A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 28.

T. H. FOurthly, that those actions, which man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be volun∣tary, and done upon choise and election. So that voluntary action, and action proceeding from ele∣ction, is the same thing. And that of a volunta∣ry Agent, 'tis all one to say he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.

J. D. THis short Section might pass without an ani∣madversion but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act. A free act is onely that which proceeds from the free election of the rationall will after deliberation, but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or election, is truly voluntary. The other thing observable is his conclusion, that it is all one to say, a man is free, and to say, he hath

not made an end of deliberating. Which confes∣sion of his, overturnes his whole structure of ab∣solute necessity, for if every Agent be necessitated to act what he doth act by a necessary and na∣turall flux of extrinsecall causes, then he is no more free before he deliberates, or whilest he de∣liberates, than he is after, but by T. H. his con∣fession here, he is more free, whilest he delibe∣rates, than he is after; And so after all his flou∣rishes, for an absolute or extrinsecall necessity, he is glad to fit himself down, and rest conten∣ted with an hypotheticall necessity, which no man ever denied or doubted of. Ascribing the necessitation of a man in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thought, Numb. 25. what is this to a naturall and speciall influence of extrinsecall causes. A∣gain, Liberty (saith he) is an absence of extrin∣secall impediments, but deliberation doth pro∣duce no new extrinsecall impediments, there∣fore (let him chose which part he will) either he is free after deliberation, by his own doctrine, or he was not free before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce an hy∣potheticall necessity, that the event be such as the understanding hath directed, and the will ele∣cted. But forasmuch as the understanding might have directed otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, this is far from an absolute necessity. Neither doth liberty respect onely future acts, but present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the world. In the same instant where∣in

the will elects it is free, according to a priori∣ty of Nature, though not of time, to elect other∣wise. And so in a divided sense, the will is free, even whilest it acts, though in a compoun∣ded sense it be not free. Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.