The intimate papers of Colonel House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour.

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

409

could reach them, but could not cut off the foodstuffs and
raw materials which the Germans received through neutral
ports and contiguous countries. Great Britain would thus
lose an offensive weapon of doubtful legality. But as
compensation, how greatly British defensive strength would
be enhanced! The disadvantages of her island position would
largely disappear, her food supply would be secure, and her
commerce with the far-flung portions of the Empire would
be assured without the protection of a costly fleet. Submarines would not be able to prey upon merchant shipping.
Under the principle of the Freedom of the Seas, the Power
with the most colonies and the widest overseas trade stood
to gain most.
So much was plain to Colonel House, although he was
careful not to whisper in Berlin that he believed the British
would win the lion's share of advantage. To him the great
irony of the war was that his proposal was so eagerly swallowed by the Germans, so scornfully refused by British
opinion.
The weak point in House's plan lay in the danger that an
unscrupulous nation, after accepting its principle, would
proceed to disregard its engagements. The British could
not escape the fear that Germany, which had broken its
promises in the Belgian treaty, was quite capable of agreeing
to the Freedom of the Seas and, after securing the partial
disarmament of Great Britain thereby, might embark upon
a wholesale destruction of British merchant shipping. To
meet this danger, House was insistent upon an association
of nations bound to unite forcibly against any nation that
violated its international promises.
The Colonel believed that the acceptance of the Freedom
of the Seas, as a principle of international law, was essential
to stability of relations between the United States and
European Powers. He also believed that the idea could be
used as a means to start peace negotiations between the