yet they have not given them any just reason so to do: For the acknowledged corruption of a doctrine or institution, in any particular part or respect, is by no means a weighty or real objection against the truth of the whole: And there has always been extant a sufficient rule to enable sincere persons, in the midst of the greatest disputes and contentions, to distinguish the doctrine which is of God from the opinions of men; the doctrine of Christ having been plainly and fully delivered in our Saviour's own discourses, and in the writings of his immediate followers the Apostles, who cannot, with any reason, be imagined either to have misrepresented it, or to have represented it imperfectly. But besides, I think it can hardly be denied, even by our adversaries themselves, but that in all times and places, wherein Christianity has been professed in any tolerable degree of purity; whatever contentions and disputes may have arisen about particular, and perhaps unnecessary doctrines; yet the great, the most necessary, and fundamental doctrines of religion, concerning God and providence; concerning the gracious method of God's reconciliation with penitent sinners; concerning the necessity of true piety, righteousness, and sobriety; concerning a judgment to come, and the final reward of the righteous, and the punishment of wicked men, in such a manner as will effectually vindicate both

the justice and goodness, the wisdom and honour of God; these things (I say) have, notwithstanding all differences concerning smaller matters, been nevertheless at the same time universally and constantly taught, pressed and inculcated upon persons of all capacities, by the earnest and continual preaching of all the ministers of the gospel; with an effect infinitely more considerable and visible, both in extent and duration, than by the teaching of any heathen philosophers that ever lived: Which shows undeniably the excellency at least, if not the divine authority of the Christian institution, in this particular respect.

Proposition XIII.

XIII. Fourthly; all the [credenda, or] doctrines, which the true, simple, and uncorrupted Christian religion teaches, (that is, not only those plain doctrines which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal salvation, but even all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truth,) are, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare reason unassisted with revelation; yet, when discovered by revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound unprejudiced reason, have every one of them a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence to reform men's minds, and correct their manners, and do together make up an infinitely more consistent and rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest of the ancient philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern unbelievers can invent or contrive.

* 1.343 1. That there is one only living and true God, existing of himself, by the necessity of his own nature, absolutely independent, eternal, omnipresent, unchangeable, incorruptible, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, knowledge, and wisdom; of perfect liberty, and freedom of will; of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other possible perfections; so as to be absolutely self-sufficient to his own infinite and unalterable happiness: This is not only the first and principal article of the Christian

faith, but also the first and most evident truth that the light of nature itself teaches us, being clearly demonstrable, upon certain and undeniable principles of right reason.

2. That this supreme self-existent cause and father* 1.344 of all things did, before all ages, in an incomprehensible manner, by his almighty power and will, beget or produce a divine person, styled the Logos, the word, or wisdom, or son, of God; God, of God;1 1.345 in whom dwells the fulness of Divine perfections, (excepting absolute supremacy, independency, or self-origination;) being the image of the invisible God, the* 1.346 brightness of his father's glory, and the express image of his person, having been in the beginning with God, partaker with him of his glory before the world was; the upholder of all things by the word of his power, and himself over all, (by communication of his father's glory and dominion) God blessed for ever: This doctrine (I say) though not indeed discoverable by bare reason, yet, when made known by revelation, appears plainly very consistent with right reason, and (it is manifest) contains nothing that implies any manner of absurdity or contradiction in it.

Indeed, if any men, pretending to be wise above and beyond what is written, have at any time given such explications of the manner how the son of God derived his being from the father, or have offered such accounts of his nature and attributes, as can by any just and necessary consequence be reduced to imply or involve any contradiction, (which perhaps many of the schoolmen have but too justly been accused of doing,)2 1.347 such explications are, without all

controversy, false, and very injurious to religion. But as this doctrine is delivered in Scripture I think there is nothing in it in any degree contrary to right reason, as I have elsewhere endeavoured to show in a particular discourse, to which I refer the reader.

* 1.348 Now the same that is said of the son, may in like manner, with little variation, be, very agreeably to right reason, understood concerning the original procession or manner of derivation of the Holy Spirit likewise from the father.

* 1.349 3. That the universe, the heavens, and the earth, and all things that are therein, were created and made by God, and this through the operation of his son, that divine word, or wisdom of the father, by whom * 1.350 the Scripture says that God made the worlds, that by him God created all things, that by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, or principalities or powers; all things were created by him and for him, and he is before all * 1.351 things, and by him all things consist; that all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made: All this likewise is very agreeable to sound and unprejudiced reason. For that neither the whole, nor any part of the world; neither the form, nor motion, nor matter of the world, could exist of itself by any necessity in its own nature, is abundantly demonstrable from undeniable principles of reason, as has been shown in my former discourse: Consequently, both the whole world, and all the variety of things that now exist therein, must

of necessity have received both their being itself, and also their form and manner of being, from God, the alone supreme and self-existent cause, and must needs depend upon his good pleasure every moment, for the continuance and preservation of that being. Accordingly, if we set aside the Epicureans, (whose absurd hypothesis has long since been given up even by all atheists themselves,) and some very few others, who with no less absurdity (as I have also at large shown) contended that the world was in its present form self-existent and necessary, all the philosophers of all ages, (even not excepting those who held the eternity of the world,) have unanimously agreed in this great truth, that the world evidently owes both its being and preservation to God, the supreme cause and author of all things. And then, that God made the world by the operation of his son, though this could not indeed be known certainly without express revelation; yet is it by no means incredible, or contrary to right reason. For, to the judgment of reason, it is one and the same thing, whether God made the world immediately by himself, or mediately by the ministration of a second principle. And what Plato and his followers have said concerning a second $gr$ζ or mind, whom they frequently stile δημι$gr$υ$gr$γ$gr$ζ the minister or workman by whom God framed all things, proves undeniably thus much at least, that the doctrines delivered in Scripture concerning this matter cannot be rejected as inconsistent and irreconcilable with right reason.

4. That, about the space of 6000 years since, the* 1.352 earth was without form and void, that is, a confused chaos, out of which God framed this beautiful and useful fabric we now inhabit, and stocked it with the seeds of all kinds of plants, and formed upon it man, and all the other species of animals it is now furnished with, is also very agreeable to right reason. For though the precise time, indeed, when all this was done, could not now have been known exactly without revelation, yet even at this day there are remaining

many considerable and very strong rational proofs, which make it exceedingly probable, (separate from the authority of revelation,) that this present frame and constitution of the earth cannot have been of a very much longer date. The universal tradition delivered down from all the most ancient nations of the world, both learned and barbarous; the constant and agreeing doctrine of all ancient philosophers and poets, concerning the earth's being formed within such a period of time, out of water or a chaos; the manifold absurdities and contradictions of those few accounts which pretend to a much greater antiquity; the number of men with which the earth is at present inhabited; the late original of learning and all useful arts and sciences; the impossibility that universal deluges, or other accidents, should at certain long periods have oft-times destroyed far the greatest part of mankind, with the memory of all former actions and inventions, and yet never have happened to destroy them all; the changes that must necessarily fall out naturally in the earth in vast length of time, by the sinking and washing down of mountains, the consumption of water by plants, and innumerable other such like accidents; these (I say) and many more arguments, drawn from nature, reason, and observation, make that account of the time of the earth's formation exceedingly probable in itself, which from the revelation delivered in Scripture-history we believe to be certain.

* 1.353 5. That the same God who created all things by the word of his power, and upholds and preserves them by his continual concourse, does also by his all-wise providence perpetually govern and direct the issues and events of things; takes care of this lower world, and of all, even the smallest things that are therein; disposes things in a regular order and succession in every age, from the beginning of the world to its final period; and inspects, with a more particular and special regard, the moral actions of men: This, as it is far more expressly, clearly, and constantly taught in

Scripture than in any of the writings of the philosophers; so it is also highly agreeable to right and true reason: For, that an omnipresent and infinitely wise being cannot but know every thing that is done in every part of the universe, and with equal ease take notice of the minutest things as of the greatest; that an infinitely powerful being must needs govern and direct every thing in such manner, and to such ends, as he knows to be best and fittest in the whole; so far as is consistent with that liberty of will which he has made essential to all rational creatures; and that an infinitely just and good governor cannot but take more particular and exact notice of the moral actions of all his rational creatures, and how far they are conformable or not conformable to the rules he has set them; all this (I say) is most evidently agreeable to right reason, and as has been before shown, deducible from it.

6. That God, after the formation of the earth, created* 1.354 man at first upright and innocent, and placed him in a happy and paradisiacal state, where he enjoyed plenty and abundance of all things without labour or sorrow; and that sin was the original cause, that now on the contrary the very ground is cursed and* 1.355 barren for our sake, and in sorrow we eat of it all the days of our life, that thorns also and thistles are brought forth to us, and in the sweat of our face we eat bread, till we return unto the ground: This likewise is very reasonable and credible in itself, as appears, not only from the abstract consideration of the nature of the thing, but also from the general opinion that the ancient learnedest heathens entertained, upon very obscure and uncertain tradition, that the original state of man was innocent and simple, and the earth, whereon they dwelt, fruitful of itself, and abundant with all plenty;1 1.356 but that God, for the sin

of man, changed this happy constitution of things, and made labour necessary for the support of our lives.

* 1.357 7. That in process of time, after the first entrance of sin into the world, men by degrees corrupted themselves more and more, till at length God, for the punishment of their sin and incorrigibleness,1 1.358 brought upon them a general flood, which destroyed them all except a few persons, preserved for the restoration of the human race, is a truth delivered down to us, not only by authority of Scripture, but also by the concurrent testimony of almost all heathen philosophers and poets: And the histories of all nations backwards terminate in it; and, (which is the most remarkable thing of all, because it is a demonstrative and ocular proof of the universality of some such kind of dissolution,) the present visible frame and constitution of the earth throughout, the disposition and situation of the several strata of different kind of matter, whereof it is composed; the numberless shells of fishes, bones of other animals, and parts of all kinds of plants, which in every country and in almost every place are, at great variety of depths, found inclosed in earth, in clay, in stones, and in all sorts of matter; are such apparent demonstrations of the earth's having been in some former times, and perhaps more than once, (the whole surface of it at least) in a state of fluidity; that whosoever has seen the collections of this kind made by the very ingenious Dr Woodward and others, must in a manner abandon all use both of his senses and reason, if he can in the least doubt of this truth.

8. That God, after the flood, made particular revelation of himself and of his will to the patriarchs, is a thing very credible in itself, for the same reasons* 1.359 that I have before shown, in general, that the expectation of some revelation from God was a reasonable and probable expectation. And that, after this, God should vouchsafe, by express revelation, to give a law to the whole nation of the Jews, consisting very much in sacrifices, and in external rites and ceremonious observances, cannot with any just reason be rejected as an incredible fact; if we consider that such a kind of institution wasnecessary, in those times and circumstances, to preserve that nation from the idolatry and worship of false gods, wherewith the countries around them were overspread; that those rites and ceremonies were typical of, and preparative to, a higher and more excellent dispensation; that the Jews were continually told by their prophets, that their observance of those rites and ceremonies was by no means so highly acceptable to God, nor so absolutely and indispensably insisted upon by him, as obedience to the moral law; and that the whole matter of fact, relating to that revelation, is delivered down to us in a history, on which the policy of a whole nation was founded, at a time when nobody could be ignorant of the truth of the principal facts, and concerning which we can now have no more reason to doubt than of any history of any ancient matter of fact in the world. The most considerable and real difficulty, viz. Why this favour was granted to that single nation only, and not to all the rest of the world likewise, is to be accounted for by the same reasons which prove (as has been before shown) that God was not obliged to make known the revelation of the gospel to all men alike.

9. That all the other particulars of Scripture history* 1.360 contained in the Old Testament, are true relations of matter of fact, (not to insist now on the many arguments which prove in general the antiquity, genuineness, and authority of the books themselves,) will

to a rational inquirer appear very credible from hence, that very many of the particular histories, and some even of the minuter circumstances also of those histories, are confirmed by concurrent testimonies of profane and unquestionably unprejudiced authors: Of which Grotius, in his excellent book of the truth of the Christian religion,1 1.361 has given us a large collection: As particularly, that the manner of the formation of the earth out of a chaos is mentioned by the ancientest Phœnician, Egyptian, Indian and Greek historians; the very names of Adam and Eve, by Sanchuniathon and others; the longevity of the antediluvians, by Berosus and Manethos, and others; the ark of Noah, by Berosus; many particulars of the flood, by Ovid and others; the family of Noah, and two of every kind of animals entering into the ark with him, mentioned by Lucian himself, as a tradition of the ancient Grecians; the dove which Noah sent out of the ark, by Abydenus and Plutarch;2 1.362 the building of Babel, by Abydenus, the burning of Sodom, by Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, and Tacitus, and others; several particulars of the history of Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs, by Berosus and others; many particulars of Moses's life, by several ancient writers; the eminent piety of the most ancient Jews, by Strabo and Justin;3 1.363 divers actions of David and Solomon, in the Phœnician annals; some of the actions of Elijah, by Menander, and confessed by Julian himself; the history of Jonah, under the name of Hercules, by Lycophron and Æneas Gazæus; and the histories of the following times, by many more authors. Besides that (as learned men have upon exceeding probable

grounds supposed,1 1.364) many of the most ancient scripture-histories are acknowledged and asserted in the writings of the poets, both Greeks and Latins; the true histories being couched under fictitious names and fabulous representations.

10. That God, in the fulness of time, that is, at * 1.365 that time which his infinite wisdom had fore-appointed, which all the ancient prophecies had determined, and which many concurrent circumstances in the state of the Jewish religion, and in the disposition of the Roman empire, had made a fit season for the reception and propagation of a new institution of religion; that God (I say) at that time, should send his only-begotten son, that word or wisdom of the father, that divine person by whom (as has been before shown) he created the world, and by whom he made all former particular manifestations of himself unto men, that he should send him, to take upon him our human nature, and therein to make a full and particular revelation of the will of God to mankind (who by sin had corrupted themselves and forfeited the favour of God, so that by the bare light of nature they could not discover any certain means by which they could be satisfactorily and absolutely secure of regaining that favour;) to preach unto men repentance and remission of sin; and by giving himself a sacrifice and expiation for sin, to declare the acceptableness of repentance, and the certainty of pardon thereupon, in a method evidently consistent with all necessary vindication of the honour and authority of the divine laws, and with God's irreconcileable hatred against sin; to be a mediator and intercessor between God and man, to procure the particular assistance of God's holy spirit which might be in men a new and effectual principle of a heavenly and divine life; in a word, to be the Saviour and judge of mankind, and finally to bring them to eternal

life; all this, when clearly and expressly revealed, and by good testimony proved to be so revealed, is apparently agreeable and very credible to right and true reason. As (because it is the main and fundamental article of the Christain faith,) I shall endeavour to make out more largely and distinctly, by showing, in particular, that none of the several objections, upon which speculative unbelievers reject this doctrine, do at all prove any inconsistency in the belief of it, with sound and unprejudiced reason.

* 1.366 For, first, it cannot be thought unreasonable to be believed in the general, that God should make a revelation of his will to mankind, since, on the contrary, (as has been before proved at large,) it is very agreeable to the moral attributes of God, and to the notions and expectations of the wisest and most rational men that lived in the heathen world.

* 1.367 Secondly, it cannot be thought unreasonable to be believed, that in such a revelation, wherein God freely proclaims remission of sin, and the acceptableness of repentance, he should nevertheless have appointed such a sacrifice or expiation for sin, as might at the same time be a sufficient testimony of his irreconcilable hatred against it. For though, by the light of nature, it was indeed exceeding probable and to be hoped for that God would forgive sin upon true repentance, yet it could not be proved that he was absolutely obliged to do so, or that he would certainly do so. On the contrary, there was reason to suppose, that, in vindication of the honour and dignity of his laws, he would require some further satisfaction and expiation. And accordingly we find the custom of sacrificing to have prevailed universally over the heathen world in all ages; which, how unreasonable soever an expectation it was, to think that the blood of beasts could truly expiate sin, yet thus much it plainly and undeniably shows, that it has been the common apprehension of mankind, in all ages, that God would not be appeased, nor pardon sin, without some punishment and satisfaction; and

yet at the same time they had good hopes, that, upon the repentance of sinners, God would accept some other satisfaction instead of the destruction of the offenders. It is therefore plainly agreeable to right reason, to believe that God, in vindication of the honour of his laws, and for a testimony of his hatred against sin, should appoint some sacrifice or expiation for sin, at the same time that he forgives the sinner upon his true repentance.

Thirdly, It cannot be thought unreasonable to be* 1.368 believed, that a mediator or intercessor should be appointed between God and man, through and by whom the prayers of sinners may be offered up, so as to be acceptable in the sight of God. It is well known, the generality of the wisest heathens thought it agreeable to reason to make use of subordinate intelligences, demons or heroes, by whom they put up their prayers to the superior gods, hoping, that, by the mediation of those intercessors, the unworthiness of their own persons, and the defects of these prayers might be supplied, and they might obtain such merciful and gracious answers to their prayers as they could not presume to hope for upon their own account. Wherein though those pagans laboured indeed under very great uncertainty, in doing a thing for which they had no sufficient warrant, and in using mediators whom they neither knew distinctly to have any being, nor could they however have any good security that such mediation would be acceptable to the supreme God; yet, at the same time, this undeniably proves, that it is by no means inconsistent with right reason, to believe that a mediator may by divine authority be appointed between God and sinful men, to be their intercessor and advocate with a justly offended God.

Fourthly, The greatest real difficulty in this matter* 1.369, to the judgment of right reason, seems to arise from the consideration of the dignity of the person whom we believe to have given himself a sacrifice and propitiation for the sins of mankind, viz. how it

is possible, that the only-begotten son of God should be incarnate and become man; how it is conceivable that God should condescend so far as to send, and the son of God condescend willingly to be sent, and do such great things for his creatures; and, above all, how it is consistent with reason, to suppose God condescending to do so much for such frail and weak creatures as men, who, in all appearance seem to be but a very small, low, and inconsiderable part of the creation. And here indeed it must readily be acknowledged, that human reason could never have discovered such a method as this, for the reconciliation of sinners to an offended God without express revelation. But then neither, on the other side, when once this method is made known, is there any such difficulty or inconceivableness in it as can reasonably make a wise and considerate man call in question the truth of a well attested revelation, merely upon that account; which, indeed, any plain absurdity, or contradiction in the matter of a doctrine pretended to be revealed, would, it must be confessed, unavoidably do. For as to the possibility of the incarnation of the son of God, whatever mysteriousness there confessedly was in the manner of it, yet, as to the thing itself, there is evidently no more unreasonableness in believing the possibility of it, than in believing the union of our soul and body, or any other certain truth which we plainly see implies no contradiction in the thing itself, at the same time that we are sensible we cannot discover the manner how it is affected. Again, as to the incredibility of the doctrine, that God should make so great a condescension to his creatures, and that a person of such dignity as the only begotten son of God should vouchsafe to give himself a sacrifice for the sins of men: He that duly considers, how it is no diminution to the glory and greatness of the father of all things, to inspect, govern, and direct every thing by his all-wise providence through the whole creation; to take care even of the meanest of his creatures, so that not a sparrow

falls to the ground, or a hair of our head perishes, without his knowledge; and to observe exactly every particle, even of inanimate matter in the universe; he (I say) who duly considers this, cannot with reason think it any real disparagement to the son of God, (though it was indeed a most wonderful and amazing instance of humility and condescension,) that he should concern himself so far for sinful men as to appear in their nature to reveal the will of God more clearly to them, to give himself a sacrifice and expiation for their sins, and to bring them to repentance and eternal life. The greatest enemies and deriders of Christianity have asserted things, far more incredible, to have been done upon far less occasions; witness what Julian the apostate1 1.370 thought fit to believe concerning Æsculapius's coming down from heaven, and conversing upon earth in a visible form, only to teach men the art of healing diseases. And modern unbelievers, who seem willing, in the contrary extreme, to deny God's having any regard, or taking any care in any respect, for the welfare and happiness of his creatures, are forced, if they will go about to give any account or explication of things, to invent much more incredible hypotheses, dishonourable to God, and utterly inconsistent with his divine attributes. Indeed, if we will consider things impartially, so far is it from being truly any diminution of the greatness and glory of God, to send his son into the world for the redemption and salvation of mankind, that, on the contrary, it is a means of bringing the very greatest honour to the laws and government of God that can be imagined. For what can be imagined more honourable, and worthy of the supreme lord and governor of all things, than to show forth his mercy and goodness, in forgiving the sins of frail and fallible creatures, and suffering himself to be reconciled to them upon

their true repentance; and yet at the same time to cause such an expiation to be made for sin, by the sufferings and death of his own son, in their nature, as might be abundant evidences of his irreconcilable hatred against sin, a just vindication of the authority and dignity of his laws, and a sufficient and effectual warning to deter men from sin, to create in them the greatest dread and detestation of it, and for ever to terrify them from venturing upon wilful transgression and disobedience? It is true, no man can take upon him certainly to say, but God, by his absolute sovereignty and authority, might, if he had so pleased, have pardoned sin upon repentance, without any sacrifice or expiation at all. But this method of doing it by the death of Christ is more wise and fit, and evidently more proper and effectual to discountenance and prevent presumption, to discourage men from repeating their transgressions, to give them a deep sense of the heinous nature of sin, and to convince them of the excellency and importance of the laws of God, and the indispensable necessity of paying obedience to them; forasmuch as it shows us, that at the same time that God was willing to save the sinner, yet, lest encouragement should be given to sin by letting it go unpunished, he did not think fit to forgive the transgressions of men without great sufferings in our nature, and to put away the guilt of our sins but upon such difficult terms as the death of his own son. So that in this dispensation, justice, and mercy, and truth, are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other. And by how much the greater the dignity of the person was, who gave himself thus a sacrifice for the sins of men, of so much the greater weight and force is this argument to deter men for the future from sin, and to convince them of the necessity of obedience. Wherefore, so far is it from being true, that the consideration of the dignity of the person suffering is a real objection against the credibility of the doctrine, that, on the contrary, that very consideration contains

the highest vindication imaginable of the greatness, and honour, and authority of the laws of God, and at the same time the greatest possible instance or expression of his mercy and compassion towards men, agreeable to our natural notions of his divine attributes. And then, as to the last part of this difficulty, viz. how it can be consistent with reason, to suppose God condescending to do so very great things for such mean and weak creatures, as men are, who in all appearance seem to be but a very small, low, and inconsiderable part of the creation; forasmuch as the whole earth itself is but a little spot, that bears no proportion at all to the universe; and in all probability of reason, the large and numberless orbs of heaven cannot but be supposed to be filled with beings more capable than we to show forth the praise and glory of their Almighty Creator, and more worthy to be the objects of his care and love. To this part of the difficulty, I say, the answer is very easy: That the mercy and love of the infinitely good God is extended equally over all his works; that, let the universe be supposed as large, and the rational creatures, with which it is furnished, as many and excellent as any one can imagine; yet mankind is plainly the chief, indeed the only inhabitant for whose sake it is evident this our globe of earth was formed into a habitable world; and this our earth is, as far as we have any means of judging, as considerable and worthy of the divine care as most other parts of the system; and this our system as considerable as any other single system in the universe; and finally, that, in like manner as the same divine providence, which presides over the whole creation, does particularly govern and direct every thing in this our lower world, as well as in every other particular part of the universe; so there is no real difficulty to right reason, in conceiving that the same divine logos, the word or messenger of the father, who, in various dispensations, according to the particular needs and exigencies of mankind, has

made various manifestations of God, and discoveries of the divine will, to us here upon earth; may also, for ought we know, have to other beings, in other parts of the universe, according to their several capacities or wants, made different manifestations of God, and discoveries of his will, in ways of which we can know nothing, and in which we have no concern; there being nothing in this at all contrary to the nature of God, or the condition of things.

* 1.371 Fifthly, and lastly, if any one thinks it unreasonable to be believed, that God should send his Son into the world for the redemption of mankind, and yet that this appearance of the Son of God upon earth should not be till the later ages of the world; and after he has appeared, yet his appearance not be made known equally to all nations; such a one must likewise, for the same reason, affirm, that it is unreasonable to believe the necessity and obligations even of natural religion itself, because it is plain all men are not furnished equally with the same capacities and opportunities of understanding those obligations, and consequently no deist can, consistently with his own principles, make this objection against the truth of Christianity. He must likewise, for the same reason, affirm, that God is obliged in all other respects also to make all his creatures equal; to make men angels; to indue all men with the same faculties and capacities as any, at least to make all men capable of the very same kind and the same degree of happiness, and to afford to all of them all the very same means or opportunities of obtaining it: In a word, he must assert that infinite wisdom cannot reasonably be supposed to have a right of making variety of creatures in very various circumstances; which is an assertion palpably most absurd, in experience false, and a very unjust diminution of God's sovereignty in the world. But besides, though the redemption purchased by the Son of God is not indeed actually made known unto all men, yet as no man ever denied but that the benefit of the death of Christ extended

backwards to those who lived before his appearance in the world, so no man can prove but that the same benefit may likewise extend itself forwards to those who never heard of his appearance, though they lived after it.

11. That the history of the life of Christ, contained* 1.372 in the New Testament, is a true relation of matters of fact, (not to insist here on the testimony of his disciples and followers, which shall be considered hereafter in its proper place,) will to a rational inquirer appear very credible from hence, that very many particulars of that history are confirmed by concurrent testimonies of profane and unquestionably unprejudiced authors. That, before the coming of our Saviour, there was a general expectation spread over all the eastern nations, that out of Judea should arise a person, who should he governor of the world, is expressly affirmed by the Roman historians, Suetonius1 1.373 and Tacitus.2 1.374 That there lived in Judea, at the time which the Gospel relates, such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, is acknowledged by all authors, both Jewish and pagan, who have written since that time. The star that appeared at his birth, and the journey of the Chaldæan wise men, is mentioned by Chalcidius the Platonist.3 1.375 Herod's causing all the children in Bethlehem, under two years old to be slain, and a reflection made upon him on that occasion by the emperor Augustus, is related by Macrobius.4 1.376 Many of the miracles that Jesus worked in

his life-time are, as to matters of fact, (particularly, his healing the lame and the blind, and casting out devils,) expressly owned by the most implacable enemies of Christianity, by Celsus and Julian,1 1.377 and the authors of the Jewish Talmud. And how the power of the heathen gods ceased after the coming of Christ is acknowledged by Porphyry, who attributes it to their being angry at the setting up of the Christian religion, which he styles impious and profane. Many particulars of the collateral history, concerning John Baptist, and Herod, and Pilate, (not to mention the famous testimony concerning Jesus himself, because it is by some suspected not to be genuine, notwithstanding it is found in all the ancient copies,) are largely recorded by Josephus. The crucifixion of Christ under Pontius Pilate, is related by Tacitus;2 1.378 and divers of the most remarkable circumstances attending it, such as the earthquake and miraculous darkness, were recorded in the public Roman registers,3 1.379 commonly appealed to by the first Christian writers, as what could not be denied by the adversaries themselves. Then, as to the resurrection and ascension of Christ; these depend on the general proofs of the credibility of his disciples' testimony, and other following evidences, which will be considered hereafter in their proper place.

* 1.380 12. That God has appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness, by that person whom he has ordained, in order to reward every man according to his works; is a doctrine perfectly agreeable to right reason, and to our natural notions of the attributes of God; as may appear more particularly from what has been before said concerning

the necessity and certainty of another life after this; and is evident from the opinion of all the wiser heathens concerning this matter. Nor may it perhaps be altogether impertinent to observe here, that the poets, both Greek and Latin, have unanimously agreed in this one particular circumstance, that men after death should not have judgment passed upon them immediately by God himself, but by just men appointed for that purpose.

13. That, in order to this final judgment, not only* 1.381 the soul shall survive the dissolution of the body, but the body itself also shall be raised again; this doctrine, though not indeed discoverable with any kind of certainty by the bare light of nature, because the belief of the soul's immortality (for ought that appears to reason alone) is sufficient to answer all the purposes of a future state, as far as is discoverable merely by the light of nature; yet this doctrine (I say) of the resurrection of the body, when made known by revelation, evidently contains nothing in it in the least contrary to right reason: For, what reasonable man can deny but that it is plainly altogether as easy for God to raise the body again after death as to create and form it at first? Some of the Stoical philosophers seem to have thought it not only possible, but even probable:1 1.382 And many of the Jews, who had no express revelation concerning it, did yet believe it upon an ancient tradition, as appears from all their writings, and particularly from the translation in the last verse of the book of Job, which according to the Seventy runs thus: So Job died, being old and full of days, but it is written that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises up.2 1.383 The only real difficulty in this doctrine seems to arise upon putting the supposition of one body's being

turned into the nourishment, and becoming part of the substance of another, so as that the same parts may equally belong to two bodies, to both of which it shall nevertheless be absolutely impossible that the same parts should be restored. But this objection, as great and principal a difficulty as it is, is really but a great trifle. For there does not at all appear any absolute necessity, that, to constitute the same body, there must be an exact restitution of all and only the same parts. And if there was any such necessity; yet even still without making that hard supposition (which Grotius and others have done,1 1.384) that God by a miraculous providence always interposes to prevent the parts of one human body from incorporating with and becoming the nourishment of another, (for I cannot see any sufficient ground to deny, but that it may be possible in nature for barbarous cannibals, if any such there be, to subsist for some time and live wholly one upon another, if deprived of all other sustenance;) without any such hard suppositions as these (I say,) it is easy to imagine many ways by which the resurrection of the same body, properly speaking, shall nevertheless be very possible; and the whole foundation of this, and all other difficulties of this kind, concerning the parts, and forms, and magnitudes, and proportions of our future bodies, be entirely taken away.

* 1.385 As first, No man can say it is improbable, (and they who have been most and best versed in microscopical observations think it more than probable,) that the original stamina, which contain all and every one of the solid parts and vessels of the body, not excepting even the minutest nerves and fibres, are themselves the entire body, and that all the extraneous matter, which, coming in by way of nourishment, fills up and distends the minute and insensible vessels, of which all the visible and sensible vessels are composed, is not strictly and properly part of the body. Consequently, while all this extraneous matter, which

serves only to swell the body to its just magnitude, is in continual flux, the original stamina may continue unchanged, and so no confusion of bodies will be possible in nature. There may be made many very considerable observations, concerning the determinate figure into which every respective body unfolds itself by growth; concerning the impossibility of the body's extending itself, by any nourishment whatsoever, beyond that certain magnitude to which the original vessals are capable of being unfolded; and concerning the impossibility of restoring by any nourishment any the smallest vessel or solid part of the body that has at any time happened to be mutilated by any accident; all which observations, often and carefully made, will seem very much to favour some such speculation as this.

Secondly, It may also be supposed otherwise, not without good probability, that in like manner as in every grain of corn there is contained a minute insensible seminal principle,1 1.386 which is itself the entire future blade and ear, and in due season, when all the rest of the grain is corrupted, evolves and unfolds itself visibly into that form; so our present mortal and corruptible body may be but the exuviæ, as it were of some hidden and at present insensible principle, (possibly the present seat of the soul,) which at the resurrection shall discover itself in its proper form. This way also, there can be no confusion of bodies possible in nature. And it is not without some weight that the ancientest writers of the church have always made use of this very similitude; that the apostle St Paul himself alleges the same comparison; and that the Jewish writers seem to have had some obscure glimpse of this notion, when they talked of a certain

incorruptible part of the body; though these latter indeed explained themselves very weakly and unphilosophically.

Many other ways perhaps may be imagined, by which the same thing may be explained intelligibly. But these speculations are nice and subtile, and neither needful nor proper to be enlarged upon in this place. Only the bare mention of them shows the manifold possibility of the doctrine of the resurrection, against the objections of those who would have it seem contradictory.

* 1.387 14. Lastly, That after the resurrection and the general judgment, wherein every man shall be judged according to his works, they that have done well shall go into everlasting happiness, and they that have done evil, into everlasting punishment, is a doctrine in itself very credible, and reasonable to be believed. Concerning the everlasting happiness of the righteous there is no dispute, it being evident that God in his infinite bounty may reward the sincere obedience of his creatures, as much beyond the merit of their own weak and imperfect works, as he himself pleases. But the everlasting punishment threatened to the wicked has seemed to many a great difficulty; since it is certain, from our natural notions of the attributes of God, that no man shall be punished beyond the just demerit of his sins. Here, therefore, it is to be observed, first that no man can say, it is unreasonable that they who by wilful and stubborn disobedience to their almighty creator and most merciful benefactor, and by the habitual practice of unrepented wickedness, have, during the state of trial, made themselves unfit for the enjoyment of that happiness which God has prepared for them that love and obey him, should be eternally rejected, and excluded from it. Thus much, the wickedest of men are willing enough to believe: And if bare deprivation of happiness was all the punishment they had reason to fear, they would be well content to sit still in their wickedness. But is it at all agreeable to reason

to believe, that the punishment to be inflicted by the final wrath of a provoked God upon his most obstinate and incorrigible enemies, should be merely such a thing as is in its own nature less dreadful and terrible than even those afflictions which by certain experience we see in this present life fall sometimes upon such persons with whom God is not angry at all? Is it agreeable to reason to believe, that God, who (as is evident by experience) suffers the very best of his own servants, for the punishment of their sins, or even only for the trial of their virtue, to fall sometimes under all the calamities and miseries which it is possible for the cruellest and most powerful tyrants to invent and execute, should punish his most obstinately rebellious and finally impenitent creatures, with nothing more than the negation of happiness? There must, therefore, in the next place be some sensible and positive punishment, besides the mere negative loss of happiness. And whoever seriously considers the dreadful effects of God's anger in this present world, in the instance of the general deluge, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the amazing calamities which befel the whole Jewish nation at the destruction of Jerusalem, and other such like examples; in some of which cases, the judgments have fallen upon mixed multitudes of good men and bad together; (not to mention the calamities which sometimes befal even good men by themselves;) whosoever, I say, seriously considers all this, cannot but frame to himself very terrible apprehensions of the greatness of that punishment which the despised patience of God shall finally inflict on the impenitently wicked and incorrigible, when they shall be separated and be by themselves. And then, as to the duration of this punishment, no man can presume, in our present state of ignorance and darkness, to be able truly to judge, barely by the strength of his own natural reason, what in this respect is or is not consistent with the wisdom, and justice, and goodness of the supreme governor of the world, since we neither

know the place, nor kind, nor manner, nor circumstances, nor degrees, nor all the ends and uses of the final punishment of the wicked. Only this one thing we are certain of, that the justice of God will abundantly vindicate itself, and all mouths shall be stopped before him, and be forced to acknowledge the exact righteousness of all his judgments, and to condemn their own folly and wickedness; forasmuch as the degrees or intenseness of the punishment which shall be inflicted on the impenitent shall be exactly proportionate to their sins, as a recompense of their demerit, so that no man shall suffer more than he has deserved.1 1.388 This being once clearly established, the difficulty about the duration of the punishment will not appear so insuperable to right reason: For nothing can be more evident than that God may justly banish the wicked eternally from his kingdom of glory, and from that happiness which is his free and undeserved gift to the righteous; and the positive punishment which shall be inflicted upon them in that state of eternal rejection shall undoubtedly be such, and so proportioned to men's deserts, as the righteous judge will then make appear before men and angels, to be just, and wise, and necessary, and such only as becomes the infinitely wise and good lord and governor of the universe to inflict. The wisest of the heathen philosophers, without the help of revelation, have taught, and did believe it agreeable to right reason, that the punishment of the incorrigible should be [$gr$ιωνι$gr$ζ] without any determinate or known end;2 1.389 and we cannot tell how many wise designs God may serve thereby. We know not but

that as God has now discovered to us in some measure the fall and punishment of evil angels, to be a warning to us, so he may hereafter use the example of the punishment of wicked and incorrigible men, to be a means of preserving other beings in their obedience. And many other considerations there may possibly be, very necessary to enable us to judge rightly concerning this matter, which, in this present state, we have no sufficient means of coming to the knowledge of.

Thus, all the credenda, or doctrines, which the Christian religion teaches; (that is, not only those plain doctrines which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal salvation, but even all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truth;) are, in the first place, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare reason unassisted with revelation, yet, when discovered by revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound and unprejudiced reason.1 1.390

In the next place, every one of these doctrines has* 1.391 a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence to reform men's lives, and correct their manners. This is the great end and ultimate design of all true religion; and it is a very great and fatal mistake to think that any doctrine or any belief whatsoever can be any otherwise of any benefit to men, than as it is fitted to promote this main end. There was none of the doctrines of our Saviour, (as an excellent prelate of our church admirably expresses this matter2 1.392) calculated for the gratification of men's idle curiosities, the busying and amusing them with airy and useless speculations; much less were they intended for an exercise of our credulity, or a trial how far we could bring our reason to submit to our faith: But, as, on the one hand, they were plain and simple,

and such as by their agreeableness to the rational faculties of mankind, did highly recommend themselves to our belief; so, on the other hand, they had an immediate relation to practice, and were the genuine principles and foundation upon which all human and divine virtues were naturally to be superstructed. Particularly, what can be a more necessary and excellent foundation of true religion than that doctrine which the Christian religion clearly and distinctly teaches us, concerning the nature and attributes of the one only true God, without any of that ambiguity and doubtfulness, those various and inconsistent opinions and conjectures, those uncertain and oft-times false reasonings concerning the nature of God, which, notwithstanding the natural possibility of discovering very many of the attributes of God by the light of true reason, did yet in fact overspread the greatest part of the heathen world with polytheism or atheism? What can be so certain a preservative against idolatry, and the worship of false gods, as the doctrine, that the universe, the heavens, and the earth, and all things contained therein, are the creatures and workmanship of the one true God, and have a continual dependence upon him for the preservation of their being? What can be so sure a ground of true piety and reliance upon God, as the clear Christian doctrine concerning providence, concerning God's perpetually governing and directing the issues and events of all things, and inspecting with a more especial regard the moral actions of men? Which doctrine was perplexed by the philosophers with endless disputes. What can be so just a vindication of the goodness of God, and consequently so necessary in order to our maintaining in our minds worthy and honourable notions concerning him, as the doctrine that God created man at first upright, and that the original of all evil and misery is sin? The want of a clear knowledge of which truth extremely perplexed the heathen world, and made many recur to that most absurd fiction of a self-existent evil principle.

What can be a more proper motive to piety than the doctrine that the deluge and other remarkable calamities which have befallen mankind, were sent upon them by God's immediate direction, as punishments for their wickedness? What can be a greater encouragement to the practice of holiness, than the doctrine that God has at several times vouchsafed to make several particular revelations of his will to men, to instruct and support them more effectually in that practice? But above all, what doctrine could ever have been imagined so admirably fitted in all respects to promote all the ends of true religion, as that of the incarnation of the Son of God? Which way could men have been filled with so deep a sense of the mercy and love of God towards them, and have been instructed in all divine truths in a method so well accommodated to their present infirmities, as by God's sending his only-begotten Son, to take upon him our nature, and therein to make a general revelation of the will of God to mankind? How could the honour, and dignity, and authority of the laws of God have been so effectually vindicated, and at the same time so satisfactory an assurance of pardon upon true repentance have been given unto men, as by this method of the son of God giving himself a sacrifice and expiation for sin? What could have been a more glorious manifestation of the mercy and compassion of God, and at the same time a more powerful means to discountenance men's presumption, to discourage them from repeating their transgressions, to give them a deep sense of the heinous nature of sin, and of God's extreme hatred and utter irreconcilableness to it, and to convince them of the excellency and importance of the laws of God, and the indispensable necessity of paying obedience to them, than this expedient of saving sinners by the sufferings and death of the son of God, and by establishing with them a new and gracious covenant upon the merits of that satisfaction? How could men be better encouraged

to begin a religious life, than by having such a mediator, advocate, and intercessor for them with God, to obtain pardon of all their frailties, and by being assured of the assistance of the Spirit of God, to enable them to conquer all their corrupt affections, and to be in them an effectual principle of a heavenly and divine life? In fine, what stronger and more powerful motives could possibly have been contrived to persuade men to live virtuously, and to deter them from vice, than the clear discovery made to us in the gospel of God's having appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness, every man according to his works, and that they who have done well shall be adjudged to everlasting happiness, and they that have done evil to endless punishment; of which the light of nature afforded men but obscure glimpses? And may we not here, upon the whole, appeal now even to our adversaries themselves, whether, in all and every one of these doctrines, there be not a more powerful, a more effectual method laid down, for the reforming human nature, and obliging the whole world to forsake their sins, and to lead holy and virtuous lives, than was ever taught before; nay, or than was possible to have been contrived by all the wit of mankind? This is the great and highest recommendation of the Christian doctrine; this is what to a well disposed mind would well nigh satisfactorily prove, even without the addition of any external testimony, that the revelation of Christianity could not possibly but come from God, seeing that not only all its practical precepts, but even all its articles of belief also, tend plainly to this one and the same end, to make men universally amend and reform their lives, to recover and restore them to their original excellent state, from the corruption and misery which had been introduced by sin, and to establish upon earth the practice of everlasting righteousness, and entire and hearty obedience to the will of God; which would have been the religion of men (had they continued innocent) in paradise, and

now is the religion of angels, and for ever will be the religion of saints in heaven. Vain men may value themselves upon their speculative knowledge, right opinions, and true and orthodox belief, separate from the practice of virtue and righteousness; but as sure as the gospel is true, no belief whatsoever shall finally be of any advantage to men, any otherwise than only so far as it corrects their practice, hinders them from being workers of iniquity, and makes them like* 1.393 unto God.

Lastly, all the doctrines of the Christian faith do* 1.394 together make up an infinitely more consistent and rational scheme of belief than any that the wisest of the ancient philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern unbelievers can invent or contrive. This is evident from a summary view of the fore-mentioned scheme of the Christian doctrines, wherein every article has a just dependence on the foregoing ones, and a close connexion with those that follow; and the whole account of the order and disposition of things, from the original to the consummation of all things, is one entire, regular, complete, consistent, and every way a most rational scheme: Whereas the wisest of the ancient philosophers, that is, those of them who hit upon the greatest number of single truths, and taught the fewest absurdities, were yet never able to make out any universal, entire, and coherent system of doctrines,1 1.395 and scheme of the whole state of things, with any manner of probability: And the cunningest of modern deists, (besides that they must needs, in their own way, believe some particular things stranger, and in themselves more incredible, than any of the fore-mentioned Christian doctrines,) cannot, in the whole, as has been before shown, frame to themselves any fixed and settled principles upon which to argue consistently; but must unavoidably either be perplexed with inextricable absurdities, or confessedly

recur to downright atheism. There have indeed, even among Christians themselves, been many differences and disputes about particular doctrines: (But, excepting such as have intolerably corrupted the very fundamental doctrines, and even the main design itself of the whole Christian dispensation; of which there are too many instances in writers of the Romish church especially;) these disputes among Christians have not been, like those among the philosophers, de rerum summa, concerning the whole scheme and system of things, but only concerning particular explications of particular doctrines; which kind of disputes do not at all affect the certainty of the whole religion itself,1 1.396 nor ought in reason to be any manner of hindrance to the effect which the plain and weighter, and confessedly more important fundamental doctrines ought to have upon the hearts and lives of men.

Proposition XIV.

XIV. Fifthly, As this revelation, to the judgment of right and sober reason, appears of itself highly credible and probable, and abundantly recommends itself in its native simplicity, merely by its own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most rational and considering men, who are desirous in all their actions to have satisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the conscience of what they do: So it is moreover positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commission, by the exact completion both of the prophecies that went before concerning him, and of those that he himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after;

and by the testimony of his followers, which in all its circumstances was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence, that was ever given to any matter of fact in the world.

First, The Christian revelation is positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commission.

Besides the great excellency and reasonableness of* 1.397 the doctrine considered in itself, of which I have already treated, it is here of no small moment to observe, that the author of it (separate from all external proof of his divine commission) appeared in all his behaviour, words, and actions, to be neither an impostor nor an enthusiast.1 1.398 His life was innocent and spotless, spent entirely in serving the ends of holiness and charity, in doing good to the souls and bodies of men, in exhorting them to repentance, and inviting them to serve and glorify God. When his bitterest enemies accused him, in order to take away his life, they could not charge him with any appearance of vice or immorality. And so far was he from being guilty of what they did accuse him of, namely, of vain-glory and attempting to move sedition, that once, when the admiring people would by force have taken him and made him their king, he chose even to work a miracle to avoid that, which was the only thing that could be imagined to have been the design of an impostor. In like manner, whoever seriously considers the answers he gave to all questions whether moral or captious, his occasional discourses to his disciples, and more especially the wisdom and excellency of his sermon upon the mount, which is as it were the system and summary of his doctrine,

manifestly surpassing all the moral instructions of the most celebrated philosophers that ever lived; cannot, without the extremest malice and obstinacy in the world, charge him with enthusiasm.

* 1.399 These considerations cannot but add great weight and authority to his doctrine, and make his own testimony concerning himself exceedingly credible. But the positive and direct proof of his divine commission are the miracles which he worked for that purpose; his healing the sick,—his giving sight to the blind,—his casting out devils,—his raising the dead,—the wonders that attended his crucifixion,—his own resurrection from the dead,—his appearance afterwards to his disciples,—and his ascension visibly into heaven.

These, and the rest of his stupendous miracles, were, to the disciples that saw them, sensible demonstrations of our Lord's divine commission: And to those who have lived since that age, they are as certain demonstrations of the same truth, as the testimony of those first disciples, who were eye-witnesses of them, is certain and true.

To the disciples that saw them, these miracles were sensible and complete demonstrations of our Lord's divine commission, because they were so great, and so many, and so public, and so evident, that it was absolutely impossible they should be the effect of any art of man, of any chance, or fallacy; and the doctrine they were brought to confirm was of so good and holy a tendency, that it was impossible he should be enabled to work them by the power and assistance of evil spirits; so that, consequently, they must of necessity have been performed, either immediately or mediately by God himself.

* 1.400 But here, because there have been many questions raised, and some perplexity introduced by the disputes and different opinions of learned men, concerning the power of working miracles, and concerning the extent of the evidence which miracles give to the truth of any doctrine, and because it hath been much

controverted, whether true miracles can be worked by any less power than the immediate power of God; and whether, to complete the evidence of a miracle, the nature of the doctrine pretended to be proved thereby is requisite to be taken into the consideration or no; it may not perhaps be improper, upon this occasion, to endeavour to set this whole matter in its true light, as briefly and clearly as I can.

1st, then; In respect of the power of God, and in* 1.401 respect to the nature of the things themselves, absolutely speaking, all things that are possible at all, that is, which imply not a direct contradiction, are equally and alike easy to be done. The power of God extends equally to great things as to small, and to many as to few; and the one makes no more difficulty at all, or resistance to his will, than the other.

It is not therefore a right distinction to define or* 1.402 distinguish a miracle by any absolute difficulty in the nature of the thing itself to be done; as if the things we call natural were absolutely and in their own nature easier to be effected, than those that we look upon as miraculous; on the contrary, it is evident and undeniable, that it is at least as great an act of power to cause the sun or a planet to move at all, as to cause it to stand still at any time: Yet this latter we call a miracle; the former not. And to restore the dead to life, which is an instance of an extraordinary miracle, is in itself plainly altogether as easy as to dispose matter at first into such order as to form a human body in that which we commonly call a natural way. So that, absolutely speaking, in this strict and philosophical sense, either nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the power of God; or, if we regard our own power and understanding, then almost every thing, as well what we call natural, as what we call supernatural, is in this sense really miraculous; and it is only usualness or unusualness that makes the distinction.

* 1.403 2. What degrees of power God may reasonably be supposed to have communicated to created beings, to subordinate intelligences, to good or evil angels, is by no means possible for us to determine. Some things absolutely impossible for men to effect, it is evident may easily be within the natural powers of angels; and some things beyond the power of inferior angels may as easily be supposed to be within the natural power of others that are superior to them; and so on. So that, (unless we knew the limit of communicable and incommunicable power) we can hardly affirm, with any certainty, that any particular effect, how great or miraculous soever it may seem to us, is beyond the power of all created beings in the universe to have produced.

* 1.404 It is not therefore a right distinction to define a miracle (as some very learned and very pious men have done,) to be such an effect as could not have been produced by any less power than the divine omnipotence. There is no instance of any miracle in scripture, which, to an ordinary spectator, would necessarily imply the immediate operation of original, absolute, and underived power: And consequently such a spectator could never be certain that the miraculous effect was beyond the power of all created beings in the universe to produce. There is one supposition, indeed, upon which the opinion of all miracles being necessarily the immediate effects of the divine omnipotence, may be defended; and that is, if God, together with the natural powers wherewith he hath indued all subordinate intelligent beings, has likewise given a law, or restraint, whereby they be hindered from ever interposing in this lower world, to produce any of those effects which we call miraculous or supernatural: But then, how certain soever it is, that all created beings are under some particular laws and restraints, yet it can never be proved that they are under such restraints universally, perpetually, and without exception: And, without

this, a spectator that sees a miracle can never be certain that it was not done by some created intelligence. Reducing the natural power of created beings to as low a degree as any one can desire to suppose, will help nothing in this matter; for, supposing (which is very unreasonable to suppose) that the natural powers of the highest angels were no greater than the natural powers of men, yet, since thereby an angel would be enabled to do all that invisibly, which a man can do visibly, he would even in this supposition be naturally able to do numberless things which we should esteem the greatest of miracles.

3. All things that are done in the world are done* 1.405 either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will, of itself, always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is; so that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God's acting upon matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent beings: (Which observation, by the way, furnishes us, as has been before noted, with an excellent natural demonstration of Providence.) Consequently, there is no such thing as what men commonly call the course of nature, or the power of nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preserved. And if (as seems most probable,) this continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of created intelligences appointed to that purpose by the supreme Creator,

then it is as easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power, (by the permission of God,) to alter the course of nature at any time, or in any respect, as to preserve or continue it.

* 1.406 It is not therefore a right distinction to define a miracle to be that which is against the course of nature, meaning, by the course of nature, the power of nature or the natural powers of created agents; for, in this sense, it is no more against the course of nature for an angel to keep a man from sinking in the water, than for a man to hold a stone from falling in the air by overpowering the law of gravitation; and yet the one is a miracle, the other not so. In like manner, it is no more above the natural power of a created intelligence to stop the motion of the sun or of a planet, than to continue to carry it on in its usual course; and yet the former is a miracle, the latter not so: But, if by the course of nature, be meant only (as it truly signifies) the constant and uniform manner of God's acting, either immediately or mediately, in preserving and continuing the order of the world, then, in that sense, indeed, a miracle may be rightly defined to be an effect produced contrary to the usual course or order of nature, by the unusual interposition of some intelligent being superior to men, as I shall have occasion presently to observe more particularly.

* 1.407 And from this observation we may easily discover the vanity and unreasonableness of that obstinate prejudice which modern deists have universally taken up against the belief of miracles in general: They see that things generally go on in a constant and regular method; that the frame and order of the world is preserved by things being disposed and managed in an uniform manner; that certain causes produce certain effects in a continued succession according to certain fixed laws or rules; and from hence they conclude, very weakly and unphilosophically, that there are in matter certain necessary laws or powers, the result of which is that which they call the course

of nature, which they think is impossible to be changed or altered, and consequently, that there can be no such thing as miracles: Whereas, on the contrary, if they would consider things duly, they could not but see that dull and lifeless matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, or of being indued with any powers; and that, therefore, that order and disposition of things, which they vulgarly call the course of nature, cannot possibly be any thing else but the arbitrary will and pleasure of God exerting itself and acting upon matter continually, either immediately by itself, or mediately by some subordinate intelligent agents, according to certain rules of uniformity and proportion, fixed indeed, and constant, but which yet are made such merely by arbitrary constitution, not by any sort of necessity in the things themselves, as has been abundantly proved in my former discourse: And, consequently, it cannot be denied, but that it is altogether as easy to alter the course of nature as to preserve it; that is, that miracles, excepting only that they are more unusual, are in themselves, and in the nature and reason of the thing, as credible in all respects, and as easy to be believed, as any of those we call natural effects.

4. Those effects which are produced in the world* 1.408 regularly and constantly, which we call the works of nature, prove to us, in general, the being, the power, and the other attributes of God. Those effects, which upon any rare and extraordiary occasion, are produced in such manner that it is manifest they could neither have been done by any power or art of man, nor by what we call chance, that is, by any composition or result of those laws which are God's constant and uniform actings upon matter, these undeniably prove to us the immediate and occasional interposition either of God himself, or at least of some intelligent agent superior to men, at that particular time, and on that particular account. For instance, the regular and continued effects of the power of gravitation, and of the laws of motion; of the mechanic,

and of the animal powers; all these prove to us, in general, the being, the power, the presence, and the constant operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the world. But if, upon any particular occasion, we should see a stone suspended in the air, or a man walking upon the water, without any visible support, a chronical disease cured by a word speaking, or a dead and corrupted body restored to life in a moment; we could not then doubt but there was an extraordinary interposition either of God himself, in order to signify his pleasure upon that particular occasion, or at least of some intelligent agent far superior to man, in order to bring about some particular design.

* 1.409 5. Whether such an extraordinary interposition of some power superior to men be the immediate interposition of God himself, or of some good angel, or of some evil angel, can hardly be distinguished certainly, merely by the work or miracle itself; because it is impossible for us to know, with any certainty, either that the natural power of good angels, or of evil ones, extends not beyond such or such a certain limit, or that God always restrains them from exercising their natural powers in producing such or such particular effects.

* 1.410 It is not therefore a right distinction, to suppose the wonders which the scripture attributes to evil spirits, to be mere prœstigiœ, sleights, or delusions. For if the devil has any natural power of doing any thing at all, even but so much as the meanest of men, and be not restrained by God from exercising that natural power, it is evident he will be able, by reason of his invisibility, to work true and real miracles. Neither is it a right distinction to suppose the miracles of evil spirits not to be real effects in the things where they appear, but impositions upon the senses of the spectators; for, to impose in this manner upon the senses of men, (not by sleights and delusions, but by really so affecting the organs of sense as to make things appear what they are not;) is to all intents

and purposes a true a miracle, and as great an one, as making real changes in the things themselves.

6. When therefore, upon any particular occasion,* 1.411 for instance, when at the will of a person who teaches some new doctrine as coming from God, and in testimony to the truth of that doctrine, there is plainly and manifestly an interposition of some superior power producing such miraculous effects as have been before mentioned; the only possible ways by which a spectator may certainly and infallibly distinguish whether those miracles be indeed the works, either immediately of God himself, or (which is the very same thing,) of some good angel employed by him, and, consequently, the doctrine witnessed by the miracles be infallibly true and divinely attested; or whether, on the contrary, the miracles be the works of evil spirits, and consequently the doctrine a fraud and imposition upon men: The only possible ways (I say) of distinguishing this matter certainly and infallibly, are these:—If the doctrine attested by miracles be in itself impious, or manifestly tending to promote vice, then, without all question, the miracles, how great soever they may appear to us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by his commission; because our natural knowledge of the attributes of God, and of the necessary difference between good and evil, is greatly of more force to prove any such doctrine to be false than any miracles in the world can be to prove it true: As, for example, suppose a man, pretending to be a prophet, should work any miracle, or give any sign or wonder whatsoever, in order to draw men from the worship of the true God, and tempt them to idolatry, and to the practice of such vices as in all heathen nations have usually attended the worship of false Gods, nothing can be more infallibly certain, than that such miracles ought at first sight to be rejected as diabolical. If the* 1.412 doctrine attested by miracles be in itself indifferent, that is, such as cannot by the light of nature and

right reason alone, be certainly known whether it be true or false; and, at the same time, in opposition to it, and in proof of the direct contrary doctrine, there be worked other miracles, more and greater than the former, or at least attended with such circumstances as evidently show the power by which these latter are worked to be superior to the power that worked the former; then that doctrine which is attested by the superior power must necessarily be believed to be divine: This was the case of Moses and the Egyptian magicians. The magicians worked several miracles to prove that Moses was an impostor, and not sent of God; Moses, to prove his divine commission, worked miracles more and greater than theirs, or else (which is the very same thing,) the power by which he worked his miracles restrained the power by which they worked theirs, from being able at that time to work all the same miracles that he did; and so appeared evidently the superior power: Wherefore, it was necessarily to be believed that Moses's commission was truly from God. If, in the last place, the doctrine attested by miracles be such as, in its own nature and consequences, tends to promote the honour and glory of God and the practice of universal righteousness amongst men, and yet, nevertheless, be not in itself demonstrable, nor could, without revelation, have been discovered to be actually true, (or even if it was but only indifferent in itself, and such as could not be proved to be any way contrary to or inconsistent with these great ends,) and there be no pretence of more or greater miracles on the opposite side to contradict it; (which is the case of the doctrine and miracles of Christ;) then the miracles are unquestionably divine, and the doctrine must, without all controversy, be acknowledged as an immediate and infallible revelation from God: Because, * 1.413 (besides that it cannot be supposed that evil spirits would overthrow their own power and kingdom,) should God, in such cases as these, permit evil spirits to work miracles to impose upon men, the error

would be absolutely invincible; and that would, in all respects, be the very same thing as if God worked the miracles to deceive men himself. No man can doubt but evil spirits, if they have any natural powers at all, have power to destroy men's bodies and lives, and to bring upon men innumerable other calamities; which yet, in fact, it is evident God restrains them from doing, by having set them laws and bounds which they cannot pass. Now, for the very same reason, it is infinitely certain that God restrains them likewise from imposing upon men's minds and understandings, in all such cases where wise, and honest, and virtuous men would have no possible way left by which they could discover the imposition.

And here at last the difference between those who* 1.414 believe that all miracles necessarily require the immediate power of God himself to effect them, and those who believe created spirits able to work miracles, is not very great. They who believe all miracles to be effected only by the immediate power of God, must do it upon this ground, that they suppose God, by a perpetual law, restrains all subordinate intelligent agents from interposing at any time to alter the regular course of things in this lower world; (for, to say that created spirits have not otherwise a natural power, when unrestrained, to do what we call miracles, is saying that those invisible agents have no power naturally to do any thing at all.) And they who believe that subordinate beings have power to work miracles must yet of necessity suppose that God restrains them in all such cases at least where there would not be sufficient marks left, by which the frauds of evil spirits could be clearly distinguished from the testimony and commission of God.

And now, from these few clear and undeniablo propositions, it evidently follows;—

1st. That the true definition of a miracle, in the* 1.415 theological sense of the word, is this—that it is a

work effected in a manner unusual or different from the common and regular method of providence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of some intelligent agent superior to man, for the proof or evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation to the authority of some particular person. And if a miracle so worked be not opposed by some plainly superior power; nor be brought to attest a doctrine either contradictory in itself, or vicious in its consequences, (a doctrine of which kind no miracles in the world can be sufficient to prove;) then the doctrine so attested must necessarily be looked upon as divine, and the worker of the miracle entertained as having infallibly a commission from God.

* 1.416 2. From hence it appears, that the complete demonstration of our Saviour's being a teacher sent from God, was, to the disciples who saw his miracles, plainly this: That the doctrine he taught, being in itself possible, and in its consequences tending to promote the honour of God and true righteousness among men; and the miracles he worked being such that there neither was nor could be any pretence of more or greater miracles to be set up in opposition to them,—it was as infallibly certain that he had truly a divine commission as it was certain that God would not himself impose upon men a necessary and invincible error.

* 1.417 3. From hence it appears, how little reason there is to object, as some have done, that we prove in a circle the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. For the miracles, in this way of reasoning, are not at all proved by the doctrine; but only the possibility and the good tendency, or at least the indifferency of the doctrine, is a necessary condition or circumstance, without which the doctrine is not capable of being proved by any miracles. It is indeed the miracles only that prove the doctrine, and not the doctrine that proves the miracles; but then, in order to this end, that the miracles may

prove the doctrine, it is always necessarily to be first supposed that the doctrine be such as is in its nature capable of being proved by miracles. The doctrine must be in itself possible and capable to be proved, and then miracles will prove it to be actually and certainly true. The doctrine is not first known, or supposed to be true, and then the miracles proved by it; but the doctrine must be first known to be such as is possible to be true, and then miracles will prove that it actually is so. Some doctrines are, in their own nature, necessarily and demonstrably true, such as are all those which concern the obligation of plain moral precepts; and these neither need nor can receive any stronger proof from miracles than what they have already (though not perhaps so clearly indeed to all capacities,) from the evidence of right reason. Other doctrines are in their own nature necessarily false and impossible to be true; such as are all absurdities and contradictions, and all doctrines that tend to promote vice; and these can never receive any degree of proof from all the miracles in the world. Lastly, other doctrines are in their own nature indifferent, or possible, or perhaps probable to be true; and these could not have been known to be positively true, but by the evidence of miracles, which prove them to be certain. To apply this to the doctrine and miracles of Christ. The moral part of our Saviour's doctrine would have appeared infallibly true, whether he had ever worked any miracles or no. The rest of his doctrine was what evidently tended to promote the honour of God, and the practice of righteousness amongst men: Therefore that part also of his doctrine was possible and very probable to be true; but yet it could not from thence be known to be certainly true, nor ought to have been received as a revelation from God, unless it had been proved by undeniable miracles. And the miracles he worked did indeed undeniably prove it to be the doctrine of God. Nevertheless, had his doctrine in any part of it been either absurd and

contradictory in itself, or vicious in its tendency and consequences, no miracles could then possibly have proved it to have been true. It is evident therefore that the nature of the doctrine to be proved must be taken into the consideration, as a necessary circumstance; and yet that only the miracles are properly the proof of the doctrine, and not the doctrine of the miracles.

* 1.418 4. From hence it follows, that the pretended miracles of Apollonius Tyaneus, Aristeas Proconnesius, and some few others among the heathens, even supposing them to have been true miracles, (which yet there is no reason at all to believe, because they are very poorly attested, and are in themselves very mean and trifling, as has been fully shown by Eusebius in his book against Hierocles, and by many late writers; but supposing them, I say, to have been true miracles,) yet they will prove nothing at all to the disadvantage of Christianity: Because they were worked either without any pretence of confirming any new doctrine at all; or else to prove absurd and foolish things; or to establish idolatry and the worship of false Gods; and consequently they could not be done by the divine power and authority, nor bear any kind of comparison with the miracles of Christ,1 1.419 which were worked to attest a doctrine that tended in the highest degree to promote the honour of God and the general reformation of mankind.

To return therefore to the argument. The miracles

(I say) which our Saviour worked were, to the disciples that saw them, sensible demonstration of his divine commission. And to those who have lived since that age they are as certain demonstrations of the same truth as the testimony of those first disciples, who were eye-witnesses of them, is certain and true: Which I shall have occasion to consider presently.

Secondly. The proof of the divine authority of the* 1.420 Christian revelation is confirmed and ascertained, by the exact completion both of all those prophecies that went before concerning our Lord, and of those that he himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after.

Concerning the Messiah it was foretold, (Gen. xlix.* 1.421 10.) that he should come, before the sceptre departed from Judah: And accordingly Christ appeared a little before the time when the Jewish government was totally destroyed by the Romans. It was foretold that he should come before the destruction of the second temple, (Hagg. ii. 7.) The desire of all nations shall come, and I will fill this house with glory, saith the Lord of hosts; the glory of this latter house shall be greater than of the former: And accordingly Christ appeared some time before the destruction of the city and temple. It was foretold that he should come at the end of 490 years, after the restoring of Jerusalem which had been laid waste during the captivity, (Dan. ix. 24.) and that he should be cut off; and that, after that, the city and sanctuary should be destroyed and made desolate: And accordingly, at what time soever the beginning of the four hundred and ninety years can, according to any interpretation of the words, be fixed, the end of them will fall about the time of Christ's appearing, and it is well known how entirely the city and sanctuary were destroyed some years after his being cut off. It was foretold that he should do many great and beneficial miracles; that the eyes of the blind (Isa. xxxv. 5.) should be opened, and

the ears of the deaf unstopped; that the lame man should leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing;—and this was literally fulfilled in the miracles of Christ,—the blind received their sight, and the lame walked, the deaf heard, &c. (Matt. xi. 5.) It was foretold that he should die a violent death, (Isai. liii. throughout,) and that not for himself, (Dan. ix. 26.) but for our transgressions, (Isai. liii. 5, 6, and 12.) for the iniquity of us all, and that he might bear the sin of many;—all which was exactly accomplished in the sufferings of Christ. It was foretold, (Gen. xlix. 10.) that to him should the gathering of the people be, and (Psal. ii. 8.) that God would give him the heathen for his inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for his possession;—which was punctually fulfilled by the wonderful success of the gospel, and its universal spreading through the world. Lastly, many minuter circumstances were foretold of the Messiah,—that he should be of the tribe of Judah, and of the seed of David, that he should be born in the town of Bethlehem, (Mic. v. 2.) that he should ride upon an ass in humble triumph into the city of Jerusalem, (Zech. ix. 9.) that he should be sold for thirty pieces of silver, (Zech. xi. 12.) that he should be scourged, buffeted, and spit upon, (Is. l. 6.) that his hands and feet should be pierced, (Psal. xxii. 16.) that he should be numbered among malefactors, (Is. liii. 12.) that he should have gall and vinegar offered him to drink, (Psal. lxix. 21.) that they who saw him crucified, should mock at him, and at his trusting in God to deliver him, (Psal. xxii. 8.) that the soldiers should cast lots for his garments, (Psal. xxii. 18.) that he should make his grave with the rich, (Is. liii. 9.) and that he should rise again without seeing corruption, (Psal. xvi. 10.) All which circumstances were fulfilled to the greatest possible exactness, in the person of Christ: Not to mention the numberless typical representations which had likewise evidently their complete accomplishment in him. And it is

no less evident, that none of these prophecies can possibly be applied to any other person that ever pretended to be the Messiah.

Further, the prophecies or predictions which Christ* 1.422 delivered himself, concerning things that were to happen after, are no less strong proofs of the truth and divine authority of his doctrine, than the prophecies were which went before concerning him. He did very particularly, and at several times, foretel his own death, and the circumstances of it, (Matt. xvi. 21.) that the chief priests and scribes should condemn him to death and deliver him to the Gentiles, that is to Pilate and the Roman soldiers, to mock, and scourge, and crucify him, (Matt. xx. 18 and 19.) that he should be betrayed into their hands, (Matt. xx. 18.) that Judas Iscariot was the person who would betray him, (Matt. xxvi. 23.) that all his disciples would forsake him and flee, (Matt. xxvi. 31.) that Peter particularly would thrice deny him in one night; (Mar. xiv. 30.) he foretold further, that he would rise again the third day, (Matt. xvi. 21.) that, after his ascension, he would send down the Holy Ghost upon hi sapostles, (John xv. 26.) which should enable them to work many miracles: (Mar. xvi. 17.) he foretold also the destruction of Jerusalem, with such very particular circumstances, in the whole 24th chapter of St Matthew, and the 13th of St Mark and 21st of St Luke, that no man who reads Josephus's history of that dreadful and unparalleled calamity,1 1.423 can without the greatest obstinacy imaginable,

doubt of our Saviour's divine fore-knowledge. Lastly, he foretold likewise many particulars concerning the future success of the gospel, and what should happen to several of his disciples; he foretold what opposition and persecution they should meet withal in their preaching; (Matt. x. 17.) he foretold what particular kind of death St Peter should die; (Job xxi. 18.) and hinted, that St John should live till after the destruction of Jerusalem; (Job, xxi. 22.) and foretold, that, notwithstanding all opposition and persecutions, the gospel should yet have such success as to spread itself over the world; (Matt. xvi. 18. xxiv. 14. xxviii. 19.) all and every one of which particulars were exactly accomplished, without failing in any respects.

Some of these things are of permanent and visible effects, even unto this day; particularly the captivity and dispersion of the Jews through all nations, for more than 1600 years; and yet their continuing a distinct people, in order to the fulfilling the prophecies of things still future: This (I say) is particularly a permanent proof of the truth of the ancient prophecies: But the greatest part of the instances above mentioned were sensible and ocular demonstrations of the truth of our Lord's doctrine only to those persons who lived at the time when they happened: The credibility of whose testimony, therefore, shall be considered presently in its proper place.

* 1.424 But before I proceed to this, it may not be improper in this place to take notice of some objections which have of late been revived and urged against this whole notion, both of the prophecies themselves, and of the application of them to Christ. The sum and strength of which objections is briefly this.

That all the promises supposed to be made to the Jews before Christ's time, of a Messiah, or deliverer, were understood and meant of some "temporal deliverer" only, who should restore to the Israelites a mere worldly kingdom, "without the least imagination of a spiritual deliverance," or of any such Saviour as is preached in the New Testament.

That, consequently, "all the prophecies" in the Old Testament, applied to Christ by the apostles in the New, are applied to him in a sense merely "typical, mystical, allegorical, or enigmatical;" in a sense "different from the obvious and literal sense," by "new interpretations put upon them not agreeable to the obvious and literal meaning of those books" from whence they are cited: That is to say, that the prophecies were all of them intended concerning other persons, and other persons only; and, therefore, are falsely and groundlessly applied either to Christ in particular, or in general to the expectation of any such Messiah as should introduce a spiritual and eternal kingdom.

That there are several passages, cited by the apostles out of the Old Testament, which are either not found there at all, or else are very different in the text itself from the citations alleged; and consequently, are, by the apostles, either misunderstood or misapplied.

That even miracles themselves "can never render a foundation valid, which is in itself invalid;—can never make a false inference true;—can never make a prophecy fulfilled, which is not fulfilled;"—can never make those things to be spoken concerning Christ, which were not spoken concerning Christ: And, consequently, that the miracles said to have been worked by Christ could not possibly have been really worked by him; but must, of necessity, together with the whole system, both of the Old and New Testament, have been wholly the effect of imagination and enthusiasm, if not of imposture.

Now, in order to enable every careful and sincere reader to find a satisfactory answer to these, and all other objections of the like nature, I would lay before him the following considerations.

1. I suppose it to have been already proved in the foregoing part of this discourse, that there is a God, and that the nature and circumstances of men, and the necessary perfections of God, do demonstrate the

obligations and the motives of natural religion; that is, that God is a moral as well as natural governor of the world. Whoever denies either of these assertions is obliged to invalidate the arguments alleged for proof of them in the former part of this book, before he has any right to intermix atheistical arguments and objections in the present question: It being evidently ridiculous in all who believe not that God is, and that he is a moral judge as well as natural governor, to argue at all about a revelation concerning religion, or to make any inquiry whether it be from God or no.

2. As God has in fact made known even demonstrable truths,1 1.425 natural and moral truths, not to all men equally, but in different degrees and proportions to such as have a disposition and desire to inquire after them; so it is agreeable to reason and to the analogy of God's proceedings, to believe that he may possibly, by revelation and tradition, have given some further degrees of light to such as are sincerely desirous to know and obey him; so that they who will do his will may know of the doctrine whether it be of God: As our natural knowledge of moral and religious truths in fact is, so revelation possibly may further be, as it were a light shining in a dark place.

3. It appears in history, that the great truths and obligations of natural religion have, from the beginning, been confirmed by a perpetual tradition in particular families, who, though in the midst of idolatrous nations, yet stedfastly adhered to the worship of the God of nature, the one God of the universe. And by the nation of the Jews (notwithstanding all their corruptions in practice, yet in the system and constitution of their religion) has the same tradition been continually preserved: Whereby they have been as it were a city upon a hill, a standng testimony against an idolatrous world.

4. Among the writings of all, even the most ancient and learned nations, there are none but the books of the Jews, which (agreeably to the above demonstrated truths concerning the God of nature, and the foundations of natural religion,) have, exclusive of chance and of necessity, ascribed either the original of the universe in general (an universe full of infinite variety and choice,) to the will and operation of an intelligent and free cause, or given any tolerable account, in particular, of the formation of this our earth into its present habitable state.

5. But in these books there is not only (in order to prevent idolatry) a full account (agreeable to the principles of natural reason,) how the heavens, and the earth, and all things therein contained, are the creatures of God, but, moreover, an uniform series of history from the infancy of mankind, consistent with itself, and with the state of the Jewish and Christian church at this day, and with the possibilities of the predicted series for the future, for several thousands of years. Which consistency with the possibilities of such predicted future events could not be by chance (as I shall show presently,) but is itself a great and standing miracle.

6. In these books, agreeably to the hopes and expectations naturally founded on the divine perfections, God did from the beginning make, and has all along continued to his church or true worshippers, a promise that truth and virtue shall finally prevail; should prevail over the spirit of error and wickedness, of delusion and disobedience: That the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head: (Gen. iii. 15.) That among her posterity should arise a deliverance from the delusion and power of sin, by which Satan should be bruised under their feet: (Rom. xvi. 20.) That, in particular, from the seed of Abra ham, and from the family of Isaac, and from the posterity of Jacob, and from the house of David, should arise the accomplishment of all God's promises to his church, and all the blessings included in God's covenant with his true worshippers. That at length the earth should be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the

waters cover the sea, (Is. xi. 9.) that the kingdoms of this world should become the kingdoms of the Lord: (Rev. xi. 15. Dan. vii. 27.) That in the last days, unto the mountain of the Lord's house, the seat of his true worship, should all nations flow; (Is. ii. 2.) That God would create new heavens and a new earth; (Is. lxv. 17.) wherein dwelleth righteousness; (2 Pet. iii. 13.) wherein the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land for ever: (Is. lx. 21. lxv. 25. xi. 9. 1. 26.) Should be all holy; (Is. iv. 8.) even every one that is written among the living.1 1.426 That God would set up a kingdom, which should never be destroyed, but stand for ever; (Dan. ii. 44.) and that the saints of the Most High should take the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever, (Dan. vii. 18, 22, 27. Is. chap. lx.)

7. All the great promises, therefore, which God has ever made to his church, to his people, to the families or nations of his true worshippers, are evidently to be all along so understood as that wicked and unworthy persons, of whatever family, or nation, or profession of religion they be, shall be excluded from the benefit of those promises, shall be cut off from God's people; and worthy persons of all nations, from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, shall be accepted in their stead. That is to say; in like manner as the promise was made originally, not to all the children of Abraham, but to Isaac only, and not to both the sons of Isaac, but to Jacob only; and among the posterity of Jacob, all were not Israel which were of Israel, but in Elijah's days, seven thousand only were the true Israel; and in the time of Isaiah, though the number of the children of Israel was as the sand of the sea, (Is. x. 22.) yet a remnant only was to be saved, (Rom. ix. 27.); and in Hosea God says, I will call them my people which werenot my people, and her beloved

which was not beloved, (Hos. ii. 23. Rom. ix. 25.) So it is all along evidently to be understood, that the children of the promise, in the literal sense, according to the flesh, the visible church, or professed worshippers of the true God, are but the type or representative of the real invisible church of God, the (Rom. ii. 28. iii. 7 and 9. iv. 12.) true children of Abraham, in the spiritual and religious sense, the saints of the Most High, who shall possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever, (Dan. vii. 18.) even every one that is written among the living. (Is. iv. 3.)

8. It being evident that God cannot be the God of the dead, but of the living; and that all promises made to such worshippers of the true God as at any time forsook all that they had, and even life itself, for the sake of that worship, could be nothing but mere mockery if there was no life to come and God had no power to restore them from the dead: This (I say) being self-evident, it follows necessarily, that when the time comes that the promised kingdom shall take place, the dead must be raised, and the saints, which have died in the intermediate time, must live again, and stand in their lot at the end of the days, (Dan. xii. 13.) When God styles himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; (Exod. iii. 6, 16.) and said to Abraham, I am thy exceeding great reward, (Gen. xv. 1.) and I will—be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, (Gen. xvii. 7.) and I will give the land unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, (Gen. xvii. 8, 13, 15, 17.) and repeated the very same promises to Isaac, (Gen. xxvi. 3.) and to Jacob personally, (Gen. xxviii. 13.) as well as to their posterity after them; (Deut. i. 8.) and yet gave Abraham none inheritance in the land, though he promised that he would give it to him and to his seed after him, (Acts vii. 5.) but Abraham himself sojourned only in the land of promise as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise, (Heb. xi. 9.) who all confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims

on the earth, (Heb. xi. 13.) and Jacob particularly complained that the days of the years of his pilgrimage had been few and evil; (Gen. xlvii. 9.) and, in blessing Isaac and Ishmael, God promised to make Ishmael fruitful, and to multiply him exceedingly, (Gen. xvii. 20. xxi. 18.) so that he should beget twelve princes, and God would make him a great nation, and multiply his seed exceedingly, that it should not be numbered for multitude; (Gen. xvi. 10.) and yet in the very same sentence expressly, by way of opposition, and of high and eminent distinction, declares that, notwithstanding all this, yet his covenant, his everlasting covenant, he would establish with Isaac: (Gen. xvii. 19, 21.) When all this (I say) is considered, the inference of the apostle to the Hebrews cannot but appear unanswerably just, that these patriarchs looked for a city somewhat more than temporal, even a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God; (Heb. xi. 10.) and that they who said such things declared plainly that they sought a country, a better country, that is, an heavenly; (Heb. xi. 14, 16.) and that for this reason God was not ashamed to be called their God, because he had prepared for them a city. And if this inference was necessarily true concerning the patriarchs, who confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth; (Heb. xi. 13.) much more concerning those who were tortured, not accepting deliverance, (Heb. xi. 35.) must it needs be true that the only possible reason of this their choice was that they might obtain a better resurrection.

Other notices in the Old Testament, that the worshippers of the true God, in every age of the world, should at the end have their lot in the kingdom promised to the saints of the Most High, are, the translation of Enoch, (Gen. v. 24.) that he should not see death; (Heb. xi. 5. Wisd. iv. 10. Eccles. xliv. 16. xlix. 14.) and the taking up of Elijah into Heaven, (2 Kings ii. 11, Eccles. xlviii. 9. 1 Macc. ii. 58.) Allusions to it at least, if perhaps not direct assertions,

are the words of Job, (Job xix. 25.) I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: And though after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God.1 1.427 And those of Isaiah: Thy dead men shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise. A wake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead. (Is. xxvi. 19.) And your bones shall flourish like an herb. (Is. lxvi. 14.) And that passage in Hosea: I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. (Hos. xiii. 14.) O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction. And that in Ezekiel: Behold,—the bones came together, bone to his bone; and — the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin covered them above; — and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up upon their feet;— Behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of your graves, and bring you into the land of Israel. (Ezek. xxxvii. 7, 8, 10, 12.) Again: The words of Isaiah; The righteous perisheth, and — is taken away from the evil to come; He shall enter into peace: (Is. lvii. 1, 2.) What more natural signification have they than that which the Book of Wisdom expresses, ch. iii. 1. 3. The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God; —They are in peace. And what but the future state can the conclusion of Isaiah's prophecy reasonably be referred to? Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth;—As the new heavens and the new earth which I will make shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain.

And— all flesh shall come to worship before me, saith the Lord. And they shall go forth and look upon the carcases of the men that have transgressed against me: For their worm shall not die; neither shall their fire be quenched, and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh, (Is. lxv. 17. lxvi. 22, 23, 24.) In like manner; Whom does God speak of by Ezekiel, when he says, the sons of (Ezek. xliv. 15, 16.) Zadock, that kept the charge of my sanctuary, when the children of Israel went astray from me;1 1.428 [which went not astray when the children of Israel went astray, (Ezek. xlviii. 11.)]—they shall enter into my sanctuary. And to what do the following words of the same prophet most naturally refer?2 1.429 Every thing shall live whither the river cometh:—And by the river, upon the bank thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all trees for meat, whose leaf shall not fade; neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed: It shall bring forth new fruit according to his months, because their waters they issued out of the sanctuary; and the fruit thereof shall be for meat, and the leaf thereof for medicine. Still more strong is that allusion in Daniel; I beheld till the thrones were cast down, [till the thrones were placed,] and the ancient of days did sit:—A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him; thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him: The judgment was set, and the books were opened. (Dan. vii. 9. 10.) But the following words of the same prophet are direct and express. Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, [every one that shall be found written in the book,] and some to shame and everlasting contempt.

And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever.—But go thou thy way, till the end be; for thou shalt rest, and shalt stand in thy lot at the end of the days; (Dan. xii 2, 3, 13.) Can any one, who considers these texts, with any truth or reason affirm that all the promises supposed to be made to the Jews before Christ's time were meant of some "temporal" deliverance only, "without the least imagination of a spiritual deliverance?"

9. There are in the Old Testament many intimations, and some direct predictions, that all the great promises of God, made to his true worshippers, shall receive their final accomplishment by means of a particular person, anointed of God for that purpose; who, after the reduction of all adversaries, shall set up the everlasting kingdom. The seed of Abraham, in which all the nations of the earth were to be blessed, (and, in like manner, the seed of the woman, which was to bruise the serpent's head,) might originally, with equal propriety, and in as reasonable and natural a sense of the words, be understood to signify (what St. Paul afterward asserts it did signify,1 1.430) in the singular sense, a particular person, as, in the plural sense, a number of persons. The Shiloh which was to come, and to whom the gathering of the people was to be, (Gen. xlix. 10.) (the promise laid up in store, τ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$χε$gr$μενα $gr$υτ$gr$, as the LXX render it,) by its opposition in the text to the terms sceptre and lawgiver, most naturally signifies a single person who was to reign; and, by the gradation in the words of the text, somewhat of superior dignity to that of a sceptre and a lawgiver. The words of Balaam:—(Num. xxiv. 17, 19.) I shall see him, but not now; I shall behold him, but not nigh: There shall

come a star out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel;—out of Jacob shall come he that shall have dominion;—are words so put in his mouth, as most properly and obviously to describe a much greater person than perhaps he thought of, a much greater person than one who should smite the corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth. Again; that the words of Moses:—(Deut. xviii. 15.) The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee, like unto me, unto him shall ye hearken;—were not meant barely of Joshua, or of "a succession of prophets," but of one who should have as eminent a legislative authority as Moses, may reasonably be gathered from the occasion of their being spoken, not merely by Moses, upon a general reliance and trust that God would provide him a successor, but by God himself, upon the people's desiring in Horeb,—saying, Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, neither let me see this great fire any more, that I die not: Then the Lord said, They have well spoken:—I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I command him: And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him. (Deut. xviii. 16, 17, 18, 19.)—And that the words were anciently, long before the application of them by the writers of the New Testament, thus understood, and not concerning Joshua, or a succession of prophets, appears from those additional words at the conclusion of the book of Deuteronomy:—(Deut. xxxiv. 9, 10.) Joshua, the son of Nun, was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his hands upon him—But there arose not a prophet since in Israel, like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face.—The prediction of Isaiah is still clearer:—(Is. ix. 6, 7.) Unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and

his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace:1 1.431 Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever: The zeal of the Lord of Hosts will perform this. Again:—(Is. xi. 1, 3, 6, 9.) There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse.—He shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears: But with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the earth; and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.—The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, &c.—They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. And (Is. xlii. 1, 3, 4.—Matt. xii. 17.) Behold my servant,—mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have put my spirit upon him:—A bruised reed shall he not break:—He shall bring forth judgment unto truth:—till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law. The prophet Jeremiah no less plainly:—(Jer. xxiii. 5, 6.—xxxiii. 15, 16.) I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth:—And this is his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. And Ezekiel:—(Ezek. xxxiv. 23, 25.—xxxvii. 22, 23, 24, 25.—Hos. iii. 5.) I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, even my servant David;—And I will make with them a covenant of peace, &c.—One king shall be king to them all;—neither shall they defile themselves any more with their idols;—

and they all shall have one shepherd; they shall also walk in my judgments,—and my servant David shall be their prince for ever. By Haggai is the same predicted:—(Hagg. ii. 6, 7.—Heb. xii. 26.) Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth,—And the desire of all nations shall come.1 1.432 And by Zechary:—(Zech. ix. 9, 10.—Matt. xxi. 5.) Behold, thy king cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt, the foal of an ass:—He shall speak peace unto the heathen; and his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth. And by Malachi;—(Mal. iii. 1.) The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple; even the messenger of the covenant. But most expressly of all by Daniel:—(Dan. vii. 13, 14.) I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him:2 1.433 And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom; that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him: His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away; and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed. And the anointing of the Holy One, this prophet calls (Dan. ix. 24.) the sealing up of the vision and prophecy, and the finishing of transgression, and the making an end of sins, and the making reconciliation for iniquity, and the bringing in ever-lasting righteousness. [Do all these things denote nothing but "temporal" deliverance, "without the

least imagination of a spiritual deliverance?"] And in the words next following, he is styled, by name, Messiah. (Dan. ix. 25.) Know, therefore, [$word$ know also] and understand, that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks.1 1.434

10. Concerning this Messiah, in the setting up of whose kingdom all the promises of God terminate, it is clearly predicted in the Old Testament that he should arise particularly from the tribe of Judah, from the family of David, and in the town of Bethlehem.

The first of these particulars is expressed in those emphatical words of Jacob:—(Gen. xlix. 8, 10.) Judah, thou art he whom thy brethren shall praise,— thy father's children shall bow down before thee:— The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a law-giver from between his feet, until Shiloh come, [LXX, $gr$ωζ $gr$ν $gr$λ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$Χε$gr$μενα $gr$υτ$gr$, till the accomplishment of the promises which God has laid up in store for him,] and unto him shall the gathering of the people be. To which the writer of the Chronicles seems to refer, when he says:—(Chr. v. 1, 2.) The genealogy is not to be reckoned after the birth-right; for Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him came the chief ruler, [Heb. and from him was it prophesied the ruler should arise.] And the Psalmist,—(Ps. lx. 7. cviii. 8.) Judah is my lawgiver.

The second is expressed in that promise to David, —(2 Sam. vii. 16.) thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee, [LXX, $gr$ν$gr$πι$gr$ν μ$gr$υ, before me;] thy throne shall be established for ever. Which words might, indeed, of themselves be understood concerning a succession of kings in the house of David: But that God had a further and a greater

meaning in them, he very clearly explains by the following prophets. By Isaiah:—(Is. xi. 1, &c. compare Rev. iii. 7. v. 5. xxii. 16.) there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and then follows through the whole chapter a glorious description of an everlasting kingdom of righteousness, over both Jews and Gentiles. By Jeremiah;—(Jer. xxiii. 5.) I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth:—And this is his name whereby he shall be called, the Lord our righteousness. By Ezekiel;—(Ezek. xxvii. 23, 24, 25, 26.) they shall be my people, and I will be their God; and David my servant shall be king over them, and they all shall have one shepherd;—and my servant David shall be their prince for ever; Moreover I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant. And by Hosea:—(Hos. iii. 4.) The children of Israel shall abide many days without a king and without a prince, and without a sacrifice:—Afterward shall the children of Israel return and seek the Lord their God, and David their king, and shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days.

The third particular is expressed in those words of Micah:—(Micah, v. 2. Mat. i. 6.) But thou Bethlehem Euphratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me, that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting. After the passages now cited out of the foregoing prophets, what can be more jejune than to understand these words of Micah concerning Zorobabel only as having been of an ancient family?

11. In the books of the Old Testament it is expressly predicted, that the kingdom of the Messiah should extend not over the Jews only, but also over the Gentiles. The (Gen. xii. 3. xviii. 18. xxii. 18. xxvi. 4. xxviii. 14.) promise made to Abraham, and so often repeated to him, and to Isaac, and to Jacob, that

in their seed should all the nations of the earth be blessed, is thus opened and explained by the prophets.—(Is. xi. 10.) There shall be a root of Jesse, which shall stand for an ensign of the people; to it shall the Gentiles seek, and his rest shall be glorious.—(Is. xlii. 1, 6. Matt. xii. 18.) Behold my servant—in whom my soul delighteth,—he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles;—I will—give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles. (Is. xlix. 6.) It is a light thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth. (Is. lvi. 6, 7, 8.—John x. 16.) Also the sons of the stranger, that join themselves to the Lord,—even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and—mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people. The Lord God, which gathereth the outcasts of Israel, saith, yet will I gather others to him, besides those that are gathered unto him. (Ezek. xlvii. 22.) The strangers that sojourn among you,—shall have an inheritance with you among the tribes of Israel. (Mal. i. 11.) From the rising of the sun, even unto the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering; for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts.

12. Concerning the same Messiah, of whom so great things are spoken, and whose kingdom is to be an everlasting kingdom, it is still expressly predicted by the prophets that he should suffer and be cut off. Concerning the very same person, who (with respect to his coming to reign, and to introduce the everlasting jubilee or rest to the people of God, (Heb. iv. 9. σα$gr$ατισμ$gr$ζ.) is styled Messiah the prince; (Dan. ix. 25.) concerning the very same person, I say, it is in the very same sentence expressly predicted that he should be cut off, but not for himself, (Dan. ix. 26.) [Heb. and the people should

not then be his; unto him should not then the gathering of the people be. (Gen. xlix. 10.)] For which reason, and also because the words can with no tolerable sense be applied to any other person, and because moreover the connexion of the whole prophecy leads to the same interpretation; the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah likewise is most justly understood to be spoken of the Messiah: There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse; (Isa. xi. 1.)—with righteousness shall he judge the poor: (Isa. xi. 4.)—Behold my servant—mine elect in whom my soul delighteth;—he shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street; a bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench; he shall bring forth judgment unto truth. (Isa. xlii. 1, 2, 3.—Behold, my servant shall deal prudently; (Is. lii. 13.) Surely he hath born our griefs;—he was wounded for our transgressions; he was bruised for our iniquities:—He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth: He was taken from prison and from judgment, and who shall declare his generation?—For the transgression of my people was he stricken; and he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death:—When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin;—my righteous servant shall justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities:—He was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors. (Is. liii. 4, &c.)

13. All prophecies of blessings to the worshippers of the true God, expressed either as being to happen in the latter days, or in words which imply a lasting duration, are in reason to be understood as having reference to the times of the promised kingdom of the Messiah, of whom it is expressly said, that he shall bring in everlasting righteousness, (Dan. ix. 24.) and that his dominion is an everlasting dominion which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed. (Dan. vii. 14.) Some

prophecies of this kind are direct and express. Others, beginning with promises of particular intermediate blessings, and proceeding with general expressions more great and lofty than can naturally be applied to the temporal blessing immediately spoken of, are most reasonably understood to have a perpetual view and regard to that great and general event, in which all God's promises to his true worshippers do centre and terminate, and of which all intermediate blessings promised by God are justly looked upon as beginnings, types, pledges, or earnests.

14. For since, from the express prophecies before cited, of the Messiah's everlasting kingdom of righteousness, it appears that God had in fact a view to that, as the great and general end of all the dispensations of providence towards his true worshippers from the beginning; and no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation, (2 Pet. i. 20.) (that is, the meaning of prophecies is not what perhaps the prophet himself might imagine in his private judgment of the state of things then present,) because the prophecy in old time came not by the will of man, but holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; there may, therefore, very possibly, and very reasonably, be supposed to be many prophecies, which, though they may have a prior and immediate reference to some nearer event, yet, by the spirit of God, (whom those prophecies which are express show to have had a further view,) may have been directed to be uttered in such words, as may even more properly and more justly be applied to the great event which providence had in view, than to the intermediate event which God designed as only a pledge or earnest of the other: For instance; suppose these words of Daniel,—I beheld till the thrones were cast down, [till the thrones were placed,] and the ancient of days did sit:—A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him; thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him; the judgment was set, and the books were opened: (Dan.

vii. 9, 10.) Suppose (I say) these words were spoken concerning the slaying of a wild beast, or the destruction of a temporal empire, (ver. 11.) yet what reasonable man, who had ever elsewhere met with any notices of a judgment to come, could doubt but the destruction there spoken of was therefore expressed in those words, that it might be understood to be the introduction to the general judgment? The exact and very particular description of a resurrection, in the 37th of Ezekiel, supposing it to be indeed spoken of a temporal restoration of the Jews, yet who can doubt but it was so worded with design to allude to a real resurrection of the dead? The words of Micah: Thou, Bethlehem, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me, that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting: (Micah, v. 2. Mat. ii. 6.) Supposing it possible they could be spoken of Zorobabel, yet, if afterwards there should arise out of Bethlehem one in whom were found all the other prophetic characters of the promised Messiah, who could doubt but the words were intended either solely, or at least chiefly, of the latter? The words of Jeremiah: (Jer. i. 7.—vi. 5.) Babylon hath been a golden cup;—the nations have drunken of her wine, therefore the nations are mad: Flee out of the midst of Babylon,—be not cut off in her iniquity:—My people, go ye out of the midst of her, and deliver ye every man his soul from the fierce anger of the Lord. Who, that considers the nature and character of the Babylon in Jeremiah's time, and compares it with the nature and character of the Babylon described by St John, can doubt but the spirit which influenced Jeremiah foresaw and intended to allude to that Babylon which had (Rev. xvii. 4.) a golden cup in her hand full of abominations, (ver. 2.) and the inhabiters of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication, (ch. xviii. 3, 4.) and the kings of the earth have committed fornication with her:—Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues: For the

words of Jeremiah are more strictly applicable to this latter Babylon than to that in his own time. Again; The words of Isaiah:—(Is. vii. 14.—Matt. i. 23.) Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son, and shall call his name Immanuel, that is to say, God with us. Supposing Isaiah himself could possibly at that time understand them concerning a son of his own, concerning a son to be born of a young woman afterwards, who at the time then present was a virgin; and that his being styled Immanuel meant nothing more than that, before this child was grown up, Judah should be delivered from the then threatened incursions of Israel and Syria; (all which, notwithstanding the seeming connexion of the words in the place they stand, is very difficult to suppose;) yet, if afterwards any person, comparing the solemn introduction wherewith the words are brought in, "Hear ye now, O house of David; is it a small thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also? therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; behold a virgin shall conceive," &c. If any one, I say, comparing this solemn introduction with the promises repeated to the house of David in other passages of the prophets, that there should be born unto them a Son who should (Is. ix. 7.—Ezek. xxxvii. 25.) sit upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom for ever, and of the increase of whose government and peace there should be no end;—and considering, moreover, the character of this promised Son, that he should (Dan. ix. 24.) finish transgression, and make an end of sins, and make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in everlasting righteousness: If a person, considering and comparing these things, should in his own days find a son really born of a virgin, attested to by numerous miracles, and by God's command named Jesus, (which is synonymous to immanuel, a potent Saviour or God with us,) because he (Matt. i. 21.) should save his people from their sins, that is, should (Dan. ix. 24.) make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in everlasting righteousness;

Could such a person possibly entertain the least doubt, whether God, who sent Isaiah to repeat the fore cited words to the house of David, did not intend thereby to describe, if not wholly and solely, at least chiefly and ultimately, this latter saviour? In like manner; suppose those great promises to David, (2 Sam. vii. 13, 14, 16.) concerning the establishment of the throne of his Son for ever, were by David, and the prophet himself that delivered them, understood (τ$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$α $gr$πιλ$gr$σει, as St. Peter speaks,) concerning Solomon, and a succession of kings in his family; yet, when following prophecies clearly and expressly declared, that out of the root of Jesse should arise a Messiah who should reign for ever, no reasonable man can doubt, but that the former and less clear prophecy was likewise intended of God, and therefore rightly applied by the apostles of Christ to the same purpose? To give but one instance more: Suppose the words, (Ps. xvi. 10.) Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thy Holy One to see corruption, were by David spoken concerning himself, (which, however, can by no way be proved,) yet who, that (Acts. ii. 30.) knew David himself to be a prophet, and that had compared the other prophecies concerning the (Is. xi. 1, &c.) branch out of the roots of Jesse, the (Ezek. xxxvii. 24.) one shepherd of Israel, even God's (ver. 25.) servant David who should be their prince for ever, and yet was to be (Dan. ix. 26.—Is. liii. tot.) cut off before he should reign for ever; and that had himself seen (as St. Peter did) and actually conversed with Christ risen from the dead; who, (I say) in these circumstances, could possibly doubt but that (2 Sam. xxiii. 2.) the spirit of the Lord which spake by David intended the fore-mentioned words should be understood of, and applied to Christ? And the like may be said concerning some other prophecies which are vulgarly supposed to be applied typically to Christ.

15. It is not agreeable to reason, or to the analogy of Scripture, to suppose that the Jews, before our Saviour's

time, could have a clear and distinct understanding of the full meaning, even of the express prophecies, much less of those which were more obscure and indirect; when both were intended to be only as it were a light shining in a dark place.1 1.435 But thus much is evident, that the Jews, both before and in our Saviour's time, had from these prophecies a general expectation of a Messiah,2 1.436 and that this Messiah was to be, not merely a "temporal" deliverer, but $word$, Pater futuri seculi, the head of the future state, as well as of the present. Nor does it at all appear that our Lord's disciples, when they (Luke, xxiv. 21.) thought he would have redeemed Israel, or when they (Acts, i. 6.) asked if he would at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel, I say, it does not at all appear that they expected merely a "temporal" kingdom, but their error was in expecting a present kingdom; and therefore our Lord's answer to them, is not concerning the nature but the time of the kingdom. And the modern Jews, at this day, who to be sure have entertained no prejudicate notions from the New Testament writer's interpretation or application of prophecies, have (I think) still an universal expectation, that the Messiah shall be their prince in the future state as well as in the present.

16. When Jesus Christ, by (John x. 25.) the works which he did in his father's name, and (John v. 36.) which his father gave him to finish, had proved himself to be sent of God; (which truth the apostles likewise confirmed by their testimony, by their works, and by laying down their lives, not for their opinions, which possibly erroneous and enthusiastic persons may sometimes sincerely do, but in attestation to

facts of their own knowledge) and it appeared, moreover, that there was wanting in him no circumstance, no sine qua non, no character, appropriated by any of the ancient prophets to the promised Messiah, he had then a clear right to apply to himself all the prophecies, which either directly spoke of the Messiah, or which, through any intermediate events, pointed at him, and were applicable to him.

17. The application of this latter sort of prophecies to Christ is not allegorical. It is not an allegorical application, much less an allegorical argument or reasoning. But they are applied to him, as being really and intentionally, in the view of providence, the end and complete accomplishment of that, whereof the intermediate blessing was a pledge or beginning.

18. The application of this latter sort of prophecies to Christ, was never by reasonable men urged as being itself a proof that Jesus was the true Messiah. Nay, the application of the most direct and express prophecies whatsoever, (unless when the characters be so particular as not to be at all compatible to different persons, or the marks of time be very definite and exact,) has not of itself the nature of a direct or positive proof, but can only be a sine qua non, an application of certain marks or characters, without which noperson could be the promised Messiah. Many men were of the seed of Abraham, and of the tribe of Judah, and of the family of David, and born in Bethlehem of Judea, and suffered, and were cut of; and yet neither any nor all of these characters could prove any man to be the promised Messiah, but the want of any one of them would prove that any man was not he. The proof of Jesus being the Christ were (John v. 36.) the works which his father gave him to finish. The application of direct and express prophecies to him is nothing but such a congruity of marks or characters as removes all objections by which an adversary would endeavour to prove that it was not he. Ought not Christ (Luke, xxiv. 26.) to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory, is not

proving from his sufferings, that Jesus was the Christ; but removing the objection, by which some were apt to infer from his sufferings that he could not possibly be the Christ. The application of indirect prophecies to him is only a giving of further light from the analogy and conformity of the Old Testament to the New, by way of illustration and confirmation, to such as have been before convinced by the direct proofs. The proof, therefore, of the truth of Christianity does not stand upon the application of prophecies; but the works by which Christ proved himself to be sent of God gave him a right to apply to himself the prophecies concerning the Messiah; and the marks or characters of the promised Messiah, given by the prophets, were so many tests by which his claim was to be tried. "Miracles," indeed, "can never render a foundation valid, which is in itself invalid; can never make a false inference true; can never make a prophecy fulfilled, which is not fulfilled; can never mark out a Messias, or Jesus for the Messias, if both are not marked out in the Old Testament:" But miracles can give a man a just and undeniable claim to be received as the promised Messiah, if the prophetic characters of the Messiah be applicable to him: And this it is by which Jesus was proved to be the Christ.

19. From what has been said concerning the application of indirect prophecies, it is easy to observe the nature and use of types and figures, and allegorical manner of speaking; that these were much less intended to be ever alleged for proofs of the truth of a doctrine; and yet, in their proper place, may afford very great light and assistance towards the right understanding of it: An instance or two will make this matter obvious. There is a very remarkable passage in the epistle to the Galatians, where the apostle himself styles the thing he is speaking of, an (Gal. iv. 24.) allegory; that is, he draws an argument, a simile. The allegory, or similitude, he makes use of is not alleged by him as a "proof" of the truth of the doctrine

he is asserting, but as a proof of the falseness and groundlessness of a particular objection urged by the unbelieving Jews against it: The doctrine the apostle asserts (both in the epistle to the Romans and in this to the Galatians,) is, that Christians of the Gentiles, who imitate the faith and obedience of Abraham, (being circumcised with the circumcision—of Christ, Col. ii. 11.) are equally capable of being admitted to the benefit of God's promises to his people, as the Jews of the literal circumcision, who were lineally descended from that patriarch. In opposition to this, the Jews alleged, that since to the Israelites confessedly (Rom. ix. 4.) pertained the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; since theirs, confessedly, were the fathers or patriarchs, to whom all the promises of God were originally made, it could not possibly be true, nor consistent with the promises of God made to their fathers, that these Israelites, who had been all along the peculiar people or church of God, should at last be rejected for not receiving the gospel; and that believers from among the Gentiles of all nations should be received in their stead. Now, in reply to this objection, the apostle argues with the greatest justness and strength, from the analogy of a like case acknowledged by themselves, in which the reason of the thing was the same, even from the analogy of God's method and manner of proceeding in the giving of those very original promises to the patriarchs, upon which this prejudice of the Jews was founded. (Gal. iv. 21. &c.) Tell me, says he, ye that desire to be under the law, do ye not hear the law? That is, will ye not attend to the analogy of God's method of proceeding, in those very promises on which ye depend? For it is written, that Abraham had two sons, the one by a bond-maid, the other by a free woman: But he who was of the bond-woman, was born after the flesh; but he of the free woman, was by promise: Which things are an allegory, &c. That is to say, even originally,

the promise was not made to all the children of Abraham, but to Isaac only, which was, from the beginning, a very plain declaration that God did not principally intend his promise to take place in (Rom. ix. 8.) Abraham's descendants according to the flesh, but in those who, by a faith or fidelity like his, were in a truer and higher sense the children and followers of that Great Father of the faithful. In like manner, and for the same reason, the promise was not made (Rom. ix. 10.) to both the sons of Isaac, but to Jacob only; and, among the posterity of Jacob, all (Rom. ix. 6.) were not Israel, which were of Israel. What ye (Gal. iv. 21.) yourselves, therefore, saith St. Paul, who are so desirous to be under the Mosaic law, cannot but acknowledge to have been originally and always true, the same is true (ver. 29.) now. What was true concerning the two sons of Abraham, and likewise concerning the two sons of Isaac, who were the patriarchs with whom God's covenant was originally made, is, by continuance of the same analogy, true concerning the covenant established with the families, and with the nation of the Jews, descended from those patriarchs; it is true concerning the church of God through all successive ages; it is true concerning the (Gal. iv. 25.) Jerusalem which now is, and concerning that which is to come. As (ver. 22.) Abraham had two sons, the one by a bond-maid, the other by a free woman: And as (ver. 30.) the son of the bond-maid, though, according to the flesh, no less truly his natural descendant than the other, yet was not to be co-heir with him, who, by the promise of God, was appointed to inherit: So, says the apostle, the (ver. 25. 26.) Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children, the visible earthly church, which received the external ceremonial law from Mount Sina, is not, by that outward general denomination, entitled to the eternal favour of God: But the Jerusalem which is above, which is the mother of us all, of all who, by true faith and sincere obedience are pleasing to God; this heavenly Jerusalem,

this spiritual invisible church or city of the living God it is, to which all the promises of God, made in all ages to his church, are, in reality, originally and finally appropriated.

From this remarkable instance, it is well worth observing, by the way, that when the apostles are supposed to argue with the Jews ad hominem, the meaning is, that arguments alleged by the apostles to the Jews in particular, differ from arguments brought to the Gentiles, in this; not that they were at any time arguments drawn from things acknowledged by the Jews, and in themselves otherwise inconclusive; but that they were drawn, justly and strongly, from things well known among the Jews, though what the Gentiles were strangers to.

The correspondences of types and antetypes, though they are not themselves proper proofs of the truth of a doctrine, yet they may be very reasonable confirmations of the foreknowledge of God; of the uniform view of providence under different dispensations; of the analogy, harmony, and agreement between the Old Testament and the New. The words in the law, concerning one particular kind of death, (Deut. xxi. 23.) He that is hanged is accursed of God, can hardly be conceived to have been put in upon any other account than with a view and foresight to the application made of it by St. Paul. (Gal. iii. 13.) The analogies between the (Exod. xii. 22. 46. John i. 29. xix. 36. Rev. i. 5.) Paschal Lamb, and the Lamb of God slain from the foundation of the world; between the Egyptian bondage and the tyranny of sin; between the (1 Cor. x. 1, 2.) baptism of the Israelites in the sea and in the cloud, and the baptism of Christians; between the (Heb. iii. 15.-9. iv. 1, 2, 3. 1 Cor. x. 1-11.) passage through the wilderness, and through the present world; between (Heb. iv. 8.9.) Jesus [Joshua] bringing the people into the promised land, and Jesus Christ being the captain of salvation to believers; between the Sabbath of rest (Heb. iv. 5. ix. 1.) promised to the people of God in the earthly Canaan, and the eternal rest promised in

the heavenly Canaan; between the (Numb. xxxv. 25. 28.) liberty granted from the time of the death of the High Priest, to him that had fled into a city of refuge, and the redemption purchased by the death of Christ; between the (Heb. ix. 25.) High Priest entering into the holy place every year with blood of others, and Christ's (Heb. iv. 12, 24, 26.) once entering with his own blood into heaven itself, to appear in the presence of God for us; these (I say) and innumerable other analogies, between the (Col. ii. 17.) shadows of things to come, the (Heb. x. i.) shadows of good things to come, the (Heb. viii. 5.) shadows of heavenly things, the (Heb. ix. 9.) figures for the time then present, the (Heb. ix. 23.) patterns of things in the heavens, and (Heb. ix. 2.) the heavenly things themselves; cannot, without the force of strong prejudice, be conceived to have happened by mere chance, without any foresight or design. There are no such analogies, much less such series of analogies, found in the books of mere enthusiastic writers, much less of enthusiastic writers living in such remote ages from each other. It is much more credible and reasonable to suppose, (what St. Paul affirms,) that (1 Cor. x. 6.) these things were our examples; and that, in the uniform course of God's government of the world, (Ver. 11.) all these things happened unto them of old for ensamples, and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come. And hence arises that aptness of similitude, in the application of several legal performances to the morality of the gospel, that it can very hardly be supposed not to have been originally intended. As (1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 8.) know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us. Therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

Again; (Phil. iii. 3.) we are the circumcision, which worship God in the spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus; and have no confidence in the flesh. And (Col. ii, 13, 11.) you being dead in your sins, and in the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath God quickened together with Christ:—In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh, by [the Christian, the spiritual circumcision,] the circumcision of Christ. And (1 Cor. ix. 13, 14, 8, 9, 10. 1 Tim. v. 18.) do ye not know that they which—wait at the altar, are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel.—Say I these things as a man? or saith not the law the same also? for it is written in the law of Moses, thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes?

Some applications of texts out of the Old Testament are mere allusions; that is, nothing more is intended to be affirmed than that the words spoken in the Old Testament are as truly and as justly applicable to the present occasion as they were to that upon which they were originally spoken. Of this kind I think is that of St. Matthew:—(Matt. iii. 17.—Jer. xxxi. 15.) Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremiah the prophet, saying, in Rama there was a voice heard, lamentation and weeping, and great mourning; Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted, because they are not. Thus likewise St. Paul:—(2 Cor. viii. 13, 14, 15.) I mean not that other men be eased, and you burdened; but by an equality; as it is written he that had gathered much, had nothing over; and he that had gathered little, had no lack. Again:—(Is. vi. 9.) What Isaiah says of the Jews, (supposing he did not speak there prophetically, though the solemnity of the introduction makes it much more reasonable to believe he did: But, supposing he spake of the Jews in his own

time,) Go and tell this people, hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye, indeed, but perceive not; make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert and be healed: was (Matt. xiii. 14.) fulfilled, was verified, was equally true, equally applicable to the Jews, in our Saviour's days. Of the same kind seems to be (Matt. viii. 17.) St. Matthew's explication of that passage in (Is. liii. 4.) Isaiah; Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows. The sense of the words in the prophecy is what St. Peter expresses:—(1 Pet. ii. 24.) Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree. And the Apostle to the Hebrews:—(Heb. ix. 28.) Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many. Yet St. Matthew says:—(Matt. viii. 16, 17.) He healed all that were sick, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses. His meaning is, Christ healed diseases in such a manner, that even in that sense also the words of Isaiah were literally verified. To give but one instance more; (Matt. xiii. 34, 35.) All these things, (saith the evangelist) spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables,—that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables, I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world: That is, the words (Ps. lxxviii. 2.) of the psalmist were as properly, as truly, and as justly applicable to the things which our Lord spoke, as to the occasion upon which they were originally spoken by the psalmist.

To such as are accustomed only to modern languages, and understand not the nature of the Hebrew and Syriac speech, it may seem very surprising, that, in the (Matt. viii. 17.—xiii. 35.) two last-mentioned passages, the citations are introduced with these words, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken

by the prophet, saying, &c. But all who understand those languages well know, that the phrase answering to these expressions, $gr$να πλη$gr$ωζ$gr$, that it might be fulfilled; mean nothing more than, hereby was verified, or, so that hereby was verified, or the like. And they who understand not the languages may yet easily apprehend this, by considering the nature and force of some other expressions of the like kind. As: (Jer. xxvii. 15.) They prophecy a lie in my name, that I might drive you out. (Matt. xxiii. 34, 35.) Behold, I send unto you prophets,—That upon you may come all the righteous blood. With (Exod. xi. 9.—xvii. 3.—Numb. xxxii. 14.—Ps. li. 4.—Jer. vii. 18.—Matt. x. 34, 35.) many other passages of the same nature; where the words "that such a thing may be," do not at all signify the intention, "to the end that it may be," but merely the event, "so that it will be." In the case of the most direct and express prophecies of all, the words, "this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet," never do, never possibly can signify literally, that the thing was done for that end, that the prophecy might be fulfilled; because, on the reverse, the reason why any thing is predicted always is, because the thing was (before that prediction) appointed to be done. Much more, therefore, in the case of indirect prophecies, the words—this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet—necessarily and evidently mean this only, that the thing was so done, as that thereby or there-in was verified what the prophet had spoken.

20. It cannot, therefore, with any sort of reason or justice, be inferred from such citations out of the Old Testament as I have now mentioned, that the apostles either misunderstood, or enthusiastically misapplied the writings of the prophets. Nor can any just argument be drawn against the authority of the books of the Old and New Testament from such topics as these; that the copies of the law, in the times of the idolatrous kings of Judah and Israel, were well nigh

lost, that some texts cited out of the Old Testament by the writers of the New, are not now found in the Old Testament at all; that other texts are read differently in the Old Testament itself, from the citations of the same texts recorded in the New, and the like: Which things have indeed given occasion to weak and ridiculous writers to invent certain senseless rules or regulations, according to which men may at any time rightly make what wrong quotations they please: But, in truth, the things themselves I am here speaking of are nothing but what must of necessity happen in a long succession of ages.

When—(2 Chr. xxxiv. 14.) Hilkiah the priest (in the days of Josiah,) found, in the house of the Lord, a book of the law of the Lord, given by Moses; it is very probable, indeed, from the circumstances of the history, that copies of the law were then very scarce, and that this found by Hilkiah, was, to his surprise, an authentic or original copy. But that the whole should have been at that time a forgery of Hilkiah, is evidently impossible, because the very being and polity of the nation, as well as their religion, was founded upon the acknowledgment of the law of Moses, how much soever idolatrous kings might at certain times have corrupted that religion, and caused the study of the law to have been neglected. And in the very same book, wherein the account is given of this particular fact, of Hilkiah's finding a copy [an authentic copy] of the law, it is expressly and at large recorded how, in a foregoing reign, the king—(2 Chr. xvii. 7. 8, 9.) sent to his princes—to teach in the cities of Judah, and with them he sent Levites and priests;—and they taught in Judah, and had the book of the law of the Lord with them, and went about throughout all the cities of Judah, and taught the people.

That, in length of time, some whole books should have been lost, is nothing wonderful. There are several books expressly cited in the Old Testament, of which we have now nothing remaining. That in

the books which remain there should sometimes, for want of infallibility in transcribers,1 1.437 happen omissions, transpositions, and various readings, is still less to be wondered at. Nothing but perpetual miracle could prevent it: They who have skill to compare, in the original, certain passages in the books of Chronicles, with the correspondent places in the books of Kings, or the 18th Psalm, with 2 Sam. c. xxii. which is a transcript of the same Psalm, or the 14th Psalm with the 53d, which are also one and the same Psalm transcribed; and, much more, they who can compare the Septuagint translation with the original will be able to find instances of these things, and very often also to see plainly how and whence they happened: (All which, far from diminishing the authority of the books, are strong arguments of their antiquity, and against their having been forged by Esdras, or any other hand.) What wonder then is it, that among the numerous texts cited in the New Testament out of the Old, one or two should now not be found in our present copies of the Old Testament, and that some others should be read differently in the Old Testament, from the citations of the same texts recorded in the New? Or how does this at all affect the authority of either, when much the greatest part of the texts cited agree perfectly either in words or at least in sense; and the whole series, harmony, analogy, connexion, and uniformity of both, compared with the system of natural and moral truths, and with the history of the world and the state of nations, through a long succession of ages, from the days of Moses to this present time, shows that the books are not the result of random and enthusiastic imaginations, but of long foresight and design?

for the spirit of enthusiasm is very hardly consistent with itself through the writings of one single person. How then is it possible that for 3000 years together, and pretending too (through all that time) to an uniform series of predictions, it should happen never to have fallen into such a track of expected events, as the nature and truth of things and the situation of the kingdoms of the world should have rendered absolutely impossible, and altogether incapable of any farther, much less of any final completion?

21. I shall conclude this head with pointing at some particular extraordinary prophecies, which deserve to be carefully considered and compared with the events, whether they could possibly have proceeded from chance or from enthusiasm. Some of them are of such a nature as that they can only be judged of by persons learned in history, and these I shall but just mention. Others are obvious to the consideration of the whole world, and with those I shall finish what I think proper at this time to offer upon this subject.

Concerning Babylon, "it was particularly foretold 1 1.438 that it (Is. xiii. 17. xxi. 2.) should be shut up, and besieged by the Medes, Elamites, and Armenians: That the river should be dried up: (Jer. l. 38. li. 36.) That the city should be taken in the time of a feast, (Jer. li. 39. 57.) while her—mighty men were drunken; which accordingly came to pass," when "Belshazzar and all his thousand princes, who were drunk with him at the feast," were "slain by Cyrus's soldiers;" (Cyropœdia, lib. 7.) Also it was particularly foretold, "that God would make the country of Babylon (Is. xiv. 23.) a possession for the bittern, and pools of water; which was accordingly fulfilled by the overflowing and drowning of it, on the breaking down of the great dam in order to take the city." Could the correspondence of these events with the predictions be the result of chance?

But suppose these predictions were forged after the event; can the following ones also have been written after the event? or with any reason be ascribed to chance? (Jer. l. 39.) The wild beasts of the desert—shall dwell there, and the owls shall dwell therein: And it shall be no more inhabited for ever; neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation: As God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, &c. (Jer. li. 26. xxxvii. 64.) They shall not take of thee a stone for a corner,—but thou shalt be desolate for ever, saith the Lord:—Babylon shall become heaps, a dwelling place for dragons, an astonishment and an hissing without an inhabitant:—It shall sink, and shall not rise from the evil that I will bring upon her. (Is. i. 19, 20, 21.) Babylon, the glory of kingdoms,—shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah: It shall never be inhabited; neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation: Neither shall the Arabian pitch tent there; neither shall the shepherds make their fold there: But wild beasts of the desert shall lie there; and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures; and owls shall dwell there.

Concerning Egypt, was the following prediction forged after the event? Or, can it, with any reason, be ascribed to chance? (Ezek. xxix. 14, 15.) Egypt—shall be a base kingdom: It shall be the basest of kingdoms; neither shall it exalt itself any more above the nations: For I will diminish them, that they shall no more rule over the nations.

Concerning Tyre, the prediction is no less remarkable: (Ezek. xxvi. 14, 21.) I will make thee like the top of a rock; thou shalt be a place to spread nets upon; thou shalt be built no more;—thou shalt be no more; (Ezek. xxvii. 36.) The merchants among the people shall hiss at thee; thou shalt be a terror, and never shalt be any more. (Ezek. xxviii. 19.) All they that know thee among the people shall be astonished at thee.

The description of the extent of the dominion of

that people, who were to possess Judea in the latter days; Was it forged after the event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to chance? (Dan. xi. 40, 41, 42, 43.) He shall come—with horsemen and with many ships, and—shall overflow and pass over: He shall enter also into the glorious land, [and (ver. 45.) shall plant the tabernacles of his palace between the seas in the glorious holy mountain;] and many countries shall be overthrown: But these shall escape out of his hand, even Edom and Moab, and the chief of the children of Ammon. He shall stretch forth his hand also upon the countries, and the land of Egypt shall not escape. But he shall have power over the treasures of gold and of silver, and over all the precious things of Egypt; and the Lybians and Ethiopians [$word$] shall be at his steps.

When Daniel,1 1.439 in the vision of Nebuchadnezzar's image foretold (Dan. ii. 38—44.) four great successive monarchies; was this written after the event? Or can the congruity of his description with the things themselves reasonably be ascribed to mere chance?

When the angel says to Daniel; (Dan. ix. 24.) seventy weeks2 1.440 are determined upon thy people and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, &c. Was this written after the event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to chance, that from (Ezra, vii. 6, 7, 8.) the seventh year of Artaxerxes the king, (when Ezra went up from Bablyon—unto Jerusalem with a commission to restore the government of the Jews,) to the death of Christ;3 1.441 [from ann. Nabonass.

290, to ann. Nabonass. 788,] should be precisely 490. [70 weeks of] years?

When the angel tells Daniel, that (Dan. ix. 25.) threescore and two weeks the street [of Jerusalem] shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times [$word$, but this in troublous times not like those that should be under Messiah the prince, when he should come to reign;] was this written after the event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to chance, that from the twenty-eighth of Artaxerxes,1 1.442 when the walls were finished, to the birth of Christ, [from ann. Nabonass. 311, to ann. Nobonass. 745,] should be precisely 434 [62 weeks of] years?

When Daniel further says; (Dan. ix. 27.) and he shall confirm [or nevertheless he shall confirm] the covenant with many for one week; was this written after the event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to chance, that from the death of Christ, (anno Dom. 33,) to the command given first to St Peter to preach to Cornelius and the Gentiles, (anno Dom. 40,) should be exactly seven [one week of] years?

When he still adds; (Dan. ix. 27.) and in the midst of the week [$word$, and in half a week] he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abominations he shall make it desolate: Was this written after the event? Or can it with any reason be ascribed to chance, that from Vespasian's marching into Judea in the spring anno Dom. 67, to the taking of Jerusalem by Titus in the autumn anno Dom. 70, should be [half a septenary of years,] three years and a half?

When the same Daniel foretels a tyrannical power, which should wear out the saints of the Most High, and they should be given into his hand until (Dan. vii. 25.) a time and times and the dividing of time, and (Dan. xii. 7.) again, for a time,2 1.443 times, and a half:

(Which can no way be applied to the short persecution of Antiochus, because these prophecies are expressly declared to be (Dan. viii. 26.) for many days concerning (Dan. x. 14.) what shall befal thy people in the latter days, for yet the vision is for many days, concerning (ch. viii. 17.) the time of the end, (ch. viii. 19.) what shall be in the last end of the indignation; concerning those who (ch. xi. 33.) shall fall by the sword and by flame, by captivity and by spoil, many days; (ch. xi. 35.) to try them, even to the time of the end, because it is yet for a time appointed; concerning (ch. xii. 1.) a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation; the time (ch. xii. 7.) when God shall have accomplished to scatter the power of the holy people; (ch. xii. 9.) the time of the end, till which the words are closed up and sealed; (ch. xii. 4.) to which the prophet is commanded to shut up his words, and seal the book, for many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased: even (ch. xii. 13.) the end, till which Daniel was to rest, and then stand in his lot at the end of the days. When Daniel, I say, foretels such a tyrannical power to continue such a determined period of time; and St John prophecies that the (Rev. xi. 2.) Gentiles should tread the holy city under foot, forty and two months, which is exactly the same period of time with that of Daniel: And again, that (Rev. xi. 3.) two witnesses clothed in sackcloth, should prophesy a thousand two hundred and threescore days, which is again exactly the very same period of time: And again, that the (Rev. xii. 6.) woman which fled into the wilderness from persecution, should continue there a thousand two hundred and threescore days: And again, that she should (Rev. xii. 14.) fly into the wilderness for a time, and times, and half a time; which is still the very same period: And again, that a wild beast, a tyrannical power, (ch. xiii. 7.) to whom it was given to make war with the saints, and to overcome them, was (ch. xiii. 5.) to continue forty and

two months,1 1.444 (still the very same period of time,) and to have (ch. xiii. 7, 8.) power over all kindreds, and tongues, and nations, so that all that dwell upon the earth should worship him: Is it credible, or possible, that ignorant and enthusiastical writers should, by mere chance, hit upon such coincidences of [occult] numbers? especially since St John could not possibly take the numbers from Daniel, if he understood Daniel to mean nothing more than the short persecution of Antiochus. And if he did understand Daniel to mean a much longer, and greater, and more remote tyranny, which John himself prophesied of as in his time still future; then the wonder is still infinitely greater that in those early times, when there was not the least footstep in the world of any such power as St John distinctly describes, (but which now is very conspicuous, as I shall presently observe more particularly,) it should ever enter the heart of man to conceive so much as the possibility of such a power, sitting, not upon the pavilion of heathen persecutors, but expressly (2 Thess. ii. 4.) in the temple and upon the seat of God himself.

But these prophecies, which either relate to particular places, or depend upon the computation of particular periods of time, are (as I said) of such a nature as that they cannot be judged of but by persons skilled in history. There are some others more general, running through the whole Scripture, and obvious to the consideration of the whole world.

For instance; it was foretold by Moses that when the Jews forsook the true God, they should (Deut. xxviii. 25.) be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth; should be (Levit. xxvi. 33.) scattered among the heathen, (Deut. iv. 27.) among the nations, (Deut. xxviii. 64.) among all people from the one end of the earth, even unto the other, should there be (Deut. iv. 37.) left few in number among the heathen, and (Levit. xxvi. 39.) pine away in their iniquity in their enemies' lands; and should (Deut. xxviii. 37.) become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by-word among all nations; and that (Deut. xxviii. 65.) among these nations they should find no ease, neither should the sole of their foot have rest; but the Lord should give them a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind; and (Levit. xxvi. 36.) send a faintness into their hearts, in the lands of their enemies, so that the sound of a shaken leaf should chace them. Had any thing like this in Moses's time ever happened to any nation? Or was there in nature any probability that any such thing should ever happen to any people? that, when they were conquered by their enemies, and led into captivity, they should neither continue in the place of their captivity, nor be swallowed up and lost among their conquerors, but be scattered among all the nations of the world, and hated by all nations for many ages, and yet continue a people? Or could any description of the Jews, written at this day, possibly be a more exact and lively picture of the state they have now been in for many ages, than this prophetic description given by Moses more than 3000 years ago?

The very same thing is in like manner continually

predicted through all the following prophets; that God would (Jer. ix. 16. Ezek. iv. 13.) scatter them among the heathen; that he would (Jer. xv. 4. xxiv. 9. xxix. 18. xxxiv. 17.) cause them to be removed into all kingdoms of the earth; that he would (Ezek. v. 10, 12.) scatter them into all the winds, and (Ezek. xx. 23. xxii. 15.) disperse them through the countries of the heathen; that he would (Amos, ix. 9.) sift them among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve; that (Jer. xxiv. 9. xxix. 18) in all the kingdoms of the earth, whither they should be driven, they should be a reproach and a proverb, a taunt and a curse, and an astonishment, and an hissing; and that they should (Hos. iii. 4.) abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without teraphim. And here concerning the predictions of Ezekiel, it is remarkable in particular that they being spoken (See Ezek. i. 1. iii. 11. xi. 24.) in the very time of the Babylonian captivity, it is therefore evident, from the time of his prophesying, as well as from the nature and description of the thing itself, that he must needs be understood of that latter (Tobit, xiv. 5.) "captivity into all places," which was to happen after the "fulfilling the time of that age" wherein God was first to "bring them again" (out of the Babylonian captivity) "into the land where they should build a temple," but not like to that which afterwards (after their final return) should "be built for ever with a glorious building." The fore-cited prophecies (I say) must of necessity be understood of that wide and long dispersion which in the New Testament also is expressly mentioned by (Luke xxi. 24) our Saviour, and by (Rom. xi. 25.) St Paul.

It is also, further, both largely and distinctly predicted as well by Moses himself, as by all the following prophets: that, notwithstanding this unexampled dispersion of God's people, (Levit. xxvi. 44.) yet, for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, God will not destroy them utterly; but (Deut. xxx. 1, 2,

3, 4.) when they shall call to mind among all the nations whither God has driven them, and shall return unto the Lord, he will turn their captivity, and gather them from all the nations,—from the utmost parts of heaven,—(Deut. iv. 30.) even in the latter days: That (Jer. xxx. 11.) though he makes a full end of all other nations, yet will he not make a full end of them; but (Isa. x. 21, 22. vi. 13. Jer. xxiii. 3. Ezek. vi. 8, 9.) a remnant of them shall be preserved, and return out of all countries whither God has driven them: That he (Amos, ix. 9.) will sift the house of Israel among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the least grain fall upon the earth: That (Isa. xi. 11.—16. xxvii. 13.) the Lord shall set his hand again the second time, to recover the remnant of his people,—and shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah, from the four corners of the earth: For (Isa. xliii. 5, 6. Jer. xvi. 15. xxiii. 7, 8. xxxi. 8—12. xxxii. 37, &c. Ezek. xi. 15, 16, 17. xx. 41. xxviii. 25. xxxiv. 12, 13. xxxvi. 24. xxxvii. 21. xxxix. 27, 28, 29.) I will bring thy seed from the east, saith the Lord, and gather thee from the west; I will say to the north, give up; and to the south, keep not back; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth: (Isa. xlix. 22. lx. 8, 9, 10. lxvi. 20.) Behold I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people, and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders: (Isa. liv. 7, and the whole chapter.) For a small moment have I forsaken thee, but with great mercy will I gather thee; in a little wrath I hid my face from thee, for a moment; but with everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee. And that these prophecies might not be applied to the return from the 70 years' captivity in Babylon, (which moreover was not a dispersion into all nations,) they are expressly referred to the latter days, not only by (Deut. iv. 30.) Moses, but by (Hos. iii. 4, 5.)

Hosea, who lived long after, (for the children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice: afterward they shall return, and seek the Lord their God, and David their king, and shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days;) and by Ezekiel, who lived in the captivity itself, (Ezek. xxxviii. 8. xii. 14, 16.) after many days [speaking of those who should oppose the return of the Israelites,] thou shalt be visited, in the latter years thou shalt come into the land;—upon the people that are gathered out of the nations;—in that day, when my people of Israel dwelleth safely,—thou shalt come up against them,—it shall be in the latter days. These predictions therefore necessarily belong to that age, when (Luke xxi. 24.) the times of the Gentiles shall be fulfilled, and (Rom. xi. 25, 29.) the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And that, through all the changes which have happened in the kingdoms of the earth, from the days of Moses to the present time, which is more than 3000 years, nothing should have happened to prevent the possibility of the accomplishment of these prophecies, but, on the contrary, the state of the Jewish and Christian nations at this day should be such as renders them easily capable, not only of a figurative, but even of a literal completion in every particular, if the will of God be so; this (I say) is a miracle, which hath nothing parallel to it in the phenomena of nature.

Another instance, no less extraordinary, is as follows. Daniel foretels (Dan. vii. 23.) a kingdom upon the earth, which shall be divers from all kingdoms, (ver. 7.) divers from all that were before it, (ver. 19.) exceeding dreadful, (ver. 23.) and shall devour the whole earth: That, among the powers into which this kingdom shall be divided, there shall arise one power (ver. 24.) divers from the rest, who (ver. 8, 8. 20.) shall subdue unto himself three of the first powers, and he shall have (ver. 8. 20.) a mouth speaking very great things, and a look more stout than his

fellows. He shall (ver. 21.) make war with the saints, and prevail against them; (ver. 25.) And he shall speak great words against the Most High, and shall wear out the saints of the Most High, and think to change times and laws; and they shall be given into his hand, for a long season; even till (ver. 26. 27.) the judgment shall sit, and—the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High. (Dan. xi. 36. &c.) He shall exalt himself and magnify himself above every God, and shall speak marvellous things against the God of Gods;—Neither shall he regard the God of his fathers, (the God of Gods, as in the foregoing verse,) nor the desire of women, (forbidding to marry, 1 Tim. iv. 3.) nor regard any God; for he shall magnify himself above all: And in his estate shall he honour1 1.445 the God of forces; and a God2 1.446 whom his fathers knew not shall he honour.—Thus shall he do in the most strong holds with a strange God, whom he shall acknowledge and increase with glory; and he shall cause them to rule over many, and shall divide the land for gain. Suppose now all this to be spoken by Daniel, of nothing more than the short persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes; which that it cannot be I have shown above: But suppose it were, and that it was all forged after the event; yet this cannot be the case of St. Paul, and St. John, who describe exactly a like power, and in like words; speaking of things to come in the latter days, of things still future in their time, and of which there was then no footsteps, no appearance in the world. The day of Christ, saith St. Paul, (2 Thess. ii. 3, &c.) shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God,3 1.447

sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God: Whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness. Again, (1 Tim iv. 1, &c.) the spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils;1 1.448—forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, &c. St John, in like manner, prophesies of a wild beast, or tyrannical power, to whom was given (Rev. xiii. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17.) great authority, and a mouth speaking great things, and blasphemies; and he opened his mouth in blasphemy against God: And it was given unto him to make war with the saints, and to overcome them; and power was given him over all kindreds and tongues, and nations; and all that dwell upon the earth, shall worship him.—And he that exerciseth his power before him,—doth great wonders,—and deceiveth them that dwell on the earth, by the means of those miracles which he had power to do.—And he causeth—that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark of the name of the beast. And the kings of the earth (Rev. xvii. 13, 15, 17.) have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beasts;—even peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues.—For God hath put in their hearts [in the hearts of the kings,] to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled. The name of the person, in whose hands the (Rev. xvii. 3, 7.) reins or principal direction of the exercise of this power is lodged, is (Rev. xvii. 5.) mystery, Babylon the great, the mother of harlots, and abominations of the earth: (Ver. 2.) With whom the kings of the

earth1 1.449 have committed fornication, and the inhabitants of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication: And she herself is (Rev. xvii, 6.) drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus: And (Rev. xviii. 23, 24.) by her2 1.450 sorceries are all nations deceived: And in her is found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that are slain upon the earth. And this person, [the political person,] to whom these titles and characters belong, is (Rev. xvii. 18.) that great city, (standing (ver. 9) upon seven mountains,) which reigneth over the kings of the earth.

If in the days of St Paul, and St John, there was any footstep of such a sort of power as this in the world; or if there ever had been any such power in the world; or if there was then any appearance of probability that could make it enter into the heart of man to imagine that there ever could be any such kind of power in the world, much less in (2 Thess. ii. 4.) the temple or church of God; and if there be not now such a power actually and conspicuously exercised in the world; and if any picture of this power drawn, after the event, can now describe it more plainly and exactly than it was originally described in the words of the prophecy; then may it with some degree of plausibleness be suggested that the prophecies are nothing more than enthusiastic imaginations.

Thirdly; The chief evidence of the facts on which* 1.451 the truth and certainty of the Christian revelation depend, to us who live now at this distance of time, is the testimony of our Saviour's followers; which, in all its circumstances, was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence that ever was given to any matter of fact in the world.

To make the testimony of our Saviour's followers a sufficient evidence to us in this case, there can be

* 1.452 required but these three things: 1. That it be certain the apostles could not be imposed upon themselves: 2. That it be certain they neither had nor could have any design to impose upon others: And, 3. That it be certain their testimony is truly conveyed down to us unto this day. All which things are indeed abundantly certain, and clear enough to satisfy any reasonable and unprejudiced person.

* 1.453 For 1. That the apostles could not be imposed upon themselves, is evident from what has been already said concerning the nature, and number, and publicness, of our Saviour's miracles: They conversed from the beginning with our Saviour himself; they heard with their ears, and saw with their eyes; they looked upon, and they handled with their hands of the word of life, as St John expresses it, (1 John, i. 1.) They saw all the prophecies of the Old Testament precisely fulfilled in his life and doctrine, his sufferings and death: They saw him confirm what he taught, with such mighty and evident miracles, as his bitterest and most malicious enemies could not but confess to be supernatural, even at the same time that they obstinately blasphemed the Holy Spirit that worked them: They saw him alive after his passion, by many infallible proofs; he appearing, not only to one or two, but to all the eleven, several times, and once to above five hundred together. And this, not merely in a transient manner, but they conversed with him familiarly for no less than forty days, and at last they beheld him ascend visibly into heaven; and soon after they received the Spirit, according to his promise. These were such sensible demonstrations of his being a teacher sent from heaven, and, consequently, that his doctrine was an immediate and express revelation of the will of God, that, if the apostles, even though they had been men of the weakest judgments and strongest imaginations that can be supposed, could be all and every one of them deceived in all these several instances; men can have no use of their senses, nor any possible proof of any facts whatsoever, nor

any means to distinguish the best attested truths in the world, from enthusiastic imaginations.

2. It is certain the apostles neither had nor could* 1.454 have any design of imposing upon others. This is evident both from the nature of the things they did and suffered, and from the characters of the persons themselves: They confirmed what they taught by signs and miracles; they lived according to the doctrine they preached, though manifestly contrary to all the interests and pleasures of this present world; and, which deceivers can never be supposed to do, they died with all imaginable cheerfulness and joy of mind, for the testimony of their doctrine and the confirmation of their religion. This, I say, is what deceivers can never possibly be supposed to do: For it is very remarkable the apostles did not lay down their lives for their opinions, (which enthusiasts may possibly be supposed to do,) but in attestation to facts of their own knowledge: They were innocent and plain men, that had no bad ends to serve, nor preferment to hope for in the world: Their religion itself taught them to expect, not dominion and glory, not the praise of men, not riches and honour, not power and ease, not pleasure nor profit,—but poverty and want, trouble and vexation, persecution and oppression, imprisonments, banishments, and death: These things are not the marks and tokens of impostors. Besides the success and event of their undertaking, that plain and illiterate men should be able to preach their doctrine to many different nations, of different languages, and prevail also in establishing the belief of it; that they should all agree exactly in their testimony, and none of them be prevailed upon, either by hopes or fears, to desert their companions, and discover the imposture, if there had been any; these things plainly show that their doctrine was more than human, and not a contrivance to impose upon the world. This argument is excellently urged by Eusebius: Is it a thing possible to be conceived, saith he, that deceivers and unlearned men, men that understood no other language but their mother

tongue,1 1.455 should ever think of attempting so extravagant a thing as to travel over all nations? and not only so, but that they should be able also to accomplish their design, and establish their doctrine in all parts of the world? Consider, moreover, how remarkable a thing it is, that they should in no respect disagree one from another in the account they gave of the actions of Christ. For if, in all questions of fact, and in all trials at law, and in all ordinary disputes, the agreement of several witnesses is always accounted sufficient to determine satisfactorily the matter in question; is it not an abundant evidence of the truth in this case, that twelve apostles, and seventy disciples, and innumerable other believers, have borne witness to the actions of Christ, with the most exact and perfect agreement among themselves; and not only so, but have endured also all kinds of torments, and even death itself, to confirm their testimony? Again, that illiterate men, saith he,2 1.456 should preach the name of Christ in all parts of the world, some of them in Rome itself, the imperial city, others in Persia, others in Armenia, others in Parthia, others in Seythia, others in India, and the farthest parts of the world, and others beyond the sea, in the British

isles: This I cannot but think to be a thing far exceeding the power of man, much more the power of ignorant and unlearned men, and still much more the power of cheats and deceivers. And again: No one of them, saith he,1 1.457 being ever terrified at the torments and deaths of others, forsook his companions, or ever preached contrary to them, and detected the forgery. Nay, on the contrary, that one, who did forsake his master in his life-time, and betray him to his enemies, being self-condemned, destroyed himself with his own hands. And much more to the same purpose, may be found, excellently said by the same author, in the seventh chapter of the third book of his Demonstratio Evangelica.

3. It is very certain, that the apostles' testimony* 1.458 concerning the works and doctrine of Christ is truly and without corruption conveyed down to us, even unto this day; for they left this their testimony in their writings: Which writings have been delivered down to us by an uninterrupted succession, through all intermediate ages. Their books were all translated very early into several languages, and dispersed through all parts of the world; and have most of them been acknowledged to be the genuine writings of those whose names they bear, even by the bitterest enemies of Christianity in all ages. Passages, containing the most material doctrines, have been cited out of them by numberless authors, who lived in every age, from the very days of the apostles unto this time; so that there is no room or possibility of any considerable corruption, such as might in any wise diminish our certainty of the truth of the whole. In sum; there is no matter of fact in the world, attested in any history, with so many circumstances of credibility, with so many collateral evidences, and in every respect attended with so many

marks of truth, as this concerning the doctrine and works of Christ.

* 1.459 And here, by the way, it is to be observed, that the peculiar authority which we attribute to the books of Holy Scripture contained in the New Testament, is founded in this; that they were written or dictated by the apostles themselves. The apostles were indued with the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost, at Pentecost: And this not only enabled them to preach the doctrine of Christ with power, but also effectually secured them from making any error, mistake, or false representation of it. And the very same authority, that by this singular privilege was added to their preaching, it is manifest, ought, for the same reason, to be equally attributed to their writings also. Now, all the books of the New Testament were either written by the apostles; or, which is the very same thing, approved and authorized by them. Most of the books were uncontrovertedly written by the apostles themselves, St Paul having been made one of that number by a commission from heaven, no less visible and sensible than that which was granted to the rest at Pentecost. And those books which were written by the companions of the apostles were either dictated, or at least approved and authorised by the apostles themselves. Thus, Eusebius expressly tells us, that St Peter reviewed and approved the gospel of St Mark, and that1 1.460 it was this approbation that authorised it to be received by the churches. And Irenæus; that what St Mark wrote was dictated by St Peter;2 1.461 and that the gospel of St Luke was only a transcript of St Paul's preaching.3 1.462 And Tertullian in like manner;4 1.463 St Mark was only St Peter's scribe, and

St Luke St Paul's. And Eusebius; that St John1 1.464 also reviewed the Gospels of St Mark and St Luke, and confirmed the truth of them. And, to mention no more, the same historian tells us, that (besides some smaller reasons drawn from some mistaken passages in the book itself) the chief reason why the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews was questioned by some, was2 1.465 because they thought it not to be written by St Paul himself.

Proposition XV.

XV. Lastly; They who will not, by the arguments and proofs before mentioned, be convinced of the truth and certainty of the Christian religion, and be persuaded to make it the rule and guide of all their actions, would not be convinced, (so far as to influence their practice and reform their lives,) by any other evidence whatsoever; no, not though one should rise on purpose from the dead to endeavour to convince them.

From what has been said, upon the foregoing* 1.466 heads, it is abundantly evident that men are not called upon to believe the Christian religion without very reasonable and sufficient proof; much less are they3 1.467 required to set up faith in opposition to reason; or to believe any thing for that very reason, because it is incredible. On the contrary, God has given us all the proofs of the truth of our religion, that the nature of the thing would bear, or that were reasonable either for God to give, or men to expect. And unless God should work upon men by such methods, as are wholly inconsistent with the design of religion and the nature of virtue and vice, which we are sure he will never do, nothing could have been done

more than has already been done, to convince men of the truth of religion, and to persuade them to embrace their own happiness. And indeed no reasonable man can fail of being persuaded by the evidence we now have. For if, in other cases, we assent to those things as certain and demonstrated, which, if our faculties of judging and reasoning do not necessarily deceive us, do upon the most impartial view appear clearly and plainly to be true; there is the same reason why in moral and religious matters we should look upon those things likewise to be certain and demonstrated, which, upon the exactest and most deliberate judgment we are capable of making, do appear to us to be as clearly and certainly true, as it is certain that our faculties do not necessarily and unavoidably deceive us, in all our judgments concerning the nature of God, concerning the proper happiness of man, and concerning the difference of good and evil. And if, in other cases, we always act without the least hesitation, upon the credit of good and sufficient testimony, and look upon that man as foolish and ridiculous, who sustains great losses, or lets slip great opportunities and advantages in business, only by distrusting the most credible and well-attested things in the world; it is plain there is the same reason why we should do so also in matters of religion. So that unless our actions be determined by some other thing than by reason and right judgment, the evidence which we have of the great truths of religion ought to have the same effect upon our lives and actions as if they were proved to us by any other sort of evidence that could be desired.

* 1.468 It is true, the resurrection of Christ, and his other mighty works, must, after all, be confessed not to be such ocular demonstrations of the truth of his divine commission to after generations, as they were to those men who then lived, and saw him, and conversed with him. But since the matters of fact are as clearly proved to us, as it is possible for any matter of fact, at that distance of time, to be; since the evidence

of this is as great, and greater, than of most of those things on which men venture the whole of their secular affairs, and on which they are willing to spend all their time and pains: Since (I say) the case is thus: He that will rather venture all that he can possibly enjoy, or suffer; he that will run the hazard of losing eternal happiness, and falling into eternal misery, rather than believe the most credible and rational thing in the world, merely because he does not see it with his eyes, it is plain that that man does not disbelieve the thing because he thinks the evidence of it not sufficiently strong, but because it is contrary to some particular vice of his, which makes it his interest that it should not be true; and for that reason he might also have disbelieved it though he had seen it himself. Men may invent what vain pretences they please, to excuse their infidelity and their wickedness; but certainly that man who can despise the authority both of reason and scripture in conjunction; who can elude the plainest evidence of matter of fact; who can be deaf to all the promises and kind admonitions of the Gospel, and to all the threatenings and terrible denunciations of the wrath of God, made known in good measure by the light of nature, and confirmed by the addition of express revelation; certainly (I say) that man must have some other reason for his unbelief than the pretended want of sufficient evidence. Did men follow the unprejudiced judgment of their own minds, and the impartial dictates of natural reason, the least possibility of obtaining eternal happiness, or the least suspicion of falling into endless misery, would immediately determine them to make it the great study and business of their lives to obtain the one and to avoid the other. If then we see men act directly contrary to this natural principle, and almost wholly neglect these things, not only when there is a fair appearance and probability of their being true, which the light of nature itself affords; but also when there is all reasonable evidence given of their being certainly true, by express revelation in the Gospel, is it not

very plain that such men are governed, not by reason and the force of evidence, but by some other very different cause of their actions?

* 1.469 What that cause is, is very apparent from the lives and actions of most of those persons who pretend want of evidence to be the ground of their infidelity. Their lusts, their appetites, their affections are interested: They are lovers of vice and debauchery, and slaves to evil habits and customs; and therefore they are not willing to discern the evidence which would compel them to believe that which yet they cannot believe with any comfort so long as they resolve not to part with their beloved vices. Their hearts and affections are habitually fixed upon things here below; and therefore they will not attend to the force of any argument that would raise their affections to things above. They are enslaved to the sensual pleasures and sinful enjoyments of earth; and therefore they will not hearken to any reasonable conviction which would persuade them to relinquish these present gratifications for the future and more spiritual joys of heaven. The love of this present world has blinded their eyes;1 1.470 and therefore they receive not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto them: Neither can they know them, because they are spiritually discerned. In a word, the true and only reason why men love darkness rather than light, is, because their deeds are evil.

* 1.471 And this reason affords a sufficient account indeed why men should be very unwilling to believe the doctrines of Christianity. If they are resolved not to reform their lives, it is no wonder they care not to discern the evidence of those truths which must needs make them very uneasy in the midst of the enjoyment of all their sinful pleasures. In this case, were the proofs of the truth of our religion much

stronger than they are, or than they can be imagined or desired to be, yet still these men would be in the very same case, and perpetually want stronger and stronger evidence. It is true, many men, who now are conscious and willing to acknowledge that they act contrary to all the reasonable evidence and convictions of religion, are nevertheless very apt to imagine within themselves, that if the great truths of religion were proved to them by some stronger evidence, they should by that means be worked upon to act otherwise than they do: But if the true reason why these men act thus foolishly, is not because the doctrines of religion are not sufficiently evidenced, but because they themselves are, without allowing themselves time for consideration, hurried away by some unruly passions to act directly contrary to all reason and evidence; it is plain (unless God should irresistibly compel them) they might well continue to act as they do, though the evidence of these things were really greater than it is. They are willing fondly to imagine, that if they had lived in our Saviour's time; if they had heard his preaching, and seen his miracles; if they had had the advantage of beholding those mighty works which he performed for the proof of his divine commission, as the Jews then had;—they should not, like them, have rejected the counsel of God against themselves, but with all cheerfulness have believed his doctrine, and embraced his religion. They fancy they should immediately have become disciples of Christ; and that the truths which he taught would have had a most powerful influence upon the whole course of their lives. And if their hearts and affections were not set upon this world, more than upon the next; if they valued not the present sinful enjoyments of sense above the expectation of the glory that shall be revealed, most certainly they would do the same now. But if their hearts be set upon earthly things, and their passions be stronger than all the arguments of reason; if they do indeed so love the pleasures of sin now, as that they cannot persuade themselves, by all the motives of religion,

to live like Christians, we need not doubt to affirm, that they might very well have been in the same case though they had lived in our Saviour's time. The Jews are a notorious and standing instance, how far prejudice, envy, pride, and affection, are able to prevail over the strongest convictions. When our Saviour began to preach that he was sent from God to instruct them in their duty, they required a sign of him, and they would believe him; but when he had worked so many miracles, that even the world itself could not contain the books if they should all be written, they persisted still in their infidelity. When they saw him hanging upon the cross, and thought themselves secure of him, they said, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him: (Matt. xxvii. 42.) But when he arose out of the grave, wherein he had lain three days, which was a much greater and more convincing miracle, they grew more hardened and obstinate in their unbelief.

* 1.472 Others there are, who imagine that if they could but be convinced of the truth of another world, by the appearance of one sent directly from that unknown state, they would immediately become new creatures. But if God should satisfy their unreasonable demands, by sending one on purpose from the dead to convince them, there is little room to doubt, but as they harkened not to Moses and the prophets, to Christ and his apostles, so neither would they be persuaded by one rising on purpose from the dead. They might indeed be at first surprised and terrified at the appearance of so unusual and unexpected a messenger: But as wicked men upon a bed of sickness, at the amazing approach of death and eternity, resolve, in the utmost anguish of horror and despair, to amend their lives and forsake their sins; but as soon as the terror is over, and the danger of death past, return to their old habits of sin and folly;—so it is more than probable it would be in the present case. Should God send a messenger from the dead, to assure men of the certainty of a future state, and the danger of their present wickedness,

as soon as the fright was over, and their present terrible apprehensions ceased, it is by no means impossible or improbable that their old vicious habits and beloved sins should again by degrees prevail over them. Some there are, in our present age, who pretend to be convinced of the being of spirits, by the powerful demonstration of their own senses; and yet we do not observe that their lives are more remarkably eminent for exemplary piety, than other good men's, who, being convinced by the rational evidence of the gospel, go on in a sober, constant, and regular exercise of virtue and righteousness.

It is not therefore for want of sufficient evidence* 1.473 that men disbelieve the great truths of religion; but plainly for want of integrity, and of dealing ingenuously and impartially with themselves, that they suffer not the arguments of religion to have that weight and influence upon them, which in the judgment of right reason they ought manifestly to have. So long as men permit their passions and appetites to over-rule their reason, it is impossible they should have due apprehensions in matters of religion, or make any right and true judgment concerning these things. Men that are strongly biassed and prejudiced even in wordly affairs, it is well known how hard and difficult it is for them to judge according to reason, and to suffer the arguments and evidences of truth to have their due weight with them. How much more in matters of religion, which concern things future and remote from sense, must it needs be, that men's present interests, lusts, and passions, will pervert their judgment, and blind their understandings! Wherefore, men that pretend to be followers of right reason, if they will judge truly of the reasonableness and credibility of the Christian revelation, it is absolutely necessary that, in the first place, in order to that end, they become impartially willing to embrace whatever shall, upon the whole, appear to be agreeable to reason and truth, and grounded upon good evidence, without interesting their lusts and appetites in the judgment; and that, before all

things, they resolve to be guided in all their actions by whatever rule shall at any time be well proved to them to be the will of God. And when they have put themselves into this temper and frame of mind, then let them try if they can any longer reject the evidence of the gospel. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God. (John vii. 17.) For, them that are meek, God will guide in judgment; (Ps. xxv. 8.) and such as are gentle, them he will teach his way.

* 1.474 Indeed, men that are of this good disposition, willing to be governed by reason, and not prejudiced by lusts and vicious appetites, could not but give their assent to the doctrines of Christianity, upon account of the very intrinsic excellency and reasonableness of the things themselves, even though the external evidence of their certainty had been much less than it at present is. Nay, were there hardly any other evidence at all, than barely the excellency and reasonableness, and natural probability of the great truths of religion, together with the consideration of the vast importance of them; yet even in that case it would be infinitely wisest and most agreeable to reason, for men to live according to the rules of the gospel. And though their faith extended no further than only to a belief of the possibility of the truth of the Christian revelation, yet even this alone ought in all reason to have weight enough to determine reasonable creatures to live soberly, righteously, and godly. For is it not plainly most reasonable, as an ancient writer expresses it,1 1.475 if each of the opposite opinions were equally doubtful and uncertain, yet by all means to embrace and entertain that which brings some hope along with it, rather than that which brings none? For on one side of the question there is no danger at all of incurring any

calamity, if that which we believe and expect should at last prove false; but, on the other side, there is the greatest hazard in the world, the loss of eternal life, if the opinion which unbelievers rely upon should at last prove an error. And again:1 1.476 What say ye, O ye ignorant men, ye men of miserable and most deplorable folly? Can ye forbear fearing within yourselves that at least those things may possibly prove true which ye now despise and mock at? Have ye not at least some misgivings of mind, lest possibly that which ye now perversely and obstinately refuse to believe, ye should at last be convinced of by sad experience, when it will be too late to repent. Nor is this the judgment of Christian writers only, but also of the wisest and most considerate heathens. We ought to spare no pains, saith Plato,2 1.477 to obtain the habits of virtue and wisdom in this present life; for the prize is noble, and the hope is very great. And Cicero:3 1.478 They have gained a great prize indeed who have persuaded themselves to believe, that, when death comes, they shall perish utterly: What comfort is there; what is there to be boasted of in that opinion? And again: If after death, saith he, as some little and contemptible philosophers think,4 1.479 I shall be nothing, yet there is no danger that when we are all dead those philosophers should laugh at me for my error.

But this is not our case. God has afforded us, as has been largely and particularly shown in the foregoing

discourse, many and certain proofs of the truth of our religion; even as certain as any matter of fact is capable of having. And we now exhort men to believe, not what is barely possible, and excellent and probable, and of the utmost importance in itself, but what moreover they have all the positive evidence and all the reason in the world to oblige them to believe.

* 1.480 To conclude: No man of reason can pretend to say but God may require us to take notice of some things at our peril, to inquire into them, and to consider them thoroughly. Any pretence of want of greater evidence will not excuse carelessness or unreasonable prejudices, when God has vouchsafed us all that evidence which was either fit for him to grant, or reasonable for men to desire; or indeed which the nature of the thing itself to be proved was capable of.

Notes

• 1 1.1

  Note—That in this whole question, the word essence is not to be taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word, as signifying that by which a thing is what it is; for in that sense the attributes of God do constitute his essence; and solidity, or impenetrability, is the essence of matter. But essence is all along to be understood as signifying here the same with substance.
• 1 1.2

  See Sir Isaac Newton's Principia, page 384 and 402. Edit. tertia.
• 1 1.3

  Quæro an a Deo fieri potuisset ut mundus esset finitus?—Epist. ad Cartesium 68, partis primœ.

  Nondum illud possum concoquere, eam esse inter res corporeas connexionem, ut nec mundum Deus creare potuerit nisi infinitum, nec ullum corpus in nihilum redigere, quin eo ipso tencatur aliud paris quantitatis statim creare.—Epist. 5. partis secundœ.
• 1 1.4

  Puto implicare contradictionem ut mundus sit finitus.—Cartes. Epist. 69, partis primœ.

  Mihi autem non videtur de ulla unquam re esse dicendum, ipsam a Deo fieri non posse. Cum enim omnis ratio veri et boni ab ejus omnipotentia dependeat; ne guidem dicere ausim, Deum facere non posse ut mons sit sine valle, vel ut unum et duo non sint tria; sed tantum dico, talia implicare contradictionem in meo conceptu. Quod idem etiam de spatio, quod sit plane vacuum, &c.—Epist. 6, partis secundœ.
• 2 1.5

  Remark, page 25.
• 1 1.6

  See Cudworth's System, page 721, &c.
• 1 1.7

  Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.—Spinoza ethic. par. prop. 14.

  Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.—Prop. 6.

  Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt.—Prop. 33.

  Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere.—Prop. 7.
• 2 1.8

  Omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant—Ethic. par. I. prop. 15. Schol.
• 3 1.9

  Per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam, et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatum; quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest.—

  Ibid.
• 4 1.10

  Substantiam corpoream quæ non nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione natura divina indignam esse dici potest.
• 5 1.11

  Schol. ad prop. 15. par 1.
• 1 1.12

  A summa Dei potentia omnia necessario effluxisse.

  Omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt, &c.

  Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.

  Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt quam productæ sunt.

  Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.
• 2 1.13

  Sequitur, soum Deum esse causam liberam.

  Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus, et a memine coactus, agit.
• * 1.14

  The introduction.
• * 1.15

  Of the several sorts of deists.
• * 1.16

  Of the first sort of deists: And of Providence.
• 1 1.17

  Omnis enim per se divûm natura necesse estImmortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur.Semota a nostris rebus, sejunctaque longe.Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil, indiga nostri,Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira.Lucret. lib. 1.

  Τὸ μαχάριον χαὶ ἄφθαρτον, οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔΧει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέΧει ὥστε οὔτε ἀργαῖζ, οὔτε Χάρισι συνέΧεται.—Laert. in Vita Epicuri.

  Nor is the doctrine of those modern philosophers much different, who ascribe every thing to matter and motion, exclusive of final causes, and speak of God as an intelligentia supramundana; which is the very cant of Epicurus and Lucretius.
• 1 1.18

  Quo confesso, confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari.—Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.
• 2 1.19

  Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos, re sustulisse.—Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.
• * 1.20

  Human affairs not beneath the regard of Providence.
• 1 1.21

  Ἐισὶ γάρ τινεζ ἱ νομίζουσιν $gr$ιναι τὰ θεῖα, χαὶ τοιαῦτα $gr$ ιάπερ ὀ λόγοζ α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ξεφηνεν, $gr$γα$gr$, Χα$gr$ δυναμιν $gr$Χ$gr$ντα την $gr$Χ$gr$τ$gr$την, Χα$gr$ γν$gr$σιν την τεγει$gr$τ$gr$την. τ$gr$ν μεντ$gr$ι $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$νων Χ αταφ$gr$νε$gr$ν, $gr$ζ μιΧ $gr$ν Χα$gr$ $gr$υτελ$gr$ν $gr$ν των, Χα$gr$ $gr$ναξ$gr$ων τ$gr$ζ $gr$αυτ$gr$ ν $gr$πιμελε$gr$αζ.— Simplic. in Epiclet.
• 2 1.22

  Deorum providentia mundus administratur; iidemque consulunt rebus humanis; neque solum universis, verum etiam singulis.—Cic. de Divinat. lib. 1.
• 3 1.23

  $gr$λλ$gr$ $gr$ δ$gr$ν τ$gr$Χ$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$σωζ $gr$ ιη Χαλεπ$gr$ν $gr$νδε$gr$ ασθαι τ$gr$τ$gr$γε, $gr$ ζ $gr$πιμελε$gr$ζ σμιΧ$gr$ν ε$gr$ζι $gr$ε$gr$, $gr$ Χ ητ$gr$ν $gr$ τ$gr$ν μεγ$gr$ε ι δι$gr$φε$gr$ντων.—Plato de Leg. lib. 10.

  $gr$ι δ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ Χ$gr$σμ$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$πιμελε$gr$τ αι $gr$ν$gr$γΧη Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν με$gr$ν α$gr$τ$gr$ π$gr$ν$gr$ε$gr$ν; $gr$σπε$gr$ Χα$gr$ α$gr$ τ$gr$Χν αι π$gr$ι$gr$σι. $gr$α$gr$ γ$gr$ $gr$ατ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ σ$gr$μα τ$gr$ζ $gr$πιμελη$gr$ναι π$gr$μεν$gr$ζ, $gr$Χ $gr$ν $gr$μελ $gr$σειε τ$gr$ν με$gr$ν $gr$δ $gr$ στ$gr$ατηγ$gr$ζ $gr$ευ $gr$ $gr$ιΧ$gr$ν$gr$μ$gr$ζ, $gr$ π$gr$λιτιΧ$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$ $tau;$gr$ ν γ$gr$ με$gr$ν $gr$μελ$gr$μ$gr$ν ων, $gr$ν$gr$γΧη Χει$gr$νω ζ τ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ν δΧ$gr$τ$gr$εσθαι.—Simplic. in Epictet.
• * 1.24

  Of the second sort of deists.
• 1 1.25

  Quasi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget: Illud quæro, quid et consentaneum sit dicere,, qui, &c.—Cic. de Finib. lib. 2.
• * 1.26

  Profane and debauched deists not capable of being argued with.
• 1 1.27

  Job xxxv. 11.
• 2 1.28

  Phil. iv. 8.
• * 1.29

  Of the third sort of deists.
• 1 1.30

  $gr$α$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ α$gr$ετ$gr$ $gr$στι τ$gr$ν μαΧα$gr$ων π$gr$ντω$gr$ $gr$στε Χα$gr$ $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ετ$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ Χα$gr$ Θε$gr$.—Orig. contr. Cel. lib. 4.
• * 1.31

  Of the fourth sort of deists.
• * 1.32

  That there is now no consistent scheme of deism in the world.
• 1 1.33

  Ita sit, ut si ab illa rerum summa, quam superius comprehendimus, aberravercs, omnis ratio intereat, et ad nihilum omnia revertantur.—Lactan, lib. 7.
• * 1.34

  That there are eternal and necessary differences of things.
• * 1.35

  The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and necessary differences of things.
• 1 1.36

  See Hobbes de Cive, c. 3. § 4.
• 1 1.37

  Ex his sequitur injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur pactum. De Cive, c. 3. § 4. where see more to the same purpose.
• 1 1.38

  Manifestum est rationem nullam esse lege prohibendi noxas tales, nisi agnoscant tales actus, etiam antecedenter ad ullam legem, mala esse.—Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 194.
• 2 1.39

  Nam stoliditas inveniri quæ inanior potest, quam mala esse nulla contendere, et tanquam malos perdere et condemnare peccantes?—Arnob. advers. Gentes, lib. 2.
• 3 1.40

  Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant; dirimunt hi communem generis humani societatem; qua sublata, justitia funditus tollitur.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
• * 1.41

  An answer to the objection drawn from the variety of the opinions of learned men, and the laws of different nations concerning right and wrong.
• 1 1.42

  $gr$ δε Χαλ$gr$ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ δ$gr$Χαια, πε$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ π$gr$λ$gr$ιΧ$gr$ σΧ$gr$πε$gr$ται, τ$gr$σ$gr$υτην $gr$ει διαφ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ πλ$gr$νην ωστε δ$gr$Χε$gr$ν ν$gr$μ$gr$ ε$gr$ναι, φ$gr$σει $gr$ μ$gr$.—Aristot. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 1.
• 1 1.43

  $gr$λ$gr$π$gr$ειν νεν$gr$μιστ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$λευ$gr$ζ πα$gr$δαζ, $gr$ τ$gr$ τιζ δ$gr$ναιτ$gr$.—Plutarch. Apophthegmata Laconica.
• * 1.44

  That the will of God always determines itself to act according to the eternal reason of things.
• * 1.45

  That all rational creatures are obliged to govern themselves in all their actions, by the same eternal rule of reason.
• * 1.46

  Proved from the original nature of things.
• * 1.47

  And from the sense that all, even wicked men, unavoidably have of their being under such an obligation.
• * 1.48

  And from the judgment of mens' consciences upon their own past actions.
• * 1.49

  Of that natural knowledge which Plato thought to be reminiscence.
• * 1.50

  The most profligate men not utterly insensible of the difference of good and evil.
• 1 1.51

  Quis est enim, aut quis unquam fuit, aut avaritia tam ardente aut tam effrænatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam adspici scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese, etiam omni impunitate proposita, sine facinore, quam illo modo pervenire?—Cic. de Finib. lib. 3.
• * 1.52

  Men's natural sense of eternal moral obligations, proved from the judgment they all pass upon the actions of others.
• 1 1.53

  Placet suapte natura, adeoque gratiosa virtus est, ut insitum etiam sit malis probare meliores.—Senec. de Benef. lib. 4.
• 2 1.54

  Joh. vii. 46.
• 3 1.55

  Joh. xviii. 88.
• 1 1.56

  $gr$ γα$gr$ $gr$σ$gr$ν $gr$σ$gr$αζ $gr$ετ$gr$ζ $gr$πεσφαλμ$gr$ν$gr$ι τυγ$gr$ν$gr$σιν $gr$ π$gr$λλ$gr$, τ$gr$σ$gr$τ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ Χ$gr$νειν τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλ$gr$ζ $gr$ π$gr$νη$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ηστ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ν δ$gr$ τι Χα$gr$ $gr$υστ$gr$ν $gr$στι Χα$gr$ τ$gr$σι ΧαΧ$gr$ζ $gr$στε π$gr$μπ$gr$λλ$gr$ι Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν σφ$gr$δ$gr$α ΧαΧ$gr$ν, $gr$ υ τ$gr$ζ λ$gr$γ$gr$ιζ Χα$gr$ δ$gr$ξαισ δια$gr$νται τ$gr$ζ $gr$με$gr$ν$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$νθ$gr$πων Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ Χε$gr$ζ.—Plato de Leg. lib. 12.
• 1 1.57

  Quis Pullum Numitorem, Fregellanum Proditorem, quanquam reipublicæ nostræ profuit, non odit?—Cic. de Finib. lib 5.
• * 1.58

  An answer to the objection drawn from the total ignorance of some barbarous nations in matters of morality.
• * 1.59

  Of the principal moral obligations in particular.
• * 1.60

  Of piety, or men's duty towards God.
• 1 1.61

  Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant; hnnc hominem omnino numerare qui decet?—Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
• 2 1.62

  $gr$ι γ$gr$ ν$gr$ν ε$gr$μεν, $gr$λλ$gr$ τι $gr$δει $gr$μ$gr$ζ π$gr$ιε$gr$ν Χα$gr$ Χ$gr$ιν$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$α, $gr$ $gr$μνε$gr$ν τ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$νφημε$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$πεξ$gr$εσθαι τ$gr$ζ $gr$ιταζ; $gr$νΧ $gr$δει Χα$gr$ σΧ$gr$π$gr$νταζ Χα$gr$ $gr$νταζ Χα$gr$ $gr$σθ$gr$νταζ $gr$δειν τ$gr$ν $gr$μν$gr$ν τ$gr$ν $gr$ιζ τ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ $gr$γαζ $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ, $gr$τι $gr$μ$gr$ν πα$gr$σΧεν $gr$γανα τα$gr$τα δ$gr$ $gr$ν τ$gr$ν γ$gr$ν $gr$γασ$gr$με$gr$α; $gr$γαζ $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ, $gr$τι $gr$ε$gr$αζ δ$gr$δωΧεν, &c.—Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 16.
• * 1.63

  Of righteousness or the duty of men one towards another.
• * 1.64

  Of justice and equity.
• 1 1.65

  Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmetipsos sumus. Quod, si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum vanitas, non imbecillitatem animorum torqueret, et flecteret quocunque cæpisset; sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quam omnes sunt omnium;—et coleretur jus æque ab omnibus.—Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
• 2 1.66

  Hoc exigit ipsa naturæ ratio, quæ est lex divina et humana, cui parere qui velit, nunquam committet ut alienum appetat, et id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
• 1 1.67

  δειν$gr$ζ γ$gr$ $gr$ν πα$gr$ε$gr$εν $gr$ωταζ, $gr$ιτι τ$gr$ν $gr$αντ$gr$ζ $gr$να$gr$γεζ $gr$ιδωλ$gr$ν πα$gr$ε$gr$ετ$gr$, &c.—Plat. in Phœd.

  Quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.

  Oculorum est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus; quàm illa ardentes amores excitaret sui, si videretur!—Id. de fin. l. 2.
• 2 1.68

  $gr$υτη μ$gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$ διΧαι$gr$σ$gr$νη, $gr$ετ$gr$ μεν $gr$στι τελε$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ $gr$σπε$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$ζ $gr$τω $gr$ανμαστ$gr$ν.—Ethic. lib. 5. c. 3.
• 1 1.69

  Non enim mihi est vita mea utilior, quam animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.

  Detrahere aliquid alteri, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum, magis est contra naturam, quàm mors, quàm paupertas, quàm dolor, quàm cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis.—Id.
• 2 1.70

  $gr$α$gr$ τ$gr$ πα$gr$παν ζ$gr$ν, μ$gr$γιστ$gr$ν μ$gr$ν ΧαΧ$gr$ν, τ$gr$ν ξ$gr$μπαντα $gr$ν$gr$ν $gr$νατ$gr$ν $gr$ντα, Χα$gr$ ΧεΧτημ$gr$ν$gr$ν π$gr$ντα τ$gr$ λεγ$gr$μενα $gr$γα$gr$, πλ$gr$ν διΧαι$gr$σ$gr$νηζ τε Χα$gr$ $gr$ετ$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$σηζ.—Plato de Leg. lib. 2.
• * 1.71

  Of universal mutual benevolence.
• 1 1.72

  Universaliter autem verum est, quod non certius, fluxus puncti lineam producit aut additio numerorum summam, quam quod benevolentia effectum præstat bonum.—Cumberland. de Leg. Naturœ, page 10.

  Pari sane ratione [ac in arithmeticis operationibus] doctrinæ moralis veritas fundatur in immutabili cohærentia inter felicitatem summam quam hominum vires assequi valent, et actus benevolentiæ universalis.—Id ibid. page 23.

  Eadem est mensura boni malique, quæ mensura est veri falsique in propositionibus pronuntiantibus de efficacia motum ad rerum aliarum conservationem, et corruptionem facientium.—Id. page 30.
• 1 1.73

  Angusta admodum est circa nostra tantummodo commoda, lætitiæ matria; sed eadem erit amplissima, si aliorum omnium felicitas cordi nobis sit. Quippe hæc ad illam eandem habebit proportionem, quam habet immensa beatitudo Dei, totiusque humani generis, ad curtam illam fictæ felicitatis supellectilem, quam uni homini, eique invido et malevolo, fortunæ bona possint suppeditare.—Id. ibid. page 214.
• 1 1.74

  In omni honesto, nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius patent, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, et quasi quædam societas et communicatio utilitatum, et ipsa charitas generis humani; quæ nata a primo satu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur,—serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum,—deinde totius complexu gentis humanæ.—Cic. de Finib. lib. 5.
• 2 1.75

  Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmetipsos sumus. Quod nisi depravatio, &c. sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quam omnes sunt omnium.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• 3 1.76

  Impellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quamplurimis.—Cic. de Finib. lib. 3.
• 4 1.77

  Hominem esse quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse conjunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate.—Cic. Quœst. Academ. lib. 1.
• 1 1.78

  Homines hominum causa sunt generati, ut ipsi inter se alii aliis prodesse possint.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.

  Ad tuendos conservandosque homines, hominem natum esse.—Cic. de Finib. lib 3.
• 2 1.79

  Omnes inter se naturali quadam indulgentia et benevolentia contineri.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• 3 1.80

  Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non posse.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
• 4 1.81

  $gr$τε $gr$α $gr$νταδιΧε$gr$ν δε$gr$, $gr$τε ΧαΧ$gr$ζ π$gr$ιε$gr$ν $gr$δ$gr$να $gr$νθ$gr$πων, $gr$ $gr$ν $gr$τ$gr$ν π$gr$σ$gr$π$gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ν.—Plato in Critone.
• 5 1.82

  Tum illud effici, quod quibusdam incredibile videatur, sit autem necessarium, ut nihil sese plus quam alterum diligat.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• * 1.83

  Of sobriety, or men's duty towards themselves; and of the unlawfulness of self-murder.
• 1 1.84

  $gr$ν τινε φ$gr$α $gr$σμεν $gr$ι $gr$ν$gr$ωπ$gr$ι, Χα$gr$ $gr$ δε$gr$ δ$gr$ $gr$αυτ$gr$ν $gr$Χ τα$gr$τηζ λ$gr$ειν, $gr$ $gr$π$gr$διδ$gr$σΧειν.— Θε$gr$ζ ε$gr$ναι $gr$μ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$πιμελ$gr$μεν$gr$ζ. Χα$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$νθ$gr$π$gr$ζ $gr$ ν τ$gr$ Χ$gr$ημ$gr$των τ$gr$ιζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$ναι—$gr$υΧ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ σ$gr$ $gr$, τ$gr$ σαυτ$gr$ Χτημ$gr$των ε$gr$τι α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$αυτ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$Χ$gr$ινν$gr$ι, μ$gr$ σημ$gr$ναντ$gr$ζ σ$gr$ $gr$τι β$gr$λει α$gr$τ$gr$ τε$gr$ν$gr$ναι, $gr$αλ$gr$π$gr$ν$gr$ιζ $gr$ν αυτ$gr$, Χα$gr$, ε$gr$ τινα $grιζ τιμω$gr$αν, τιμω$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ν.—Plato in Phœd.
• 1 1.85

  Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injussu hinc nos suo demigrare. Cum verò causam justam Deus ipse dederit, ne ille medius fidius vir sapiens, lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit; nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant; sed tanquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a Deo evocatus, atque emissus, exirit.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 2 1.86

  Illud breve vitæ reliqnum nec avide appetendum sensibus, nec sine causa deserendum est; vetatque Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est, Dei, de præsidio et statione vitæ decedere.—Cic. de Senect.
• 3 1.87

  Nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne quod conspicis, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit; hue tibi aditus patere non potest.—Quare et tibi et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est nobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est; munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse videamini.—Cic. Somn. Scipion.
• 1 1.88

  $gr$Χδ$gr$ξασθε τ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ $gr$ταν $gr$Χε$gr$ ν$gr$ζ σημ$gr$ν$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$λ$gr$σ$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ζ τα$gr$τηζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$πη$gr$εσ$gr$αζ τ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$λ$gr$εσθε π$gr$ζ α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ πα$gr$ντ$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$σ$gr$εσθε $gr$ν$gr$ι$chi;$gr$ντεζ τα$gr$την τ$gr$ν $gr$αν, ε$gr$ζ $gr$ν $gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$μ$gr$ζ $gr$ταξεν. $gr$ε$gr$νατε, μ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$στωζ $gr$π$gr$λθητε.—Arrian, lib. 1.
• 1 1.89

  O$gr$ μεν $gr$α ν$gr$Χηζ $gr$νεΧα π$gr$ληζ Χα$gr$ δ$gr$μων Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ι$gr$των, $gr$τ$gr$λμησαν $gr$π$gr$εσθαι.—$gr$ δ$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$τε$gr$ι πα$gr$δεζ, $gr$δυνατ$gr$σ$gr$σι Χα$gr$τε$gr$ειν, π$gr$λ$gr$ Χαλλ$gr$ν$gr$ζ ενεΧα ν$gr$Χ$gr$ζ.—Plato de Legib. lib. 8.
• * 1.90

  The law of nature eternal, universal, and absolutely unchangeable.
• 1 1.91

  Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo; vetando, a fraude deterreat.—Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus.—Cic. de Repub. lib. 3. fragment.

  — $gr$γ$gr$απτα Χ$gr$σφαλ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ν $gr$μιμ$gr$ —$gr$υ γ$gr$ τι ν$gr$νγε Χ$gr$ζ, αλ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ π$gr$τε$gr$ τ$gr$υτα, Χ$gr$δε$gr$; $gr$δεν $gr$ξ $gr$τ$gr$ $gr$νη.$gr$των $gr$γ$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$μελλ$gr$ν, $gr$νδ$gr$ζ $gr$δεν$gr$ζφ$gr$νημα δε$gr$σα$gr$, $gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ σι τ$gr$ν δ$gr$Χηνδ$gr$σειν.—Sophocl. Antigon. 464.
• 2 1.92

  Lex quæ seculis omnibus ante nata est, quam scripta lex ulla, aut quam omnino civitas constituta.—Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
• 3 1.93

  Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddami, quod universum mundum regat.—Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.
• 4 1.94

  Nec si, regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sextus Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, et ad recte faciendum impellens, et a delicto avocans; quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta esset; orta autem simul est cum mente divina.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
• 1 1.95

  In judicio de bonitate harum rerum, æque omnes ubique convenirunt, ac omnia animalia in motu cordis et arteriarum pulsu, aut omnes homines in opinione de nivis candore et splendore solis.—Cumberland. de Leg. Natura, page 167.
• 2 1.96

  Hoc tamen non magis tollit consensum hominum de generali natura boni, ejusque partibus vel speciebus præcipuis, quam levis vultuum diversitas tollit convenientiam inter homines in communi hominum definitione, aut similitudinem inter eos in partium principalium conformatione et usu. Nullagens est quæ non sentiat actus Deum diligendi, &c.—nulla gens quæ non sentit gratitudinem erga parentes et benefactores, toti humano generi salutarem esse. Nulla temperamentorum diversitas facit ut quisquam non bonum esse sentiat universis, ut singulorum innocentium vitæ, membra, et libertas conserventur.—Cumberland de Legib. Naturœ, page 166.

  Neque enim an honorifice de Deo sentiendum sit, neque an sit amandus, timendus, colendus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim hæc religionum, per omnes gentes communia.—Deum eo ipso, quod homines fecerit rationales, hoc illis præcepisse, et cordibus omnium insculpsisse, ne quisquam cuiquam faceret, quod alium sibi facere iniquum duceret.—Hobbes, de Homine, cap. 14. [Inconsistently enough with his own principles.]
• 1 1.97

  Nam ut vera et falsa, ut consequentia et contraria, sua sponte, non aliena, judicantur: sic constans et perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ est virtus; itemque inconstantia, quod est vitium; sua natura probatur.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• 2 1.98

  Quod verè dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudabile esse naura.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.
• 3 1.99

  Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura ponere, dementis est. Nam nec arboris nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur, in opinione sita est, sed in natura.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• 4 1.100

  Jam vero stultissimum illud; existimare omnia justa esse, quæ scita sint in populorum institutis aut legibus. Etiamne si quæ sunt tyrannorum leges, si triginta illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent, aut si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco hæ leges justæ haberentur?—Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.
• 5 1.101

  Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum, jura constituerentur; jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciunt ut quæ mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus, aut cur, cum jus ex injuriâ lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere; non possit ex malo?—Id. ibid.
• * 1.102

  Eternal moral obligations antecedent in some respect even to this consideration, of their being the will and command of God himself.
• 1 1.103

  Virtutis et vitiorum, sine ulla divina ratione, grave ipsius conscientiæ pondus est.—Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib 3.
• 2 1.104

  Denique nequis obligationem legum naturalium arbitrariam et mutabilem a nobis fingi suspicetur, hoc adjiciendum censui; virtutum exercitium, habere rationem medii necessarii ad finem, (seposita consideratione imperii divini,) manente rerum natura tali qualis nunc est. Hoc autem ita intelligo, uti agnoscunt plerique omnes, additionem duarum unitatum duabus prius positis, necessario constituere numerum quaternarium; aut, uti praxes geometricæ et mechanicæ, problemata proposita solvunt immutabiliter; adeo ut nec sapientia nec voluntas divina cogitari possit quicquam in contrarium constituere posse.—Cumberland de Legib. Naturæ, page 231.
• 1 1.105

  $gr$ $gr$μεν$gr$ν, $gr$ δι$gr$ι $gr$μεν$gr$ν γ$gr$ $gr$στι, δι$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$τα$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ τ$gr$ναντ$gr$ν, δι$gr$τι $gr$ται, $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$μεν$gr$ν. [Note,—These words are by Ficinus ridiculously translated videtur and visum est.] $gr$υΧ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$σι$gr$ν, δι$gr$τι $gr$σι$gr$ν $gr$στι, φιλε$gr$ται $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$τι φιλε$gr$ταζ, δι$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$σι$gr$ν $gr$στι.—Plato in Euthyphr.
• 2 1.106

  $gr$α$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ετ$gr$ $gr$στι τ$gr$ν μαΧα$gr$ων π$gr$ντω$gr$ $gr$στε Χα$gr$ $gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ $gr$ετ$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ Χα$gr$ Θε$gr$.—Origen. Advers. Celsum. lib. 4.
• * 1.107

  Ezekiel xviii.
• 3 1.108

  Dictamina divini intellectus sanciuntur in leges apud ipsum valituras, per immutabilitatem harum perfectionum.—Cumberland de Leg. Naturœ, page 343.

  Solebam ipse quidem, cum aliis plurimis antequam dominii jurisque omnis originem universaliter et distincte considerassem; dominium Dei, in creationem velut integram ejus originem, resolvere. Verum quoniam, &c.—in hanc tandem concessi sententiam, dominium Dei esse jus vel potestatem ei a sua sapientia et bonitate, velut a lege, datam ad regimen eorum omnium quæ ab ipso unquam creata fuerint vel creabuntur.—Nec poterit quisquam merito conqueri, dominium Dei intra nimis angustos limites hac explicatione coerceri; qua hoc unum dicitur, illius nullam partem consistere in potestate quicquam faciendi contra finem optimum, bonum commune.—Idem, page 345, 346.

  Contrà autem, Hobbiana resolutio dominii divini in potentiam ejus irresistibilem adeo apertè ducit ad, &c.—ut mihi dubium non sit, illud ab eo fictum fuisse, Deoque attributum, in eum tantum finem, ut juri suo omnium in omnia patrocinaretur.—Id. page 344.

  Nos e contrario, fontem indicavimus, e quo demonstrari potest, justitiam universalem, omnemque adeo virtutem moralem, quæ in rectore requiritur, in Deo præ cæteris refulgere, eadem planè methodo, qua homines ad eas excolendas obligari ostendemus.—Id. page 347.
• * 1.109

  The law of nature obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of particular rewards and punishments.
• 1 1.110

  Dignæ itaque sunt, quæ propter intrinsecam sibi perfectionem appetantur, etiam si nulla esset naturæ lex, quæ illas imperaret.—Cumberland de Leg. Nat. page 281.
• 2 1.111

  $gr$ν$gr$ δ$gr$Χαι$gr$ζ $gr$στιν, $gr$ $gr$ μ$gr$ $gr$διΧ$gr$ν, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$στιζ $gr$διΧε$gr$ν δυν$gr$μεν$gr$ζ μ$gr$ β$gr$λεται, $gr$υ$gr$ $gr$ζ τ$gr$ μιΧ$gr$ λαμ$gr$νειν $gr$ντ$gr$σ$gr$ε$gr$, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ζ τ$gr$ μεγ$gr$λα Χα$gr$τε$gr$ε$gr$ μ$gr$ λαμ$gr$νων, $gr$Χειν δυν$gr$μεν$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ Χ$gr$ατε$gr$ν αζημ$gr$ωζ. $gr$υ$gr$ $gr$ζ γε τα$gr$τα π$gr$ντα διατη$gr$ε$gr$ μ$gr$ν$gr$ν, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$στιζ $gr$δ$gr$λ$gr$ν γνησ$gr$αν $gr$ $gr$ων φ$gr$σιν, $gr$ιναι δ$gr$Χαι$gr$ζ, $gr$ $gr$ δ$gr$Χε$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι $gr$λει.

  Philemonis Fragmenta.
• 1 1.112

  Honestum intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detractâ omni utilitate, sine ullis præmiis fructibusque, per seipsum possit jure laudari.—Cic de Finib. lib. 2.

  Atque hæc omnia propter se solum, ut nihil adjungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt.—Id. de Inventione, lib. 2.

  Nihil est de quo minus dubitare possit, quam et honesta expetenda per se, et, eodem modo, turpia per se esse fugienda.—Id. de Finib. lib. 3.
• 2 1.113

  Jus et omne honestum, sua sponte est expetendum. Etenim omnes viri boni, ipsam æquitatem et jus ipsum amant.—Id. de Legib. lib. 1.

  Optimi quique permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet quia rectum, quia honestum est etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident.—Id. de Finib. lib. 2.
• 3 1.114

  Satis enim nobis, (si modo aliquid in philosophia profecimus,) persuasum esse debet, si omnes Deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum.—Id. de Offic. lib. 3.

  Si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, quum aliquid divitiarum, potentiæ, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris; si id Diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus?—Id. ibid.
• 1 1.115

  Itaque si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletum testamenta nomen ejus irrepere, hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem unquam suspicaturum.—Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quis sit vir bonus, nescire fatetur.—Idem. de Offic. lib. 3.
• 2 1.116

  $gr$ν ε$gr$ μ$gr$ δυνατ$gr$ν ε$gr$η τα$gr$τα λαν$gr$νειν Χα$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ Χαι $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ζ, $gr$μωζ δ$gr$τ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι, τ$gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$ $gr$νεΧα $gr$να α$gr$τ$gr$ διΧαι$gr$σ$gr$νη π$gr$ζ $gr$διΧ$gr$αν α$gr$την Χ$gr$ι$gr$ε$gr$η.—Plato de Republ. lib. 10.
• * 1.117

  Yet it does not from thence at all follow, either that a good man ought to have no respect to rewards and punishments, or that rewards and punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the practice of virtue in this present world.
• 1 1.118

  Est autem unus dies bene et ex preceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponendus.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. l. 5.
• 1 1.119

  Quæro si duo sint, quorum alter optimus vir, æquissimus, summa justitia, singulari fide, alter insigni scelere et audacia; et si in eo sit errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum, sceleratum, facinorosum, nefarium putet; contra autem qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse summa probitate ac fide; proque hac opinione omnium civium, bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat; postremò jure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur: Contra autem, ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes denique copiæ conferantur, vir denique optimus omnium æstimatione, et dignissimus omni fortuna judicetur; Quis tandem erit tam demens qui dubitet utrum se esse malit?—Idem. de Republ. lib. 3, fragment.
• 1 1.120

  Cùm omnis ratio veri et boni ab ejus Omnipotentiâ dependeat.—Cartes. Epist. 6, partis secundœ.
• * 1.121

  The manifold absurdities of Mr Hobbes's doctrines concerning the original of right shown in particular.
• 1 1.122

  Ab æqualitate naturæ oritur unicuique ea, quæ cupit, acquirendi spes.—Leviath. c. 13.
• 2 1.123

  Natura dedit unicuique jus in omnia. Hoc est; in statu merè naturali, sive antequam homines ullis pactis sese invicem obstrinxissent, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque et in quoscunque libebat; et possidere, uti, frui omnibus, quæ volebat et poterat.—De Cive, c. 1. § 10.
• 1 1.124

  Si impossibile sit singulis, omnes et omnia sibimet subjicere; ratio quæ hunc finem proponit singulis, qui uni tantum contingere potest, sæpius quam millies proponeret impossibile, et semel tantum possible.—Cumberl, de Leg. Nat. page 217.
• 2 1.125

  Nec potest cujus quam jus seu libertas ab ulla lege relicta eo extendere, ut liceat oppugnare ea, quæ aliis eadem lege imperantur facienda.—Id. p. 219.
• 1 1.126

  Omnium adversus omnes, perpetuæ suspiciones,—Bellum omnium in omnes.—De Cive, c. 1. § 12.
• 2 1.127

  Spes unicuique securitatis conservationisque suæ in eo sita est, ut viribus artibusque propriis proximum suum, vel palam vel ex insidiis, præoccupare possit.—Ibid. c. 5. § 1.
• 3 1.128

  Securitatis viam meliorem habet nemo anticipatione.—Leviath. c. 13.
• 4 1.129

  See de Cive, c. 3. sec. 1.
• 1 1.130

  Unicuique licebat facere quæcunque libebat.—De Cive, c. 1. § 10.
• 2 1.131

  Consequens est, ut nihil dicendum sit injustum. Nomina justi et injusti, locum in hac conditione non habent.—Leviath. c. 13.
• 3 1.132

  Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur pactum.—Siquis alicui noceat, quozum nihil pactus est, damnum ei infert, non injuriam.—Etenim si is qui damnum recipit, injuriam expostularet; is qui fecit sic diceret, quid tu mihi? quare facerem ego tuo potius, quam meo libitu? &c. In qua ratione, ubi nulla intercesserunt pacta, non video quid sit quod possit reprehendi.—De Cive, c. 3, § 4.
• 1 1.133

  Prima et fundamentalis lex nuturæ est, quærendam esse pacem, ubi haberi potest, &c.—De Cive, c. 2. § 2.
• 2 1.134

  See De Cive. c. 2 and 3.
• 3 1.135

  Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, &c.
• 4 1.136

  Regulas boni et mali, justi et injusti, honesti et inhonesti, esse leges civiles; ideoque quod legislator præceperit, id pro bono, quod vetuerit, id pro malo habendum esse.—De Cive, c. 12. § 1.

  Quod actio justa vel injusta sit, a jure imperantis provenit. Reges legitimi quæ imperant, justa faciunt imperando; quæ vetant, vetando faciunt injusta.—De Cive, c. 12. § 1. [In which section it is worth observing, how he ridiculously interprets those words of Solomon,

  Dabis servo tuo cor docile ut possit discernere inter bonum et malum,

  to signify not his understanding or discerning, but his decreeing what shall be good, and what evil.]
• 1 1.137

  Si tamen lex civilis jubeat invadere aliquid, non est illud furtum, adulterium, &c.—De Cive, c. 14. sec. 10.
• 2 1.138

  Sequitur ergo, legibus illis, non occides, non mæchabere, non furabere, parentes honorabis; nihil aliud præcepisse Christum, quam ut cives et subditi suis principibus et summis imperatoribus in quæstionibus omnibus circa meum, tuum, suum, alienum, absolute obedirent.—De Cive, c. 17. § 10.
• 3 1.139

  Si quæratur an obediendum civitati sit, si imperetur Deum colere sub imagine, coram iis quid id fieri honorificum esse putant, certè faciendum est.—De Cive, cap. 15. § 18.
• 4 1.140

  Universaliter et in omnibus obedire obligamur.—De Cive, c. 14. § 10.

  Doctrina alia, quæ obedientiæ civili repugnat, est, quicquid faciat civis quicunque contra conscientiam suam, peccatum esse.—Leviath. c. 29.

  Opinio eorum qui docent, peccare subditos, quoties mandata principum suorum, quæ sibi injusta videntur esse, exsequuntur; et erronea est, et inter eas numeranda, quæ obedientiæ civili adversantur.—De Cive, c. 12, sec. 2.
• 5 1.141

  Concludendum est, legem naturæ semper et ubique obligare in foro interno, sive conscientia, non semper in foro externo, sed tum solummodo, cum secure id fieri possit.—De Cive, c. 3.
• 1 1.142

  Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur cur non sanciunt, ut quæ mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus?—Cicero de Legib. lib. 1.
• 2 1.143

  De Cive, c. 6. sec. 11.
• 3 1.144

  Ibid. c. 17. sec. 12.
• 4 1.145

  Ibid. c. 18. sec. 4.
• 5 1.146

  Neque enim an honorificè de Deo sentiendum sit neque an sit amandus, timendus, colendus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim hæc religionum per omnes gentes communia.—De Homine, cap. 14.
• 6 1.147

  Si is qui summum habet imperium, seipsum, imperantem dico, interficere alicui imperet, non tenetur. Neque parentem, &c. cùm filius mori quam vivere infamis atque exosus malit. Et alii casus sunt, cum mandata facta inhonesta sunt, &c.—De Cive, c. 6. sec. 13.
• 7 1.148

  Lex naturalis est pactis standum esse, sive fidem observandam esse.—De Cive, c. 3. sec. 1.
• 8 1.149

  Lex naturalis omnes leges civiles jubet observari.—Ibid. c. 14. sec. 10.
• 9 1.150

  Legem civilem, quæ non sit lata in contumeliam Dei (cujus respectu ipsæ civitates non sunt sui juris, nec dicuntur leges ferre, &c.)—De Cive, c. 14. sec. 10.

  Pacti violatio, &c.—See de Cive, c. 3. sec 3.
• 1 1.151

  See de Cive, c. 14. sec. 10.
• 2 1.152

  Est similitudo quædam inter id, quod in vita communi vocatur injuria, et id quod in scholis solet appellari absurdum. Quemadmodum enim is, qui argumentis cogitur ad negationem assertionis quam prius asseruerat, dicitur redigi ad absurdum; eodem modo is, qui præ animi impotentia facit vel omittit id quod se non facturum vel non omissurum pacto suo ante promiserat, injuriam facit; neque minus in contradictionem incidit, quam qui in scholis reducitur ad absurdum.—Est itaque injuria, absurditas, quædam in conversatione, sicut absurditas, injuria quædam est in disputatione.—De Cive, c. 3. sec. 3.
• 1 1.153

  Ex his sequitur, injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur pactum.—De Cive, c. 3. sec. 4. [Which whole section highly deserves to be read and well considered, as containing the secret of Mr Hobbes's whole scheme.]
• 2 1.154

  Itaque patet quod, si Hobbiana ratiocinatio esset valida, omnis simul legum civilium obligatio collaberetur; nec aliter fieri potest quin earum vis labefactetur ab omnibus principiis, quæ legum naturalium vim tollunt aut minuunt; quoniam his fundatur et regiminis civilis auctoritas ac securitas, et legum a civitatibus latarum vigor.—Cumberland de Leg. Nat. page 303.

  Etiam extra regimen civile, a malis omnigenis simul consideratis tutior erit, qui actibus externis leges naturæ constantissime observabet; quam qui, juxta doctrinam Hobbianam, vi aut insidiis alios omnes conando præoccupare, securitatem sibi quæsiverit.—Id. p. 304.
• 1 1.155

  Voluntas lædendi omnibus inest in statu naturæ.—De Cive, c. 1. sec. 4.
• 2 1.156

  In statu naturali, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque et in quoscunque libebat.—Ibid. sec. 10.
• 3 1.157

  Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri, hominibus violandis; quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat?—Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.
• 4 1.158

  $gr$δε δε δ$gr$Χαια $gr$ ε$gr$ναι τ$gr$πα$gr$παν φυσ$gr$—γ$gr$γν$gr$μενα τε$gr$νη Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ ν$gr$μ$gr$ζ, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ δ$gr$ τ$gr$νι φ$gr$σει.— φασΧ$gr$ντων ε$gr$ναι τ$gr$ διΧαι$gr$τατ$gr$ν, $gr$, τι τιζ $gr$ν νιΧ$gr$ βια$gr$μεν$gr$ζ. $gr$εν $gr$σε$gr$ $gr$ι τε Χα$gr$ στ$gr$σει$gr$ $gr$σην λ$gr$ην $gr$ν$gr$πων ν$gr$ων δ$gr$μ$gr$σ$gr$α π$gr$λεσ$gr$ τε Χα$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$ιζ $gr$Χ$gr$ιζ.—Plato de Leg. lib. 10.
• 1 1.159

  Homines libertatis et dominii per naturam amatores.—Leviath. c. 17.

  Nemini dubium esse debet, quin avidius ferrentur homines natura, sua si metus abesset, ad dominationem quàm ad societatem.—De Cive, c. 1. sec. 2.
• 2 1.160

  Homines inter se de honoribus et dignitatibus perpetuo contendunt, sed animalia illa [apes et formicæ] non item. Itaque inter homines invidia, odium, bellum, &c.—Leviath. c. 17.
• 1 1.161

  Inter animalia illa bonum publicum et privatum idem est.—Homini autem in bonis propriis nihil tam jucundum est, quam quod alienis sunt majora.—Ibid.
• 2 1.162

  Animantia quæ rationem non habent, nullum defectum vident vel videre se putant, in adminstratione suarum rerum publicarum. Sed in multitudine hominum, plurimi sunt qui præ cæteris sapere existimantes, conantur res novare; Et diversi novatores innovant diversis modis; id quod est distractio et bellum civile.—De Cive, c. 5. sec. 5.
• 3 1.163

  Animantia illa verborum arte illa carent, qua homines alii aliis videri faciunt bonum malum, et malum bonum; magnum parvum; et parvum magnum.—Leviath. c. 17.
• 4 1.164

  Animalia bruta, quamdiu bene sibi est, cæteris non invident: Homo autem tum maxime molestus est, quando otio opibusque maximè abundat.—Ibid.
• 5 1.165

  Consensio creaturarum illarum brutarum, naturalis est; hominum pactitia tantum, id est, artificiosa.—De Cive, c. 5. § 5.
• 6 1.166

  Regni divini naturalis jus derivatur ab eo, quod divinæ potentiæ resistere impossibile est.—Leviath. c. 31.

  In regno naturali, regnandi et puniendi eos qui leges suas violant, jus Deo est a sola potentia irresistibili.—De Cive, c. 15. sec. 5.

  Iis quorum potentiæ resisti non potest, et per consequens Deo omnipotenti, jus dominandi ab ipsa potentia derivatur.—Ibid.
• 1 1.167

  Nam quoniam Deus jus ad omnia habet, et jus Dei nihil aliud est quam ipsa Dei potentia, hinc sequitur, unamquamque rem naturalem tantum juris ex natura habere, quantum potentiæ habet.—Spinoz. de Monarch. cap. 2. [See also Tractat. Theolog. politic. cap. 16.]
• 2 1.168

  See Cumberland de Leg. Naturæ, locis supra citatis.
• 3 1.169

  See Hobbes, de Cive, c. 3. § 4.
• 4 1.170

  Quod si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifes tum est obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem. [To explain which, he adds in his note,]—Si cui durum hoc videbitur, illum rogo ut tacita cogitatione considerate velit, si essent duo omnipotentes, uter utri obedire obligaretur. Confitebitur, credo, neutrum neutri obligari. Hoc si verum est, verum quoque est quod posui, homines ideo Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt.—De Cive, c. 15. sec. 7.
• 1 1.171

  Ut enim omittam vim et naturam Deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse.—Cic de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
• * 1.172

  That moral duties are the positive will and command of God, proved from the consideration of the divine attributes.
• * 1.173

  Job xl. 9.
• * 1.174

  Hab. i. 13.
• * 1.175

  Mat. v. 45
• * 1.176

  Acts xiv. 17.
• * 1.177

  Mat. xviii. 24. 28.
• * 1.178

  Lu. vi. 36.
• * 1.179

  Mat. xi. 23.
• 1 1.180

  Ita principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei.—Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.

  Quæ vis non modo senior est quam ætas populorum et civitatum, sed æqualis illius cœlum atque terras tuentis et regentis Dei. Neque enim esse mens divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sanciendis habere.—Ibid.
• 2 1.181

  Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit, qui imitatus est.—Senee. Epist. 96.

  $gr$α$gr$ γ$gr$ δειν$gr$ν $gr$ν ε$gr$ν, ε$gr$ π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ δ$gr$α Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$υσ$gr$αζ $gr$π$gr$λ$gr$π$gr$σιν $gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$, $gr$λλ$gr$ μ$gr$ π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$υ$gr$, $gr$ν τιζ $gr$σι$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$Χαι$gr$ζ $gr$ τυγ$gr$νη. $gr$λλ$gr$ γε μ$gr$λλ$gr$ν, $gr$ ιμαι, $gr$ π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ π$gr$λυτελε$gr$ζ τα$gr$ταζ π$gr$μπ$gr$ζ τε Χα$gr$ $gr$υσ$gr$αζ.—Plato in Alcibiade, 2.

  Collitur autem, non taurornm opimis corporibus contrucidatis, nec auro argentove suspenso, nec in thesauros stipe infusa; sed pia et recta voluntate.—Senec. Epist. 116.
• * 1.182

  And from the consideration of the nature of God's creation.
• 1 1.183

  Mens humana non potest non judicare, esse longè credibilius, quod eadem constantissima voluntas, à qua hominibus datum est esse, pariter mallet ipsos porro esse et valere, hoc est, conservari et felicitate frui, quam illo deturbari de statu, in quo ipsos collocavit—Sic scilicet e voluntate creandi, cognoscitur voluntas conservandi tuendique homines. Ex hac autem innotescit obligatio, qui tenemur ad inserviendum eidem voluntati notæ.—Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 227.
• * 1.184

  And from the tendency of the practice of morality to the good and happiness of the whole world.
• 1 1.185

  Dubitari non potest, quin Deus, qui ita naturalem rerum omnium ordinem constituit, ut talia sint actionum humanarum consequentia erga ipsos auctores, fecitque ut ordinaria hæc consequentia ab ipsis præsciri possint, aut summa cum probabilitate expectari, voluerit hæc ab iis considerari, antequam ad agendum se accingerent; atque eos his provisis velut argumentis in legum sanctione contentis determinari,—Cumberl. de Leg. Nat. page 228.

  Rector seu causa prima rationalis, cujus voluntate res ita disponuntur, ut hommibus satis evidenter indicetur, actus quosdam illorum esse media necessaria ad finem ipsis necessarium; vult homines ad hos actus obligari, vel hos actus imperat.—Id. page 285.
• 1 1.186

  Pari sane ratione (ac in arithmeticis operationibus) doctrinæ moralis veritas fundatur in immutabili cohærentia inter felicitatem summam quam hominum vires assequi valent, et actus benevolentiæ universalis.—Id. page 23.
• * 1.187

  That the practice of virtue or vice must be attended with rewards and punishments, proved from the attributes of God.
• * 1.188

  And from the necessity there is, that there should be some vindication of the honour of God's laws and government.
• * 1.189

  1 Sam. ii. 30.
• * 1.190

  That, according to the original constitution of things, virtue and vice are attended with natural rewards and punishments.
• * 1.191

  But that now in this present world, the natural order of things is so perverted that vice often flourishes in great prosperity, and virtue falls under the greatest calamities of life.
• * 1.192

  That therefore there must needs be a future state of rewards and punishments.
• 1 1.193

  $gr$ι δε μ$gr$ λανθ$gr$νετ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ, $gr$ μεν δ$gr$Χαι$gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$φιλ$gr$ζ $gr$ν ε$gr$η, $gr$ δε $gr$διΧ$gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$μισ$gr$ζ—$gr$ δε $gr$ε$gr$φιλε$gr$, $gr$σα γε $gr$π$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ν γ$gr$γνεται, π$gr$ντα γ$gr$γνεται $gr$ζ $gr$ντε, $gr$ιστα.—$gr$υτωζ $gr$α $gr$π$gr$ληπτ$gr$ν πε$gr$ τ$gr$ διΧα$gr$ $gr$νδ$gr$ζ, $gr$ν $gr$ εν πεν$gr$α γ$gr$γνεται, $gr$αν $gr$ εν ν$gr$σ$gr$ιζ, $gr$ τινι $gr$λλ$gr$ τ$gr$ν δ$gr$Χ$gr$ντων ΧαΧ$gr$ν, $gr$ζ τ$gr$τ$gr$ τα$gr$τα ε$gr$ζ $gr$γα$gr$ν τι τελευτ$gr$σει ζ$gr$ντι $gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$αν$gr$ντι. $gr$υ γ$gr$ δη $gr$π$gr$ γε $gr$ε$gr$ν π$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$μελε$gr$ται, $gr$ζ $gr$ν π$gr$ $gr$υμε$gr$σ$gr$αι $gr$λ$gr$ δ$gr$Χαι$gr$ζ γ$gr$γνεσ$gr$αι, Χα$gr$ $gr$πιτηδευων $gr$ετην ε$gr$ζ $gr$σ$gr$ν δυνατ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ι$gr$σ$gr$αι $gr$ε$gr$.—Plato de Republ. lib. 10.
• * 1.194

  Of the Stoical opinion concerning the self-sufficiency of virtue to its own happiness.
• 1 1.195

  $gr$υΧ $gr$ ιδα $gr$πωζ μαΧα$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$λ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ μη$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$λα$gr$σανταζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ετ$gr$ζ $gr$γα$gr$ν, δ$gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ν δ$gr$ τα$gr$την $gr$π$gr$λλυμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ. —Dionys. Halicarn.
• 1 1.196

  Porro ipsa virtus, cum sibi bonorum culmen vendicet humanorum, quid hie agit nisi perpetua bella cum vitiis; nec exterioribus, sed interioribus; nec alienis, sed plane nostris et propriis?— Absit ergo, ut quamdiu in hoc bello intestino sumus, jam nos beatitudinem, ad quam vincendo volumus pervenire, adeptos esse credamus.—Augustin de Civitate Dei, lib. 19.c. 4.

  Non enim virtus ipsa est summum bonum, sed effectrix et mater est summi boni, quoniam perveniri ad illud sine virtute non potest.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• * 1.197

  From whence the certainty of a future state is again concluded.
• 1 1.198

  Ita sit, ut si ab illa rerum summa, quam superiùs comprehendimus, aberraveris; omnis ratio intereat, et ad nihilum omnia revertantur.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 2 1.199

  Non enim temerè, nec fortuito sati et creati sumns; sed profecto fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consuleret humano; nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum exantlavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum sempiternum.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 3 1.200

  Si sine causa gignimur, si in hominibus procreandis providentia nulla versatur, si casu nobismetipsis ae voluptatis nostræ gratia nascimur; si nihil post mortem sumus; quid potest esse tam supervacuum, tam inane, tam vanum, quam humana res est, quam mundus ipse?—Lactant. lib. 7.
• * 1.201

  Why the wisdom of God is not so clearly and plainly seen in his government of the moral, as in the fabric of the natural world.
• * 1.202

  Of the immortality of the soul and the natural proofs we have of it.
• 1 1.203

  Et primum quidem omni antiquitate, &c.—Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.
• 2 1.204

  Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. See also a letter to Mr Dodwell, with the several answers and replies.
• 1 1.205

  $gr$υ τ$gr$ι $gr$γωγε, $gr$ πα$gr$δεζ, $gr$δ$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ π$gr$π$gr$τε $gr$π$gr$ισ$gr$ην, $gr$ζ $gr$ ψυ$gr$, $gr$ωζ $gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$νητ$gr$ σ$gr$μα$gr$ $gr$, ζ$gr$ $gr$ταν δ$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$παλλαγ$gr$, τ$gr$θνηΧεν. $gr$υδ$gr$ γε $gr$πωζ $gr$φ$gr$ων $gr$σται $gr$ ψυ$gr$ $gr$πειδην τ$gr$ $gr$φ$gr$ν$gr$ζ σ$gr$μα$gr$ζ δ$gr$α γ$gr$νηται, $gr$δ$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ π$gr$πεισμαι. $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ταν $gr$Χα$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ Χα$gr$α$gr$ζ $gr$ ν$gr$ζ $gr$ΧΧ$gr$ι$gr$, τ$gr$τε Χα$gr$ φ$gr$νιμ$gr$τατ$gr$ν ε$gr$Χ$gr$ζ α$gr$τ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι.—Cyrus apud Xen.
• 2 1.206

  Quid multa? Sic mihi persuasi, sec sentio; quum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorum providentia, tot artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa; non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat, esse mortalem.

  —Cic. de Senectute.
• 3 1.207

  Quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; hæc divina sunt. Nec invenictur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo.—Idem. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 1 1.208

  Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen, ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum, et inventione, et celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscito.—Id. ibid.
• 2 1.209

  Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii qui à Platone et Socrate et ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur;) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit intelligent—Id. Ibid.
• 3 1.210

  —Si immortalis natura animi est, Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro; Quinque (ut opinor) eam faciundum est sensibus auctam: —At neque seorsum oculi, &c. Lucret. lib. 3.

  Quod autem corpus animæ per se? quæ materia? ubi cogitatio illi? quomodo visus? auditus? aut qui tangit? qui usus ejus? aut quod sine his bonum?—Plin. lib. 7.

  Neque aliud est quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis sit animus vacans corpore intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 1 1.211

  Quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore.—Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, quam qualis cum exierit.—Id. Ibid.
• 2 1.212

  Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, page 71.
• * 1.213

  The natural credibility of the soul's being immortal of great use to the wiser heathens.
• 1 1.214

  Sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 2 1.215

  Quod si in hoc error, quod animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo.—Idem de Senectute.
• 3 1.216

  His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, et supremo vitæ die, de hoc ipso multa disseruit; et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit.—Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit, duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum, e corpore excedentium, &c.—Id. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.

  See also the passage of Sophocles, cited above.
• 4 1.217

  O præclarum diem, quum in illud animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, et quum ex hac turba et colluvione discedam!—Idem de Senect.
• 1 1.218

  $gr$ π$gr$ντα π$gr$ιε$gr$ν, $gr$στε $gr$ετ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ φ$gr$ν$gr$σεωζ $gr$ν τ$gr$ β$gr$ μετασ$gr$ε$gr$ν Χαλ$gr$ν γ$gr$ τ$gr$ αθλ$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$ $gr$λπ$gr$ζ μεγ$gr$λη.—Plato in Phædone.
• 2 1.219

  $gr$α$gr$ μεν τ$gr$ γε μ$gr$γιστα $gr$π$gr$ει$gr$α $gr$ετ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ π$gr$Χ$gr$ιμενα $gr$θλα $gr$ διεληλ$gr$θαμεν. —$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ε γε $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$ $gr$ω μ$gr$γα γ$gr$ν$gr$ιτ$gr$;; π$gr$ζ γ$gr$ $gr$τ$gr$ζ γε $gr$ ενπ$gr$ιδ$gr$ζ μ$gr$ι π$gr$εσβ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$ζ π$gr$ζ π$gr$ντα $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$ζ π$gr$ τιζ $gr$ν ε$gr$η.—Plato de Republ. lib. 10.
• 3 1.220

  $gr$α$gr$τα τ$gr$νυν $gr$δ$gr$ν $gr$στι πλ$gr$ει $gr$δ$gr$ μεγ$gr$ει π$gr$ζ $gr$Χε$gr$να $gr$ τελευτ$gr$σαντα $gr$Χ$gr$τε$gr$ν πε$gr$ιμ$gr$νει.—Idem, ibid.
• 4 1.221

  $gr$ μεν $gr$α ν$gr$Χηζ $gr$νεΧα π$gr$ληζ Χα$gr$ δ$gr$μων Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ι$gr$των, $gr$τ$gr$λμησ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$εσθαι.—$gr$ δε $gr$μ$gr$τε$gr$ι π$gr$ιδεζ $gr$δυνατ$gr$σ$gr$σι Χα$gr$τε$gr$ε$gr$ν, π$gr$λ$gr$ Χαλλι$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$νεΧα ν$gr$Χηζ.—Plato de Legib. lib. 8.
• * 1.222

  The argument for a future state drawn from men's natural desire of immortality.
• * 1.223

  Another drawn from men's conscience or judgment of-their own actions. Rom. ii. 14, 15.
• * 1.224

  Another drawn from man's being by nature an accountable creature.
• 1 1.225

  $gr$α$gr$τηζ τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$Χηζ $gr$τε σ$gr$ μ$gr$π$gr$τε, $gr$τε $gr$ι $gr$λλ$gr$ζ $gr$τυηζ γεν$gr$μεν$gr$ζ $gr$πε$gr$ξηται πε$gr$ιγεν$gr$σ$gr$αι $gr$ε$gr$ν.— $gr$υ γ$gr$ $gr$μελη$gr$σ$gr$ π$gr$ $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$τω σμιΧ$gr$ζ $gr$ν, δ$gr$σ$gr$ Χατ$gr$ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ζ β$gr$ $gr$δευ $gr$ψηλ$gr$ζ γεν$gr$μεν$gr$ζ, ε$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$αν$gr$ν $gr$ναπτ$gr$σ$gr$ τ$gr$σειζ δε α$gr$τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν π$gr$ησ$gr$Χ$gr$σαν τιμω$gr$αν, ε$gr$ $gr$ $gr$νθ$gr$δε μ$gr$νων, ε$gr$τε Χα$gr$ ει $gr$δ$gr$ διαπ$gr$εν$gr$ε$gr$ζ, $gr$ε Χα$gr$ τ$gr$των $gr$ιζ $gr$γι$gr$τε$gr$ν $gr$τι διαΧ$gr$μισ$gr$ε$gr$ζ τ$gr$π$gr$ν.—Plato de Legib. lib. 10.
• * 1.226

  Men hindered from discovering and understanding religious truths, by carelessness and want of attention.
• 1 1.227

  Multis signis natura declarat quid velit;—obsurdescimus tamen, nescio quomodo, nec audimus.—Cic. de Amicit.
• * 1.228

  And by early prejudices and false notions.
• 2 1.229

  Si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere, eâque optimâ duce cursum vitæ conficere possemus; haud esset sanè quod quisquam rationem et doctrinam requireret. Nunc vero, &c.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 3.

  Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravatis sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat.—Simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa opinionum perversitate, versamur; ut pene cum lacte nutricis, errorem suxisse videamur. Cum vero parentibus redditi, deinde magistris traditi sumus; tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, et opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat.—Cum vero accedit eodem, quasi maximus quidem magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a naturaque ipsa desciscimus.—Ibid.
• * 1.230

  And by sensual appetites, passions, and worldlybusiness.
• 1 1.231

  $gr$τι δ$gr$ $gr$Χ νηπ$gr$ π$gr$σιν $gr$μ$gr$ν συντ$gr$απται [$gr$δ$gr$ν$gr$] δι$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$αλεπ$gr$ν απ$gr$τ$gr$ψασθαι τ$gr$τ$gr$ τ$gr$ π$gr$θ$gr$ζ, $gr$γΧε$gr$ωσμ$gr$ν$gr$ν τ$gr$ β$gr$.—Arislot. Ethic. lib. 2. c. 2.
• 1 1.232

  Vitia de mercede sollicitant; avaritia pecuniam promittit: luxuria multas ac varias voluptates; ambitio purpuram et plausum; et ex hoc potentiam, et quicquid potentia ponit.—Senec. Epist. 59.

  $gr$δε δε $gr$σμεν, $gr$τι τα$gr$τα τ$gr$ π$gr$θη $gr$ν $gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$ν νε$gr$α $gr$ μ$gr$ινθ$gr$ τινεζ εν$gr$σαι, σπ$gr$σ$gr$ τε $gr$μαζ Χα$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$λαιζ $gr$νθ$gr$λΧ$gr$σιν, $gr$ναντ$gr$αι $gr$σαι $gr$ $gr$ναντ$gr$αζ π$gr$ξειζ.—Plato de Legib. lib. 1.
• 2 1.233

  —Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.
• 3 1.234

  $gr$δ$gr$ξε δ$gr$, Χα$gr$ ν$gr$ν $gr$τι δ$gr$Χε$gr$, τ$gr$ μ$gr$ν $gr$λλα $gr$πιτηδε$gr$ματα π$gr$ντα, $gr$ σφ$gr$δ$gr$α $gr$αλεπ$gr$ ε$gr$να$gr$ τ$gr$ δ$gr$ τ$gr$να τ$gr$π$gr$ν $gr$ γ$gr$γνεσθαι $gr$ηστ$gr$ζ $gr$νθ$gr$π$gr$ζ, παγ$gr$λεπ$gr$ν.—Plato in Epinomide.
• 4 1.235

  φ$gr$νησιν δ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ληθε$gr$ζ δ$gr$ξαζ βε$gr$αι$gr$ν, $gr$υτυ$gr$ζ $gr$τ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ζ τ$gr$ γ$gr$αζ πα$gr$εγ$gr$νετ$gr$.—Id. de Legib. lib. 1.
• * 1.236

  And above all, by vicious habits and practices.
• * 1.237

  Rom. i. 19, &c.
• * 1.238

  Eph. iv. 18. 19.
• 1 1.239

  Justos natura esse factos;—tantam autem esse corruptelam malæ consuetudinis, ut ab ea tanquam igniculi extinguantur a natura dati, exorianturque et confirmentur vitia contraria.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• * 1.240

  Wherefore men have great need to be taught and instructed in matters of religion.
• * 1.241

  Rom. vii. 23.
• 1 1.242

  Quidam ad magnificas voces excitantur, et transeunt in affectum dicentium, alacres vultu et animo. Rapit illos instigatque rerum pulchritudo.—Juvat protinus quæ audias, facere. Afficiuntur illi, et sunt quales jubentur, si illa animo forma permaneat, si non impetum insignem protinus populus honesti dissuasor excipiat. Pauci illam quam conceperant mentem, domum perferre potuerunt.—Senec. Epist. 109.
• * 1.243

  The great use and necessity of an order of preachers.
• 1 1.244

  $gr$υδ$gr$ν γ$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ π$gr$ττων $gr$γ$gr$ πε$gr$ι$gr$μαι, $gr$ πε$gr$θων $gr$μ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ νεωτ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ π$gr$εσ$gr$υτ$gr$ζ μ$gr$τε σωμ$gr$των $gr$πιμελε$gr$σ$gr$αι, μ$gr$τε $gr$ηματων π$gr$τε$gr$ν, μ$gr$τε $gr$λλ$gr$ τιν$gr$ζ.$gr$τω σφ$gr$δ$gr$α, $gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ ψυ$gr$ζ, $gr$πωζ $gr$ζ $gr$στη $gr$στα$gr$ λ$gr$γων, $gr$τι $gr$Χ $gr$Χ $gr$ημ$gr$των $gr$ $gr$ετ$gr$ γ$gr$νεται, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ξ $gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$ματα Χα$gr$ τ$gr$λλα ταγα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ιζ $gr$παντα, Χα$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$ Χα$gr$ δημ$gr$σ$gr$.—Plato in Apol. Socrat.
• * 1.245

  Who seem to have been designed by Providence to bear witness against the wickedness of the nations wherein they lived.
• 1 1.246

  $gr$α$gr$ $gr$ι μετ$gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$υ βι$gr$σαν$gr$εζ, $gr$ιστιαν$gr$ι ε$gr$σι, Χ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ι $gr$ν$gr$μ$gr$σ$gr$ησα$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$λλησι μεν σωΧ$gr$τηζ Χα$gr$ $gr$Χλειτ$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ $gr$ι $gr$μ$gr$ι$gr$ι α$gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$ν βα$gr$ιζ δ$gr$ $gr$α$gr$μ, &c.—Justin, Apolog. 2.
• 2 1.247

  $gr$α δ$gr$ Χα$gr$ π$gr$ηγ$gr$υμ$gr$νωζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλησιν $gr$δ$gr$η $gr$ φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$α τ$gr$τε, π$gr$ν $gr$ τ$gr$ν Χ$gr$ι$gr$ν Χαλ$gr$σαι Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$λληνα$gr$ $gr$παιδαγ$gr$γει γ$gr$ Χα$gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$λληνιΧ$gr$ν, $gr$ζ $gr$ ν$gr$μ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$α$gr$υζ ε$gr$ζ $gr$ιστ$gr$ π$gr$πα$gr$ασΧευ$gr$ζει τ$gr$ινυν $gr$ φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$α, π$gr$δ$gr$π$gr$ι$gr$σα τ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ $gr$ιστ$gr$ τελει$gr$μεν$gr$ν.—Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1.
• 1 1.248

  $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ γ$gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ζ τα$gr$τα, Χα$gr$ $gr$σα Χαλ$gr$ζ λ$gr$λ$gr$Χται, $gr$φαν$gr$ωσε.—Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.
• * 1.249

  But yet none of these men were ever able to reform the world with any considerable success.
• * 1.250

  Rom. i, 21—28.
• 1 1.251

  Egregium sanctumque virum si cerno, bimembri
  Hoc monstrum puero, vel miranti sub aratro
  Piscibus inventis, et fœtæ comparo mulæ.Juvenal, Sat. 13.

  See also the places cited a little below.
• 2 1.252

  Sint licet perhonesti;—sed audire deposcimus quot sint aut fuerint numero.—Unus, duo, tres.—At genus humanum non ex bonis pauculis, sed ex cæteris omnibus æstimari convenit.—Arnob. advers. Gentes, lib. 2.

  Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, maledicus, efficinatus, paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam. Da libidinosum, &c.—Numquis hæc philosophorum aut unquam præstitit, aut præstare, si velit, potest?—Lactant. lib. 3.

  πα$gr$ μ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλητιν $gr$ ιζ τιζ φ$gr$ιδων Χα$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$ιδα ε$gr$ δε$gr$τε$gr$ζ, &c.—Origen advers. Cels. lib. 1.
• 1 1.253

  $gr$α$gr$τα λ$gr$γισμ$gr$ λα$gr$ν, $gr$συ$gr$αν $gr$omega;ν Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ π$gr$τ$gr$ων, $gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$ειμ$gr$νι Χ$gr$νι$gr$τ$gr$ Χα$gr$ ζ$gr$ληζ $gr$π$gr$ πνε$gr$ματ$gr$ζ φε$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$υ, $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ι$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$στ$gr$ζ $gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλ$gr$ζ Χαταπιμπλαμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ, $gr$ν$gr$μ$gr$αζ, $gr$γαπ$gr$ ε$gr$ πη α$gr$τ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$α$gr$ζ $gr$διΧ$gr$αζ τζ Χα$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$σ$gr$ων $gr$γων, τ$gr$ντε, $gr$ν$gr$δε β$gr$ν βι$gr$σεται, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$παλλαγ$gr$ν, α$gr$τ$gr$ μιτ$gr$ Χαλ$gr$ζ $gr$λπ$gr$δ$gr$ζ $gr$δε$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$υμεν$gr$ζ $gr$παλλ$gr$ξεται.—Plato de Republ. lib. 6.
• * 1.254

  Because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves about that excellent work.
• 1 1.255

  $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ι π$gr$λλ$gr$ τα$gr$τα μεν $gr$ π$gr$τ$gr$σι$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ δε τ$gr$ν λ$gr$γ$gr$ν Χαταφε$gr$γ$gr$ντεζ $gr$νται $gr$ιλ$gr$σ$gr$φε$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$τωζ $gr$σεσ$gr$αι σπ$gr$υδα$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ι$gr$ν τε π$gr$ι$gr$ντεζ τ$gr$ζ Χ$gr$μν$gr$υσιν, $gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ατ$gr$ν $gr$Χ$gr$υσι μ$gr$ν $gr$πιμελ$gr$ζ; π$gr$ι$gr$σι $gr$ $gr$εν τ$gr$ν π$gr$στασσ$gr$μ$gr$νων, $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ $gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$ι ε$gr$ $gr$ξ$gr$υσι τ$gr$ σ$gr$μα, $gr$τω $gr$ε$gr$απευ$gr$μεν$gr$ $gr$ $gr$τ$gr$ι τ$gr$ν ψυ$gr$ν, $gr$των φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$ντεζ.—Arislot. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 3.
• 2 1.256

  Inclusos [philosophos] in angulis, facienda præcipere, quæ ne ipsi quidem faciunt qui loquuntur, linguæ et quoniam se a veris actibus removerunt, apparet eos exercendæ causa, vel advocandi gratia, artem ipsam philosophiæ reperisse.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 1 1.257

  Sed hæc eadem num censes apud cos ipsos valere, nisi admodum paucos, a quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat; qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem scientiæ, sed legem vitæ putet, qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis suis pareat? videre licet multos, libidinum servos, &c.—Cic. Tusculan. Quœst. lib. 2.
• * 1.258

  And those few of the philosophers, who did indeed sincerely endeavour to reform mankind, were yet themselves entirely ignorant of some doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great end.
• 2 1.259

  Errant ergo velut in mari magno, nec quo ferantur intelligunt; quia nec viam cernunt nec ducem sequuntur.—Lactant. lib. 6.
• 1 1.260

  Ex cæteris philosophis, nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque confitetur, multa se ignorare; et multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda?—Cic. Tusc. Quest. 3.
• 2 1.261

  $gr$ν β$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$εια.
• 3 1.262

  Tui ergo te, Cicero, libri arguunt, quam nihil a philosophia disci possit ad vitam. Hæc tua verba sunt, mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam cæci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa, quæ aliqua ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 4 1.263

  $gr$σπε$gr$ γ$gr$ Χ$alpha;$gr$ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ν νυΧτε$gr$δων $gr$μματα π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ φ$gr$γγ$gr$ζ $gr$ει τ$gr$ με$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$αν, $gr$τω Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$μετ$gr$αζ ψυ$gr$ζ $gr$ ν$gr$ζ π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ φ$gr$σει φανε$gr$τατα π$gr$ντων.—Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 2. c. 1.
• 5 1.264

  $gr$ν μ$gr$ν $gr$ν π$gr$ιητ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ πατ$gr$α τ$gr$δε τ$gr$ παντ$gr$ζ ε$gr$ε$gr$ν τε $gr$γ$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ ε$gr$ντα λ$gr$γειν ε$gr$ζ π$gr$νταζ $gr$δ$gr$νατ$gr$ν.—Plato in Timœo.

  Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissensio.—Cic. de Natura Deor. lib. 1.
• 6 1.265

  Utinam tam facilè vera invenire possem, quam falsa convincere.—Id. ibid.
• 1 1.266

  $gr$π$gr$ $gr$υξ$gr$μεν$gr$ζ με$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$.—$gr$α$gr$ μ$gr$ι δ$gr$σ$gr$ατ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ τιζ τ$gr$π$gr$ζ φα$gr$νεται Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$σΧι$gr$ $gr$σ$tau;ιν $gr$ν σΧ$gr$τειν$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ δυσδιε$gr$ε$gr$νητ$gr$ζ.—Plato de Republ. lib. 4.
• 2 1.267

  See Plato in Apologia Socratis.
• * 1.268

  Particularly they were very ignorant in what manner God might be acceptably worshipped.
• 3 1.269

  Lactantius observes that Socrates himself, at the conclusion of one of the bravest discourses that ever was made by any philosopher, superstitiously ordered a sacrifice to be offered for him to Æsculapius. But herein Lactantius was certainly mistaken; for Socrates undoubtedly spake this in mockery of Æsculapius, looking upon death as his truest deliverance.

  $gr$ιπεν, $gr$ δ$gr$ τελευτα$gr$ν $gr$φ$gr$γξατ$gr$ $gr$ $gr$των, τ$gr$ $gr$σΧληπι$gr$ $gr$φε$gr$λ$gr$μεν $gr$λεΧτ$gr$υ$gr$ν$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$δ$gr$τε, Χα$gr$ μ$gr$ $gr$μελ$gr$σητε.—Plato in Phœdone.

  Illud vero nonne summæ vanitatis, quod ante mortem familiares suos rogavit, ut Æsculapio gallum, quem voverat, pro se sacrarent?—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 1 1.270

  π$gr$τ$gr$ν μεν, φαμ$gr$ν, τιμ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ με$gr$ $gr$λυμπ$gr$ζ τε Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ τυν π$gr$λιν $gr$νταζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ, τ$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$ιζ $gr$ν τιζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$τια Χα$gr$ δε$gr$τε$gr$α Χα$gr$ $gr$ιστε$gr$ ν$gr$μων, $gr$τα$gr$α τ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$υσ$gr$ειαζ σΧ$gr$π$gr$ τυγ$gr$ν$gr$ι.—$gr$ετ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ δε τ$gr$σδε, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ δα$gr$μ$gr$σιν $gr$ $gr$μφ$gr$ν $gr$γι$gr$ζ$gr$ι$gr$ $gr$ν.—$gr$παΧ$gr$λ$gr$ε$gr$ $gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ζ $gr$δ$gr$ματα $gr$δια πατ$gr$ων $gr$ε$gr$ν Χατ$gr$ ν$gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$γιαζ$gr$μενα.—Plato de Legib. lib. 4.
• 2 1.271

  $gr$ζ μ$gr$ν γ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ν $gr$ντεζ σαφ$gr$ζ, τιμ$gr$με$gr$ τ$gr$ν δε ε$gr$Χ$gr$ναζ $gr$γ$gr$λματα $gr$δ$gr$υσ$gr$μεν$gr$ι, $gr$ζ $gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$γ$gr$λλ$gr$σι, Χα$gr$πε$gr$ $gr$ψ$gr$υζ $gr$νταζ, $gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$υζ $gr$γ$gr$με$gr$α, τ$gr$ζ $gr$μψ$gr$υζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ π$gr$λλ$gr$ν δι$gr$ ταυ$gr$ $gr$υν$gr$ιαν Χα$gr$ $gr$ιν $gr$ειν.—Plato de Legib. lib. 11.
• 3 1.272

  $gr$ πλ$gr$τωνι $gr$Χ $gr$πι$gr$νωζ μ$gr$ν ε$gr$ημ$gr$να, $gr$ μ$gr$ν $gr$α$gr$ δι$gr$εντ$gr$ τ$gr$ν φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$ν $gr$ξ$gr$ωζ Χ$gr$ν $gr$υτ$gr$ $gr$ναστ$gr$αφ$gr$ναι $gr$ν τ$gr$ π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν π$gr$ιητην τ$gr$ν $gr$λων $gr$υσε$gr$ια, $gr$ν $gr$ν μ$gr$ ν$gr$θε$gr$ειν, μηδ$gr$ μι$gr$ινειν τ$gr$ ε$gr$δωλ$gr$λατ$gr$ε$gr$α.—Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.
• 4 1.273

  A patribus acceptos Deos placet coli.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.
• 5 1.274

  Item illud ex institutis pontificum et aruspicum non mutandum est, quibus hostiis immolandum cuique Deo.—Id. ibid.
• 6 1.275

  Nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammâsse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent Deos, quorum hic mundus omnis templum esset et domus. Melius Græci atque nostri, qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos, quas nos urbes incolere voluerunt.—Id ibid.
• 7 1.276

  Video te, Cicero, terrena et manufacta venerari. Vana esse intelligis, et tamen eadem facis quæ faciunt ipsi quos ipse stultisssimos confiteris.—Si libenter errant etiam ii, qui errare se sentiunt quanto magis vulgus indoctum?—Lactant. lib. 2.
• 1 1.277

  σπ$gr$ιδειν δε Χα$gr$ $gr$ειν, Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$εσ$gr$αι Χατ$gr$ τ$gr$ π$gr$τ$gr$ια $gr$Χ$gr$στ$gr$ π$gr$σ$gr$Χει—Epict. cap. 38.
• * 1.278

  And in what method God would be reconciled to returning sinners.
• 1 1.279

  See Plato's Alcibiades 2. throughout.
• * 1.280

  And other doctrines absolutely necessary in order to reform mankind, the best philosophers were very doubtful and uncertain about.
• 2 1.281

  Præterea nihil apud eos certi est, nihil quod à scientia veniat;—et nemo paret, quia nemo $word$ incertum laborare.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 1 1.282

  $gr$μ$gr$ μ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$γαν$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$, $gr$μ$gr$ν βιωσ$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ι$gr$ $gr$π$gr$τε$gr$ι δε $gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$νται $gr$π$gr$ $gr$μειν$gr$ν τ$gr$γμα, $gr$δηλ$gr$ν παντ$gr$ πλην $gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ε.—Plato in Apolog, Socr.
• 2 1.283

  Quod præter Deos negat scire quenquam, scit ipse, utrum melius sit, nam dixit antè. Sed suum illud, nihil ut affirmet, tenet ad extremum.—Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.
• 3 1.284

  $gr$ν δε $gr$ υ $gr$στε $gr$τι πα$gr$ $gr$νδ$gr$αζ τε $gr$λπ$gr$ζω $gr$φ$gr$ξεσ$gr$αι $gr$λα$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$Χ μ$gr$ν $gr$ν π$gr$νυ δι$gr$σ$gr$υ$gr$ισα$gr$μην.—Plato in Phœd.
• 4 1.285

  $gr$ι δε$gr$ α$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$π$gr$δημ$gr$σα$gr$ $gr$στιν $gr$ $gr$νατ$gr$ζ $gr$νθ$gr$νδε ε$gr$ζ $gr$λλ$gr$ν τ$gr$π$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$λη$gr$ $gr$στι τ$gr$ λεγ$gr$μενα, $gr$ζ $gr$α $gr$Χε$gr$ ε$gr$σι π$gr$ντεζ $gr$ τε$gr$νε$gr$τεζ, &c.—Plato in Apolog. Socrat.
• 5 1.286

  § Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa nt sint et fixa quæ dixero, sed ut homunculus unus è multis, probabilia conjectura sequens. Ultra enim quò progrediar, quam ut verisimilia videam, non habeo.—Cic. Tusc. Quœst. lib. 1.
• 6 1.287

  Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ verisimillima, magna quæstio est.—Id. ibid.
• 1 1.288

  Etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim sæpe aliquo acutè concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.—Id ibid.
• 2 1.289

  Nescio quomodo, dum lego, assentior, cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur.—Id ibid.
• 3 1.290

  Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, tam gratissimam [animæ immortalitatem] promittentium magis quam probantimm.—Senec. Epist. 102.

  Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia Socratis, de industria venerat consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis.—Tertullian de Anima.
• * 1.291

  And those things which they were indeed certain of, yet they were not able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough.
• 1 1.292

  Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiæ contineat, tamen collata cum horum [qui rempublicam gubernant] actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum oblectationem quandam otii.—Cic. de Repub. Fragm.
• 2 1.293

  Est, inquit Cicero, philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa, fugiens.—Maximum itaque argumentum est, philosophiam quod neque ad sapientiam tendere, neque ipsam esse sapientiam, quod mysterium ejus, barba tantum celebratur et pallio.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 3 1.294

  $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$ζ μεν $gr$νησεν $gr$ πε$gr$Χαλλ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$πιτετηδευμ$gr$νη πλ$gr$των$gr$ζ λ$gr$ξιζ, $gr$λ$gr$ναζ δ$gr$ $gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$υτελ$gr$στε$gr$ν $gr$μα Χα$gr$ π$gr$αγματιΧ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$στ$gr$ασμ$gr$νωζ τ$gr$ν π$gr$λλ$gr$ν διδαξ$gr$ντων Χα$gr$ γ$gr$αψ$gr$ντω$gr$ $gr$στι γ$gr$ν $gr$δ$gr$ιν, τ$gr$ν μεv;ν πλ$gr$τωνα εν $gr$ε$gr$σι τ$gr$ν δ$gr$Χ$gr$ντων ε$gr$ναι φιλ$gr$λ$gr$γων μ$gr$ν$gr$ν.—Orig. Advers. Cels. lib. 6.

  $gr$γ$gr$ιΧ$gr$τε$gr$ν $gr$ιπ$gr$ν $gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ζ, $gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ντι τ$gr$ν $gr$ιτ$gr$ν$gr$ σ$gr$ λα$gr$ν $gr$φεζ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$τι$gr$ν, βιωφελ$gr$στε$gr$ν ΧεΧ$gr$νηΧε τ$gr$ν λ$gr$γ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ πα$gr$στησεν $gr$τωζ $gr$ιπ$gr$ν, $gr$ $gr$ζ $gr$ν τ$gr$ $gr$τωνι πλ$gr$των, $gr$ μη$gr$ $gr$Χ$gr$ιν $gr$δι$gr$ται δ$gr$νανται, $gr$λλ$gr$ μ$gr$γιζ $gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$γΧ$gr$Χλια π$gr$ζ τηζ σεμν$gr$ζ $gr$λλ$gr$νων φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$ζ μεμα$gr$ηΧ$gr$τεζ—Id. lib. 7.
• 1 1.295

  $gr$Χ $gr$τι $gr$λλ$gr$τ$gr$ι$gr$ $gr$σ$gr$ι τ$gr$ πλ$gr$των$gr$ζ διδαγμ$gr$τα τ$gr$ $gr$ιστ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$τι $gr$Χ $gr$στι π$gr$ντη $gr$μ$gr$ια, $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$λλων.—$gr$Χαστ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ, $gr$π$gr$ μ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ σπε$gr$ματιΧ$gr$ $gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$ τ$gr$ συ$gr$γεν$gr$ζ $gr$ν, Χαλ$gr$ζ $gr$φ$gr$γξατ$gr$. $gr$ δε τ$gr$ναντ$gr$α α$gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$ν Χυ$gr$ιωτ$gr$ιζ $gr$ι$gr$ηΧ$gr$τεζ, $gr$Χ $gr$πιστ$gr$μην τ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$π$gr$ν Χα$gr$ γν$gr$σιν τ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$λε$gr$τ$gr$ν φα$gr$ν$gr$νται $gr$σ$gr$ηΧ$gr$ναι.—Justin. Apolog. 1.
• 2 1.296

  Nec quid defendere debeant, scientes; nec quid refutare. Incursantque passim sine delectu omnia quæ asserunt, quicunque dissentiunt.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 1 1.297

  Totam igitur veritatem, et omne divinæ religionis arcanum philosophi attigerunt. Sed aliis refellentibus, defendere id, quod invenerant, nequiverunt; quia singulis ratio non quadravit; nec ea quæ vera senserant, in summam redigere potuerunt.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 2 1.298

  Quam summam, quia philosophi non comprehenderunt, nec veritatem comprehendere potuerunt, quamvis ea ferè, quibus summa ipsa constat, et viderint et explicaverint. Sed diversi ac diversè illa omnia protulerunt, non annectentes nec causas rerum, nec consequentias, nec rationes; ut summam illam, quæ continet universa, et compingerent et complerent.—Lactant. lib. 7.

  Quod si extitisset aliquis qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum, ac redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret à nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verùm autem non nisi ejus scire est, qui sit doctus a Deo.—Id. ibid.
• * 1.299

  And those things which they were able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, yet they had not sufficient authority to enforce in practice.
• 1 1.300

  Platonis documenta quamvis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum habent firmitatis ad probandam et implendam veritatem.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 2 1.301

  Quid ergo? nihilne illi [philosophi] simile præcipiunt? Imo permulta, et ad verum frequenter accedunt. Sed nihil ponderis habent illa præcepta, quia sunt humana, et auctoritate majori, id est, divina illa carent. Nemo igitur credit, quia tam se hominem putat esse qui audit, quam est ille qui præcipit.—Lactant. lib. 3.
• 3 1.302

  $gr$ιπ$gr$ιμι $gr$ $gr$ν $gr$λη$gr$ε$gr$ειν, τ$gr$υζ δυνη$gr$νταζ δια$gr$ε$gr$ναι τ$gr$ζ $gr$Χ$gr$ατ$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$εγ$gr$μ$gr$νων $gr$τω βι$gr$νταζ, $gr$ζ τ$gr$των $gr$τωζ $gr$ντων. διατ$gr$ενται $gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ιστιαν$gr$ πε$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ν Χαλ$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ μ$gr$λλ$gr$ντ$gr$ζ α$gr$ν$gr$ζ. —δειΧν$gr$τω $gr$ν Χα$gr$ Χ$gr$λσ$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$ β$gr$λ$gr$μεν$gr$ζ, τ$gr$εζ διετ$gr$η$gr$αν πε$gr$ α$gr$ων$gr$ων Χ$gr$λ$gr$σεων, $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ν τελετ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ μυσταγωγ$gr$ν.—Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 8.

  πα$gr$ μ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλησιν ε$gr$ζ τιζ φα$gr$δων, Χα$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$δα $gr$ι δε$gr$τε$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ ε$gr$ζ π$gr$λ$gr$μων, μετα$gr$αλ$gr$ντεζ $gr$π$gr$ $gr$σ$gr$τ$gr$υ Χα$gr$ μ$gr$θη$gr$τ$gr$τ$gr$υ β$gr$ $gr$φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φησα$gr$ πα$gr$ δε τ$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$, $gr$ μ$gr$ν$gr$ν τ$gr$τε $gr$ δ$gr$δεΧα, $gr$λ$gr$ α$gr$ε$gr$ Χα$gr$ π$gr$λλαπλασ$gr$ζ $gr$τινεζ γεν$gr$μεν$gr$ι σωφ$gr$νων $gr$ζ.—Idem, lib. 3.

  Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, &c. Numquis hæc philosophorum, &c.—Lactant, lib. 3. See this passage cited above.
• 1 1.303

  σωΧ$gr$τει μ$gr$ν γ$gr$ $gr$δε$gr$ζ $gr$πιστε$gr$η $gr$πε$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ τ$gr$ δ$gr$γματ$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$ν$gr$σΧειν. $gr$ιστ$gr$ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ σωΧ$gr$τ$gr$υζ $gr$π$gr$ μ$gr$υζ γνωσ$gr$εντι $gr$ φιλ$gr$σ$gr$φ$gr$ι $gr$δε φιλ$gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$ι μ$gr$ν$gr$ν $gr$πε$gr$σ$gr$ησαν, $gr$λλ$gr$ Χα$gr$ παντελ$gr$ζ $gr$δι$gr$ται Χα$gr$ δ$gr$ξηζ Χα$gr$ φ$gr$υ Χα$gr$ $gr$αν$gr$τ$gr$υ Χαταφ$gr$ν$gr$σαντεζ.—Justin. Apolog. I.
• 2 1.304

  Nam si, consensu omnium philosophorum, sapientiam nemo assequitur; in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optimè consultum à Diis immortalibus dicitis. Nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit valere; sic non intelligo quid intersit, utrum nemo sit sapiens, an nemo esse possit.—Cic, de Natura Deor. lib. 3.
• 1 1.305

  Nemo unquam vir magnus sine divino afflatu fuit.—Cicero.
• * 1.306

  A divine revelation absolutely necessary for the recovery of mankind.
• 1 1.307

  $gr$μ$gr$τηζ $gr$στιζ ν$gr$ν Χ$gr$τηται, $gr$π$gr$τε μ$gr$ τ$gr$λμ$gr$σ$gr$ Χαιν$gr$τ$gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$σε$gr$ειαν, $gr$τιζ μ$gr$ σαφ$gr$ζ $gr$ει τι, τ$gr$ψαι π$gr$λιν $gr$αυτ$gr$.—μηδ$gr$ν τ$gr$πα$gr$παν $gr$ιδ$gr$ζ, $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ν δυνατ$gr$ν ε$gr$δ$gr$ναι τ$gr$ $gr$νητ$gr$ φ$gr$σει τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ι$gr$των π$gr$ι.—Plato in Epinomide.

  $gr$α γ$gr$ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ια$gr$τα [$gr$ε$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$απ$gr$ιαζ] $gr$ $gr$πιστ$gr$με$gr$α $gr$με$gr$ζ, $gr$ζ$gr$ντ$gr$ζ τε $gr$λιν $gr$δεν$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ πεισ$gr$με$gr$α $gr$αν ν$gr$ν $gr$μεν, $gr$δε $gr$ησ$gr$μεθα $gr$ξηγητ$gr$, $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ πατ$gr$ Θε$gr$.—Plato de Republ. 4.
• 2 1.308

  $gr$ μ$gr$ν $gr$λη$gr$ζ, $gr$ ξ$gr$νε, δ$gr$σ$gr$υ$gr$ζεσ$gr$αι τα$gr$τα $gr$τωζ $gr$ειν, π$gr$λλ$gr$ν $gr$μφισ$gr$ητ$gr$ντων, Θε$gr$ $gr$στι.—Plato de Legib. lib. 1.
• 3 1.309

  $gr$τ$gr$ δ$gr$ $gr$ν τ$gr$ μ$gr$ζ φαμ$gr$ν φ$gr$σει Χυ$gr$ι$gr$τα$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ δυνα$gr$ν $gr$ζ $gr$ν τε μ$gr$στα Χα$gr$ $gr$ιστα μα$gr$ε$gr$ν, ε$gr$ διδ$gr$σΧ$gr$ι τι$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ν διδ$gr$ξειεν, $gr$ι μ$gr$ Θε$gr$ζ $gr$ηγ$gr$τ$gr$.—Plato in Epinomide.
• 1 1.310

  $gr$τα τ$gr$ν λ$gr$ιπ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$ν Χαθε$gr$δ$gr$ντεζ διατελε$gr$τε $gr$ν, ε$gr$ μ$gr$ τινα $gr$λλ$gr$ν $gr$μ$gr$ν $gr$ Θε$gr$ζ $gr$πιπ$gr$μψειε, Χηδ$gr$μεν$gr$ζ $gr$μ$gr$ν.—Plato in Apolog. Socratis.
• 2 1.311

  $gr$ γ$gr$ $gr$ ε$gr$δ$gr$ναι, $gr$, τι πε$gr$ $gr$ν σωθ$gr$ τε Χα$gr$ γ$gr$νηται $gr$ν δε$gr$, $gr$ν τ$gr$ια$gr$τ$gr$ Χαταττ$gr$τει π$gr$λιτει$gr$ν, Θε$gr$ μ$gr$αν α$gr$τ$gr$ σ$gr$σαι.—Plato de Republ. lib. 6.
• * 1.312

  That it was agreeable to the dictates of nature and right reason, to expect or hope for such a divine revelation.
• 1 1.313

  σω$gr$: $gr$μ$gr$ν μ$gr$ν $gr$ν δ$gr$Χε$gr$ Χ$gr$τιστ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι, $gr$συ$gr$αν $gr$ειν.—$gr$ναγΧα$gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$στι πε$gr$μ$gr$νειν, $gr$ωζ $gr$ν τιζ μ$gr$η $gr$ζ δε$gr$ π$gr$ζ Θε$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$π$gr$ζ διαΧε$gr$σ$gr$αι. $gr$. $gr$τε $gr$ν πα$gr$σται $gr$ $gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$τ$gr$ζ, $gr$ σ$gr$ατεζ; Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ παιδε$gr$σων; $gr$διστα γ$gr$ $gr$ν μ$gr$ι δ$gr$Χ$gr$ $gr$δε$gr$ν τ$gr$τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν $gr$νθ$gr$ωπ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$στι. σω$gr$: $gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$στιν, $gr$ μ$gr$λει πε$gr$ σ$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ δ$gr$Χε$gr$ μ$gr$ι, $gr$σπε$gr$ τ$gr$ δι$gr$μ$gr$δει φησ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ην$gr$ν $gr$μη$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$φ$gr$αλμ$gr$ν $gr$φελε$gr$ν την $gr$λ$gr$ν, $gr$φ$gr$ ε$gr$ γιγν$gr$σΧ$gr$ι $gr$μ$gr$ν Θε$gr$ν $gr$δ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$νδ$gr$, $gr$τω Χα$gr$ σ$gr$ δε$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ζ ψυ$gr$ζ π$gr$τ$gr$ν $gr$φελ$gr$ντα τ$gr$ν $gr$λ$gr$ν, $gr$ ν$gr$ν πα$gr$σα τυγ$gr$νει, τ$gr$τηνιΧα$gr$τ $gr$δη π$gr$σφ$gr$ειν δ$gr$ $gr$ν μ$gr$λλειζ γν$gr$σεσ$gr$αι $gr$μ$gr$ν ΧαΧ$gr$ν $gr$δ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$σ$gr$λ$gr$ ν$gr$ν μ$gr$ν γ$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$ν μ$gr$ι δ$gr$Χ$gr$ζ δ$gr$νη$gr$ναι. $gr$: $gr$φαι$gr$ε$gr$τω, ε$gr$τε β$gr$λεται, τ$gr$ν $gr$λ$gr$ν, ε$gr$τε $gr$λλ$gr$ τ$gr$ ωζ εγ$gr$ πα$gr$εσΧε$gr$ασμαι μηδ$gr$ν $gr$ν φε$gr$γειν τ$gr$ν $gr$ $gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$ π$gr$στασσ$gr$μ$gr$νων, $gr$στιζ π$gr$ $gr$στιν $gr$ $gr$ν$gr$ωπ$gr$ζ, $gr$ιγε μ$gr$λλ$gr$ιμι βελτ$gr$ων γεν$gr$σ$gr$αι. σω$gr$: $gr$λλ$gr$ μ$gr$ν Χ$gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$αυμαστ$gr$ν $gr$σην πε$gr$ σε π$gr$υμ$gr$αν $gr$ει. $gr$: $gr$ζ τ$gr$τε τ$gr$ινυν Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$υσ$gr$αν $gr$να$gr$λλεσ$gr$αι Χ$gr$τιστ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι μ$gr$ι δ$gr$Χε$gr$. σω$gr$: $gr$α$gr$ $gr$ζ γε σ$gr$ δ$gr$Χε$gr$ $gr$σφαλεστε$gr$ν γ$gr$ $gr$στιν $gr$ πα$gr$αΧινδυνε$gr$ειν τ$gr$σ$gr$τ$gr$ν Χ$gr$νδυν$gr$ν. $gr$: $gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ δε Χα$gr$ στεφ$gr$ν$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$λλα π$gr$ντα τα ν$gr$μιζ$gr$μενα τ$gr$τε δ$gr$σ$gr$μεν, $gr$ταν $gr$Χε$gr$νην τ$gr$ν $gr$μ$gr$αν $gr$λ$gr$σαν $gr$δ$gr$ $gr$ξει $gr$ $gr$ δι$gr$ μαΧ$gr$, τ$gr$των $gr$ελ$gr$ντωιν.—Plato in Alcibiade, 2. [If it be supposed that Socrates in this passage means himself, (which is very difficult,) yet it nevertheless very lively represents the great sense which the most considerate heathens had of their want of some extraordinary instruction.]
• 1 1.314

  $gr$μ$gr$ γ$gr$ δ$gr$Χε$gr$ζ $gr$ σ$gr$Χ$gr$ατεζ, πε$gr$ τ$gr$ν τ$gr$ι$gr$των $gr$σωζ $gr$σπε$gr$ Χα$gr$ σ$gr$ τ$gr$ μ$gr$ν σαφ$gr$ζ ε$gr$δ$gr$ναι $gr$ν τ$gr$ ν$gr$ν β$gr$ $gr$ $gr$δ$gr$να$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι, $gr$ παγ$gr$λεπ$gr$ν τ$gr$ τ$gr$ μ$gr$ντ$gr$ι $gr$υτ$gr$ [leg: τ$gr$] λεγ$gr$μενα πε$gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ν μ$gr$ $gr$ π$alpha;ντι τ$gr$π$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$ειν, Χα$gr$ π$gr$αφ$gr$στασ$gr$αι π$gr$ν $gr$ν παντα$gr$ σΧ$gr$π$gr$ν $gr$πε$gr$π$gr$ τιζ, π$gr$νυ μαλ$gr$αΧ$gr$ ε$gr$ναι $gr$νδ$gr$ζ. [Note that Ficinus, in his translation of this passage, as if the word $gr$ was to be repeated $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ Χ$gr$ιν$gr$ with π$gr$αφ$gr$τασ$gr$αι, writes absurdly non desistere, instead of desistere.] δε$gr$ν γ$gr$ πε$gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ν γε τι τ$gr$των διαπ$gr$ξασ$gr$α$gr$ $gr$ μα$gr$ε$gr$ν $gr$πη $gr$ει $gr$ $gr$υ$gr$ε$gr$ν, $gr$, ε$gr$ τα$gr$τα $gr$δυνατ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν γ$gr$ν β$gr$λτιστ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$ωπ$gr$νων $gr$γων λα$gr$ντα Χα$gr$ δυσελεγΧτ$gr$τατ$gr$ν, $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$μεν$gr$ν $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ σ$gr$εδ$gr$αζ Χινδυνε$gr$ντα διαπλε$gr$σαι τ$gr$ν β$gr$ ε$gr$ μ$gr$ τιζ δ$gr$ναιτ$gr$ $gr$σφαλ$gr$στε$gr$ν Χα$gr$ $gr$Χινδυν$gr$τε$gr$ν, $gr$π$gr$ βε$gr$αι$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$ματ$gr$ζ, $gr$ $gr$γ$gr$ Θε$gr$ τιν$gr$ζ, διαπ$gr$ευ$gr$ναι.—Plato in Phœdron.
• 1 1.315

  Quum autem dicit Porphyrius, in primo de Regressu Animæ libro, nondum receptum in unam quandam sectam quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatum, procul dubio confitetur, esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam. Ita ei non sufficebat quicquid de anima liberanda studiosissime didicerat, sibique, vel potius aliis, nosse ac tenere videbatur. Sentiebat enim adhuc sibi deesse aliquam præstantissimam auctoritatem, quam de re tanta sequi oporteret.—Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. 10. c. 32.
• * 1.316

  The unreasonableness of modern deists, in denying the want and use of a revelation.
• 1 1.317

  $gr$Χ $gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$υζ, $gr$λληναζ Χα$gr$ $gr$α$gr$ζ, σ$gr$φ$gr$σ Χα$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$τ$gr$ζ, μ$gr$ι $gr$αν$gr$τ$gr$ $gr$γων$gr$ζεσ$gr$αι $gr$π$gr$ $gr$ιστιανισμ$gr$, $gr$ α$gr$τ$gr$υ μ$gr$ $gr$ξ$gr$μ$gr$σωντα$gr$ $gr$πε$gr$ $gr$δε$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ δ$gr$γματ$gr$ζ $gr$στ$gr$ηται π$gr$ιε$gr$ν.—Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 1.
• 2 1.318

  ωστε μηΧετι Χατ$gr$ τ$gr$ παλαι$gr$ν β$gr$α$gr$ε$gr$ ζ τιναζ Χα$gr$ $gr$ι$gr$μ$gr$ ληπτ$gr$ζ, $gr$θ$gr$ζ πε$gr$ Θε$gr$ φ$gr$ειν δ$gr$ξ$alpha;$gr$ $gr$λλ$gr$ μυ$gr$α πλ$gr$η βα$gr$ων.—Euseb. Demonstrat. Evangel. lib. 3. c. 3.

  $gr$ δε τ$gr$ Θε$gr$ $gr$ιστ$gr$ μαθητευθε$gr$ σαι $gr$ΧΧλησ$gr$αι, συνεξεταζ$gr$μεναι τα$gr$ζ $gr$ν πα$gr$ιΧ$gr$σι δ$gr$μων $gr$ΧΧλ$gr$σ$gr$αι$gr$ $gr$ζ φωζτ$gr$ζ ε$gr$σιν $gr$ν Χ$gr$σμ$gr$, $gr$ζ γ$gr$ $gr$Χ $gr$ν $gr$μ$gr$λ$gr$γ$gr$σαι, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ΧΧλησ$gr$αζ Χα$gr$ συγΧ$gr$σει τ$gr$ν βελτι$gr$νων $gr$λ$gr$τ$gr$ζ, π$gr$λλ$gr$ Χ$gr$ε$gr$τ$gr$ζ τυγ$gr$νειν τ$gr$ν $gr$ν τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$μ$gr$ιζ $gr$ΧΧλησι$gr$ν. [Note, this passage is both corruptly printed π$gr$λλ$gr$ν instead of π$gr$λλ$gr$, and also the sense of it hurt by an imperfect translation.—Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 3. Edit. Cant. p. 128.]
• * 1.319

  The great necessity and use of divine revelation.
• 1 1.320

  See an excellent passage of Cicero to this purpose cited above.
• * 1.321

  Yet God was not absolutely obliged to afford men the help of such a revelation.
• 1 1.322

  Oracles of Reason, page 197, &c.
• * 1.323

  Want of universality, no sufficient objection against the truth of a revelation.
• * 1.324

  Of the Mahometan religion.
• * 1.325

  Of the Jewish religion.
• * 1.326

  The marks of a religion coming from God.
• * 1.327

  The proposition proved in the several instances of duty.
• * 1.328

  Mat. v. 16, &c.
• * 1.329

  Matt. v. 28. Matt. vi. 19, 24, &c.
• * 1.330

  This a great evidence of a religion coming from God.
• 1 1.331

  —Ut naturæ lumen nusquam appareat.—Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 3. See this passage cited before at large.
• 1 1.332

  Formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem honesti, quæ si eculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui.—Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.
• * 1.333

  Phil. iv. 8.
• 2 1.334

  $gr$Χ $gr$τι $gr$λλ$gr$τ$gr$ι$gr$ $gr$στι τ$gr$ πλ$gr$των$gr$ζ διδ$gr$γματα τ$gr$ $gr$ιστ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ $gr$τι $gr$ $gr$στι π$gr$ντ$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ι$gr$ $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$δ$gr$ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$λλων—$gr$Χαστ$gr$ζ γ$gr$ τιζ, $gr$π$gr$ μ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ σπε$gr$ματιΧ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$υ λ$gr$γ$gr$ τ$gr$ συγγεν$gr$ζ $gr$ν, Χαλ$gr$ζ $gr$φ$gr$γξατ$gr$—$gr$σα $gr$ν πα$gr$ π$gr$σι Χαλ$gr$ζ, $gr$ηται, $gr$μ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν $gr$ιστιαν$gr$ν $gr$στ$gr$.—Justin Apolog. 1.

  Quod si extitisset aliquis, qui veritatem sparsam per singulos per sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum ac redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verum autem non nisi ejus scire est, qui sit doctus a Deo.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 1 1.335

  Sed si vel causa id efficeret, certissime philosopharentur, et quamvis non posset divinis testimoniis illa defendere, tamen seipsam veritas illustraret suo lumine.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• * 1.336

  Of the acceptableness of true repentance, a motive to obedience.
• * 1.337

  Of the divine assistance, as another motive to obedience.
• * 1.338

  Luke xi. 13.
• 1 1.339

  Da mihi virum, qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effrænatus, paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da libidinosum, &c.—Lactant. lib. 3.

  $gr$α$gr$α μεν τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλησ$gr$ν ε$gr$ζ τιζ, &c,—Origen, advers. Cels. lib. 1. See this passage cited above.
• * 1.340

  Of the clear discovery of future rewards and punishments, as another motive to obedience.
• * 1.341

  The proposition proved by particular instances.
• * 1.342

  An answer to the objection drawn from the division among Christians.
• * 1.343

  Of the one supreme God.
• * 1.344

  Of the only begotten son of God.
• 1 1.345

  Θε$gr$ζ $gr$Χ Θε$gr$, in contradistinction to $gr$υτ$gr$ε$gr$ζ.
• * 1.346

  Col. i. 15. Heb. i. 3. $gr$πα$gr$γασμα τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ξηζ $gr$υτ$gr$. John i. 2. xvii. 5. Heb. i. 3. Rom. ix. 5. and John i. 1.
• 2 1.347

  It is not to be denied but that the schoolmen, who abounded in wit and leisure, though very few among them had either exact skill in the Holy Scriptures, or in ecclesiastical antiquity, and the writings of the ancient fathers of the Christian Church; I say, it cannot be denied but that these speculative and very acute men, who wrought a great part of their divinity out of their own brains, as spiders do cobwebs out of their own bowels, have started a thousand subtilties about this mystery, such as no Christian is bound to trouble his head withal, much less is it necessary for him to understand those niceties which we may reasonably presume that they who talk of them did themselves never thoroughly understand; and, least of all, is it necessary to believe them.—Archbishop Tillotson. Sermon concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature.

  It were to be wished, that some religionists did not here symbolize too much with the atheists, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian trinity as a thing directly contradictory to all human reason and understanding.—Cudrvorth's System, page 560.
• * 1.348

  Of the Holy Spirit.
• * 1.349

  Of the creation of the universe.
• * 1.350

  Heb. i. 2. Eph. iii. 9. Col. i. 16.
• * 1.351

  John i. 3.
• * 1.352

  Of the formation of the earth. Gen. i. 2.
• * 1.353

  Of the continual government of Providence.
• * 1.354

  Of paradise, and the loss of it by sin.
• * 1.355

  Gen. iii. 17, 18, 19.
• 1 1.356

  $gr$ παλαι$gr$ν π$gr$ν$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$λφ$gr$των Χα$gr$ $gr$λε$gr$ων πλ$gr$η, Χα$gr$πε$gr$ Χα$gr$ ν$gr$ν Χ$gr$νεω$gr$ Χα$gr$ Χ$gr$ναι $gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ν, α$gr$ μ$gr$ν $gr$δα$gr$ζ γ$gr$λαΧ$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$λλα$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ωζ α$gr$ μ$gr$ν μ$gr$λιτ$gr$ζ, α$gr$ $gr$ $gr$ιν$gr$υ, τιν$gr$ζ $gr$ $gr$λα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ πλησμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ, $gr$ $gr$ι $gr$ν$gr$ωπ$gr$ι Χα$gr$ τ$gr$υφ$gr$ζ, ε$gr$ζ $gr$ιν $gr$ξ$gr$πεσ$gr$ν. $gr$ε$gr$ζ δε μισ$gr$σαζ τ$gr$ν Χατ$gr$στασιν, $gr$φ$gr$νισε π$gr$ντα, Χα$gr$ δ$gr$α π$gr$ν$gr$υ τ$gr$ν β$gr$ν$gr$π$gr$δειξε—Calanus Indus apud Strabon. lib. 15.
• * 1.357

  Of the flood.
• 1 1.358

  $gr$π$gr$ δε $gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ μεν μ$gr$α $gr$ξ$gr$τηλ$gr$ζ $gr$γ$gr$γνετ$gr$ $gr$ν α$gr$τ$gr$σ, π$gr$λλ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$νητ$gr$ Χα$gr$ π$gr$λλ$gr$Χιζ $gr$ναΧε$gr$αννυμ$gr$νη, τ$gr$ δ$gr$ $gr$ν$gr$πιν$gr$ν $gr$ζ $gr$πεΧ$gr$τει, τ$gr$τε Θε$gr$ζ $gr$ Θε$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ζ, $gr$τε δυν$gr$μεν$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ν τ$gr$ τ$gr$ια$gr$τα, $gr$ννν$gr$ησαζ γ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$πιειΧ$gr$ζ $gr$θλ$gr$ωζ διατι$gr$μεν$gr$ν, διΧην α$gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$πιθε$gr$ναι β$gr$λη$gr$ιζ, &c.—Plato in Critia sive Atlantico.
• * 1.359

  Of God's revealing himself to the patriarchs, and giving the law to the Jews.
• * 1.360

  Of the other particulars of Scripture-history in the Old Testament.
• 1 1.361

  Lib. 1. c. 16, and lib. 3. c. 16, where see the citations at large.
• 2 1.362

  δευΧαλ$gr$ωνι φασι πε$gr$ιστε$gr$ν $gr$Χ τ$gr$ζ λ$gr$ναΧ$gr$ζ $gr$φιεμ$gr$νην δ$gr$λωμα γεν$gr$σ$gr$αι, $gr$ειμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ μ$gr$ν $gr$ισω π$gr$λιν $gr$νδυ$gr$μ$gr$νην, $gr$υδ$gr$αζ δ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$πτ$gr$σαν.—Plutarch: utrum Terrestria an Aquatica animantia plus habeant Solertiœ.
• 3 1.363

  $gr$ δ$gr$ [$gr$ωσ$gr$ν] διαδεξ$gr$μεν$gr$ι, $gr$ν$gr$ζ μ$gr$ν τιναζ $gr$ν τ$gr$ζ $gr$υτ$gr$ζ δι$gr$μεν$gr$ν διΧαι$gr$π$gr$αγ$gr$ντεζ, Χα$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$σε$gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$ζ $gr$λη$gr$ζ $gr$ντε$gr$ $gr$πει$gr$, &c.—Lib. 16.
• 1 1.364

  See Stillingfleet's Origin. Sacræ, lib. 3. cap. 5. and Bocharti Phaleg. et Vossius de Idololatria.
• * 1.365

  Of God's sending his son into the world for the redemption of mankind.
• * 1.366

  That it is not unreasonable to suppose God making a revelation of his will to men.
• * 1.367

  That it is not unreasonable to believe, that God would appoint a sacrifice or expiation for sin.
• * 1.368

  That it is not unreasonable to believe, that a mediator should be appointed between God and man.
• * 1.369

  Of the objection drawn from the dignity of the person whom we believe to be our mediator and redeemer.
• 1 1.370

  $gr$ γ$gr$ $gr$ε$gr$ζ $gr$ξ $gr$αυτ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$σΧλ$gr$πι$gr$ν $gr$γ$gr$ννησεν ε$gr$ζ δε τ$gr$ν γ$gr$ν δι$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$λ$gr$ γ$gr$ν$gr$μ$gr$ ζω$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$φ$gr$νε$gr$ $gr$τ$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$ γ$gr$ζ $gr$ξ $gr$αν$gr$ π$gr$ιησαμεν$gr$ζ π$gr$δ$gr$ν, $gr$ν$gr$ειδ$gr$ζ μ$gr$ν πε$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$δαυ$gr$ν $gr$φ$gr$νη.—Julian.
• * 1.371

  Of the objection drawn from the Christian revelation not being in fact universal.
• * 1.372

  Of the other particulars of scripture-history contained in the New Testament.
• 1 1.373

  Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus et constans opinio esse in fatis, ut Judæa profectirerum potirentur.—Suelon.
• 2 1.374

  Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum libris contineri, co ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæa rerum potirentur.—Tacil. lib. 21.
• 3 1.375

  See the place cited by Grotius, de Veritate Christianœ Religionis.—Lib. 3. c. 14.
• 4 1.376

  Cum audisset [Augustus,] inter pueros quos in Syria Herodes rex Judæorum intra bimatum jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum; ait, melius est Herodis porcum esse quam filium.—Macrcb. lib. 2. cap. 4. [A testimony so very remarkable and pertinent, that it is strange how Grotius could omit to mention it in the place now cited.]
• 1 1.377

  See the places cited by Grotius, de Veritate Christ. Rel. lib. 2. cap. 5.
• 2 1.378

  Tiberio imperitante, per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum, supplicio affectus erat.—Lib. 15.
• 3 1.379

  Eum mundi casum relatum in arcanis vestris habetis.—Tertullian. Apol.
• * 1.380

  Of the day of judgment, and Christ the judge.
• * 1.381

  Of the resurrection of the body.
• 1 1.382

  δ$gr$λ$gr$ν $gr$ζ $gr$δ$gr$ν $gr$δ$gr$νατ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ $gr$μ$gr$ζ μετ$gr$ τ$gr$ τελευτ$gr$σαι, π$gr$λιν πε$gr$ι$gr$δων τι$gr$ν ε$gr$λυμ$gr$νων $gr$ν$gr$, ε$gr$ζ $gr$ ν$gr$ν $gr$σμεν $gr$π$gr$Χαταστ$gr$σεσ$gr$αι σ$gr$μα.—Chrysippus, citat. a Lactant. lib. 7.
• 2 1.383

  γ$gr$γ$gr$απται δε α$gr$τ$gr$ν π$gr$λιν $gr$ναστ$gr$σε$gr$αι, με$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ $gr$ι$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$στησι—Job 42. ult.
• 1 1.384

  De Veritate Rel. Chr.—Lib. 2. c. 10.
• * 1.385

  Of the resurrection of the same body.
• 1 1.386

  $gr$με$gr$ζ μ$gr$ν $gr$ν $gr$ φαμ$gr$ν$gr$τ$gr$ διαφ$gr$α$gr$ν σ$gr$μα $gr$παν$gr$εσ$gr$αι ε$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$ξ $gr$ζ φ$gr$σιν, $gr$ζ $gr$δ$gr$ τ$gr$ν διαφ$gr$α$gr$ντα Χ$gr$ΧΧ$gr$ν τ$gr$ σ$gr$τ$gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$μεν γ$gr$, $gr$σπε$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ Χ$gr$ΧΧ$gr$ν τ$gr$ σ$gr$τ$gr$υ $gr$γε$gr$εται στ$gr$υζ $gr$τω λ$gr$γ$gr$ζ τιζ $gr$γΧειται τ$gr$ σ$gr$ματι. $gr$ $gr$ μ$gr$ φ$gr$ει$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$υ $gr$γ$gr$ι$gr$εται τ$gr$ σ$gr$μα $gr$ν $gr$φ$gr$α$gr$σ$gr$α.—Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 5.
• * 1.387

  Of the eternal happiness of the blessed, and the eternal punishent of the damned.
• 1 1.388

  Rev. xiv. 10. shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, in the presence of the Holy Angels, and in the presence of the Lamb.
• 2 1.389

  $gr$ δε $gr$ν δ$gr$ξωσιν $gr$νι$gr$τωζ $gr$ειν δι$gr$ τ$gr$ μεγ$gr$η τ$gr$ν $gr$μα$gr$τημ$gr$των, τ$gr$τ$gr$υζ $gr$ π$gr$σ$gr$Χ$gr$υσα μ$gr$α $gr$πτει ε$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$τα$gr$ν, $gr$εν $gr$π$gr$τε $gr$Χ$gr$α$gr$ν$gr$υσι.—Plato in Phœd.

  ωσπε$gr$ σ$gr$ Χ$gr$λ$gr$σειζ α$gr$ων$gr$υζ ν$gr$μ$gr$ζειζ, $gr$τω Χα$gr$ $gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ε$gr$ν $gr$Χε$gr$νων $gr$ξηγητα$gr$ τελητα$gr$ τε Χα$gr$ μυσταγωγ$gr$.—Cels. apud Origen. lib. 8.

  $gr$ δ$gr$ $gr$διΧ$gr$ι π$gr$μπαν α$gr$ων$gr$ ζ ΧαΧ$gr$ζ σ$gr$ν$gr$ζ$gr$ν$tau;αι—Id. ibid.
• 1 1.390

  T$gr$ τ$gr$ζ π$gr$στεωζ $gr$μ$gr$ν, τα$gr$ζ Χ$gr$ινα$gr$ζ $gr$νν$gr$αιζ $gr$εν συναγ$gr$ε$gr$ντα.—Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 3.
• * 1.391

  Every one of them has a direct tendency and powerful influence to reform men's manners.
• 2 1.392

  Archbishop Sharp's Sermon before the Queen on Christmas day, 1704.
• * 1.393

  Luke, xiii, 7.
• * 1.394

  And all of them together make up the most consistent and rational scheme of belief in the world.
• 1 1.395

  Diversi ac diverse omnia protulerunt non annectentes nec $word$ rerum, nec consequentias, nec rationes; ut summam illam, quæ continet universa, et compingerent et complerent.—Lactant. lib. 7.
• 1 1.396

  Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissensio. Et qua non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos, putamus; illa, quæ aliis sic, aliis secus, nec iisdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse dicimus. Quod est longe aliter.—Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.
• * 1.397

  Of the life and character of our Saviour, as an evidence of the truth of the Christian revelation.
• 1 1.398

  πευστ$gr$ν δ$gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ν, ε$gr$ π$gr$τ$gr$ τιζ $gr$λλ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ι$gr$τ$gr$ζ πλ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$στ$gr$ηται, π$gr$α$gr$τητ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$πιειΧε$gr$αζ σωφ$gr$συνηζ τε Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$λληζ $gr$ετ$gr$ζ διδ$gr$σΧαλ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$πατωμ$gr$ν$gr$ιζ γεγ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$ιτι$gr$ζ, &c.—Easeb. Demonstrat. Evangelic. lib. 3. c. 3.
• * 1.399

  Of the miracles of Christ as the evidence of his divine commission.
• * 1.400

  Of miracles in general.
• * 1.401

  That in repect of the power of God, all things are alike easy.
• * 1.402

  That therefore miracles ought not to be defined by any absolute difficulty in the nature of the things themselves to be done.
• * 1.403

  What degrees of power God may have communicated to created beings is not possible for us to determine.
• * 1.404

  That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be such an effect as could not have been produced by any less power than the divine omnipotence.
• * 1.405

  All things that are done in the world, are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being capable of no laws or powers. And consequently there is, properly speaking, no such thing as the course or power of nature.
• * 1.406

  That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be that which is against the course of nature or above the natural powers of created agents.
• * 1.407

  The unreasonableness of those who deny the possibility of miracles in general.
• * 1.408

  Some effects prove the constant providence of God, and others prove the occasonal interposition eitheir of God himself, or of some imelligent being superior to man.
• * 1.409

  Whether such interposition be the immediate work of God, or of some good or evil angels, can hardly be discovered merely by the work itself.
• * 1.410

  That there is no reason to suppose all the wonders worked by evil spirits to be mere delusions.
• * 1.411

  How we are to distinguish miracles worked by God, for the proof of any doctrine, from the frauds of evil spirits.
• * 1.412

  Deut. xiii. 1, &c.
• * 1.413

  Matt. xii. 25.
• * 1.414

  The difference between those who teach that the immediate power of God is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the working of a miracle, is not very great at bottom.
• * 1.415

  The true definition of a miracle:
• * 1.416

  The strength of the evidence of our Saviour's miracles.
• * 1.417

  Concerning the objection, that we prove in a circle the miracles by the doctrine, and the doctrine by the miracles.
• * 1.418

  Of the pretended miracles of Apollonius and others.
• 1 1.419

  δι$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ Χα$gr$ βε$gr$ασανισμ$gr$νωζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$παγγελλ$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ν$gr$μειζ $gr$ξετ$gr$σ$gr$μεν $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ β$gr$υ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ζ Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$παΧ$gr$λ$gr$υ$gr$ντων τα$gr$ζ δυν$gr$μεσιν, $gr$τ$gr$ι ε$gr$ζ βλ$gr$ην τ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$πων, $gr$ ε$gr$ζ $gr$ν $gr$παν$gr$ωσιν.—Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 2.

  $gr$σ$gr$ν τ$gr$νυν σαυτ$gr$ν στ$gr$σαζ τ$gr$ν πε$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ιστ$gr$υ γιν$gr$μ$gr$νων, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν πε$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ $gr$στ$gr$υμ$gr$νων, $gr$δε ε$gr$ μ$gr$ $gr$Χ τ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ντ$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$φελ$gr$υμ$gr$νων ε$gr$ζ $gr$ν $gr$παν$gr$ωσιν Χα$gr$; $gr$υλ$gr$ειαν τ$gr$ν π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ π$gr$σι $gr$ε$gr$ν, $gr$στ$gr$ν ε$gr$πε$gr$ν $gr$τι πιστευτ$gr$ν μ$gr$ν $gr$ζ $gr$Χ $gr$εε$gr$ γεν$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ιζ τ$gr$ζ πε$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ $gr$στ$gr$υμ$gr$ν$gr$ιζ, $gr$ δε τ$gr$ζ πε$gr$ τ$gr$ζ π$gr$Χ$gr$ννησ$gr$υ $gr$ιστ$gr$υ. $gr$ μ$gr$ν γ$gr$ β$gr$υλ$gr$μ$gr$νη $gr$ π$gr$ν$gr$ια τ$gr$ πε$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ιστ$gr$αν πα$gr$δ$gr$ξα $gr$π$gr$αγματε$gr$ε$gr$, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$φελ$gr$σαι τ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ν$gr$πων γ$gr$νει β$gr$υλ$gr$μ$gr$νη, τ$gr$ τηλιΧα$gr$τα ($gr$ζ $gr$ιει) $gr$πεδε$gr$Χνυτ$gr$, $gr$Χ $gr$ειζ λ$gr$γειν.—Id. lib. 3.
• * 1.420

  Of the fulfilling the prophecies, as an evidence of our Saviour's divine commission.
• * 1.421

  Of the prophecies that went before, concerning the Messiah.
• * 1.422

  Of the prophecies that Christ himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after.
• 1 1.423

  Very remarkable also is the history recorded by a heathen writer of what happened upon Julian's attempting to rebuild the temple: Imperii sui memoriam magnitudine operum gestiens propagare, ambitiosum quondam apud Hierosolymam templum, quod post multa et interneciva certamina obsidente Vespasiano posteaque Tito ægrè est expugnatum, instaurare sumptibus cogitabat immodicis; negotiumque maturandum Alypio dederat Antiochensi, qui olim Britannias curaverat, pro præfectis. Cùm itaque rei idem instaret Alypius, juvaretque provinciæ rector; metuendi globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes fecere locum exustis aliquoties operantibus inaccessum; hocque modo, elemento destinatius repellente, cessavit inceptum.—Ammian. Marcellin. lib. 22. sub initio,
• * 1.424

  Objections answered.
• 1 1.425

  See above, prop. vii. sec. 4.
• 1 1.426

  Or written unto life, $word$ So Dan. xii, 1. every one that shall be found written in the book.
• 1 1.427

  The introduction to these words is very solemn: Oh! that my words were now—graven with an iron pen and lead in the rock for ever. And how they were anciently understood, appears from that addition to the end of the book of Job in the LXX, γ$gr$γ$gr$απται δ$gr$, $gr$υτ$gr$ν π$gr$λιν $gr$ναστ$gr$σεσθαι, με$gr$ $gr$ν $gr$ Χ$gr$ι$gr$ζ $gr$ν$gr$στησιν. So Job died, being old and full of days.

  But it is written that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises up.
• 1 1.428

  $word$ The sons of righteousness.
• 2 1.429

  Ezek. xlvii. 9, 12. compared with Rev. xxii. 1, 2. He showed me a pure river of water of life:—And of either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.
• 1 1.430

  Gal. iii. 16. He saith not, and to seeds, as of many, but as of one, and to thy seed; that is to say, in the promise to Abraham, the Scripture uses the ambiguous word seed, not in the plural sense, but in the singular sense.
• 1 1.431

  $word$, Wonderful, Counsellor, [LXX, $gr$εγ$gr$ληζ β$gr$υλ$gr$ζ γ$gr$γελ$gr$ζ. as Mal. iii. 1, $gr$ $gr$γγελ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ δια$gr$Χηζ.] the Mighty, the Potent One, the Father of the age to come. [Vulg. Pater futuri seucli. Compare Heb. ii. 5.]
• 1 1.432

  The Shiloh, unto whom shall the gathering of the people be. Gen. xlix. 10.
• 2 1.433

  With reference to this it is, that Christ in the gospel perpetually styles himself the son of man, and once the son of man which is in [which in the prophecy is described as coming in the clouds of] heaven, John iii. 13: And tells his disciples that they shall see the son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, Matt. xxiv. 30. And the high priest, that hereafter ye shall see the son of man sitting on the right hand of Power, and coming in the clouds of heaven, Matt. xxvi. 64.
• 1 1.434

  Seven septendaries (or weeks) of years (as the word is used, Gen. xxix. 27.) That is to say, forty-nine years, the number of years appointed until the jubilee, Levit. xxv. 8, 9, 10. Concerning the other number of Daniel in this place I shall have occasion to speak presently.
• 1 1.435

  See above, Prop. VII. § 4.
• 2 1.436

  Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus et constans opinio, esse in fatis, ut Judæâ profecti rerum potirentur.—Sueton.

  Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum libris contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæâ rerum potirentur.—Tacit.
• 1 1.437

  In some few places there is reasonable ground for a worse suspicion. As, for instance, Psal. xxii. 16. where the sense most evidently shows it ought to be read, and the LXX version shows it anciently was read, $word$ or $word$

  they piere'd my hands and my feet;

  the Jewish masters, in all their correct Hebrew editions, have writen it, $word$

  as a lion my hands and my feet;

  which has no tolerable sense at all.
• 1 1.438

  Prideaux Connection, part I, book ii. page 67. edit. fol.
• 1 1.439

  The fame of which was so early spread, that Ezekiel, who was contemporary with Daniel, plainly alludes to it when he says of the prince of Tyre, chap. xxviii. 3. thou art wiser than Daniel; there is no secret that they can hide from thee.
• 2 1.440

  Weeks or septenaries, of years. Compare Gen. xxix. 27. Num. xiv. 34. Ezek. iv. 6.
• 3 1.441

  This and the following observation was extracted out of a MS. communicated by Sir Isaac Newton; and was published in his life-time in the foregoing editions of this discourse, with his express consent.
• 1 1.442

  $gr$ζ $gr$ε$gr$σ$gr$λ$gr$μ$gr$ιζ, $gr$ν$gr$Χδ$gr$μ$gr$η τ$gr$ τε$gr$Χ$gr$ζ, $gr$γδ$gr$ Χα$gr$ α$gr$Χ$gr$στ$gr$ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ξ$gr$υ $gr$ασιλε$gr$αζ $gr$τει, μην$gr$ $gr$νν$gr$τ$gr$ τ$gr$λ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ν τει$gr$ν λα$gr$ντων, &c.—Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 11. cap. 5. Compare Nehem. v. 14.
• 2 1.443

  Three years and a half, or 1260 days, is, according to the analogy of all the forementioned numbers, 1260 years.
• 1 1.444

  There has prevailed among learned men a very important error as if the 1260 days, (or years) here spoken of, took their beginning from the rise of the tyranny here described: Whereas, on the contrary, the words of Daniel are express; that, not from the time of his rise, but after his having made war with the saints, and from the time of their being given into his hand, should be a time, and times, and the dividing of time, chap. vii. 24, 25. And St John no less expressly says, that the time, not of the two witnesses prophesying, (for in part of that time they had great power,) but of their prophesying in sackcloth, should be a thousand two hundred and threescore days, Rev. xi. 3. And the persecuted woman, after her flight, was to be actually in the wilderness, (and in her place there, of riches and honour,) a thousand two hundred and threescore days, chap. xii. 6. Wherefore also the forty and two months, (the very same period,) during which time power was given unto the wild beasts to continue, (in the original it is, π$gr$ι$gr$σαι, to do what he pleased, (Rev. xiii. 5.) evidently ought not to be reckoned from his rise, or from the time when the ten kings (chap. xvii. 12.) received power with him, but from the time of his having totally overcome the saints, and of his being worshipped by all that dwell upon the earth, ch. xiii. 7. 8.
• 1 1.445

  Gods protector, as it is in the margin of the Bible, or saints protectors.
• 2 1.446

  Changing time and laws, ch. vii. 25. setting up new religions.
• 3 1.447

  It is therefore a Christian (not an infidel) power, that he here speaks of.
• 1 1.448

  Doctrines, concerning dæmons, that is, ghosts or souls of (good or bad) men departed. Epiphanius, citing this text, alleges the following words, as part of the text itself; $gr$σ$gr$νται γ$gr$, φησι νεΧ$gr$ζ λατ$gr$ε$gr$ντεζ, $gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$ν τ$gr$ $gr$σ$gr$αηλ $gr$σε$gr$σ$gr$ησαν.

  For they shall be, says the apostle, worshippers of the dead, even as the dead were anciently worshipped in Israel.

  And he applies the whole to the worshippers of the blessed Virgin.—Hœres. 78. § 22.
• 1 1.449

  Have been led into idolatrous practices.
• 2 1.450

  φα$gr$μαΧε$gr$, (σ$gr$φ$gr$ζ φα$gr$μ$gr$Χ$gr$ιζ) Methods of making men religious without virtue.
• * 1.451

  Of the testimony of our Saviour's disciples as an evidence of the truth of the Christian revelation.
• * 1.452

  What things are requisite to make the testimony of our Saviour's disciples a complete evidence.
• * 1.453

  That the apostles could not be imposed upon themselves.
• * 1.454

  That the apostles could have no design of imposing upon others.
• 1 1.455

  χ$gr$Χε$gr$ν$gr$ δ$gr$ π$gr$ζ $gr$ μεστ$gr$ν $gr$Χπλ$gr$εωζ, τ$gr$ πλ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$νδ$gr$αζ Χα$gr$ $gr$δι$gr$ταζ, μ$gr$τ$gr$ λαλε$gr$ν μ$gr$τε $gr$Χ$gr$ειν πλ$gr$ν τ$gr$ζ πατ$gr$ φων$gr$ζ $gr$πισταμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ, μ$gr$ μ$gr$ν$gr$ν δι$gr$νσηθ$gr$ναι τ$gr$λμ$gr$σαι π$gr$ελθε$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ την τ$gr$ν $gr$θν$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ντων πε$gr$δ$gr$ν, $gr$λλ$gr$ Χα$gr$ π$gr$ελθ$gr$νταζ Χατ$gr$θ$gr$σαι τ$gr$ $gr$πιτηδευμα; σΧεψαι δ$gr$, $gr$π$gr$ν $gr$στ$gr$, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ μηδενα μηδαμ$gr$ δι$gr$φων$gr$ν $gr$ενεγΧε$gr$ν πε$gr$ τ$gr$ν π$gr$εων τ$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$ν. $gr$ γ$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ π$gr$ντων $gr$μφιγν$gr$μ$gr$νων π$gr$αγμ$gr$των, $gr$ν τε τ$gr$ζ Χατ$gr$ ν$gr$μ$gr$ζ διΧαστη$gr$ιζ, Χα$gr$ $gr$ν τα$gr$ζ Χ$gr$ινα$gr$ζ $gr$μφισ$gr$ητ$gr$σεσι, τ$gr$ν μα$gr$τ$gr$ων συμφων$gr$α Χυ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$μφιγν$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ π$gr$ζ $gr$Χ $gr$ν $gr$ $gr$λ$gr$θεια Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$νδε συστα$gr$η, δ$gr$δεΧα μ$gr$ν $gr$ντων $gr$π$gr$στ$gr$λων, ε$gr$δ$gr$μ$gr$Χ$gr$ντα δ$gr$ $gr$αθητ$gr$ν, μυ$gr$ τε πλ$gr$θ$gr$υζ τ$gr$των $gr$Χ$gr$ζ, $gr$π$gr$ντων $gr$αυμαστην συμ φων$gr$αν $gr$πιδεδειγμ$gr$νων, Χα$gr$ μα$gr$τυ$gr$ησ$gr$ντων γε τ$gr$ζ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ πεπ$gr$αγμ$gr$ν$gr$ιζ, $gr$Χ $gr$νιδ$gr$ωτ$gr$, δι$gr$ δ$gr$ βασ$gr$νων $gr$π$gr$μ$gr$ν$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ π$gr$σηζ $gr$ιΧ$gr$αζ Χα$gr$ $gr$αν$gr$τ$gr$υ.—Euseb. Demonstrat. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 2.
• 2 1.456

  χη$gr$τ$gr$ειν δ$gr$ $gr$γ$gr$Χ$gr$υζ $gr$νδ$gr$αζ $gr$ιζ π$gr$νταζ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$ησ$gr$ $gr$νυμα, Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ζ μ$gr$ν $gr$υτ$gr$ν τ$gr$ν $gr$ωμα$gr$ων $gr$Χ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ν τε τ$gr$ν βασιλιΧωτατην π$gr$λιν νε$gr$μασ$gr$α$gr$ τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ν πε$gr$σ$gr$ν, τ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$μεν$gr$ων, $gr$τ$gr$υζ δ$gr$ τ$gr$ πα$gr$θ$gr$ν $gr$θν$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ $gr$υ π$gr$λιν τ$gr$ σΧυθ$gr$ν, τιν$gr$ζ δ$gr$ $gr$δη Χα$gr$ $gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ τηζ $gr$ιΧ$gr$υμ$gr$νηζ $gr$λθε$gr$ν τ$gr$ $gr$Χ$gr$α, $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$νδ$gr$ν φθ$gr$σαι $gr$αν, Χα$gr$ $gr$τ$gr$υζ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$Χεαν$gr$ν πα$gr$ελθε$gr$ν $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ζ Χαλ$gr$υμ$gr$ναζ $gr$εττανιΧ$gr$ζ ν$gr$σ$gr$υ$gr$ τα$gr$τα $gr$Χ $gr$ $gr$γω γε $gr$γ$gr$μαι Χατ$gr$ $gr$νθ$gr$ωπ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι, μ$gr$τι γ$gr$ Χατ$gr$ $gr$υτελε$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ $gr$δι$gr$ταζ, π$gr$λλ$gr$ δε$gr$ Χατ$gr$ πλ$gr$ν$gr$υζ Χα$gr$ γ$gr$ηταζ.—Id. ibid. cap. 7.
• 1 1.457

  $gr$υδε$gr$ζ τε $gr$υτ$gr$ν π$gr$π$gr$τε τ$gr$ συμ$gr$ντα τ$gr$ζ π$gr$αν$gr$ημ$gr$ν$gr$ιζ τ$gr$σαζ, $gr$στη τηζ $gr$ται$gr$αζ, $gr$δ$gr$ $gr$ντεΧ$gr$υξε τ$gr$ζ $gr$λλ$gr$ιζ, ε$gr$ζ φ$gr$ζ $gr$γαγ$gr$ν τ$gr$ συν$gr$εθειμ$gr$να. $gr$λλ$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$ ζ$gr$ντα π$gr$δ$gr$ναι τ$gr$λμ$gr$σαζ $gr$υτ$gr$ν, $gr$υτ$gr$ει$gr$ Χα$gr$ $gr$αυτ$gr$ πα$gr$α$gr$μα τ$gr$ν δ$gr$Χην $gr$πεσπ$gr$σατ$gr$—Id. ibid.
• * 1.458

  That the apostle's testimony had been truly conveyed downtous.
• * 1.459

  Of the authority of the books of Holy Scripture.
• 1 1.460

  χυ$gr$σα$gr$ τε τ$gr$ν γ$gr$αφ$gr$ν ε$gr$ζ $gr$ντευξιν τα$gr$ζ $gr$ΧΧλησ$gr$αιζ.—Euseb. Histor. l. 2. c. 15.
• 2 1.461

  Marcus, discipulus et interpres Petri, quæ à Petro annuntiata erant, edidit.—Iren. lib. 3. c. 1.
• 3 1.462

  Lucas, sectator Pauli, quod ab illo prædicabatur Evangelium, in libro condidit.—Id. ibid. Vide et Tertullian. adv. Marcion, lib. 4.
• 4 1.463

  Licet et Marcus quod edidit, Petri adfirmetur, cujus interpres Marcus; nam et Lucæ digestum, Paulo adscribere solent.—Tertull. adv. Marcion. lib. 4.
• 1 1.464

  $grδ$η δ$gr$ $gr$Χ$gr$υ Χα$gr$ $gr$υΧ$gr$ τ$gr$ν Χα$gr$ $gr$υτ$gr$ζ $gr$υαγγελ$gr$ων τ$gr$ν $gr$Χδ$gr$σιν πεπ$gr$ιημ$gr$νων, $gr$ω$gr$ννην $gr$π$gr$δ$gr$ξα$gr$αι μ$gr$ν φασ$gr$ν, $gr$λ$gr$ειαν $gr$υτ$gr$ζ $gr$πιμα$gr$τυ$gr$σαντα —Euseb. Hist. l. 3. c. 24.
• 2 1.465

  $gr$ιν$gr$ζ $gr$ετ$gr$Χασι τ$gr$ν π$gr$ζ $gr$α$gr$ζ, π$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$ωμα$gr$ων $gr$ΧΧλησ$gr$αζ $gr$ζ μ$gr$ πα$gr$λ$gr$ $gr$σαν α$gr$τ$gr$ν $gr$ντιλ$gr$γεσ$gr$αι φ$gr$σαντεζ.—Id. lib. 3. c. 3.
• * 1.466

  That the evidence which God has afforded us of the truth of our religion is abundantly sufficient.
• 3 1.467

  $gr$λλ$gr$ιζ δ$gr$, $gr$ση δ$gr$ναμιζ, $gr$π$gr$δειΧτιΧ$gr$ζ δ$gr$ $gr$τ$gr$σεων Χα$gr$ $gr$π$gr$Χ$gr$σεων π$gr$σε$gr$με$gr$ $gr$υδ$gr$ λ$gr$γ$gr$μ$gr$ν, (τ$gr$ μετ$gr$ $gr$λε$gr$ηζ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$λσ$gr$υ $gr$ι$gr$ημ$gr$ν$gr$ν) $gr$τι π$gr$στευσ$gr$ν, $gr$ν $gr$ισηγ$gr$μαι σ$gr$ι, τ$gr$τ$gr$ν ε$gr$ναι $gr$ι$gr$ν Θε$gr$, Χ$gr$ν $gr$ δεδεμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$τιμ$gr$τατα, $gr$ ΧεΧ$gr$λασμ$gr$ν$gr$ζ $gr$ισ$gr$ιστα—$gr$υδ$gr$ φαμ$gr$ν, τα$gr$τη Χα$gr$ μ$gr$λλ$gr$ν π$gr$;στευσ$gr$ν.—Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 1.
• * 1.468

  That the cause of men's unbelief is not want of better evidence to prove the great truths of religion.
• * 1.469

  But that wickedness and ungoverned lusts are the only causes of obstinate infidelity.
• 1 1.470

  1 Cor. ii. 14.

  $gr$νι$gr$ι $gr$π$gr$Χε$gr$υμεν$gr$υζ $gr$υσι τ$gr$ζ $gr$φ$gr$αλμ$gr$ζ, Χα$gr$ μ$gr$ βλ$gr$π$gr$νταζ τ$gr$ φ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$υ. $gr$υτω Χα$gr$ σ$gr$, $gr$ $gr$ν$gr$ωπε, $gr$ειζ $gr$π$gr$Χε$gr$υμ$gr$ν$gr$υζ τ$gr$ζ $gr$φ$gr$αλμ$gr$ζ τ$gr$ζ ψυ$gr$ζ σ$gr$υ $gr$π$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$μα$gr$τημ$gr$των Χα$gr$ τ$gr$ν $gr$ξε$gr$ν σ$gr$υ τ$gr$ν π$gr$νη$gr$ν.—Theophil. Anlioch. l. 1.
• * 1.471

  And so long as men are under the dominion of their lusts, they would not be convinced, though the evidence of religion was even much stronger than it is.
• * 1.472

  Nay, not even tho' one should rise on purpose from the dead to convince them.
• * 1.473

  That therefore to make men judge rightly of the evidence of religion, it is absolutely necessary, in the first place, that, laying aside prejudice, lust, and passion, they become impartially willing to embrace all truth, and to obey all reasonable obligations which shall at any time be made known to them.
• * 1.474

  That men of such a disposition would think it their greatest wisdom to be truly religious, even tho' the evidences of religion were much less than they are.
• 1 1.475

  Non purior ratio est, ex duobus incertis et in ambigua expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam quod nullas? In illo enim periculi nihil est, si, quod dicitur imminere, cassum fiat et vacuum; in hoc, damnum est maximum (id est, salutis amissio,) si, cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur hoc fuisse mendacium.—Arnob. adv. Gentes, lib. 2.
• 1 1.476

  Quid dicitis, O nescii, etiam fletu et miseratione dignissimi? ita non tam extimescitis, ne sorte hæc vera sint, quæ sunt despectui vobis et præbent materiam risus? nec saltem vobiscum sub obscuris cogitationibus volvitis, ne, quod hoc die credere obstinata renuitis perversitate, redarguat serum tempus, et irrevocabilis pœnitentia castiget?—Id. ibid.
• 2 1.477

  $gr$ π$gr$ντα π$gr$ιε$gr$ν, $gr$στε α$gr$ετ$gr$ζ Χα$gr$ φ$gr$ν$gr$σεωζ $gr$ν τ$gr$ β$gr$ μετασ$gr$ε$gr$ Χαλ$gr$ν γ$gr$ τ$gr$ $gr$λ$gr$ν, Χα$gr$ $gr$ $gr$λπ$gr$ζ μ$gr$γ$gr$λη.—Plato in Phœd.
• 3 1.478

  Præclarum nescio quid adepti sunt, qui didicerunt se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros.—Quid habet ista res aut lætabile aut gloriosum?—Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.
• 4 1.479

  Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi censent, nihil sentiam, non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui philosophi irrideant.—Cic. De Senect.
• * 1.480

  That God may require us to take notice of certain things, and to inquire into them and consider them, at our peril.