A history of the Sikhs, from the origin of the nation to the battles of the Sutlej.

218

HISTORY OF THE SIKHS

CHAP. VII

1837-8. made use of this partiality, and of the fact that his friendship
was courted, to try and secure himself against the only
power he really feared, viz. that of the Sikhs; and he reDost Mu- newed his overtures to Persia and welcomed a Russian
hammad emissary, with the view of intimidating the English into the
eventually
falls into surrender of Peshawar, and into a guarantee against Ranjit
the views of Singh. Friendly assurances to the Kandahar brothers, and
Persia and
Russia. a hint that the Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul,
would have given Dost Muhammad a proper sense of his
The origi- insignificance;' but the truth and the importance of his
nal policy hostile designs were both believed or assumed by the
of the
English British Government, while the rumours of a northern invaerroneous sion were eagerly received and industriously spread by the
vanquished princes of India, and the whole country vibrated
with the hope that the uncongenial domination of the English
was about to yield to the ascendancy of another and less
But, under dissimilar race.2 The recall of Capt. Burnes from Kabul
stances cu- gave speciousness to the wildest statements; the advantage
brought of striking some great blow became more and more obvious;
about,the for the sake of consistency it was necessary to maintain
expedition
to Kabul peace on the Indus, and it was wisely resolved to make a
wisely and triumphant progress through Central Asia, and to leave
boldly conceived. Shah Shuja as a dependent prince on his ancestral throne.
The conception was bold and perfect; and had it been
iii. 423. The idea of taking the district from the Sikhs, either
for Dost Muhammad or his brothers, is moreover apparent from
Sir Alex. Burnes's published letters of 5th Oct. 1837, and 26th Jan.
and 13th March 1838 (Parliamentary Papers, 1839), from the Government replies of remark and caution, dated 20th Jan., and especially
of 27th April 1838, and from Mr. Masson's statement (Journeys,
iii. 423, 448). Mr. Masson himself thought it would be but justice
to restore the district to Sultan Muhammad Khan, while Munshi
Mohan Lal (Life of Dost Muhammad, i. 257, &c.) represents the
Amir to have thought that the surrender of Peshawar to his brother
would have been more prejudicial to his interests than its retention
by the Sikhs.
1 Such were Capt. Wade's views, and they are sketched in his
letters of the 15th May and 28th Oct. 1837, with. reference to
commercial objects, although the line of policy may not have been
steadily adhered to, or fully developed.
2 The extent to which this feeling was prevalent is known to those
who were observers of Indian affairs at the time, and it is dwelt
upon in the Governor-General's minute of the 20th Aug. 1839.