A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 13.

J. D. Proofs of Liberty drawn from reason.

[argument 1] THe first argument is Herculeum or Baculinum, drawn from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man; The servant had commit∣ted some pettilarceny, and the master was cud∣gelling him well for it; The servant thinks to creep under his masters blind-side, and pleades for himself; That the necessity of destiny did com∣pell him to steal. The master answers, the same necessity of destiny compells me to beat thee. He that denies liberty is fitter to be refuted with rodds, than with arguments, untill he confess that it is free for him that beates him either to continue striking, or to give over, that is, to have true liberty.

T. H. OF the Arguments from reason, the first is, that which he saith, is drawn from Zenos beating of his man which is therefore called Ar∣gumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The story is this, Zeno held that all actions were necessary, His man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it. To avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that mainteined, but he that derided the necessity of things was beaten, contra∣ry to that he would infer; And the argument

was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

J. D. WHether the argument be withdrawn from the story, or the answer withdrawn from the argument, let the Reader judge. T. H. mi∣stakes the scope of the reason, the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno, a rigid Stoick, which is not worth a button in this cause; Nor in the servants being an ad∣versary to Stoicall necessity, for it appeares not out of the story, that the servant did deride ne∣cessity, but rather that he pleaded it in good ear∣nest for his own justification. Now in the suc∣cess of the fray, we were told even now, that no power doth justifie an action, but onely that which is irresistible. Such was not Zenos. And therefore it advantageth neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno, nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff out of his ma∣sters hand and beaten him soundly, would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the master? that the necessity of destiny did compell him to strike again. Had not Zeno smarted justly for his Paradox? And might not the spectators well have taken up the Judges Apothegm, concerning the dispute between Co∣rax and his Schollar, An ill egg of an ill bird? But the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great Champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence but with a cudgell. No man (saith the servant) ought to be beaten

for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. If a strong man shall take a weak mans hand per∣force, and do violence with it to a third per∣son, he whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he only culpable who compelled him. The mi∣nor was Zenos own doctrine; what answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? very learnedly he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant, telling him in effect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten. And partly, in the evident absurdity of such an opinion which deserves not to be confu∣ted with reasons, but with rods. There are four things, said the Philosoher, which ought not to be called into question, First, such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt; as whether the soul be immortall, whether there be a God, such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but cast into the sea, with a millstone about his neck, as unworthy to breath the aire, or to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are above the capacity of reason; as among Christians, the my∣stery of the holy Trinity. Thirdly, such prin∣ciples as are evidently true; as that two and two are foure in Arithmetick, that the whole is greater than the part in Logick. Fourthly, such things as are obvious to the senses; as whether the snow be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied motion, to be beaten

untill he recanted. So he who denies all li∣berty from necessitations, should be scourged untill he become an humble suppliant to him that whips him, and confess, that he hath power, either to strike, or to hold his hand.