may define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations. Art. i. 8. And so, likewise, Congress may make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for car∣rying into execution, the powers of the General Government. But here is no reference to a common law authority: Every power is matter of definite and positive grant; and the very powers that are granted cannot take effect until they are exercised through the medium of a law. Congress had undoubtedly a power to make a law, which should render it criminal to offer a bribe to the commissioner of the Revenue; but not having made the law, the crime is not recognized by the Federal code, Constitutional or Legislative; and consequently, it is not a sub∣ject on which the Judicial authority of the Union can operate. So far the observations of the defendant's Counsel Judge Chase, who on that occasion differed from Judge Peters, as to the common law jurisdiction of the Court, held, that under the 8th section of the first article, which I am now considering, although bribery is not among the crimes and of∣fences specially mentioned, it is certainly included in that general provi∣sion; and Congress might have passed a law on the subject which would have given the Court cognizance of the offence. Judge Peters was of opinion, that the defendant was punishable at common law; but that it was competent for Congress to pass a Legislative act on the subject.I conclude, therefore, that the first objection is not maintainable.With regard to the second objection, which is, that this law is not war∣ranted by that clause in the constitution authorising Congress to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, the powers specially enumerated, and all other powers vested, by the constitu∣tion, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof: because, it is not necessary and proper to pass any such law, in order to carry into execution any of those powers—it is to be ob∣served, that, from the very nature of the power, it is, and must be, discre∣tionary.—What is necessary and proper, in regard to any particular sub∣ject, cannot, before an occasion arises, be logically defined; but must de∣pend upon various extensive views of a case, which no human foresight can reach. What is necessary and proper in a time of confusion and ge∣neral disorder, would not, perhaps, be necessary and proper in a time of tranquillity and order. These are consderations of policy, not questions of law, and upon which the legislature is bound to decide according to its real opinion of the necessity and propriety of any act particularly in con∣templation. It is, however, alledged, that the necessity and propriety of passing collateral laws for the support of others, is confined to cases where the powers are delegated, and does not extend to cases which have a reference to general danger only. The words are general, for carry∣ing into execution the special powers previously enumerated, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the Uni∣ted States, or any department or officer thereof. If, therefore, there be any thing necessary and proper for carrying into execution any or all of those powers, I presume, that may be constitutionally enacted. Two ob∣jects are aimed at by every rational government, more especially by free ones; 1. That the people may understand the laws, and voluntarily obey them. 2. That if this be not done by any individual, he shall be com∣pelled to obey them, or punished for disobedience. The first object is, 0