Aut Deus aut nihil God or nothing, or, a logicall method comprised in twelve propositions, deducing from the actual being of what we evidently experience, the unavoidable necessity of a God, against the atheists of our age and nation / by Vincent Hattecliffe.

The fifth Proposition Amongst all things which alwayes have been, are now, and ever shall be, there must be some (I determine not yet whether one or more) which is absolutely, and es∣sentially necessary, and not produced by any different cause; that is, to which it is es∣sential to be in actual being, and so cannot

but be from all eternity to all eternity; the same without the least change or al∣teration.

Proof.

IF there were no such essential necessa∣ry being as this, there could never either have been, be now, or ever hereaf∣ter be any thing in actual being; but there alwayes hath been is now, and ever shall be something in actual being, as is already proved. Ergo.

I prove the major, or first Proposition. Whatsoever is not essentially an actual being, cannot be of it self; for were it of it self, it must be of its own essence, or essentially; for the essence of a thing is nothing really, but the thing it self. Seeing therefore it cannot be of it self, whensoever it is, it must be from some∣thing else, that is, from some cause; now if that cause be not essentially of it self, it requires as much another cause, to have an actual being, as the former re∣quired it; and so there will be no settle∣ment

nor firm foundation in causing, till one come to some cause which proceeds not from any other, but is essentially of it self: but every thing which is unset∣tled in it self, that it may have consisten∣cy, must have its firmness and foundation from something, which is in it self firm and constant; for other wise it destroyes it self, and falls to nothing: therefore see∣ing that every cause which is not essenti∣ally from it self, is as unsettled, and in∣firm in causing, as was the first cause men∣tioned in this Argument; there must ne∣cessarily be found some cause essentially from it self, to give firmness, as a foun∣dation to all the rest: And to put a con∣catenation in dependency of causes and effects, without such a firm cause as this, would be as foolish and absurd, as to put a wall of stones, one holding up an∣other in the air, without any firm foun∣dation, whereon some of them are to rest and stand. Neither will the infinite pro∣gress in multiplying contingent, or cau∣sed causes without end, help the matter:

For as a wall composed of infinite stones, one holding up another, without a foun∣dation, would be as absurd, as if it con∣sisted of a finite and determinate number of stones; so will it be in this infinite progress in causes, without being sup∣ported by a necessary existent cause; and there will be no other difference save this, that the one will be onely a finite, but the other an infinite absurdity. Nay, as the now instanced Wall would not be onely absurd, but a mere Chymera, and fiction of the Brain, unless it were su∣stained by some power able to supply the want of a foundation; for otherwise it would fall down as fast as it is builded up, and never come to have any frame of a Wall in it: So the fore-mentioned contingent causes and effects, would not onely be inept and foolish, but wholly implicatory, and impossible: seeing in the former supposition there is nothing pos∣sible, which can supply the absence of that essential actual being, which is to give firmness to all contingent causes, as

their foundation in causing; and conse∣quently all things would be impossible, and it would imply a contradiction that any thing should ever be put in actual be∣ing: But that is manifestly false; for it is made evident, that something is now in a∣ctual being, therefore there is some actual being essentially necessary. Neither will it any way darken the light of this Pro∣position, if denying all contingency, one should say, that every thing proceeds by fatal necessity, and by an inevitable, and essential exigency one from another in their different successive durances, for such a determinate measure of time: (as hath been above touched, and shall hereafter be examined) For seeing even in this supposition every thing hath its necessity from its causes, and nothing from it self, or of it self, it will be as ridicu∣lous, and implicatory a supposition, as the former supposing contingency. For Exempligratiâ, the effect A, will have no necessity of being now, but from the cause B; nor the cause B, but from its

cause C, and so each will be necessary de∣pendently of another cause; therefore un∣less there be found a cause independent of all others, and having a necessary be∣ing essentially from it self, it will be a collection of causes and effects, hanging one upon another, like the stones of a Wall in the air, without all ground or foundation; and therefore as absurd, and implicatory as the former. Whatso∣ever Systeme therefore be put of causes and effects, the truth of this fifth Pro∣position stands firm, and immoveable, that amongst all things in actual being, &c. there must be something essentially necessary.

Yet to give it more strength and light, I will endeavour to prove that the Sy∣steme of succeeding subordinate causes, producing one another, without any cause improducible, (whereupon what∣soever cause that is produced, depends either mediately, or immediately) whe∣ther they have a contingent onely, or a necessary connection with their effects,

to be wholly impossible by this Argu∣ment.

If this Systeme be subsistent and so∣lid, then all Causes and Effects, that ei∣ther are now, or ever have beem are, and have been produced by a Cause; but that is impossible. Ergo, the Major is evi∣dent, as containing nothing but the sup∣posed Systeme; for whatsoever is pro∣duced by a cause, must have a cause pro∣ducing it. The Minor I prove. If it were possible, that all the Effects and Causes that are now, or ever were, could be, or have been produced by a Cause, then it is possible that they shold be all Causes, and Effects, and yet should not be all Causes and Effects that either are now, or ever were, but that is impossible. Ergo, The Minor is evident exterminis. For it onely asserts that both parts of a Con∣tradiction, all, and not all, cannot be true. The Major I prove. Whatsoever is conceived to be produced by a Cause, must be conceived to have a producing Cause; this is clear. But if all Effects

and Causes, that either are, or ever were, be conceived to have a producing Cause, they must be conceived to be all, and not to be all. Ergo, This Minor is evi∣dent, for they must be conceived to be all, as is now supposed, and affirmed in the Systeme; and yet they cannot be conceived to be all, for the cause which is conceived to produce all, will be ex∣cluded from the number of all that are, or ever were produced by a Cause. The force, &c. This Argument cannot possi∣bly be avoided, otherwise then by an∣swering that it proceeds upon a false sup∣position; for the number of produced Causes and Effects being infinite, it is al∣wayes false, to say all, for still there will be more, and more without end, and one can never reach to all. To this I reply, by demanding whether the Authours of this Opinion intend by this Answer to elude all universal Propositions de omni, concerning this number of produced Causes, by denying the supposition of all, by reason of the infinity of the num∣ber,

if it were admitted, exempli gratia, all effects and causes, that either are now, or ever were, are and were, either Corporal or Spiritual; all men that either are now, or ever were, are and were animalia rationalia, all bruits irra∣tionalia, &c. If they intend this, they take away the chief gound of humane discourse, by denying all universal Propositions, upon pretence that they proceed upon false suppositions, there being no such thing as All, in an infi∣nity of things proceeding one from an∣other, in every particular species of them: so, omnis homo, omnis leo, omnis arbor, &c. will be false suppositions, and consequently cannot compose a true proposition; nor will this enume∣rative argument be of force: Petrus est animal rationale, & Paulus, & Johannes, et idem de singulis aliis, ergo, omnis homo est animal rationale; for it may be eluded by saying I deny the supposition, omnis homo, all men; because all cannot be

said in an infinite number. If this be their intention, then they are obliged to give disparity betwixt these fore∣named universal propostions, and that proposition which I advanced, of all causes and effects produced, for this being as really and universally true, as the other, if the supposition of all be admitted, they must give a solid reason, why all causes may not be admitted in this, as well as all men, &c. in the other. If they should give this dispari∣ty, that omnis homo, all men, &c. in the foresaid propositions, is an abstract from time and place, and so supposes not to signifie all men, as constituted in time and place, as omnes causa product &, all produced causes signifies in my pro∣positions; for by omnis homo est animal rationale, is no more signified, then that it is the formal intrinsecal notion, or es∣sence of a man, to be a reasonable crea∣ture: I answer, that this is not a suffi∣cient disparity, for omnis res est produci∣bilis

ab aliquâ causâ, abstracts as much from time and place, and (in this opi∣nion which I impugne) is as much sig∣nifying the formal intrinsecal notion of every thing, as animal rationale is of homo, in as much as res in genere is conceived in order to its existency, or actual being: and hence, as from the intrinsecal notion of a man, consisting in animal rationale, is rightly inferred this Proposition, That all the men that ever yet were, were animalia rationalia, because the same essence is common to all, and every individuum of the same kinde, though this second Proposition abstract not from time: so from this Preposition, omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ, must be rightly inferred this, All things that ever were yet in actual being, were produced from some cause. Neither will it avail any thing to instance in the infinite series of things in possibility to have an actual being hereafter one from another, by

way of cause and effect without end, wherein it cannot be said, that all ef∣fects shall proceed from causes, or all causes shall produce their effects, be∣cause in this infinite series, there is no such thing as all. This, I say, availes nothing, for the comparison is not rightly instituted betwixt all things which have been, and all things which are in possibility, or may be hereafter; for those causes which have been, or which are past, though they be not now any thing themselves, yet they re∣main in virtute sua, that is, mediately or immediately, in the works which they have produced, and whereof some now remain, by a continual descent of causation, from their efficient vertue; so that the present effect (a) exists by vertue of the cause (b), and (b) by ver∣tue of (c), and (c) by vertue of (d), &c. so that the effect (A) hath so necessary a dependence immediate, or mediate, of every precedent cause in this line of

production, that it could not now be, if any of the precedent causes, how distant soever from it, had not been before it; so that from the actual being of any effect now, the authors of this line of produced causes without end, must confess, that a forcible inference is drawn, of the actual praeexistency of all and every cause of the said effect, either immediately or mediately, ha∣ving a necessary dependence a well of all, as of any one of them, as being a fruit lineally deduced from them all, which cannot possibly be true in an in∣finite series of produced causes; be∣cause in a number infinite, one can ne∣ver say all, as these Authors affirme. but in the instance alledged, of Causes and Effects possible hereafter without end, and so infinite; those which re∣main, and shall remain without end in the state of possibility, so long as they remain in that state, are a pure nothing, not having any being at all, neither in

themselves, nor in virtute sua; there being nothing in actual or virtual be∣ing, save onely causes able to produce them; so that they are meerly in poten∣tia causae, and no more, neither recei∣veth the cause any vertue to exist from the effects which it can produce; for that which is yet nothing, cannot give any thing to another thing: whence appears, that the instance objected is defective, there being an evident dis∣parity, betwixt the causes which have been produced heretofore, and the ef∣fects which may be produced without end, or time hereafter; for first from the effects which now are existent, by an ascendent successive line, a mediate consequence is forcibly drawn to all the causes, which by connected causa∣lities, have wrought the being of this present effect, which cannot be done possibly in an infinite line, even accord∣ing to the acknowledgement of these Authors; but contrariwise the actual

existence of this present cause, hath no dependence at all of all or any of the effects, which may successively proceed from it; but can subsist actually by vertue of its causes, though it should never produce any effect at all; and therefore there is no necessary depen∣dance immediate or mediate, betwixt the cause and the effect, as there is be∣twixt the effect and the cause; whence no forcible inference can be drawne, from the actuality of the cause, to the necessary sequele of all possible effects; and consequently, all the causes that ever have been of this effects, mediate or immediate, are demonstrable by this present effect to have had an actual be∣ing: but all effects which may possibly proceed mediately or immediately from this present cause, are not inferred from the actuality of this cause, so that all may be said in the one, but not in the other; the first therefore is finite, but the second is an infinite number.

If therefore the instance had beene rightly instituted, it should not have been put betwixt the effects which are inpossibility to be hereafter, and the precedent causes which already have had their actuall being; but betwixt the effects which may be hereafter, per posterius & posterius without end, and the causes which might have been here∣tofore per prius & prius without end. For both these are eqully infinite, inex∣haustible, indeterminate in potentia, and syncategorematical; for as descending from this present effect (A,) there shall or may be alwayes effects one after an∣other without end possible; so ascend∣ing from the same effect (a) there might have been causes one before another without end. But as the instance thus stated concludes nothing, that the pro∣duced causes have de facto prodeeded one from another without end; so supposes it some improducible cause, which might endlesly have produced

causes one before another, and before all those which it actually produced. Or if we turn the comparison another way, it should have been proposed, be∣twixt the causes which have had actual being, and the effects which shall have actual being, wheresoever they are in actual possession of that being, and then the instance had been of force; for as beginning from the cause (A) which now is in actual being, to all the effects hereafter possible, when they are put in actual being, the number will be deter∣minate, exhaustible, and finite; so be∣ginning from the same effects (A) to all the causes which have had actual being in their several precedences, the number will be exhaustible, and deter∣minately finite: the infinity therefore is onely conceiveable in the endless succession of possible effects, whereof all can never be in actual possession of their beings à parte post, and an infinite precedency of possible causes, whereof

all could never have been in actual possession of their beings à parte ante, which in effect is nothing else, then to say, that there is some necessary impro∣ducible cause, which could have pro∣duced causes one in time before an∣other without end, and can produce effects one in time after another with∣out end; and as this improducible cause can produce nothing so late, but he can product something which shall exist after it; so could it not produce any thing so soon, but it could have produced something which might have existed before it. Whence followes evidently, that there must be alwayes a first and a last, a beginning and an end, a determinate number, and so a proper all, of things which either have had, or ever shall have had the exercise of their actuall being: for the effects which are actual now, are the last of all actual beings which ever were be∣fore, and those of the next ensuing mo∣ment

shall be then the last, and so shall it be without end. Now if actual things have an end, they must have had a beginning; for an infinite actual time without all beginning could never have come to an end, because infinity is that which is without end: seeing then all actual time which hath been heretofore, is come to an end in this present moment, which is the last that hath been, or is actual, it is evident, that it had a beginning. Neither will it avail to say, That it is onely infini∣tum à parte ante, but not à parte post; for I answer, that such an actual infini∣tum, is a pure Chymera, that is a thing without an end which hath an end. And it will press as little, to instance in the imaginary moments of precedent time, begore any thing was produced by a cause, which were infinite à parte ante, and yet came to an end à parte post, when things were first caused: For I answer that those moments were pure

nothings, and mere fictious or false conceipts of our understanding; for time is nothing but either the measure of mutable things, or rather the muta∣bility or mutation it self: (as I shall declare hereafter) when therefore it is supposed that no mutable thing is in actual being, it is impossible to con∣ceive truly that there is any time; for those fained moments are nothing else, then that improducible, and immutable cause, which hath power to produce something actual and mutable, which should have bin before all other things which he hath caused, as the imagina∣ry moments possible to be hereafter, are nothing save the same cause, either alone or with other causes which can produce mutable effects after all those which shall have been actually produ∣ced; by reason therefore that this pow∣er of the first cause is without begin∣ning or ending, as being wholly im∣mutable, and so not measurable by

time, we conceipt that time possible in precedency, and of futurition, is com∣posed of successive moments.

Thus therefore having passed through these occurring difficulties, I return to my former Argument, and press it thus: All the effects which now are in actual being (even according to the adverse opinion) have necessary dependance, mediate or immediate, of all the causes which have preceded them in the line of their causation; therefore it is a truth and a proper expression to say, that all those causes have concurred mediately or immediately to these pre∣sent effects; but it is impossible that all those precedent causes should be produced by a cause, for then they would be all, and not all, as I have al∣ready proved: therefore amongst the causes which in the line of causation have concurred immediately or medi∣ately to these present effects, there must be at least some one which is a produ∣cing

onely, and not a produced cause, which is my fifth Proposition.

Hitherto I have only labor'd to evince, that such beings as are subject to con∣tinual generation, and corruption, and which by a line of Succession follow one another, in production and desiti∣on, must have had some improducible cause: some difficulty may yet remain in these greater and more solid parts of this Universe, as the Earth, Water, Air, Heaven, Sun, Moon, Stars, &c. for these still remaining (so far as we can judge by our experience) in that main substantial being which they ever had, may occasion a difficulty how they came to be. Forasmuch therefore as touches this present propostion, ei∣ther it must be said, that they are of themselves, and never had any produ∣cing cause, and then my present propo∣sition is in part afferted, that amongst all actual beings there must be impro∣ducible causes: or that they were pro∣duced

by causes successive one to an∣other, and all caused, which I have al∣ready confuted: or that they are causes one above another, and one producing another without end, and all actually and eternally existent, which I have à fortiori, evinced to be false, by my for∣mer Argument, against infinite succes∣sive causes; for it would be both an actu infinitum, and as hard to under∣stand or believe, as a first improducible cause; and it would destroy it self by being as impossible, as that of succeed∣ing causes, &c. Neither will the in∣stance of infinite divisible parts less, and less without end, in continuo, make a parity with infinitum actu. For first, that opinion is not certain: and se∣condly, if it be true, I answer, that parts whilst they are in continuo, are onely potential, and not actual parts, no nor entia actu; for nothing is an actual being but the totum it self, and

when that is divided, of one totum or whole thing, there is made two, and if each of them be divided, they be∣come two less totums, and so without end by each division, a new totum will begin to be, which was onely in poten∣tia before; for so long as they are in continuo, they are the continuum with∣out any beginning, ending, term, or determination, save onely the terms of the whole continuum; so that it is im∣possible to say the part (a) is of this de∣terminate length, bredth, or profundi∣ty, so long as it remains in continuo, for it hath nothing to terminate it, till it come to the utmost superficies or point of the continuum. And seeing every actual being must be determinate, and no indeterminate thing can be ens actu, there will be nothing actual in continuo, save the totum it self, or the continuum, because that onely is ens determinatum, having its fixed and determinate limits: so that in every continuo, there is onely

one actual thing, containing in potentia, many things, which by actual division may become acta less continuums then that is wherein they are contained; and so every continuum contained in potentia in a greater, will be less then its continent, when it becomes a conti∣nuum by a new division, and this with∣out end; there being then no actual determination of different parts in con∣tinuo, there can be no actual distinction of them; and if no distinction, no actual number; and if no actual num∣ber, there can be no actual infinity, or infinitum actu.

Thus I have proved my fifth Pro∣position, and have been something prolix in it, because it contains the mainest difficulty of the whole de∣duction.

Against the three last precedent pro∣positions may be objected, that there appears no contradiction, in constitu∣ting the essence of something not ab∣solutely

and alwayes necessary, but yet having a necessary and essential con∣nection with such a determinate term of time, v. g. that it have an essence requiring necessarily to begin its actual being in the determinate instant (A), and to continue till the determinate in∣stant (G), and the same is of so many determinate hours, dayes, moneths, years, &c. and this without any cause at all, but of its particular essence, or of it self: whence will follow, that one thing may begin to be actually in such a term of time, and then cease to be; and after many revolutions of time another thing may begin, and desist from being, in another discontinued portion of time, &c. So that a time may be given wherein there was no∣thing at all, nor shall be any thing, though there be something now in actual being. I answer, that such an essence as this, implies a manifest con∣tradiction, in our present supposi∣tion,

of no being at all: for supposing once that there be nothing at all, it can∣not be supposed, that there are any de∣terminate instants, or parts of time, to which that being can have any necessa∣ry and essential relation; for those in∣stants, or parts, must be something; and so this objection suppose nothing at all to be, and yet something to be, which is a clear contradiction. And hence also follows, that it is as clear a contradiction as the former, to affirm, that any thing essentially annexed to a determinate space of time, should be of it self, ab aeterno; for that limited eter∣nity must be presupposed to be actual∣ly, before you suppose that any thing can be actually and essentially annexed to it, seeing the actuality of no being can be essentially annexed to that which is nothing actually; for then something should depend of nothing: now I sub∣sume, but it is impossible to conceive that pretended not beginning, or eter∣nal

determinate time designed in the objections to be presupposed as actu∣ally existing, before that being com∣mensured essentially to that forenamed space of time, ergo. This Minor I prove because it is wholly impossible to conceive any actual durance of time, whether eternal or not eternal, whether infinite of finite, before we conceive something actually existent, which is a second sign of posteriority of Nature, we conceive measured by such a determinate space of time; for no part of time whatsoever, can have any other proper notion (if it be any reality distinct from the thing which dures) then to be an affect, and (as many think) consequently an effect of that which dures by it; both which suppose either the thing effected to be its subject, or the thing effecting it to be its cause; and by consequence, that thing to be in priority, and this in posteriority of na∣ture, in relation to it: whence it fol∣lows,

according to the common strain of Philosophers, that it can have no essential dependence of it in its actual being; for what is supposed to be actu∣ally, before the actual being of another thing, cannot essentially depend in its actual being upon that before which it is supposed to be actually.

Secondly, seeing that that which this objection pretends to be eternal, or ab aeterno, must have an essential relati∣on to this or that determinate actual space of time, for which alone, and for no other, it hath a necessary being of it self, and that ended ceases of it self to be any longer, I cannot conceive such an essence without a manifest contra∣diction; for it is impossible to conceive any thing to have an essential relation to be so soon, or in such a priority of time that no time can be conceived to be possible before it, if it continue one∣ly for a determinate space of successive time, and then as it existed (in his sup∣position)

of it self ab aeterno, so of it self it ceases to be in this or that deter∣minate instant of time. For in this supposition, that determinate instant will terminate a time which is determi∣nately finite; therefore from that in∣stant ascending, one may attain to the first instant of that time; and so that time will have a final and last instant, and consequently be finite, and not eternal, wherein no first instant is to be found. Seeing therefore (as we shall see hereafter) successive eternity is but a meer possible indetermination of one priority conceived before another, and that no indeterminate thing so long as it remains indeterminate, or as such, can possibly be, or ever have been ens actu, an actual being; it is also impos∣sible to conceive such an indeterminate successive eternity, to be any actual thing in it self, or any thing else, save the necessary and immutable power of some cause which can produce nothing

so soon, but it could have produced something, which might have been be∣fore whatsoever it hath actually pro∣duced; and if it had produced any thing before that, it could yet have produced another thing which would have been, and so in infinitum, without all term or limit.