SEPTEMBER 14th.

THE Court met according to adjournment.

Major Dunn, Aid de Camp to General St. Clair, being sworn, says:

I arrived at Ticonderoga about the 18th of June, 1777. A day or two after my arrival I went round the lines on Ticonderoga, and found them much in the same situation as they were in November, 1776, except|ing the redoubts on the low ground, which were evacuated, and a chain of new ones erected on the height between the old sort and the right of the French lines. These were nearly compleated. In some cannon were mounted, and a party of fatigue at work on the rest. On Mount Independence I found a party of about 100 men, under the direction of Colonel Koseiuszko, erecting three redoubts in the rear of the Mount, and forming an abbatis, the old one having taken fire some time before, and was chiefly destroyed. One other party of about 150 men, under Colonel Baldwin, sinking a number of piers in the passage between the two posts. One other fatigue party, employed daily in bringing stores and provision from Lake George Land|ing. Besides these, Colonel Hay, the Quarter-Master General, had a party of Negroes, taken from the different regiments, as a constant fatigue, independent of the daily detail. There were two regiments of militia cutting logs for the piers then sinking, these were likewise independent of the daily detail, and exempt from all other garrison duty. All these parties of fatigue were continued as above, with very little alteration, till the evacuation took place. Being the only Aid de Camp belonging to General St Clair's family, most of the orders delivered were through me, and therefore I had the greatest opportunities of seeing all parties that were sent out; and after my arrival, I do not remember a day that parties were not sent out on the east or west, and frequently on both sides of the Lake Champlain, to reconnoitre the Lake and woods. Those parties consisted from 15 to 50 men. I do not recollect exactly the time the enemy first made their appearance on the Lake, but remember perfectly, after their appearing with their fleet at Split-Rock, that no party could be perswaded (because of the savages) to approach near enough to discover any thing of consequence. They frequently fell in with the enemy's parties, but were always obliged to retire. In this state we remained till the enemy landed on Three Mile Point, I think on the 30th of June; and on this occasion I heard the Ge|neral complain that his garrison was not in force to risque a party large enough to do them any damage. This occasioned the parties being reduced; sometimes not more than one officer, and two or three men, was thought the most eligible mode to discover the movements of the enemy. A look-out boat was also stationed between the enemy's fleet and the Jersey redoubt, to apprize the garrison of any movement in the fleet. On the enemy's landing at the point, the General ordered all the provision and stores at Lake George Landing immediately removed into the lines; the batteaus and boats to be in readiness to move to Fort George on the shortest notice. The enemy, advancing towards the lines, on the first or second day of July took possession of the heights between the landing and the old French lines. The boats were ordered to move to Fort George, and the troops posted at the landing and saw-mills ordered into the garrison, which was effected without any loss. The communication between the garrison and Lake George was now effectually cut off, the enemy being in possession of the heights in our front. Their light parties made frequent attacks on our picket, which consisted of fifty men, posted some distance in front of the lines. On those occasions, and every other alarm that came to my knowledge (and I believe none escaped me) the Ge|neral always appeared at the lines, going from right to left encouraging the troops, putting them in mind of the cause they were engaged in, telling them to keep themselves cool, and not to throw away their fire if the enemy should approach; that he wished for nothing more than a serious attack, and did not doubt but we should repulse them if they did attack. Such was the General's personal attention to the posts, and the movements of the enemy, after they landed at Three Mile Point, that I do not believe he slept one hour in four and twenty, on an average, till the evacuation took place. As to the quantity of provision I can say but little; but I recollect, soon after my arrival. General Schuyler's expressing great surprize that no magazines were formed at Albany, or any other place nearer than that, for the supply of the garrison. He sent Mr. Yancey immediately to the country, and pressed him in the strongest terms to spare no pains in ob|taining provision for the post; that if the enemy should come on, we should be reduced by famine; adding, at the same time, that the neglect of the Commissaries had been such, that he believed it would be serving the public to hang at least one of the department.—The following are the particulars I recollect respecting the retreat. About eight o'clock in the evening, July 5. I saw the ammunition and cannon removing on board the vessels and to Mount Independence. I was at this time ignorant of the retreat. About nine o'clock the same evening General St. Clair sent me with orders to General Fermoy, that he should direct all the stores, ammunition, cannon, baggage, &c. to be taken to the foot of the hill on the east side of the Mount, where they were to be put on board batteaus for Skeensborough. I returned, after delivering the order, to Ticon|deroga, and was sent by the General with orders to the Officer in the Jersey redoubt, to continue firing his cannon every half hour towards the battery the enemy were erecting opposite to the redoubt till further orders. About twelve o'clock the same evening I was again sent to Mount Independence. I found General Fermoy near his house, with his own baggage. I went to the landing, where I found Colonel Hay directing the loading the boats, with between three and four hundred men carrying down the stores, &c. but, for want of proper orders and attention from General Fermoy, every thing appeared in the greatest confusion. About this time they began to strike their tents on Mount Independence, all of which, I believe, were put on board the boats. At two o'clock General St. Clair left Ticonderoga, all the stores, ammunition, artillery and camp equipage from that side being removed, except the heavy cannon, which, from our small number of men and want of draught cattle, could not then be removed. All the tents and hospital stores, most of the am|munition Page  36 and light cannon, were also removed from Mount Independence. Some provision, I cannot say what quantity, and most of the heavy cannon, were left; all the batteaus and boats were however loaded. About three o'clock in the morning the troops were put in motion for the evacuation, but General Fermoy having set fire to his house (contrary to positive orders) which lighted the whole Mount, and gave the enemy an opportunity of seeing every movement we made, it damped the spirits of our own troops; the militia re|giments pushed out of the Mount in disorder, and were followed by a number of continental troops; the guards from Ticonderoga had also to pass the light, and rushed forward in confusion. The General at this time rode to the front, and obliged them to halt, and formed a line of march in rank and file, the roughness of the country and badness of the road permitting no other. Having effected this, he returned to the rear, which still remained at the foot of the Mount. It was near four in the morning when the rear began to march. Colonel Francis, who commanded the rear guard, followed immediately after, and the line continued in good order till we arrived at Hubbarton, where the whole were halted to refresh. The halt was near two hours. Most of the stragglers and rear guard having joined us, the army was again put in motion. The rear guard here was given to Colonel Warner, with orders to halt about one and a half mile short of the main body, which would remain that night at Castle-Town, about six miles from Hubbarton, and to march in the morning by four, and join the main body. In the morning the General paraded the army, and waited near two hours for the rear guard. About seven o'clock a firing began on Warner's party, and on enquiry found he had halted at Hubbarton. The General expressed his surprize that his orders were disobeyed. He dispatched myself and Major Livingston to order two militia regiments, that had halted between the main body and Warner, to reinforce him (these regiments were commanded by Colonel Bellows) and if the enemy should appear in much superior force, that Warner should retreat to Rutland, where the main body would be to cover him. Those regiments of militia refused to go up, tho' positively commanded, and afterwards intreated, by Colonel Bellows. This delay occasioned Warner's retreat to Rutland, where the main body received him. The militia regiments returned, and although myself on horseback, and three miles from the main body, they arrived there with me. I rode express.

Q. Court. Besides the parties you have mentioned on fatigue, do you recollect whether there was a brigade ordered for fatigue on Mount Independence about the 23d of June?

A. I do recollect there was a brigade ordered for fatigue on Mount Independence about that time, which was exclusive of the parties for fatigue I have mentioned.

Q. Do you know the time General St. Clair received information of the strength and designs of the enemy?

A. I do not know the time.

Q. Did General St. Clair remove any of his baggage from Ticonderoga at any time previous to the evacuation?

A. No part of it. His son went off, I believe, about a week before, but did not even carry all his own baggage with him. About the time General St. Clair's son went away, General Fermoy's baggage was removed from Head-Quarters to Mount Independence, he having lived with the General until that time.

Q. What distance is Split-Rock from Ticonderoga?

A. About thirty-seven miles.

Q. What distance is Gilliland's Creek from Ticonderoga?

A. About forty-two miles.

Lieutenant Colonel Livingston, Aid de Camp to General Schuyler, being sworn, says:

About the middle of June, 1777, General St. Clair (agreeable to orders from General Schuyler) took upon himself the command of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. A few days after I went to Ticonderoga, in company with General Schuyler. After being there a few days. General Schuyler found it necessary for the service to return to Albany, and the command in that department continued in General, St. Clair, with whom I had the honour of serving during the siege and on the retreat. Previous to the enemy's appear|ance before Ticonderoga, every method was made use of to gain intelligence of their movements and intentions. For this purpose scouting parties, properly officered, were kept out on the east and west sides of Lake Cham|plain. These parties were generally selected from a corps of rangers, who had been accustomed to services of this kind. The General did not confine his attention to the article of intelligence alone. No measures were neglected to strengthen the works on both sides of the Lake. Fatigue parties were daily employed in this duty, and the direction of them generally committed to Colonel Koseiuszko, an active officer, who acted as an assistant engineer in the northern department. The obstructions of the navigation at Lake Champlain was also attended to. Besides a very slight boom, which had been thrown across the Lake during the command of General Gates, large cassoons were sunk between Mount Independence and Ticonderoga, altho' this ar|duous work was not compleated when the evacuation took place. On the 26th of June, or thereabouts, our scouts observed an encampment of the enemy at Crown-Point, fifteen miles from Ticonderoga. From this time it became exceedingly difficult to procure any intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, as the woods between us and Crown-Point were so infested with savages as to render it exceedingly hazardous to send small parties that way, and the force of the garrison was too weak to justify the detaching a large number. Not many days after, I think it was on the last of June, the enemy's gun-boats appeared off Three Mile Point. The same day there was a skirmish between a scout from the garrison and the enemy. Our party were worsted, and obliged to retire with a little loss. A considerable body of the enemy then took possession of Mount-Hope. This height commanded the road between Ticonderoga and the North Landing of Lake George. It had been fortified by us the preceding year, but was dismantled long before General St. Clair's arrival in that quarter. The old block-house at the north end of Lake George was still in our hands. A subaltern's guard was left in it, to protect the public stores which were lying at that landing. The enemy did not suffer this officer to remain long in peaceable possession; they attacked him with small arms, and were repulsed. The General, aware of the dangerous situation of the block-house, and that the small garrison there must soon be overpowered by numbers, or be obliged to submit on the appearance of artillery, judged it necessary to order them within the lines. This was effected just in time, and without loss. The Communication between Ticonderoga and Lake George, by the main road, was now entirely cut off, which rendered it impracticable to bring the stores from the Lake within the fort. There was now Page  37 great danger of their falling into the enemy's hands. To prevent a loss of this kind, the General ordered the stores to be immediately put on board the batteaus, and carried back to Fort George, on the south side of the Lake. This service was executed without loss, and no further communication possible between Ticon|deroga and the country by the way of Lake George. The enemy continued to make their approaches on the Ticonderoga side of the Lake. It was impossible, from the weakness of the garrison, and the great extent of works we had to defend, to give them much interruption in their approaches. But the movement of the enemy, which gave the greatest alarm to the garrison, was the very rapid progress they made in clearing a road, and getting artillery on Sugar Hill or Mount Defiance. This proceeding was the more surprising, as it had been in agitation during the command of General Gates (in the fall of 1776, after our misfortune on Lake Champlain, when an attack on Ticonderoga was daily apprehended) to occupy that height with artil|lery, but was judged to be impracticable. This hill had such an entire command of Ticonderoga, that the enemy might have counted our very numbers, and enfiladed every part of our works. After possesing them|selves of this commanding height, it would have required but a few hours more to invest us on all sides. This might have been effected by only occupying the ground on the east side of Lake Champlain below Mount Independence, where the pass from the Lake to East Creek is very narrow. Had this taken place, our com|munication with the country had been at an end, no further supplies of provision or men could have reached us, nor would a retreat, in case of necessity, then been practicable. But before this was effected, it was de|termined in a Council of War to retire from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. This resolution was entered into on the evening of the 5th of July, and very early in the morning of the 6th the troops left the ground. Measures for the evacuation were concerted with the greatest secrecy, to keep the enemy ignorant of our designs. The centinels within the works were ordered to challenge no person that night. This order I carried myself to the guards on Ticonderoga, though I was ignorant of the reason of such an order. The guns at the French lines were spiked; but, to amuse the enemy, the Jersey battery kept up a regular fire during the night. The General also sent me to the old French redoubt, which commanded the bridge between Ticonderoga and the Mount, to order the officer commanding the artillery there not to spike the guns in that redoubt until further orders, as this redoubt might have been of service in covering our troops on their passage across the bridge; but I found that through some mistake those guns had already been spiked. What stores it was possible to remove in the course of one night, or rather in the space of a few hours, were put on board the vessels and batteaus in Lake Champlain, and sent for Skeensborough under Colonel Long, with the invalids and sick of the hospital. Many barrels of powder, in particular, I remember were taken from the magazine, and put on board the vessels, though they afterwards fell into the enemy's hands, or were blown up. The remainder of the army, under General St. Clair himself, retired by land. The rear guard was under the command of Colonel Francis. The army the first day reached Castle-Town, about thirty miles from Mount Independence. We made a halt of between one and two hours at Hubbarton, twenty odd miles from the same place. Before our leaving that town, the General ordered the rear guard to halt a mile or two short of Castle-Town, where he intended to stay with the army that night. The General had no reason to doubt but these orders would have been attended to, and therefore was not a little surprised to find early the next morning that the rear guard was still at Hubbarton, which is six miles distant from Castle-Town. At this distance from the army, they were attacked by General Frazer's corps. The rear guard was increased by many who at first did not belong to it. This was owing to the excessive bad roads and very heavy march|ing, which prevented many, who were more feeble than others, from keeping pace with their regiments. These were picked up by the rear guard, agreeable to orders. At the time of the engagement, I imagine it could not amount to less than 1000 men. The moment the firing was heard at Castle-Town, the General determined to support the rear guard at Hubbarton. The troops at Castle-Town were already under arms, and ready to march when the firing was first heard. They were then ordered to keep their ground, and Major Dunn and myself were dispatched with orders from the General to Colonel Bellows, who lay with his and another militia regiment between Castle-Town and Hubbarton. Our orders were to direct Colonel Bellows to march with those two regiments immediately to the assistance of Colonel Francis, and to assure Colonel Bel|lows at the same time that they should be farther supported, if necessary. In riding towards Hubbarton we were met by these regiments which were marching with speed towards Castle-Town. We delivered our orders, but could not prevail upon either regiment to reinforce the rear guard; though, in justice to Colonel Bellows, it must be said, he was in the rear of the regiment, and warmly persuaded them to go to the field of action. an unaccountable panic had seized his men, and no commands or intreaties had any effect on them. Finding it impossible to turn these regiments to this necessary piece of service, we rode on towards the seene of action, to find how matters were situated there, and report to the General; but we had not proceeded far before we were met by Capt. Chadwick, with about 30 men. Capt. Chadwick had just left the field, and informed us that the action was at an end, that our men were dispersed, that the communication between us and Hubbarton was cut on, so that we should run the greatest risque of being made prisoners if we proceeded any further that way, and that the enemy were in possession of the field of battle, in great force. The firing (which had heen very smart) having ceased, countenanced this intelligence, and we returned to Castle-Town and ap|prized the General of it. General St. Clair now thought it unnecessary to send any further reinforcement to Hubbarton, and prepared to pursue his march. But here I must not forget to mention the conduct of the General towards two eastern regiments of militia, commanded, I believe, by Hale and Learned. These regiments had shewed much discentent on the march the preceding day, and began now to be very cla|morous to be dismissed. The General, apprized of this spirit of discontent in these regiments, ordered them to be paraded at Castle-Town, on the morning of the action at Hubbarton, and addressed them in person. He spoke on this occasion in so forcible and pathetic a manner, that the regiments, ashamed of their con|duct, consented to remain with the army as long as there was any prospect of immediate danger from the enemy; but the plundering disposition they discovered on the march, and their other disorderly behaviour, obliged the General a day or two afterwards to dismiss them from the army with disgrace. The army after this continued their route through several towns, east of Castle-Town, without any further interruption from the enemy, to Hudson's River. I am very well perswaded that it was General St. Clair's intention at first to have marched by Skeensborough to Fort Edward; but an officer of one of our gallies on the Lake arrived Page  38 at Castle-Town before we left it, and informed the General that the enemy were pursuing in force that way, who would reach Skeensborough before he could possibly get there, and that some vessels had already fallen into their power. This determined the General to change his intended route, and take the road he after|wards did. Before we reached Hudson's River, General St. Clair dispatched me to inform General Schuyler of the situation of his army. So far as I had an opportunity of observing General St. Clair's conduct, it reflects high honour on him. Previous to, during the siege, and on the retreat, he gave proofs of his atten|tion, activity and courage. The garrison were always under arms at their proper posts before sun-rise, and frequently before day-break. The General was always out on these occasions himself, and was an example of vigilance to the soldiery. I do not remember, tho' I lived in the same quarters with him the greater part of the time during the siege, that he ever undressed himself at night. All night, indeed, he would scarcely ever permit himself to sleep. If he did, it was not above an hour or two, tho' the gentlemen about him would frequently observe that he would certainly injure his health unless he indulged himself with more sleep. In case of alarms, which were very frequent, he always appeared at the lines, encouraging the soldiery by his presence and exhortations. On the retreat, he preserved as much order in the army as was possible thro' such bad roads, and so rough a country.

Q. Do you know the time General St. Clair received information of the strength and designs of the enemy?

A. I do not.

Major General St. Clair, having concluded the testimony in his behalf, desires the Court to give him time to make his defence.

The Court, taking into consideration the General's desire, do give him till the 21st instant for that purpose.

The Court adjourn till the 21st instant.